On-the-money

The book begins by describing the inner workings of the gold standard and how it evolved from its inception in the 1800s. This part may be a bit dry for generalists, but once underway all the terms become quite easy to understand. It's worth persevering since WW1changed the way the world worked. In particular, the after effects of the war made staying on gold much more difficult for countries experiencing persistent balance of payments deficits.

After that, Eichengreen goes on a tour of the interwar years and aims to show why the collapse of the gold standard and the plunge into depression had nothing to do with the US stock market and everything to do with rivalries and mismanagment on an international scale. The US crash was a symptom of an international crisis, not the cause.

All the classic powderkegs are there. The UK's mindless attempt to rejoin the gold standard at the overvalued, pre-war rate. Vindictive French domestic politics and the hyperinflations in continental Europe. Vindictive French attempts to humiliate the Germans over reparations. Bank runs in Germany and Austria. French and American attempts to bend the rules of the Gold Standard for their own national interests. Wild swings in capital flows from Europe to the US and back again. And the cataclysmic days of 1931 when the whole system collapsed under the weight of banking crises and currency contagion - in ways very similar to Asia in 1997.

After the crash, we get down to the Great Depression and who fared the best. This part is much shorter since it isn't as complicated. Basically, those countries that devalued quickly and went the free market route fared much better than those that didn't. Sweden was a star performer. The US can be found towards the back of the class. Dear old Blighty gets full marks for going solo, although more recent evidence shows this had more to do with throwing in the towel than playing with new ideas.

Strangely there's little mention of Japan. Nippon took a beating in the late 1920s while the yen remained fixed to gold. Once sterling devalued, the Japanese followed suit. The recovery was swift and full blooded. But the central bank forgot to stop the printing press once growth returned and ended up fighting hyperinflation in the late 1930s. So Eichengreen's line that giving up was the great panacea isn't quite as true as he'd have you believe.

All told, Golden Fetters is great. While it lacks facts and figures on banking problems and doesn't really provide convincing evidence on contagion, it works really well as a diary of contrasting fortunes in Europe and the US after the guns fell silent in 1918. If you like history then this is for you.

He points to the workers at the Reebok plant in Thailand, workers in China's "industrial zones," Nike and Alcoa workers in Mexico. Instead of working 80 hours a week, and getting constantly cut and bruised by machines, and getting chemicals in the eyes and nausea and headaches, or getting beaten up if you don't work fast enough and getting arrested if you try to leave work, these people could fight for their dignity if they had a viable union to advance their cause.

It is only labor rights, such as the right not to be fired for launching a strike, which allow workers to try to get rights to decent pay, humane working conditions and other such essentials while they make their bosses such huge profits with their work. The author goes over some of the public relations efforts of such companies. The Clinton administration helped in such an effort with top retail companies which created a "code of conduct" with companies policing themselves but such standards have been little enforced.

The author looks at the particularly interesting case of aids drugs. 17 million people and counting have died of AIDs in Africa. However U.S. companies have patents on the leading AIDs drugs which gives them a monopoly on producing them so they can charge 10,000 dollars to poor Africans for Aids treatment. Al Gore on behalf of U.S. pharmaceuticals threatened sanctions on South Africa when that country passed laws allowing for local companies to produce Aids drugs at 90 to 95 percent cheaper than American pharmaceutical companies demand. The Clinton administration argued that compulsory liscencing laws did not apply in that case. And the Pharmaceuticals have argued that they need to charge high prices so they can continue to research Aids treatments and if they are stricted their entrepreneurial genius will strangled. Of course, the problem is that these drugs have been substantially developed through U.S. government funded research. For instance the author points out that while the company Glaxo Wellcom claims to have developed AZT, it was actually the National Cancer Institute and Duke University researchers that developed AZT to suppress the Aids virus in human cells and Glaxo Wellcom did not do any of the immunological or Virological studies or test it on patients. The author points to a study by the National Bureau of Economic Research which found that of the 21 drugs "considered to have the highest therapeutic value of those introduced between 1965 and 1992" publicly funded research developed 15 of them. Most tropical diseases have been cured by U.S. military research or by private companies that do research on livestock and pets. The author notes that the U.S. government has offered 200 million to the UN's proposed 10 billion dollar program to fight Aids and has insisted that its money be used to buy from American pharmaceutical companies.

