Renewal

Analysis of Jon C. Teaford's The Rough Road to Renaissance: Urban Revitalization in America, 1940-1985

The Rough Road to Renaissance is a chronicle of the urban revitalization efforts of several older central cities in the Northeastern United States from World War II to the mid 1980s. As the author reveals, these efforts were fraught with difficulties from the very beginning, but usually not from a lack of planning or enthusiasm. According to Teaford, "this study charts the treacherous course toward the seemingly elusive goal of urban renaissance" (Teaford, 2).

The body of the work is a discussion of the techniques that city leaders used to stop the "blight" of the urban centers. Teaford divides these strategies into a number of historical stages based on renewal tactics and support for revitalization programs. The first stage in the story of urban renewal occurred during World War II, which was the realization that a problem existed in America's aging cities. Census figures revealed that the population in older urban areas was beginning to decline resulting from the increased migration to suburbia. City planners believed that the best way to combat urban decline and slow migration to the suburbs was by become more like them.

With the war's end came the opportunity for enthusiastic city planners to test their renewal schemes. Because the post-war economy did not fall into the collapse that they had anticipated, plans for massive public works projects and federal support were stalled. Planners were forced to seek support from inside the metropolitan area through the installation of public officials dedicated to the cause, development of a solid fiscal base for redevelopment, and "massing the clout of big business behind renewal efforts" (Teaford, 45).

By the 1950s, most older central cities had joined the urban renewal bandwagon. Because many planners believed that their cities simply needed a facelift, most revitalization efforts concentrated on creating a modern and clean urban image. Sewer and water treatment plants were constructed to clean up the environment and freeway systems and airports were built to bring the city up to the "automobile age." Instead of slowing suburban migration both of these tactics actually encouraged it. But planners were not yet disheartened, for failure had brought valuable lessons. "During the late 1940s and the early 1950s, America's aging cities may not have eradicated their slums or achieved their dreams of renewal, but they had experimented with redevelopment and rehabilitation and prepared the ground for more massive projects of the future" (Teaford, 120).

Unfortunately, urban decline only accelerated in the following decades. Despite attempts at renewal, even more wealthy and middle class whites were washed out to the suburbs as poor minorities flooded in to the central city. Urban sales plummeted and manufacturing jobs disappeared. "By the early 1960s prudent observers perceived that the path to revival was longer and less direct than optimistic boosters had formerly hoped" (Teaford, 145). Almost everyone concerned agreed that something needed to be done to halt this decline, but there was little consensus on the best method of achieving this goal.

The mid to late 1960s brought an increased bitterness to the battlefield as reformers were split between methods of human renewal, physical renewal, or neither. "If harmony and good will were characteristics of the renaissance city, then the goal of rebirth seemed to be receding rather than approaching" (Teaford, 183). By the mid 1970s, the state of urban decay had bottomed out, according to Teaford. Urban property was not only dilapidated but abandoned. Crime rose so high that many people were afraid to venture into the city. Cities faced their worst financial crises in history, as many were forced into bankruptcy.

Not everyone, however, was ready to accept the death of the city without a fight. Some optimists still believed that rebirth was possible, but only along a new line of reform. Instead of becoming a pale imitation to suburbia, they believed that the city should concentrate on what made it great in the beginning: a spirit of community and "animation." To the surprise of many, Boston's Quincy Market proved the potential for success of this philosophy in the early 1980s. As sources of animation, cities had much to offer with which suburbia could not compete. Prophets of this new urban renewal philosophy were the city mayors who claimed each bit of success for themselves. What ever their actual victories, these "messiah mayors" did much to bolster the spirits and hopes of city residents.

Of the older urban areas, Teaford concludes: "They had coped with a different world then that which had spawned them, and they had muddled through four difficult decades. But they had never regained their stellar positions, and boosters never felt so confident that they were willing to permanently shelve plans for renaissance or cease to look for signs of comeback" (Teaford, 313).

