Strategy

First published in 1995 by Oxford University Press, America's Competitive Secret suggests how to utilize women as a management strategy. It was an excellent idea then and an even better idea now as globalization initiatives of American companies increase and intensify. In the Preface, author Judy B. Rosener explains that her book is intended for executives and managers "who want to improve their organization's bottom line, and for women who wonder why their career paths so often seem to be shaped by the fact that they are female." Note the reference to "bottom line." For Rosener, it is prudent to leverage the talents of professional women" inorder to create "more innovative, productive, and profitable organizations." Also, for male executives, the principle of enlightened self-interest is relevant to their own success. It makes absolutely no sense to under-utilize the talents of women professionals, especially as the global economy continues to expand so rapidly and extensively. Rosabeth Kanter agrees: "Whatever the duration and objectives of business alliances,...in the global economy, a well-developed ability to create and sustain fruitful collaborations gives companies a significant competitive leg up." Hence the importance of women.

As Connie Glaser and Barbara Steinberg Smalley suggest in Swim with the Dolphins, the female temperament is better suited than is the male's to concluding "win-win" negotiations, resolving conflicts, reaching consensus, preferring to cooperate and collaborate rather than compete, keeping an open mind, asking direct and relevant but not insulting questions, etc. Rosener describes the female temperament in terms of "consensus building, power sharing, and comfort with ambiguity."

She examines five "stages" through which organizations must proceed if they are to undergo the transformation required by new realities as well as opportunities: Stage One: Staying Out of Trouble Stage Two: We Need to React Stage Three: It's a Case of Survival Stage Four: It's the Right Thing to Do Stage Five: It's Part of Our Culture

Females as well as males within an organization will proceed from one stage to the next at varying speeds and within varying timeframes. Fair enough. However, all must reach Stage Five. Rosener recommends that, from both a strategic and financial point of view, structural reorganization "should be undertaken in concert with efforts to rectify female underutilization. Flexibility and diversity are two keys to competitive advantage, and both are closely related to the underutilization issue."

So much in the business world has changed since 1995 when this book was first published. However, many American companies and most companies in other countries have yet to take full advantage of -- and reward appropriately -- the talents of women. The companies which do so have a significant competitive advantage, a "secret weapon" if you will. Professional women know at which companies they will be appreciated and rewarded, where there are the greatest opportunities for their personal as well as professional growth. It is no coincidence that these are the same companies which, year after year, are the most profitable in their respective industries. At least until now, many of our nation's companies seem unaware of or indifferent to this "competitive secret."

The importance of this short but essential summary of economic thought in the late 1970s (the decade of "malaise") is critical to understanding the growth of the economy today. This book demonstrates the true power of an idea whose time has (and had) come--supply side economics. Jack Kemp, along with Jude Wanniski and Ronald Reagan started the revolution--pick up this book and see how it happened.

This book came about as a result of the public debate about the direction of United States trade policy. In September of 1989, the Brookings Institution put together a conference entitled An American Trade Strategy: Options for the 1990s. The three main papers presented at the conference each defended an alternative policy approach, namely multilateral free trade, aggresive bilateralism and managed trade. This tome contains revised versions of these three documents, along with the remarks of the official discussants of each paper and the comments of a panel of three experts. As a bonus, the volume also includes two introductory chapters in which the editors, Robert Lawrence and Charles Schultze, both affiliated with the Brookings Economic Studies Program, sum up and evaluate the strategies at hand, which, by the way, are spoused by Anne Krueger (free trade), Rudiger Dornbusch (bilateral trade) and Laura Tyson (managed trade).

Lawrence and Schultze, in assessing the different arguments and proposals put forth in regards to the aforementioned central issue of the book, first evaluate the two chief objectives -- improvement in the terms of trade and strategic industrial policy -- and then turn their attention to the various means suggested for their attainment.

Traditional economic analysis suggests that free trade is the best approach to raise global welfare. Given the importance of the US in the global economy, this country's actions are likely to have systemic repercussions. Protectionist policies by the US might prompt other nations into taking defensive and retaliatory actions.

As long as other countries help companies that produce goods America imports, the US gains. But if countries subsidize their exports to third markets or protect domestic firms against US exports, they can lower US living standards.

On the other hand, Dornbusch believes that the informal, mainly nongovernmental, barriers to imports into Japan have biased the terms of trade against the US. He claims that the negotiation of free trade areas with other US trading partners might put pressure on Japan to agree to trade concessions in the form of increasing its imports of US goods. Dornbusch is not explicitly concerned about the specific composition of US exports. Therefore, when he proposes the negotiation of numerical goals for the expansion of imports into Japan, he envisages an aggregate target for manufactured goods.