He notes that neoliberal capitalism has been a horrible failure throughout the world. The deregulation of capital flows has led to increased financial panics such as the Asian crises a few years ago. 90 percent or more of international financial transactions are for speculative purposes. He notes that eliminating tarrifs for Western goods has led to the destruction of local industries, throwing farmers off the land, and so on. He notes that Western countries, with their usual grotesque hypocrisy, put tarrifs and huge subsidies on their agricultural products against foreign competetion. He quotes a study from the World Bank which states that greater openness to trade slows income growth amongst the poorest 40 percent of poor nations. The author refers to the subidized sugar industry of Mozambique and IMF efforts to privitize it.

The author notes that polls show that a majority of Americans symphathize with the views of Anti-WTO protestors. Real wages have stagnated for a majority of Americans over the last few decades. Job insecurity has greatly increased. His quotation of statistics about Americans crying on the job, getting inadequate sleep, problems at work affecting their personal lives, and so on is interesting. He quotes Human Rights Watch which points out the great attack on Unions launched by the U.S. government, continuing since the Reagan years. 54 percent of young workers say they would like to join a union but 80 percent of workers say it is somewhat or very likely that union organizers will face retribution from companies

The author devotes a section to the environment too, probably the most difficult of the book. He points out that drilling in the Wildlife refuge in Alaska will only produce oil in ten years and after that only 42 million gallons a day. He says that 49 million gallons a day of oil would be saved if the miles per gallon of SUV's would be increased by three miles.

The insight into characters and "the way things work" is sharp and the sex is well handled without becoming prurient. I was amazed at the talent here ("I normally read more "serious" authors) and this is a cut above other best selling authors I sometimes have read. I intend to explore his other novels.

So if you happen across this review, this is my thinking. Without Schwab's name this book is dead. It is okay, but nothing special. It covers the basics of planning, but so what. There are a zillion books that do.

Leaves me underwhelmed.

Jack in Toronto

What I had hoped for was some insight into why there is so much economic disparity in this country and what we can, or should, do about it. Instead the author gave more of a status quo, "we are here," appoach.

The last chapter was maybe the most insteresting. It focused on the economic changes in the US since WW2. It is anybody's guess what the future will bring, but it seems like it will continue as it is now until there is some big crash or other disaster.

One of the most important lessons I learned from him is to always read between the lines; so that we may learn to think beyond the 68% norm. While Dr. Hacker could certainly fill hundreds of more pages with his insightful comments and statistical analyses, he knows that in between the lines, there is a whole other book yet to be created by the reader. I regret not having learned that until after he had already given me my final grade.

There is no one way to have a ceremony and reception as the "Sample Weddings" section explained, however only one included the budget used, and it was over budget. Also, paying [their estimated expense] for dinner is NOT budget minded. It may have been helpful to know where Rachel and Mark's reception was taking place, since weddings (and budgets) vary from places like New York or Los Angeles to the Midwest.

I must disagree with the statement on page 7 which states, "people seldom use wedding consultants unless they are having a larger, more expensive wedding." Many of my brides had small guest lists and low budgets... I would think that the brides with less money to spend would want the assistance of a professional to ensure that their hard earned dollars are spent wisely.

To the potential reader of this book, let me give you two cautions. If you like exciting reading, go elsewhere. Economics and monetary policy are pretty boring stuff, and the way they are treated here makes them more boring than they have to be. Second, if you want to learn about the significance of Dr. Greenspan's role at the Federal Reserve, skip this book. It misses the target in that area.