In his introduction, the author states that because the study of urban development policy has been led by social scientists who tend to over generalize at the expense of historical reality, there exists no true picture of American revitalization efforts from the 1940s to the 1980s. Teaford's historical analysis is an attempt to fill this gap by recording the events without forcing them into a "theoretical straitjacket" (Teaford, 3). In this objective, the work is excellent. Using a good mix of primary and secondary source material, the author gives an interesting, accurate, and detailed account of the "who," "what," "when," and "where" of urban redevelopment strategy. The only thing missing is the "why."

Throughout the work, the one characterization of renewal efforts that kept running through my head was "pathetic." With all their enthusiasm and planning, city planners seemed to have no idea why their ideas didn't work. The more projects they planned, the faster the decline seemed to accelerate. I would have been very interested in Teaford's assessment of why these attempts failed and why city planners were so slow to foresee failure. I also felt a lack of closure on the work; I would have enjoyed the author's opinion of the future of urban renewal. Perhaps Teaford should have taken a lesson from the social scientists in his historical analysis by concentrating less on the "history" and more on the "analysis."

With marginal interest, I bought this book, in mere hopes of passing time. However, as I read, my excitement amplified. By providing daily exercises leading to personal insight, Isabella allows one to evolve greatly to an amazing person, that is, one who gains motivation, accomplishments, and ultimately, happiness. I would reccommend this book to anyone who has an insatiable desire to live life up to its full potential, in contrast of just going through life's motions.

Edward Feld's stirring book is an example of creative religious thinking for this new century basing itself on historical precedents, personal experience and contemporary theological insights. He is part of a generation that grew up with or immediately following the Holocaust and which sought to reclaim a spiritual life in the wake of the destruction of European Jewry.

I am eight years younger than Rabbi Feld. His book resonated with me because we have many of the same generational experiences and yearnings. I took it with me when I escorted teenagers on the March of the Living and found that it provided a religious outlook which mirrored mine and enabled me to help frame both the Holocaust and the lived reality of the State of Israel for teenagers who would accept no false notes as they grappled with the core events of Jewish life in the 20th century.

Feld traces a number of historical precedents to the radical evil of the Holocaust and examines the historical responses of previous generations to those events. Genesis, Job and Isaiah form the touchstones of Feld's exploration of Biblical theodocy. The loss of the Temple, the despair of that primary generation, subsequent responses of martyrdom and a rejection of this world and ultimately the replacement of history by timeless Torah are described by Feld as creating a theological paradigm which would persist and characterize Jewish life in subsequent centuries.

If the Biblical responses to evil represent the early stage of Jewish theodocy and the rabbinic reactions form the "middle ages" of such a theology, the horror of the Holocaust and the miracle of the birth and continued existence of the State of Israel become the watershed of modernity.

Feld rejects any simple effort to find meaning in the Shoah. I recall standing at the ashes of the crematoria with children of survivors who rejected the pablum offered them as an "explanation" of the Holocaust. Feld details the descent into hell and the effort to strip the Jew of both life and meaning. This leads to a radical critique of Jewish life and the notion of divine providence. He focuses on human efforts to remain faithful to life, what Fackenheim calls "kiddush hahayyim."

That becomes the critical part of the rebuilding of a measure of faith after the Shoah. Rather like the rejection of Western civilization by Eliezer Berkovits, Feld sees our ideas of what humanity can be as transformed by the Holocaust - both for woe and for weal. Like most post-Holocaust thinkers, Feld is drawn away from the image of a transcendent God whose power and providence are everywhere to a more modest conception of God who is to be discovered in the small acts of those who clung to their ideals despite all efforts to degrade and dehumanize them. These acts are the "signs of transcendence" of which Peter Berger writes.

Additionally, this returns Jewish life to a concern with history and away from an otherwordly orientation. The birth of Israel is part of this re-affirmation of life in its deepest physicality. The contrast between the Jews who survived the death camps, those who triumphed in the Six Day War and those who control the skies over Lebanon has led this generation of Jews to contend with questions of national power and ethics. Feld leaves us with the questions of how to lead an ethical and holy life in a world which exhibits both violence and tragedy.

