Strategy

This book has three features that I really like-

1)An intro chapter discussing typical middlegame plans, tactics, and various pawn structure that are likely to arise in this variation.

2)It covers many other sidelines such as staunton gambit, english, etc. that one is likely to face in addition to the main line.

3)It has a final chapter with "test" positions so that you can find out how well you have learned the opening.

Warning! This opening is not for the fainthearted! - If you like an all out slug fest where both sides "burn their bridges" early, and you enjoy putting maximum pressure on white's position-then play this opening.

Note: I have had pretty decent results with this opening. I am currently rated in the 1800-1900 USCF range and I find that many of my opponents are not terribly versed in dutch lines- they spend thier time preparing against the Nimzo-Indian, King's Indian, Queen's Gambit, etc. Therefore, an additional bonus in playing the dutch is that I have generally been more familiar with what's going on during the game than my opponent.

The books starts with a chapter on the common plans in the dutch for both sides, which gives you a jump start in understanding the opening. At the end there are also 9 strategical tests with the motto "How well do you understand the Dutch?", to test you and give you hints on what parts you need to study again. This book does a great job in explaining a difficult opening system to the point where it becomes close to being percieved as simple.

If you are planning on playing the dutch you must buy this book!

This book avoids both of these shortcomings. It gives a reasonably large number of variations - anything worthwhile/likely to be played by white, AND detailed explanations regarding the strategies behind the moves. The variations are all supported by games of leading players. The book is well written and easy to read.

Importantly, it clearly points out some of the pitfalls to be aware of in playing this opening.

It also provides brief but insightful annotations to a large number of complete games, adding value beyond simply opening theory.

Thoroughly recommended.

The authors examine the natures of military revolutions and RMA (a very hot topic that has arguably produced more hot air than substance) and provide a number of case studies examining the issues and testing the authors' views through history.

The case studies are;

- The English in the 14th century
- 17th century France
- The French Revolution
- The American Civil War
- The Prussian RMA, 1840-1871
- The Battlefleet Revolution
- The First World War
- Blitzkrieg 1940

The various case studies are backed up by an extremely satisfying introduction and a thorough, well argued conclusion which fires one or two shots across the bows of those residents of the Pentagon who may be suffering from technology-centric tunnel vision. The authors (very distinguished bunch, it should be said) warn against the idea that Clausewitzian truths regarding such issues as friction can be discounted thanks to the wonders of technology and indeed make clear that they are as important as ever.

The various case studies work extremely well as concise stand-alone works on their various historical periods, even if RMA is not your hot topic. Especially good are the chapters on the English in the 14th century and on the Battlefleet Revolution (and the inner workings of the Imperial German Navy and the Royal Navy during this period).

This is a well written, interesting book which should annoy all the right people.

This is the only serious book I have been able to find that addresses revolutions in military affairs with useful case studies, a specific focus on whether asymmetric advantages do or do not result, and a very satisfactory executive conclusion. This book is strongly recommended for both military professionals, and the executive and congressional authorities who persist in sharing the fiction that technology is of itself an asymmetric advantage.

It merits emphasis that the author's first conclusion, spanning a diversity of case studies, is that technology may be a catalyst but it rarely drives a revolution in military affairs--concepts are revolutionary, it is ideas that break out of the box.

Their second conclusion is both counter-intuitive (but based on case studies) and in perfect alignment with Peter Drucker's conclusions on successful entrepreneurship: the best revolutions are incremental (evolutionary) and based on solutions to actual opponents and actual conditions, rather than hypothetical and delusional scenarios of what we think the future will bring us. In this the authors mesh well with Andrew Gordon's masterpiece on the rules of the game and Jutland: we may be best drawing down on our investments in peacetime, emphasizing the education of our future warfighters, and then be prepared for massive rapid agile investments in scaling up experimental initiatives as they prove successful in actual battle.

The book is noteworthy for its assault on fictional scenarios and its emphasis on realism in planning--especially valuable is the authors' staunch insistence that only honesty, open discussion among all ranks, and the wide dissemination of lessons learned, will lead to improvements.

Finally, the authors are in whole-hearted agreement with Colin Gray, author of Modern Strategy, in stating out-right that revolutions in military affairs are not a substitute for strategy as so often assumed by utopian planners, but merely an operational or tactical means.

This is a brilliant, carefully documented work that should scare the daylights out of every taxpayer--it is nothing short of an indictment of our entire current approach to military spending and organization. As the author's quaintly note in their understated way, in the last paragraph of the book, "the present trend is far from promising, as the American government and armed forces procure enormous arsenals only distantly related to specific strategic needs and operational and tactical employment concepts, while continu[ing], in the immortal words of Kiffin Rockwell, a pilot in the legendary First World War Lafayette Escadrille, to 'fly along, blissfully ignorant, hoping for the best.'"

Lest the above be greeted with some skepticism, let us note the 26 October 2001 award of $200 billion to Lockheed for the new Joint Strike Fighter calls into serious question whether the leadership in the Pentagon understands the real world--the real world conflicts of today--all 282 of them (counting 178 internal conflicts) will require the Joint Strike Fighter only 10% of the time--the other 90% of our challenges demand capabilities and insights the Pentagon is not only not capable of fielding, it simply refuses to consider them to be "real war." Omar Bin Laden beat the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, and he (and others who follow in his footsteps) will continue to do so until we find a military leadership that can lead a real-world revolution in military affairs.... rather than a continuing fantasy in which the military-industrial complex lives on regardless of how many homeland attacks we suffer.

Regarding all major variations, he presents general themes and plans for both sides. There are many diagrams, and in some cases the positions in the diagrams are closely related which helps you understand the connection between some plans.In my opinion, these are very instructive.

After each variation is covered, he starts a discussion entitled "Which line to choose in the (for example) Sozin)", where he explains firstly his own view and experience and then generally the differences, which line suits the positional player, the aggressive player, the solid player etc. From someone who has tested different lines in various variations and then read his discussion afterwards, I can say that he is right on many points.

Between me and some of my friends, we own all the Easy Guides in the different Sicilian Openings and a few others as well. In my opinion, this one is the best.

The dishes are simple and delicious and varied - curried potatoes, tomatoes and peas; yellow fruited rice with fish, Chinese chicken and rotini, turkey apple patties.

Perfect for the harried cook, sick of eating the same things all the time.

I read THE EDGE in its entirety in one sitting, and discovered that after 22 years of being in the job market there were still a few things I didn't know. I reccommend it highly. Even if you find THE EDGE a bit extreme, the strategies presented in it are practical and relevant to today's job market. (One small section includes tips on scannable and electronic resumes. An extensive appendix includes worksheets you can photocopy.) You can aim between THE EDGE ideas and conventional ones, and still come out ahead.

Rugman provides examples of how globalization fails (Disney, Saatchi and Saatchi) as well as success stories (ACER) and an analysis of how 20 of the world's multi-national corporations actually operate - i.e., with a strong regional and local presence.

We covers the role of the WTO (demise imminent), protectionism (NAFTA and EU), health and evironmental restrictions, and positions the dot com dream of internet-driven wealth as being one of media hype. There is no single global culture he says, and the new mantra really should be "Think Regional. Act Local. Forget Global".

This book is a brilliant demolition act on the false promises of globalization and also a stinging riposte to the doom-mongering paranoia of the Starbuck's trashers of Seattle and the McLibel crybabies.

Well written, clear, forthright, and with relevant examples this book is a must for students of globalization and international economics everywhere