Mr. Woodward, by comparison, is lucky I gave him 3 stars. The man treats biography as though he is uncovering the Watergate scandal, and the end justifies the means. For example, he does not cite sources. This means that the reader cannot judge for her- or himself what bias may be present in the material being quoted. For example, the first pages of the book slam James Baker in every possible way short of accusing him of being a pedophile. Who is this source (or sources) who is (are) providing the dirt? What do they have to gain by blackening Mr. Baker's reputation? I would like to know before I take the information seriously. Any other biographer or historian would tell you.

The second problem is that Mr. Woodward does not seem to know very much about economics or the Federal Reserve System. For there is little about either subject in a book that primarily focuses on Dr. Greenspan's role at the Fed. For example, the book does not even describe all of the legislative objectives that have been set for the Federal Reserve by Congress. The Humphrey-Hawkins legislation about encouraging full employment is first mentioned more than half-way through the book. Those who are not familiar with the subject wouldn't have guessed that Dr. Greenspan was supposed to be addressing this subject and was reporting to Congress regularly on it as Mr. Woodward reports on what Dr. Greenspan was doing to fight inflation.

Now, most will agree with me that economics is a pretty difficult subject to write about. But Mr. Woodward could have written about someone else rather than Dr. Greenspan. In this book, economic events, thoughts, and analyses are usually treated as either minor background events or as gossip items to reflect on personal qualities. As such, the economic events and implications are greatly oversimplified. For example, I doubt if many readers can understand the obscure references in the book to Dr. Greenspan's successful search for the missing service productivity measurements. At a minimum, Mr. Woodward needed a coauthor who is an economist to add some depth related to the book's treatment of Dr. Greenspan's work.

A third major problem with the book is that Mr. Woodward makes a great deal out of unused contingency planning in crises. These are dropped on the reader to suggest we were a hairs-breadth away from financial Armaggedon. That is like reporting the fact that we always had bombers in the air with nuclear weapons during the Cold War as suggesting that we were always about to bomb the USSR. All government agencies are always preparing for contingencies that will never occur. That doesn't mean that the contingencies are imminent. Mr. Woodward, for example, tries to make a case for having us think that President Reagan might have closed down the New York Stock Exchange in 1987 and that it could have taken a week to reopen. This is pure sensationalism in my view. It probably helps sell books.

The strength of the book is based on the fact that the Federal Reserve releases the transcripts of its deliberations. Mr. Woodward has liberally used these transcripts to give you a flavor of the consensus-building process he uses to lead in creating policy and interest rate decisions by the Fed. This raw material in interesting, even if Mr. Woodward's characterizations of these transcripts frequently are not. He makes a great deal about differences between Alan Blinder and Dr. Greenspan. That is much ado about nothing, and simply makes the book longer. Achieving consensus in Dr. Greenspan's Fed is a lot like the EDS television commercial about cowboys herding cats, especially after President Clinton began making appointments to the Fed.

One of Dr. Greenspan's great strengths is his approach to preparing for decisions. He is unusually open-minded, willing to listen, and eager to get better information. This makes others more willing to listen to him, and to pay attention to this views. It also allows him to improve his own views in useful ways. The book does a reasonably good job of exposing the benefits of this approach.

In two other minor areas, the book is clearly deficient. Mr. Woodward fails to discern the usefulness of Dr. Greenspan's complicated communications. You can read whatever you want into them. The Federal Reserve chairman is required to make more speeches, deliver more testimony, and to answer more questions than just about any other public official. Usually, the best result is to have to no impact on the financial markets. Dr. Greenspan is brilliant in performing these tasks in a neutral way. To listen to Mr. Woodward, you get a sense that Dr. Greenspan's convoluted communications are solely some sort of genetic defect acquired from his father.

Mr. Woodward does notice that stock price levels are high, but fails to fully appreciate how much the surging markets reflect a failure of Fed policy. Clearly, the interest rate raises we have going on now have been aimed more at the stock market (in a preemptive strike against future inflation) than against anything else. How will it all turn out? Much of Dr. Greenspan's final reputation will be determined by this open chapter in the story. I wish him well.