In an evocative conclusion, Feld leaves us with an image of reaching out to the one beside us, echoing the concerns of Emmanuel Levinas for the Other as an essential aspect of Jewish thought and practice. This book will take you on a spiritual journey and leave you with questions - not so much about the Holocaust, but about the nature of Jewish life after the Shoah, the responsibilities of Jews to each other and the obligations of Jews to the Other we face both in prayer and in the plaza.

I am uncomfortable with Feld's shrinkage of Torah to moral guidance, leaving it primarily as a repository of ethical wisdom and vocabulary. The stiving for holiness of which Feld writes can be seen in many of the contemporray expressions of Jewish life - including the reaffirmation of Jewish law and practice as a pathway to the sacred. Nonetheless, the book should be read by those who seek to confront the claims of history and the demands of the future.

This book of photography takes you on a tour of Times Square. The unique shots capture the pace and beauty of this landmark that draws people from the world over. If you've been to Times Square this book makes you want to return and take another look around and if you haven't been at the Crossroads of the World it makes you want to run to Broadway.

As an Elder in a Presbyterian church which has been undergoing cultural changes in the past 5-10 years, I found Mr. Robinson's book facinating. It is an easy read and it lays out so many changes that my own church has witnessed. After reading the book and finding out that Mr. Robinson lives in Seattle, I plan on visiting his church when I am there visiting my son and granddaughter. I also plan on getting other members of the church together for a book discussion and try to implement some of the suggestions layed out in the book.

There is a great deal of practical information in this book. The minister or church considering moving from a traditional to a contemporary worship, or starting a new service that is contemporary in nature, would do well to read through this book. It is an easy read -- a few hours is all that is needed but there is a lot that a worship committee or staff could discuss for hours. One of the best parts of the book is the brief section from pages 112 to 119 -- a list of specific suggestions: use greeters, use name tags, improve lighting -- each with a brief paragraph giving a little detail to the suggestions. The weakest part is the historical background. Understanding the origins of contemporary worship would be helpful to a church making this transition because it is important to understand this is not an overnight fad. Still, Langford says little if anything about the influence of the Vatican II, the Liturgical Renewal, or the Jesus Movement. It is here that it is obvious that Langford is a United Methodist writer. Other than this chapter, however, the book would be useful in any liturgical tradition -- Methodist or otherwise.

This book gives an absorbing view of the life and culture of some of the Aboriginal peoples of northern Western Australia. It describes a journey, physical and spiritual, of collaboration between a senior elder and law man of the ngarinyin people and a white Australian photographer. Photographs by Jutta Malnic show the vast country of the Kimberley and the magnificent rock art sites. These pictures are complemented by elegant black and white photographs taken 50 years earlier of the young David Mowaljarlai growing up in his country. The text is clearly written and contains some amusing accounts of bush travel as well as the story of David Mowaljarlai's life and quite complex accounts of the ngarinyin view of the world. The Kimberley region contains some of the most magnificent rock art in the world and for a visitor some of the most memorable images are of the wandjina figures. These are human-like figures with large eyes and a halo-like appearance around their head. It is an intensely powerful experience to see a huge rock gallery of these figures. For the ngarinyin, they are powerful religious images connected with the rain-bearing monsoon clouds and must be approached with great respect. This book gives a privileged view of a world in which land, people and culture are intimately linked. If you are interested in Aboriginal art and culture, this is an important work.

THIS BOOK by Michael Barratt Brown sheds some light on the origins of the war in Yugoslavia. Like all serious studies, it shows that the wars were not the result of ethnic differences. There are no ethnic differences among the Slavs who make up Yugoslavia. Serbs, Croats and Muslims are not separate nations: they are all Slavs.

