market-economics

This book began life as the text of seventh annual Institute of Economic Affairs Hayek Memorial Lecture given by Professor Jonathan Sacks, Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregations of the Commonwealth in June 1998.

Dr. Sacks approach was based on a debate that Hayek had proposed in 1978 on the question of "was socialism a mistake". Although the debate never took place, Hayek prepared for it by writing a manuscript which ultimately saw the light of day as "The Fatal Conceit".

Beginning from the thesis that the Fatal Conceit's essential premise eas that for the free market or extended order to emerge, a certain kind of morality needed to emerge also. He develops his argument through a scholarly exegesis beforeutimately arriving at a conclusion that the free market has gone too far such that in effect it has become it's own morality and morals/ethics have been subordinated.

This conclusion is challenged by the the three commentators who were asked to write in response due to the reception received by the lecture. Dr. Sacks was also asked to write a rejoinder.

Norman Barry contends, if I understand him correctly, that markets bring about change and that morality must be adaptive and flexible. Thus the issue is not one of no morality but is one of the changing rules which come about ultimately because markets do not have a life of their own. They a rise through the interaction of people in a social process.

Robert Davidson looks at the role of traditions in religion and the necessity to test them against the reality of the world. In another illuminating passage he refers to the division of labor within society and argues that theologians have a role in giving people a vision of hope.

Michael Novak, takes a different approach by looking at what the world owes to Judaism, articulating the notion that it, as Christianity, is not a monolithic tradition.

In his rejoinder, Dr. Sacks takes the opportunity to clarify his position. He argues that he is not against markets, per se, but that he is against the extension of markets into all aspects of life. He fears that such extension will result in social disaster and makes the case that markets and the free society can only succeed within a strong moral framework.

The lecture was described as stimulating. After reading this collection there is clearly much food for thought. In this excellent little book there is much for all of us to think about.

Highly commended for everyone.

A very valuable resource. It includes all the relevant stats, and research to build a business case for increasing your ethnic marketing budget. If you are having a hard time getting buy-in from senior management for your ethnic marketing initiatives, this book is great ammunition.

Although our consulting staff does not deal in international direct response marketing, we receive many inquiries on this subject from around the world. We recommend this publication without hesitation. It clearly presents the many steps necessary to successful direct-market a product or service into North America, Europe and Asia. With interesting case studies, it answers key questions about creating effective sales messages, securing reliable international mailing lists, pricing in foreign currencies, delivering overseas, and receiving prompt payment. John R. Jagoe, Director, Export Institute.

A good introduction to neural nets and their applicability tothe futures markets. Provides mathematical/theoretical basis fortechniques involved in neural net training, testing, chaos and touches on nonlinear systems in general. Also provides interesting benchmarks of several nets against several time series. Great bibliography. Includes Fortran source code for running trained nets but not for training a net.

Lederman and Sullivan have crafted an insightful review of the High Yield market in the early '90's.
Contributed chapters from thoughtful sources.
This is a MUST own for junk bond junkies.

Everybody knows that the US economy is generating a lot of low-wage, dead-end service jobs. Now there's a book that knows what to do about it. This book is chock full of cheap, practical, useful ways of turning dead-end jobs into careers, linking jobs to training, facilitating employee organization. Should be part of the platform for Republicans and Democrats.

It is the definitive book. It taught me everything I need to know in this field. It covered all the relevant topics with a fair and unbiased perspective.

We have owned this book for years. While the information is somewhat dated (given the books 15 year old publication date) this is still the most authoritative tome on the subject. The book is filled with endless discussions of marvelous food shops, their quaint histories and the interesting people who run them. If you love food and New York, buy it!

Niche Strategies offers a refreshing and insightful way to understand and build a competitive retail marketplace in the downtown by creating a critical area of unique products and services, the identity of a downtown can be enhanced benefiting everyone.