After you have finished reading this book, I suggest you consider the next biography you plan to read. Ask yourself these questions: What does the biographer have to know about to be competent in this area? Who would be an ideal biographer? How much time needs to pass before a reasonably objective and complete biography can be done? As a result, you may find your choice of subjects more limited than you like. Certainly, this book would fail these tests.

As for Mr. Woodward, please go back and write about crooked politics. You do that well, and your methods and skills are more appropriate there.

Woodward has already been blessed with his 15 minutes of fame. His latest work, "Maestro: Greenspan's Fed and the American Boom," represents neither earth-shattering importance nor an erudite treatment of his subject, Alan Greenspan and his reign over the Federal Reserve.

To its merit, "Maestro" does shed a surprising amount of light on a once mysterious and self-consciously secretive organization. The inner-workings of the Fed and its policy-making are depicted with excellent detail, as Woodward takes the reader through the bumpy rides of setting interest rates from 1987-2000. And for non-economic types, Woodward does a pretty decent job explaining how monetary policy works and what the implications are for increasing interest rates or expanding the money supply.

Yet it is a shame Woodward is not an economist himself because his book suffers from a lack of depth on certain issues. The work's treatment of developments over the last decade, including the savings and loan scandals of the late '80s and the Asian financial crises of the '90s, is rather superficial.

What is most bothersome about Woodward's work is its failure to point out many of the negative conclusions the details of the work might necessitate. The author's editorial on his subject is one of pure praise, as he attempts to elevate the status of Greenspan to that of a modern hero. The truth is far more complicated than the rose-colored picture Woodward would like to paint.

One of the scariest points Woodward's book fails to make is that the position of chairman of the Federal Open Market Committee is perhaps the most powerful seat of economic policymaking in the United States. Many students of the Fed's operations grow up believing that interest rates are set by the democratic vote of a committee of economists. In reality, the monetary power of the last 13 years has rested in the judgement of one man.

Greenspan's career epitomized the struggle to push the envelope on limitations to power. The chairman was the master of the FOMC, and before each meeting, he polled and called every member to figure out each one's stance on whether to raise or lower interest rates. Since the chairman always speaks last at an FOMC meeting, Greenspan often could plea for the universal support of his decisions, and his careful rhetoric frequently was enough to achieve the policy outcomes he desired. There were even times from 1988-1999, when the committee voted to allow Greenspan to make minor adjustments in the Fed Funds rate between meetings, giving him complete monetary control.

We are all lucky that Greenspan has handled the responsibility of his power with such sobriety. What if Greenspan had not been so judicious? An America where the sovereign economic policymaker was a bumbling idiot would resemble the despair of 1929, when interest rates were raised even after the stock markets crashed. The very idea that determining the Fed Funds rate could rest in the hands of a moron is a scary thought.

Another frightening notion Woodward doesn't elucidate is the number of problems with the way our system allocates its human capital. Many of those on the FOMC were there simply because they had political ties and connections. If Greenspan were to resign tomorrow, party friendships and political allies could influence the new appointment.

Often when economic policymaking is submerged in politics, short-run prosperity is prioritized, and little thought is given to where things will head five or 10 years down the road. If we had a Fed chairman who - because he was a pawn of politics - strove for break-neck growth without regard to price stability, disaster could occur. Woodward strives to make the point that Greenspan always has tried to put his job above factionalism, but Woodward fails to recognize that future Fed chairmen may not behave the same way.

Overall, Woodward's "Maestro" gives a decent overview of the history of economic developments and monetary policy in the last decade. The book's flaws lie not in the display of facts but rather in its pure, unquestioning praise of its central figure, Alan Greenspan. I would not disagree with statements that Greenspan has done his job especially well. He, however, has been fortunate, as circumstances beyond his control contributed to the record expansion of our economy and our subsequent prosperity. Greenspan's ability as Fed chairman surely will be tested as our economy slows, and whether we continue to prosper will determine if he really has, as Woodward says, a "mastery of process."

