Strategy

This book is truly amazing! You can teach yourself Calculus AB & Calculus BC with this book alone and get a 5 on the AP Exam..all without a teacher! Every topic on the ap exam is covered in depth in this book by an excellent teacher, and the sample ap exams are very similar to the ap exam. This book helped me get a 5! Definitely buy it!

This is very simply the best AP calc review book ever written. It is simple and fun to read--yes I said FUN. There are plenty of examples for each topic and each topic is exlained in a way where it can be actually understood. Ive seen the other books out there for this subject and they are nothing compared to this one.

I read this book a month before the actual exam, and i made a five in calc BC and AB. However, you do need to do ur hwk and understand the concepts in class. If you are shaking in few chapters, then this book will definitely help you master the important skills. GET THIS BOOK FOR SURE!!

As an avid investor and market researcher, I found Dan Coker's "Mastering Microcaps" to be the standard on investing in microcap companies. Unfortunately, while other books shed light on small caps, Coker goes the extra mile, producing 200+ pages of data on microcaps and how to select microcaps for possible investment. This is definitely the definitive book on the subject and I continue to enjoy reading Bloomberg Professional Library books.

This is a fascinating read...the entire Bloomberg series is fantastic but this book and Bloomberg's book on IPOs are great. The book points out valuable readings and web sites to utilize. I would say this book ranks up with the best.

I have always been interested in low-priced stocks. As a preteen, I used to look at the stock tables in the American Stock Exchange, where I found many low priced stocks, and pretended that I was buying and selling. As I got older I have remained loyal to buying low priced stocks, but only after much investigation. "Mastering Microcaps" teaches strategies that I have used, and many that I plan to use. Another very helpful book that compliments this title that has been valuable is MAKING DOLLARS WITH PENNIES: HOW THE SMALL INVESTOR CAN BEAT THE WIZARDS ON WALL STREET by R. Max Bowser. Both books contain strategies for stock selection, when to buy and when to sell. I recommend "Mastering Microcaps" to everyone who has a love for small companies with great futures.

This guide is great if your having problems beating the game or not. It has great behind the scenes stories and maps and a great walk thru. if you didn't know Mark H. Walker did the Ages of Empires 2 guide which is also great. If you have this game it is a must have and you should also get the soundtrack for Medal of Honor

Get shot? This guide is the key to the game. You don't even have to read the walkthrough. The maps are so in-depth. The entire guide is helpful. YOU HAVE GOT TO GET THIS GUIDE. If you don't have enough money than save, save, save! This is the must have game of the century. GET IT!

This has the best pictures, maps and everything else that makes up the perfect strategy guide. This was able to get me through the games' easily, with great detail, so no mistakes were made. I highly recomend this title to anyone who loves gaming.

Regardless if you are a pilot or not, this book is extremely helpful and filled with great tips, hints and solid information.

You can play Fs2004 without this, but if you really want to get the most of the simulator you should have it because have a lot of extra information. and If you like to fly and all concerned with aviation it is a good idea for your collection. 200 and more pages.

This is a really good companion book for the game. It compiles all important data into one place, and includes fun challenges that are instructional. I give it an A-.

First, to correct another review; this book was written in 1950, not the 1920s. Lasker's first strategy book, entitled "Chess Strategy" was written before World War I. The present book is an update of that timeless classic. If you have and love the first one, you still need this newer book. Lasker made corrections (rather, improvements) from the original, and he added new sections on more modern openings, such as the Indian Defenses, and there is a section on the Sicilian too, which was not in the original. Plus, there are 20 new annoated illustrative games, covering 60 pages. To this day, I have found no one who annotates a game for the intermediate player more beautifully than Edward Lasker. The only writer I can compare him too for instructional value is Jeremy Silman. Each has a unique and rare gift of being able to translate chess into ideas that are understandable to the average player. There are many chess players out there who do not know what a great and important chess writer Lasker was. His works are essential parts of my collection.

I have started to learn chess recently.It is therefore,not my size, to comment on the technical aspects of this superb classical masterpiece.I, however wish, such books are available on CD's with which may include,but not limited to algebric notations, reader controlled analysis, side analysis (auto) as mentioned in the book, novice to expert level computer opponent, print facility.