This is a review from the Financial Times in London. JRB Copyright 1994 The Financial Times Limited; Financial Times (London) November 2, 1994, Wednesday By CHRISTOPHER HOWE 'OPENING JAPAN'S FINANCIAL MARKETS' By J. Robert Brown Jr. Routledge, Pounds 45, 272 pages ... The Japanese began systematic preparations to penetrate the western economies about 130 years ago. Serious, large-scale efforts to reverse the process date only from the rise of the Japanese trade surplus in the early 1980s. Given the linguistic, psychological, institutional and other barriers between the parties, it is not surprising that the balance of economic advantage in recent years has seemed to be so much in Japan's favour. Furthermore, although the west is beginning to catch up, at least in consciousness of the problem, the problem itself gets more difficult. For whereas the main challenge used to be how to penetrate the markets for goods, there is now increasing concern with the markets for services and with the obstacles to making a success of direct investment in Japan. J. Robert Brown's book is one of the most interesting accounts of these subjects yet to appear. Based on careful study of the literature and on more than 100 detailed interviews, it throws new light not only on the banking sector, but on the wider issue of how public and private sectors can interact in the process of market opening. A small number of western banks had established themselves in Japan before the Pacific War, including the old British Far Eastern banks, and Citibank, representing America. These mainly supported foreign trade and the banking needs of foreign companies in Japan. In the case of Citibank, at least, care was taken not to compete with domestic banks, on whom it relied for advice on local creditworthiness. During the post-war occupation, foreign banks had a new opportunity to re-enter the market and three prominent American Banks did so. Again, however, the foreigners were sidelined rather than integrated into the mainstream of the financial system, focusing on trade finance and short- to medium-term dollar lending. After the occupation, the Japanese government and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) resumed control. No new foreign entrants were allowed in for many years and a highly regulated financial system was established. In this system, Japanese institutions were assigned designated, highly specialized roles and the volume, direction and price of credit flows were each tightly controlled by an MOF with enormous legal and discretionary authority. The only way in which foreigners could be fitted into the picture was to restrict them to specific classes of business, such as foreign exchange, trade and dollar lending. Foreign banks acquiesced in these arrangements through much of the 1960s and early 1970s partly because their niches were exceptionally profitable. So much so, that in the early 1960s Citibank's profits from only four branches were larger than those of Fuji Bank, the largest of the Japanese City Banks. The other reason for acquiescence was that in the Japanese system, since banks rather than security markets were the main source of industrial finance, they were called upon to provide what was in reality a form of risk-sharing, equity finance, and were also expected by the authorities to provide both leadership and, when necessary, bail-outs for large companies. At the time, western bankers, with their short term, balance sheet approach to lending, found these practices unacceptable and hence were unwilling to undertake a lead role in company lending, even had they been encouraged to do so. All this began to collapse after the oil shock of the 1970s and the rise of US-Japan trade frictions in the 1980s. What Brown brings out so clearly is that liberalisation and market opening occurred because it was in the interests of both the western banks and the Japanese City Banks. Both sides wanted new instruments and avenues to funds and both wanted abolition of the old division between banking and securities business. The government had ultimately to agree to change, and all that this entailed, because of its need for large-scale bond financing to cover its budgetary deficit. Brown also shows that, although driven by these underlying factors, the occasion of the big breakthrough was the Reagan-Nakasone summit of 1983, when an embarrassing absence of business allowed the Americans to put the financial services issue on an unexpectedly high-level agenda. In spite of all the change and the formal steps towards liberalisation that have taken place, the longer term results remain disappointing. On the positive side, examples such as Citibank have shown that by taking a long view and making a careful analysis of the market, by a shrewd combination of conformity and innovation, and by good training and personnel policies, it is possible to make a success of business in Japan. On the other hand, the overall profitability and market shares of western banks as a group, remain very low. A fundamental reason for this is that there remain strong traditional elements in both the relationships between the financial system and the MOF, and between the institutions and their customers. Whether the political economy of the post-'Bubble' era will change this, or whether western companies will adapt even more flexibly to Japanese ways, remain fascinating questions for the future.