Tyson contends that some industries are more important than others. She voices two concerns: that market forces left to their own devices will not channel enough resources into the critical high-technology industries, and that the trade and industrial policies of other countries will drive US producers out of these key sectors and thus lower US living standards.

According to Tyson, there are three principal kinds of departures from the scenario of efficiently functioning markets that make some industries ''more equal than others'' and that warrant interventionist policies. One, because of the nature of their products and production processes, some markets are necessarily imperfectly competitive and can generate, for a limited number of firms in the world market, surplus profits (rents) -- profits higher than the necessary to induce investment in the sector. If a country can somehow secure a place for its firms in such markets, it can earn rents -- its capital investments would make more than could be earned in other uses. Two, some industries pay workers surplus (premium) wages, more than their experience and skills could earn elsewhere in the economy. Expansion of those industries will increase real wages and living standards. Three, the production of certain goods creates ripple benefits for the rest of the economy, that is, the benefits to the economy from the production of the goods in question are greater than the revenues earned by the producers.

In recent years the analysis of trade has moved to take into account the widespread reality of imperfect competition. The new trade theories suggest that in imperfectly competitive situations a country may be able to use government intervention to enrich itself at the expense of other nations.

However, the circumstances under which these monopoly-promoting policies might pay off are difficult to detect in practice. They depend on the behavioral features in the market, the degree to which other countries retaliate and the supply response of other firms to the government intervention. Moreover, the government must know the full consequences in the industries from which the resources are drawn. Redirecting scarce resources into a particular sector could produce losses elsewhere in the economy that outweigh the gains in the sector being promoted.

Since the ability of economists to estimate demand and costs' curves with precision is very low, to predict the response of other firms to the market changes induced by government intervention is lower still and to calculate the general equilibrium effects from the drawdown of resources elsewhere in the economy is virtually nil, there is slim chance that the government could know in advance whether any particular policy of subsidy or protection will add to or substract from national income.

Some have advocated using trade policies to enhance employment in sectors with premium wages. If what appear to be rents are in fact payments for skills, abilities or other characteristics of jobs, a governmental policy that subsidized the expansion of these industries could have damaging consequences, for instance, a regresive distributional impact.

The view that some industries provide productivity-enhancing spillover effects to the rest of the US economy lies at the heart of the arguments of many proponents of policies for managed trade. One unresolved problem is how are these industries going to be identified and favored.

Although published ten years ago, this book addresses issues that are still current. Trade policy is a topic that is likely to surface in every presidential and congressional election for years to come. In addition, there are sufficient theoretical concepts thrown around in this tome to make it a good read.

U.S. War Plans 1939-45 presents source material documents which outline U.S. war plans for the second world war, with introductory chapters outlining joint war strategy operations and the documents following. Libraries and individuals with in-depth collections on World War II history will find this an invaluable reference which assembles under one cover U.S. war plans and meeting results.

"American War Plans: 1945-1950" by Steven T. Ross is a detailed look at the planning that the United States undertook in the period from the end of World War II to the beginning of the Korean War in order to meet the rising Soviet threat, with a strong emphasis on the word "plan". If you are looking for a book on early Cold War politics, or even a look at U.S. grand strategy in the post-war era, this is not what you are looking for. Ross concerns himself exclusively with the military's contingency planning for open war with the U.S.S.R., and given the hypothetical nature of that planning, and the vastly reduced role in policy formulation the military enjoyed post 1945, these plans are exercises in threat evaluation, and generally speaking, not power politics.

Ross' work opens with perhaps one of the great ironies of the Cold War: by 1946 the U.S. military, arguably the most powerful armed force in history at the end of WWII, and certainly the most well rounded, had been gutted to the point that it was not only incapable of defending Western Europe, it was largely incapable of even slowing the U.S.S.R. down. At the same time, there is the puzzling dichotomy of a military forced to rely on atomic weapons to compensate for a lack of conventional forces, at the same time that they have no idea how many weapons are available, and only a dim view of their battlefield utility. Thus, the first plans Ross discusses, are defined by a complete withdrawal from Western Europe, and a WWIII fought from the Middle East. The initial phases of such a conflict would entail an evacuation of continental Western Europe, a reinforcement of Great Britain, and securing the Mediterranean theater of operations. At the same time, atomic attacks would attempt to pound the U.S.S.R. and its satellites into submission. In the final phases of this scenario, the Allies would drive into the Soviet Union from the south, through the Caucuses. This final element is interesting in that it draws far more on the maneuver theory so prevalent today, than do the latter iterations of the plan, which presage the defense in depth of later decades.