Although an older book's claim to being "Modern" can be disputed, Modern Chess Strategy remains current because of its emphasis on ideas and principles. Using lucid prose and numerous diagrams, Lasker - a strong international master-level player in his day - teaches the newcomer the basic principles of opening development, combinations, and endgame principles. What I particularly like is the author's no nonsense approach: he doesn't dumb down nor does he attempt to overwhelm with variations. One shouldn't be put off by the book's age (I think it was written in the 1920s): You're getting first-rate, world-class instruction for a bargain-basement price.

This book is not light reading. A good background in 20th Century military history as well as Clausewitz is necessary to get the most from this very impressive work. So why bother? What are the uses of Neo-Clausewitzian Strategic Thought?

In the post 9-11 world there is no better way in my opinion to understand the Al Qaida threat. Professor Gray published this work in 1999, but his views and methodology remain as important as ever.

The reason for this is that the grammar of war changes (the ways we fight it, the increasingly complex "elements"), while the nature of war remains the same. Politics and political goals have always been the core reasons for the violent struggle of wills between polities which we call war. That was true in ancient times and remains true today.

Following Clausewitz and Gray I think one could make a very convincing case that Al Qaida is waging war in three forms simultaneously-- guerrilla war, terrorist war and revolutionary war which all put heavy emphasis on the political. With this in mind our MAIN weapon against Al Qaida should be our foreign (political) policy, not an emphasis on high-tech, military responses against obscure targets, the resulting "colateral" destruction only hurting our political policy and playing to the goals of our enemies. Such are the nuances of Clausewitzian strategic thought, far from the "war-as-ideal Mahdi of Mass" strawman usually portrayed by the great strategic theorist's detractors.

Of interest also are Gray's appreciation of the contributions of John R. Boyd, his untangling of the confusion surrounding the term "Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), and his comments on the little known (or understood) impact of the Second Smuts Report of 1917.

In all this book is a great work in strategic thought of high intellectual merit. Of interest also is a recent article in the Spring issue of Parameters by Gray on Asymmetrical Warfare.

This is an outstanding contribution to strategic studies, a comprehensive placing of virtually all theorists and historians of war and strategy, and hugely thought-provoking. Yet Gray never forgets that practice is primary, noting the 'authority of practice over theory'.

He uses Clausewitz's method, defining strategy as 'the use that is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy': it is about objectives, effects. The nature and function of strategy and war are unchanging, though their characters change constantly. "Every war is both unique yet also similar to other wars." Strategy is in every conflict everywhere.

Tactics, by contrast, is the use of instruments of power in action. Strategy proposes; tactics dispose. "War is not 'about' economics, morality, or fighting. Instead, it is about politics."

Strategy's dimension are politics, ethics, military preparations, people, technology, time, war proper. Technological changes alter the character not the nature of war: "Technology is important, but in war and strategy people matter most."

Gray analyses strategy's components, its various environments, land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace. Seapower, airpower and spacepower function strategically as enabling factors: a war's outcome may be decided by action at sea, in the air or in space, but all conflicts have to be finally resolved on land, where people are.

He illuminates wars from the Punic to the Boer, but focuses mainly on the 20th century's excessive amount of war experience: wars between empires, still all too possible, and wars against nations, opposed by wars for national liberation and independence. He writes, "how truly heroic is Mao's message of eventual success through the conduct of protracted revolutionary warfare." Success can mean just stopping the enemy from winning.

We can check the quality of his approach by assessing the strategic conclusions it generates, despite his overmuch reliance on histories emanating from State Department and Foreign Office. He shows that bombing Germany before defeating the Luftwaffe was a costly error. He proves that the atomic bomb did not defeat Japan in 1945; Japan was already defeated. He praises the Soviet Union's prudent and successful practice of nuclear deterrence.

First published in 1999, this is an original tour d-horizon that is essential to any discussion of the theory and practice of conflict in the 21st Century, to include all those discussions of the alleged Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), the need for "defense transformation", and the changing nature of civil-military relations.

I am much impressed by this book and the decades of thinking that have gone into it, and will outline below a few of its many signal contributions to the rather important questions of how one must devise and manage national power in an increasingly complex world.

First, the author is quite clear on the point that technology does not a revolution make-nor can technology dominate a national strategy. If anything-and he cites Luttwak, among others, with great regard-an excessive emphasis on technology will be very expensive, susceptible to asymmetric attack, and subversive of other elements of the national strategy that must be managed in harmony. People matter most.