But why then did this ghastly conflict suddenly erupt when it did? To answer this question, we have to look at Yugoslavia's economic record. In the late 1980s, Yugoslavia suffered a massive economic crisis.

From its inception in 1945, Tito's Government had tried to integrate Yugoslavia into the capitalist system, receiving credits from the US Government. In 1960, the Yugoslav Government gave up the state monopoly of foreign trade; this meant that it could not protect the country's infant industries. It borrowed heavily from Western banks: the resulting debt payments absorbed 30 per cent of export earnings.

By the 1980s, Yugoslavia had the highest level of debt to national income of any country in Europe. The EC and the banks rejected the Yugoslav Government's requests for help with rescheduling their debts. They demanded that the debts be paid, whatever the cost. The ever-increasing debt burden caused economic disaster. Yugoslavia's economy suffered a catastrophic collapse, which led to a social breakdown.

Barratt Brown quotes Susan Woodward's book, The Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and dissolution after the Cold War, (Brookings Institution, 1995), "The conflict ... is the result of the politics of transforming a socialist society to a market economy and democracy. A critical element of this failure was economic decline, caused largely by a program intended to resolve a foreign debt crisis. More than a decade of austerity and declining living standards corroded the social fabric and the rights and securities that individuals and families had come to rely on." The Guardian/Channel 4 book, Bloody Bosnia, ignores this economic disaster.

In 1983, Yugoslavia placed itself in the International Monetary Fund's hands. The IMF imposed economic measures that as usual worsened the problems. It insisted on cuts in the universal social services and in the programmes which to some extent redistributed wealth to the less developed regions. Devolution of power to the regions also undercut the economic integration so vital to building a united nation.

Yugoslavia stopped being a single market: the South of Yugoslavia lost its Northern markets for primary products. Only a third of its national output and 20 per cent of its capital movements circulated between the regions. This, incidentally, shows how important it is that Britain's workers reintegrate England, Scotland and Wales economically, even under capitalism, to prevent further economic decline.

Between 1980 and 1984, Yugoslavia's standard of living fell by 30 per cent, and unemployment rose to 15 per cent. By 1989, Kosovo's unemployment rate was 50 per cent; in the southern regions, Serbia, Bosnia, Montenegro and Macedonia, it was between 20 and 30 per cent.

This book shed light on the origins of the war in Yugoslavia. It shows that it is wrong to blame the whole disaster on Serbian aggression, or indeed on Croat fascism or on Bosnian fundamentalism. But if nationalism is not to blame for the war, why does Barratt-Brown maintain that his book's central theme is to 'condemn all forms of nationalism'? Surely, his economic analysis has shown that capitalism, not nationalism, is to blame for the war.

From a 'Left' perspective, he argues, wrongly, that any attempt to build a self-reliant economy must end in disaster, and that only a federal, capitalist, Europe can prevent wars. But the Yugoslav government, as we have seen, relied increasingly on capitalism, creating rivalry between regions and enterprises. This deepened regional inequalities, and increased the pressures towards devolution and breakup. The government imported goods that Yugoslavs could have produced themselves; this created huge debts and increased unemployment.

The people of Yugoslavia, like those of other countries, will have to take responsibility for rebuilding their country. This is a process in which outside forces will have no part.