It would excessive to give an overview of each additional scenario, but there are a few developments in the following years that often define the remainder of the Cold War era. The first is that the arms race is defined at a very early date; aside from the use of atomic weapons, Ross repeatedly mentions contingency planning for the development, and presumable use, of chemical and biological weapons. Along those same lines, the direction of nuclear war was pretty much set by 1948, as the first target of atomic bombs became the enemy's atomic bombs. Thus, in the span of three years, atomic bombs went from being a decisive weapon, to a non-factor (although it wasn't recognized yet) as all battlefield utility (e.g. counterforce) had largely been removed from their employment. This likewise dovetails into the internecine strife that often characterized the service branch turf wars of the Cold War. In particular, the Air Force/Navy battles become apparent as the Air Force argues that atomic war is the primary task in any future war, rather than one of many. In addition, although it is never explicit, the refusal to mount a first strike becomes implicit in U.S. military planning at this point. Finally, Ross' discussion of the fears for terrorism and subversion in the U.S., including the use of unconventional weapons by Soviet agents strongly echoes the fears of a post 9/11 world.

Ultimately, the need to shore up European allies in the newly formed NATO brings planning full circle, as the Joint Chiefs are forced by political requirements to plan for the defense of Europe. This, when combined with the Korean War, finally begins the process of funding that will allow the U.S. to have at least a reasonable chance of defending Europe. Thus, in five years another full circle is achieved as the military is gutted to achieve a political expedient, only to be rebuilt in order to achieve a different one.

In the end, Ross has done an excellent job of compiling numerous primary sources into a through, cogent and readable volume. His considerations of budget constraints versus planning necessities serve as a constant grounding for the work, and his exploration of the challenges of atomic planning is both interesting in and of itself, and critical to understanding the development of America strategy. This is a must read for any student of the Cold War.

Jake Mohlman

This book focuses on the execution of strategy through the administrative infrastructure. It presents conceptual foundations for four basic management processes-coordination, planning, resource allocation, and control-as well as tools to assist process analysis and design.

This is an enormously useful book, rich in content and exceptionally well organized. Outstanding and highly recommended. Reviewed by Gerry Stern, founder, Stern & Associates, author of Stern's Sourcefinder: The Master Directory to HR and Business Management Information & Resources, Stern's CyberSpace SourceFinder, and Stern's Compensation and Benefits SourceFinder.

Not many books on military history dare to cover such topics as troop deployment and formations. Most works on warfare from these periods tend to assume that the reader would not be interested in such topics. Mostly what we tend to read are strategic overviews, strategy and helpful hints on how to win battles from the military top 100 generals. But how many books really tell us what was techically involved in depolying regiments on to battlefield. Not many. But this is one of them.

Mr. Nosworthy has performed a valuable service in helping to re-define our understanding of 17th and 18th Century warfare. The book covers the period from 1685-1763, showing us the important military technological innovations that would change war forever. Most noteably these were the introduction of the socket bayonet and the flintlock musket. While seemingly minor events by today's standards, these weapons would have far reaching influence on the battlefields of Europe and beyond. Their use forced a modernization of field tactics which would have profound impact on the battlefield. Any serious student of the period who wants to learn the nuts and bolts of how Marlborough and Frederick the Great employed their armies successfully needs to read this book. There are also interesting chapters about the tactical experiments the French army was conducting in this period which was destined to influence later Napoleanic warfare. Although out of print at the moment, keep your eyes on when this title might get re-printed. It's a classic of its kind and deserves to be in every serious collection on warfare. Try and and get a copy from any second hand source or just read it in the library!

As a professional fundraiser in a small-but-elite liberal arts college, I have found this book helpful to delve into the pertinent issues of our Annual Fund office. Ann Gee has edited 32 essays from noted development professionals that are arranged in sequential order. She starts with a fundamental overview of the Annual Fund, dealing with such basic issues as, "Why an Annual Fund?" goals and strategies, and implementing the planning calendar. Techniques covered include: printed materials, direct mail, phonathons, matching gifts, challenge gifts, events, and alumni directories. Also covered are programs within the AF, such as class agent programs, parents council, campus and community campaigns, student involvement, volunteer management, and the role of trustees. The book ends with several essays on donor benefits and recognition, and evaluation of the AF office. It's a valuable resource to me when I need a fresh idea -- fast!

Awesome Book! Useful, practical and research based ideas for all educators. It doesn't present short term "magic cures," however those really never work anyway. Instead the focus is on long term solutions for prevention & intervention with these tough kids. A must for your professional library (however, start saving those pennies, it is a little pricey).

This book was very useful in my clinical practice. It does a tremendous job covering drug information as well as methods for educating physicians about therapeutic information. I would strongly recommend this book for any clinican dealing with complex drug therapy literature.