Second, and this is the point that hit me hardest, it is clear that security strategy requires a holistic approach and the rather renaissance capability of managing a multiplicity of capabilities-diplomatic, economic, cultural, military, psychological, information-in a balanced manner and under the over-arching umbrella of a strategy.

Third, and consistent with the second, "war proper" is not exclusively about force of arms, but rather about achieving the national political objective by imposing one's will on another. Those that would skew their net assessments and force structure capabilities toward "real war" writ in their conventional terms are demeaning Clausewitz rather than honoring him.

Fourth, as I contemplate in this and other readings how best to achieve lasting peace and prosperity, I see implicit in all that the author puts forward, but especially in a quote from Donald Kegan, the raw fact that it is not enough for America to have a preponderance of the traditional military and economic power in the world-we must also accept the burden and responsibility of preserving the peace and responding to the complex emergencies around the globe that must inevitably undermine our stability and prosperity at home.

Fifth, it is noteworthy that of all the dimensions of strategy that are brought forward, one-time-is unique for being unimprovable. Use it or lose it. Time is a strategic dimension too little understood and consequently too little valued by Americans in particular and the Western alliance in general.

Sixth, it merits comment that the author, perhaps the greatest authority on Clausewitz in this era, clarifies the fact that the "trinity" is less about people, government, and an army, than about primordial violence, hatred, and enmity (the people); chance and probability on the battlefield, most akin to a game of cards (the army); and instrumental rationality (the government)-and that these are not fixed isolated elements, but interpenetrate one another and interact in changing ways over time and space.

Seventh, the author devotes an entire chapter to "Strategic Culture as Context" and this is most helpful, particularly in so far as it brings forward the weakness of the American strategic culture, notably a pre-disposition to isolationism and to technical solutions in the abstract. Perhaps more importantly, a good strategic culture with inferior weapons can defeat a weak strategic culture with an abundance of technology and economic power.

Eighth, and finally, the author courageously takes on the issue of small wars and other savage violence, seeking to demonstrate that grand strategy applies equally well to the savage criminal and warlord parasites that Ralph Peters has noted are not susceptible to our traditional legal and military conventions. While he does not succeed (and notes in passing that Clausewitz's own largest weakness was a failure to catalogue the enemy and the dialog with the enemy as a major factor in strategic success and failure), the coverage is acceptable in making three key points:

1) small wars and sub-national conflicts are generally not resolved decisively at the irregular level-conventional forces are required at some point;

2) special operations forces have a role to play but lack a strategic context (that is to say, current political and military leaders have no appreciation for the strategic value of special operations forces); and

3) small wars and non-traditional threats-asymmetrical threats-must be taken seriously and co-equally with symmetrical regular conflicts.

At the end of the day, this erudite scholar finds common cause with gutter warrior Ralph Peters and gang-warfare iconoclast Martin Van Crevald by concluding his book with a quote from Alexander Solzhenitsyn: "In the Computer Age we will live by the law of the Stone Age: the man with the bigger club is right. But we pretend this isn't so. We don't notice or even suspect it-why surely our morality progresses together with our civilization."

Prussia gained ascendancy over Austria and thus dominion of Germany through the art of war by one of its ablest commanders, Moltke the Elder. With Austria defeated at the decisive battle of Koniggratz (1866), Prussia stood alone for the coveted leadership of Germany; therefore, when France declared war on Prussia (1870) to prevent German unification, ironically this afforded Prussia the opportunity to fulfill its destiny. Napoleon III intended to cut Prussia off from the southern German republics; however, Prussia called the other German republics to arms, not for defense, but for a joint attack against the French vanguard, in French territory. The French seriously underestimated Prussia's capacity to rapidly deploy its seemingly disparate forces into one cohesive whole. How did Prussia accomplish this epic task? At the strategic level Prussia was able to marshal all of its forces under one central command, but at the tactical level the subordinate commanders were permitted the greatest independence possible to take the initiative (Selbstatigkeit).

Moltke states that if one makes a mistake during the initial deployment, one cannot compensate for it later. As the forces evolve, the error propagates concentrically outward like a chain reaction, jeopardizing the outcome of the entire campaign. The French deployment during the Franco-Prussian war suffered from such deficiencies.

According to Moltke, during the decision phase the commander must champion only one perspective to the green table. Once he has arrived at a decision, although it may not be the best, his subordinates should execute it resolutely. The consistent execution of even a mediocre plan will more often lead to victory (in the long-run) than an inconsistent execution of a great plan; hence, Molke's maxim that 'strategy grows silent in the face of the need for a tactical victory'. Moltke states that only a layman believes that it is possible to foresee and predict causal events deterministically in war.