Dr. Kissinger is without question the most regarded and respected Secretary of State in this century - if not in U.S. history. Any work by him I consider to be essential reading, and as such, this was a must-read for me. I have read the three installments of his memoirs, culminating in this one. I will concede to those who don't read a lot of history/current affairs books, this one seems a bit daunting. However, out of the three, this one is certainly quite "readable". It is the best-written of the three; Dr. Kissinger seems to exhibit a great deal more clarity and reflection in this work. Critics of Dr. Kissinger have complained that he is only writing because of some need to make excuses for his foreign policy "blunders" - namely, in regards to Vietnam and the USSR. I would argue emphatically that this book is not such a work. Dr. Kissinger presided over some of the most troubling and chaotic events of the century. While there occasionally is a hint of defense on his part for his actions, it is certainly not a "puff piece" designed to give him a favorable legacy. One must remember that Dr. Kissinger was by and large commended for his actions in the foreign policy arena. History already looks upon him favorably. He is not a monumental screw-up like Robert MacNamara, who is futilely trying to rewrite his legacy with book after book. These are Dr. Kissinger's memoirs, the purpose of which is to shed light and reflect on the events he witnessed and dealt with. Thus, he does not need to make apologies or absolve himself. He is merely writing a historical record of his service, a career that needs no bolstering or "revisionism". I recommend it strongly, not only to those readers of history and foreign policy, but to those of you tired of the incompetents now directing foreign policy for this country. Dr. Kissinger's work must be studied and factored into current world events, because he was the grandmaster of that domain.

Henry Kissinger's book, "Years of Renewal," is a complete review of U.S. foreign policy initiatives while he was Secretary of State under President Gerald R. Ford. In it, he details how they built upon the foreign policy successes of the Nixon Administration and laid the foundation for the resurgence of the American spirit seen during the Reagan Administration. From a diplomatic standpoint, this may have been America's finest hour.

With the possible exception of Lincoln, no U.S. president has inherited a nation as severely divided as Gerald R. Ford. Immediately after assuming office, he faced one international crisis after another with a hostile, "McGovernite Congress," and an emasculated intelligence gathering system that made effective response to even the most extreme provocations virtually impossible. Kissinger says throughout, Ford made decisions solely on what was best for the nation, not on what was politically expedient. His reward for such selfless service: defeat in the next election.

Like Kissinger's other works, this book can be read either in individual chapters or be taken as a whole. In each segment he details, what they did, what their options were, the assumptions their actions were based upon, and if unsuccessful, what their fall back plan was to be. In spite of seemingly insurmountable odds, they were able to hold the Atlantic Alliance together, strengthen our ties to the Peoples Republic of China, and keep the Soviets out of both the Middle East and Africa.

The Chinese war philosopher, Sun Tsu said, "In the moment of victory, button your chin strap." History has proven the Soviets should have listened. Given our national paralysis following Vietnam/Watergate, it seemed they could not be stopped. In the international chess game--that is diplomacy at the highest levels--they were stopped through the efforts of a few, dedicated statesmen who blocked them at every turn. The fall of the Soviet Union and Communism was the ultimate result.

This book is a textbook on how to conduct foreign policy. Enlightening and informative, it has inspired me to read Kissinger's other works, "White House Years," and "Years of Upheaval." I highly recommend it to any serious student of the era.

kissinger details how the white house was run after nixon resigned and ford came into power--the photographs are excellent and the text is inciteful----kissinger has been accused of some very bad decisions inhis time that caused many innocent lives--this book gives the reader for why he made those decisions

This book is not a serious or scholarly piece of work, and I recommend that you not waste your time reading it.

It begins with a description of the life of Mohammed, the origins and spread of Islam, and the creation of various Islamic sects. This is probably the best part of the book, but it is still very poor.

For example, Schwartz never really explains even the basic distinction between Shi'a and Sunni Islam. And Schwartz's overall goals badly tarnish his discussion: He wants to portray traditional Islam as being perfectly pluralist, tolerant, and peace-loving, so as to contrast it with hate-filled, intolerant, and violent Wahhabism. As a result, his description of the Ottoman Empire (representing Schwartz's traditional Islam) is completely uncritical and consequently not credible. For instance, he never even mentions the Ottomans' barbaric and murderous treatment of Armenians and Kurds, to name just two salient examples.

The rest of the book follows a similar pattern: There are Muslims Schwartz likes (especially Sufis), and there are Muslims he hates (Wahhabis, plus others who are not Wahhabis but whom Schwartz describes as "Wahhabized," though he never explains what that's supposed to mean). The "good" Muslims can do no wrong, and the "bad" Muslims are behind just about every act of terrorism committed anywhere on the globe. I know this sounds like it must be a charicature of the book, but it's not. Rather, Schwartz's book is itself a charicature of the complexity of contemporary international affairs.