Pond's book also reveals the secrets you'll need to know to make the most of the opportunities in the new millenium. Unlike other guides, Your Money Matters takes a humanistic approach to money, reminding us that there is no reason our financial lives have to be dull. As Jonathan Pond delights in joking, "Never take responsibility for anything that eats." But if you do, you need this book.

Jonathan Pond is a recognized personal finance authority. What a pleasure it is to read a book by a respected financial authority instead of just a "paper authority." This excellent book by Pond will get you on track financially.

Mr. Pond is a recognized authority. I and many others have benefitted from his advice. As I see it, there is no place for internet junkies on this website and I have reported this to amazon as well.

Jonathan Pond has written an excellent book and unlike Quinn, is a recognized authority on investing and personal finance.

I highly recommend this excellent book by Pond. I also recommend the excellent books by Ray Linder, if you want real financial advice and not regurgitated, outmoded advice ala JBQ.

Many factual mistakes and half-truths are apparent to the casual reader, and I shudder to think what an "expert" on the subject would think. Also, the proofreading is bad, with many typos, and the photographs are generally of such poor quality that they are almost useless. The writing is generally uneven as well.

All of this gives the impression that this book was a rushed and lightly-treated project. I will search for a better one on the same topic.

Rocco Dormarunno, author of The Five Points Concluded, A Novel

If you're willing to look past all that, and if you appreciate seeing large complex chunks of history telescoped into compact coctail-party-sized anecdotes, you'll enjoy this brief history of a truly fascinating piece of New York real estate. And one thing Eliot makes clear is that it IS all about real estate (i.e., money). Enormous and bizarre egos clash in scramble for profits. The history of 42nd Street is the history of corruption and neglect on the part of public officials; fear, fascination, and indifference on the part of citizens and tourists; and greed held in check by caution on the part of the private sector. In other words, there has been enough ambivalence about 42nd Street to keep Midtown in limbo (if not hell) for almost five decades. Eliot depicts this dilemma well. He also discusses what has been missing from most newspapers' accounts of the "resurrection" of 42nd Street: the fact that it was Organized Crime under the leadership of the Teflon Don, John Gotti, that almost single-handedly engineered the descent of one of the world's most amazing entertainment capitals into a truly dangerous place to be, day or night.

Eliot's final assessment reflects many New Yorkers' cynicism about the Disney-ification of Times Square. With the influx of Mall-of-America type stores and a Toys-R-Us Ferris Wheel, can Ed Koch's pedestrian mall be far behind? Maybe so. But one thing is sure, 42nd Street is one street that never stands still.

First of all I've always found their advice frustrating. On one hand they kind of half-heartedly recommend passive index investing and then they go about telling you about the latest stock-screening get-rich-quick fad. Toss in a couple dubious stock picks along the way and you have nothing but a mixed message.

I think this book is a pretty shallow attempt for these two to make up for the really bad advice they gave in their other books over the years. They take several chapters explaining away (in hindsight) how wrong they were, but even in this light they fail to embrace proven strategies and instead go about telling you what stocks to own (Starbucks anyone??). Basically this book is trying to convince you that "This time it's different." They are now trying to mend their ways and show that now their advice is worth listening to and all the stuff they said before was wrong and they're very sorry you lost so much of your money using their strategies. And oh, by the way, we still offer for sale this nifty stock investment newsletter and website for a really great price!

I really think the best approach is to concentrate your portfolio on passive index funds compromising various asset classes (domestic, foreign, bonds, real estate) and just rebalancing once a year. This is a very proven strategy that will beat virtually every actively managed portfolio/fund with far less stress (and taxes). Most major pension funds follow an indexing approach for a good reason: It works.

For a much better read try out The Coffeehouse Investor, books by Larry Swedroe, Bogle, and William Bernstein. Send these two jesters back to the circus...

If you've read or heard them before, there's no need for this one. Try to find somebody who has beaten these bad times.