Moltke counsels commanders with one force just how vulnerable they are to envelopment when they maneuver their force between two opposing formations with 'interior lines' and 'central position'. This appears to be a trivial statement; however, one must realize that 'interior lines' was Napoleon's favorite attack maneuver, which he implemented so successfully against numerically superior but divided forces (See The Campaigns of Napoleon by David G. Chandler). Napoleon I succeeded because he adroitly maneuvered his one force directly, halfway between the two opposing forces, which effectively neutralized his opponents from acting in concert and from supporting one another. Then he would march to attack one of the two, but the other opponent had to march twice as far (to support), hence, Napoleon I could concentrate on defeating the first opponent and then countermarch to defeat the second opponent that arrived too late, thus, his single force fought as well as two. During the Franco-Prussian war, Napoleon III intended to implement a similar maneuver to cut Prussia off from south Germany. First, he hoped to defeat Prussia, alone, which would entice Austria and Italy into forming a triumvirate with him. Then he hoped the triumvirate would attack the south German Confederation.

During the Franco-Prussian war, Prussia was victorious in battle, but as Moltke says, 'at what a cost'. It seems to me that Prussia's losses were rather high, primarily because of their reluctance to change plans and to break off any engagement once it began. Then the 'peoples army' arose like a phoenix in the midst of the vanquished French field armies, which made the consummation of Moltke's final victory elusive. He could not pursue all the remaining military targets; therefore, he just focused on one-Paris. He surrounded the French capital with the preponderance of his remaining forces (150,000) because it was the only strategic option left open to him.

The commander should position himself with his uncommitted reserves to ensure that they are committed where and when they may be of greatest service; he should not be at the front with units already committed. He should send reserves to those areas where the forward units are already nearly winning, thereby, overcoming these areas of resistance faster, with fewer losses by their timely intervention. Secondly, he should endeavor to bolster tenuous positions or those that are in danger of being lost.

The attack has the advantage of dictating the course of events to the defender who must conform to them. The advantages are greater morale and confidence gained through the knowledge of the time and place of the attack. The best method of attack is to envelope the opponent with two forces. First, one must attack the opponent frontally with one force to pin down as much of their main force as possible. Then the second force must attack the opponent's flank. Moltke believed that both the frontal and flank attacks should be performed simultaneously, however, if I were attacking the flank, I would wait until it has been sufficiently denuded, since the opponent will be drawing forces from it to counter the frontal attack (i.e., feint). The flank attack is usually the center of gravity (Schwerpunkt), but the frontal attack may be the center of gravity as well. There should be a reserve element to cover the force attacking the opponent's flank. An example of precisely this method took place during the battle of Koniginhof (Austria, 1866).

This book is a compendium of essays written by v. Moltke that covers many practical aspects of the art of war with historical examples. Many of these methods are just as valid today as they were in 1860. Moltke writes very lucidly with great candor, which is precisely what one would expect of a Prussian Officer.

Count Helmut von Moltke was perhaps the greatest military leader during the period between Napoleon and the First World War. Moltke shaped the way that the German Army looked at war up until 1945. What was important to Moltke was not a set of rules or principles, but rather a way of thinking. Initiative and control were stressed, "when in doubt advance toward the sound of the guns". . . While he had great respect for the Prussian philosopher of war, Carl von Clausewitz, whom he had limited contact with as a young staff officer, Moltke rejected several of Clausewitz's most important concepts, perhaps the most eventful being the place of the military in strategic decisions made during time of war. For Moltke the military should simply be allowed to fight the war to the finish at which time the political leadership would be allowed to negotiate the peace. Clausewitz saw war as the continuation of politics by other means, meaning that political decisions did not end with the commencement of hostilities but continued. The editor of this book mentions several similarities including one that upon closer study is in reality another break between the two outlooks. Referring to Book 6, Chapter 8 of On War, he mentions that Clausewitz wrote, "that all strategic planning rested on tactical success alone, because only tactical successes could produce a favorable outcome." Moltke obviously agreed since he thought, "strategy grows silent in the face of the need for a tactical victory." However if one actually reads that chapter in On War one comes away with a different impression since Clausewitz's view is far more nuanced than that of Moltke. Clausewitz had experienced terrible defeat and great hardship during the struggle against Napoleon, having served with the Russians during the fateful campaign of 1812. It was the experience of that campaign which showed Clausewitz the importance of a Fabian strategy (denying battle, allowing an enemy to exhaust himself through exertion). Thus Clausewitz writes, "One may admit that even where the decision has been bloodless, it was determined in the last analysis by engagements that did not take place, but had merely been offered. In that case, it will be argued, the strategic planning of these engagements, rather that the tactical decision should be considered the operative principle. . . That is why we think it is useful to emphasize that all strategic planning rests on tactical success alone, and that -whether the solution is arrived at in battle or not - this is in all cases the fundamental basis for the decision."