An example will illustrate Schwartz's appalling sloppiness with evidence. On pages 217-218, he claims that a "manifesto" written by Osama bin Laden proves that Saddam Hussein is connected with bin Laden and Al Qaeda. I found this surprising, because there is, to my knowledge, no proven link between them whatsoever (and I have followed this issue very closely). In fact, it is well known that bin Laden has always hated Hussein and secular rulers like him, that bin Laden had called for Hussein's overthrow, that Hussein hated bin Laden and had brutally repressed Islamic fundamentalists like him, etc. (See, for example, the analysis of this issue in a report by the Carnegie Endownment for International Peace, ). So I was very curious to see what evidence Schwartz had found in bin Laden's "manifesto" to support his conclusion that, in spite of all that, Hussein and bin Laden were allies.

Here is Schwartz's evidence: In his "manifesto," bin Laden (1) called for an end to the UN sanctions on Iraq, (2) lamented the destruction inflicted on Iraq in the first Gulf War, and (3) also lamented the deaths of Iraqi children that were caused by the UN santions. I'm not kidding--that is the sum total of Schwartz's "proof" that Hussein was an ally of bin Laden and Al Qaeda in their global terror campaign. It's absurd.

The book does contain one interesting thesis: Schwartz claims that for most Americans, the face of violent and dangerous Islamic extremism is Ayatolla Khomeini and the Iranian revolution, while Americans have regarded Saudi Islam as "moderate" because the Saudis are US allies. Schwartz plausibly argues that the reverse is true: Saudi Islam (Wahhabism) is much more dangerous because of its support for a "holy war" without borders, while the Islamic revolution in Iran was really about liberating the Shi'a of Iran from oppression under the Shah, not about waging a larger war beyond Iran (although Schwartz does acknowledge Iranian support for certain Palestinian militant groups). The thesis is interesting and very probably true. But that one interesting point certainly doesn't make this dreadful book worth reading.

If you are looking for an introduction to Islam, or for insightful and well-reasoned discussion of world affairs, please look elsewhere.

This is a timely book, in its attempt to demonstrate to a Western and in particular an American audience the rise of the Saudi based Wahhabi cult, and the resulting violence and mayhem that many in the west mistake for Islam itself. He shows how the policies of the British and later the American governments supported this rise, sometimes for cynical political and economic ends, and sometimes inadvertantly, and how mistaken ideas of multi-culturalism, political correctness and religious freedom have muted the Western academic and media criticism of Saudi-backed fanaticism, with the World Trade Centre attacks as only the most high profile disaster arising from this.
In parallel, he paints a picture of traditional Islam, tolerant and humane, that will surprise few Muslims but many Western non-Muslims. These traditions survive strongly today, despite the attempts of fanatics to destroy them.
Schwartz's account is weaker in his understanding of the perception around the world of the overbearing nature of the American empire. While he rightly points out the irrational hatred which the Wahhabis display with regard to America, he seems not to recognise the real, valid grievances which people in many countries, Muslim and non-Muslim, have about American economic, political and military muscle. Sometimes his logic is weak, as where he suggests that Saudi opposition to the war on Iraq proves that the Saudis and Saddam Hussain were in league with each other.
Despite these flaws, this book is well worth reading - essential for anyone seeking to understand the true danger of the Saudi/Wahhabi project, and even as an avid reader of books on Islam and politics, this book had a wealth of new material for me.

This book is all too true - it looks at the real issues of what is going on in today's world and especially the way in which Saudi-funded Wahhabism is altering the Muslim world globally. As Bernard Lewis points out, it is as if the US government owned all the oil revenues and used that to fund the Klu Klax Klan worldwide. We live in disturbing times! Christopher Catherwood, author of CHRISTIANS, MUSLIMS AND ISLAMIC RAGE