Moltke, during his most successful period, could only see the winning of offensive battles as assuring strategic success. For this reason he developed his strategic sequence which combined mobilization, transportation, deployment, movement and combat into one continuous chain of events. Widely deployed forces would converge at the proper moment and destroy the enemy in a complete or partial envelopment. This worked well in 1866 against the Austrians and in 1870 against the French. His system seemed to promise victory in any war. He had taken the gift of fire from Prometheus and changed its very nature, or so his followers thought. Moltke himself grew more cautious in his later years, suggesting that only a partial success could be achieved in a war against both France and Russia, a political solution would have to be found for the strategic dilemma instead. During the period up to and following the First World War, most German military thinkers followed Moltke's earlier views while giving lip service to Clausewitz. Moltke was the more modern man, the technician of war for the machine age, while Clausewitz was a philosopher, belonging to another time and mode of thinking, or so it seemed.

Professor Hughes' book provides translations of various examples of Moltke's writings. I found Moltke's views on the training and duties of General Staff officers particularly interesting. The editor includes excellent commentary on various German military terms and the ways that they have been translated into English in the past, some rather confusing.

In all I find this book well worth the money and would recommend it to those interested in German military history, 19th Century military history, and military strategy and tactics in general, particularly the evolution of military thought. What seems to be missing is an edition of the works of Sigismund von Schlichting, who as Hughes points out provides the key link between Moltke's theories and modern theory.

The book shows von Moltke to be a prophetic genius. One wonders whether the German generals who joined the French and British in ordering lemminglike frontal assualts during the First World War read his works... he predicted the effectiveness of modern firearms during the 1870s. He also projected the ineffectiveness (or worse) of the United Nations and League of Nations (see page 25). Principles of management include acceptance of responsibility by a single person (p. 26) and delegation to the frontline manager (p. 77). Moltke's advocacy of delegation belies the stereotype of the Prussian Army as mechanistic and rigid. The book contains some echoes of von Clausewitz' "On War," which von Moltke undoubtedly read. Page 22 gives the FULL context of Moltke's infamous statement, "Eternal peace is a dream, and not even a pleasant one." (He continues, "... who can deny that every war, even a victorious one, inflicts grevious wounds on all involved?") -William A. Levinson http://www.pic.net/~wlevinso "The Crisis Manager"

A lot of praise is often given to books Chinese but this is probably among the best somebody should read when doing business in Mainland China. It does not only summarizes all of what you need to know about Chinese philosophy but compares the negotiation process step by step comparing between Western and Chinese methods.

Confirming information found in New Asian Emperors, a book talking about Overseas Chinese, it explains the relation between outsiders and insiders of the Chinese group. According to Confucian principles, relations with outsiders (the Westerners) are not the same than Mainland Chinese. Second it explains how Chinese are strongly integrated in their society and that any mistake will follow them all their lives meaning they do not have much room to make favours to outsiders but only to abide by the rules of their superiors and the group.

Chinese slice negotiations in 22 pieces and go step by step from A to Z negotiating each step in detail (forget about jumping steps because they will come back to it later and start the negotiation all over again), comparing the offer available on the market, playing market players against each other to obtain the best deals, reneging on their previous agreements in the negotiation if necessary to put pressure on the outsider. They also want to obtain as much information as possible and expect them to be ruthless. Everything is permitted.

But on the other side, be careful not too loose temper (loss of face is terrible and make any favourable issue impossible), use pressure when required (books explains when to do this), pull strings whenever you can and never forget information flow is never open either because Chinese do not want to explain an embarrassing matter and find excuses which have nothing to do with the matter or they do not have the power to decide and you should find out who really does.

Even after a contract has been signed, expect that you will have to follow up and negotiate again. Author explains the different cases you can encounter.

What Chinese appreciate above all is somebody which is tenacious. Their favourite proverb is 'You can move a mountain stone by stone' and anybody adopting this tactic will be considered a valid player. Of course you must see if the cost are really worth it for you or your company. Therefore China can only be considered a good market if ready to invest there for a long time. Once your reputation as negotiator (the Chinese way) is established, you will find that dealing with Chinese will be much easier, since the word will spread quickly.

But a reputation is linked to a person, not to a company. So when a person or a team of a company is successful, do not change this person or team in your dealings with China because once they are gone, so are the relations.

Thousands of good advices based on case studies in an easy to read book which will learn you more about China than any other one and save you months of painstaking learning experience and probably millions of dollars too.

negotiating China is clear, concise and full of usefull tips and case studies. Anyone who is thinking of doing business in China should peruse this little book.

The Secretary of State and all her cronies at foggy bottom would also do well to read this so they could figure out why they never get anywhere with the Chinese.

This 205 page paperback book is a must reading for anyone intending to go to China in any business capacity. Especially useful is a 4 page quick reference chart to Chinese negotiating characteristics. This chart is essentially a concise summary of the thesis of the book. The author makes it quite clear that it is extremely unwise to go uninformed and expect to successfully negotiate with the Chinese. Why is that so? Because of the dramatically different cultural complications, transference of negotiation skills that are successful in the west is not a given. Personal relationships and friendships are very important factors in helping to cut negotiating time and in helping to obtain favorable financial terms. Negotiations from the Chinese side will entail time and many people in the decision making and negotiation process. You should be prepared to exhibit great persistence for the long term. The author discusses what to expect during the pre-negotiation, the negotiation, and the post-negotiation phases. This book is an excellent reference for preparing yourself. Case studies and analyses review both successful and unsuccessful negotiations in various industries. Chapter headings are: 1. The Haggling Society 2. The World of the Chinese Negotiator 3. Preparing to Negotiate in China 4. The Formal Negotiation 5. Chinese Influence Factors 6. A Bridge Between East and West: the Overseas Chinese 7. Coming Out of China Crying 8. Working the Network 9. Taking Control 10. Stepping Back 11. Demonstrating Commitment 12. Conclusion

This is a review for an earlier edition (the one that has 300 favorites): what a wonderful resource -- we use it when the kids are stuck indoors after a series of rainy days, or when we have company (adult or kids). It has games for one, two, or many; board games, card games, word games, outdoor games -- you name it, the book has it. We like our, now dog-eared, book so much that we wanted to get it as a gift and we were very disappointed to find that it was out-of-print. Well, let us hope that the third edition is coming up.

I'm so glad I purchased this book. I've been looking at it for hours at a time since I got it. There's sure to be a game that everyone in your family will enjoy. Outdoor, dice, card (many variations, including solitaire games), stones, beans, shells, pen & paper, domino, board (some requiring special pieces, like Chess and Monopoly), parlor, travel, really old, and somewhat new games! Buy it if for no other reason than to settle family arguments about rules!

Got a big yard or park nearby and lots of friends? Play Capture the Flag, Touch or Flag Football, Prisoner's Base, Red Rover, Dodge Ball or tons of other outdoor games requiring little or no equipment.

Like word games? There's a section for those, too!

Got a little one who's lonely and bored? Teach 'em how to play various forms of Hopscotch, Jacks, Jump Rope, or Marbles.

Want a global, multi-cultural gaming persprective? Try the Mancala games, dreidels, or French Tarot games (these all require special equipment).

I bought it for the information about horseshoes, croquet, and bocce (lawn bowling). It gives dimensions for the playing area, rules, even a little strategy! I am not kidding you, this book is great if you have kids to entertain, or just really love a good game.

I plan to teach my fiancee how to play chess this weekend using the very comprehensive instructions this book provides.

This is a great book. The card games alone make it a terrific resource but then add homemade board games, dice games, guessing games, outdoor games for all ages children to adult, and you have hours and hours of fun in a book. The directions are straightforward and easy to follow. The games index lets you choose a game by number of players, complexity, time, and age level with notations for variations, equipment needed and a distinction between quiet and active games. Our family has learned many new games we had never even dreamed about - we even learned to play bocce ball with croquet balls! Buy it if you like to play games.

The New Teacher's Handbook by Yvonne Bender is a well written and helpful book. Although I'm no longer a first year teacher, my experiences with teaching lead me to agree with her advice in almost every case. I'm recommending this book to my student teachers with the following suggestion: This book is meant to be read.
Although thumbing through and reading headings, examples, and scenarios can be helpful, it is well worth the time to read The New Teacher's Handbook completely. It is written with humor and sensitivity toward beginning teaching problems and filled with useful teaching strategies. It does not insult young teachers as it is not full of pictures, platitudes, and large type. Charts and forms are informative and useful. It is certain to be a reference for more than the first years of teaching. I plan to keep and refer to my copy for a long time.

FINALLY! Here is a book I can only hope will allow new teachers to remain in the field without constantly asking, "Why don't they teach the realities of teaching in College?" or "Why didn't my college coursework and training include real life and not one in a PERFECT WORLD?" After completing the four years of college in order to take that first step into one's own classroom, it is so frustrating and defeating to realize that the picture painted in the job preparation is actually one of an idealistic and fictional world full of sunshine and rainbows of satisfaction. This book should be a required text for all student teachers beginning their experience in the classroom.

If only this book had been written 28 years ago when my career began! It certainly could have helped me to avoid some of the hard knocks of the realities of experience. One of the topics included in this book is the unspoken politics of the professional undefined hierarchy within the school, which I've never before seen addressed. The advice suggested for newcomers into the field can definitely allow for more positive personal relations and a less fearful, self-doubting or threatening working environment. This book contains answers and suggested solutions to so many real problem situations within the classroom setting as well as in the whole school environment.

Most teachers don't even realize they are not yet asking themselves the right questions when self assessing their reasons for the stress and anxieties they feel as they prepare to go to school each day. By the time one even recognizes and accepts that physical problems may exist as a result of the emotional traumas and strains of the job, the solutions are too far out of their energy level to attain. I have witnessed this situation countless times and it is often too late for the pieces to be put back together as one goes down for the third time......with defeat and resignation in hand.

If only The New Teacher's Handbook had been available to the hundreds of excellent and qualified professionals who chose to leave the profession because they felt they had no way to find solutions and alternative strategies and practices to deal with the challenges, troubles, stress and unspoken negatives of the profession.

Thank you, Yvonne Bender, for possibly saving the profession of so many new teachers who are just about to step over that glorified idealistic threshold into the den of reality. With your book as a resource and hopefully the advice and expertise of others who already have learned the HARD way to stay happy, satisfied and sane in the profession, the teaching force will have a much better chance of continuing to grow and maintain its qualified newcomers.

FINALLY! Here is a book I can only hope will allow new teachers to remain in the field without constantly asking, "Why don't they teach the realities of teaching in College?" or "Why didn't my college coursework and training include real life and not one in a PERFECT WORLD?" After completing the four years of college in order to take that first step into one's own classroom, it is so frustrating and defeating to realize that the picture painted in the job preparation is actually one of an idealistic and fictional world full of sunshine and rainbows of satisfaction. This book should be a required text for all student teachers beginning their experience in the classroom.

If only this book had been written 28 years ago when my career began! It certainly could have helped me to avoid some of the hard knocks of the realities of experience. One of the topics included in this book is the unspoken politics of the professional undefined hierarchy within the school, which I've never before seen addressed. The advice suggested for newcomers into the field can definitely allow for more positive personal relations and a less fearful, self-doubting or threatening working environment. This book contains answers and suggested solutions to so many real problem situations within the classroom setting as well as in the whole school environment.

Most teachers don't even realize they are not yet asking themselves the right questions when self assessing their reasons for the stress and anxieties they feel as they prepare to go to school each day. By the time one even recognizes and accepts that physical problems may exist as a result of the emotional traumas and strains of the job, the solutions are too far out of their energy level to attain. I have witnessed this situation countless times and it is often too late for the pieces to be put back together as one goes down for the third time......with defeat and resignation in hand.

If only The New Teacher's Handbook had been available to the hundreds of excellent and qualified professionals who chose to leave the profession because they felt they had no way to find solutions and alternative strategies and practices to deal with the challenges, troubles, stress and unspoken negatives of the profession.

Thank you, Yvonne Bender, for possibly saving the profession of so many new teachers who are just about to step over that glorified idealistic threshold into the den of reality. With your book as a resource and hopefully the advice and expertise of others who already have learned the HARD way to stay happy, satisfied and sane in the profession, the teaching force will have a much better chance of continuing to grow and maintain its qualified newcomers.