Monetary-policy

With important implications for academics, practitioners, or anyone who thinks they "know" about money this book is a MUST READ for all. Give this one for Fathers Day and get a hearty thanks! Put aside some time because once you get inside this book, you will not want to put it down. Once read you will see the offerings of money and property with a robust and deeper understanding.

Integrating and weaving cultures, psychology, and meaning with skill and grace this author takes an approach that is at once searching and at times searing. Find your own Talisman with the help of these pages. A Mighty Thank You to the author for your adventurous exposition!!!!!!

He points to the workers at the Reebok plant in Thailand, workers in China's "industrial zones," Nike and Alcoa workers in Mexico. Instead of working 80 hours a week, and getting constantly cut and bruised by machines, and getting chemicals in the eyes and nausea and headaches, or getting beaten up if you don't work fast enough and getting arrested if you try to leave work, these people could fight for their dignity if they had a viable union to advance their cause.

It is only labor rights, such as the right not to be fired for launching a strike, which allow workers to try to get rights to decent pay, humane working conditions and other such essentials while they make their bosses such huge profits with their work. The author goes over some of the public relations efforts of such companies. The Clinton administration helped in such an effort with top retail companies which created a "code of conduct" with companies policing themselves but such standards have been little enforced.

The author looks at the particularly interesting case of aids drugs. 17 million people and counting have died of AIDs in Africa. However U.S. companies have patents on the leading AIDs drugs which gives them a monopoly on producing them so they can charge 10,000 dollars to poor Africans for Aids treatment. Al Gore on behalf of U.S. pharmaceuticals threatened sanctions on South Africa when that country passed laws allowing for local companies to produce Aids drugs at 90 to 95 percent cheaper than American pharmaceutical companies demand. The Clinton administration argued that compulsory liscencing laws did not apply in that case. And the Pharmaceuticals have argued that they need to charge high prices so they can continue to research Aids treatments and if they are stricted their entrepreneurial genius will strangled. Of course, the problem is that these drugs have been substantially developed through U.S. government funded research. For instance the author points out that while the company Glaxo Wellcom claims to have developed AZT, it was actually the National Cancer Institute and Duke University researchers that developed AZT to suppress the Aids virus in human cells and Glaxo Wellcom did not do any of the immunological or Virological studies or test it on patients. The author points to a study by the National Bureau of Economic Research which found that of the 21 drugs "considered to have the highest therapeutic value of those introduced between 1965 and 1992" publicly funded research developed 15 of them. Most tropical diseases have been cured by U.S. military research or by private companies that do research on livestock and pets. The author notes that the U.S. government has offered 200 million to the UN's proposed 10 billion dollar program to fight Aids and has insisted that its money be used to buy from American pharmaceutical companies.

He notes that neoliberal capitalism has been a horrible failure throughout the world. The deregulation of capital flows has led to increased financial panics such as the Asian crises a few years ago. 90 percent or more of international financial transactions are for speculative purposes. He notes that eliminating tarrifs for Western goods has led to the destruction of local industries, throwing farmers off the land, and so on. He notes that Western countries, with their usual grotesque hypocrisy, put tarrifs and huge subsidies on their agricultural products against foreign competetion. He quotes a study from the World Bank which states that greater openness to trade slows income growth amongst the poorest 40 percent of poor nations. The author refers to the subidized sugar industry of Mozambique and IMF efforts to privitize it.

The author notes that polls show that a majority of Americans symphathize with the views of Anti-WTO protestors. Real wages have stagnated for a majority of Americans over the last few decades. Job insecurity has greatly increased. His quotation of statistics about Americans crying on the job, getting inadequate sleep, problems at work affecting their personal lives, and so on is interesting. He quotes Human Rights Watch which points out the great attack on Unions launched by the U.S. government, continuing since the Reagan years. 54 percent of young workers say they would like to join a union but 80 percent of workers say it is somewhat or very likely that union organizers will face retribution from companies

The author devotes a section to the environment too, probably the most difficult of the book. He points out that drilling in the Wildlife refuge in Alaska will only produce oil in ten years and after that only 42 million gallons a day. He says that 49 million gallons a day of oil would be saved if the miles per gallon of SUV's would be increased by three miles.

If you want to buy a gift for your boss--you're all set.

If you want a useful reference volume on DFSS look elsewhere.

Sean
ASQ Six Sigma Blackbelt

The book is an easy read and provides a nice high-level overview, but those looking for details and solid examples should not consider this book.

To the potential reader of this book, let me give you two cautions. If you like exciting reading, go elsewhere. Economics and monetary policy are pretty boring stuff, and the way they are treated here makes them more boring than they have to be. Second, if you want to learn about the significance of Dr. Greenspan's role at the Federal Reserve, skip this book. It misses the target in that area.

Mr. Woodward, by comparison, is lucky I gave him 3 stars. The man treats biography as though he is uncovering the Watergate scandal, and the end justifies the means. For example, he does not cite sources. This means that the reader cannot judge for her- or himself what bias may be present in the material being quoted. For example, the first pages of the book slam James Baker in every possible way short of accusing him of being a pedophile. Who is this source (or sources) who is (are) providing the dirt? What do they have to gain by blackening Mr. Baker's reputation? I would like to know before I take the information seriously. Any other biographer or historian would tell you.

The second problem is that Mr. Woodward does not seem to know very much about economics or the Federal Reserve System. For there is little about either subject in a book that primarily focuses on Dr. Greenspan's role at the Fed. For example, the book does not even describe all of the legislative objectives that have been set for the Federal Reserve by Congress. The Humphrey-Hawkins legislation about encouraging full employment is first mentioned more than half-way through the book. Those who are not familiar with the subject wouldn't have guessed that Dr. Greenspan was supposed to be addressing this subject and was reporting to Congress regularly on it as Mr. Woodward reports on what Dr. Greenspan was doing to fight inflation.

Now, most will agree with me that economics is a pretty difficult subject to write about. But Mr. Woodward could have written about someone else rather than Dr. Greenspan. In this book, economic events, thoughts, and analyses are usually treated as either minor background events or as gossip items to reflect on personal qualities. As such, the economic events and implications are greatly oversimplified. For example, I doubt if many readers can understand the obscure references in the book to Dr. Greenspan's successful search for the missing service productivity measurements. At a minimum, Mr. Woodward needed a coauthor who is an economist to add some depth related to the book's treatment of Dr. Greenspan's work.

A third major problem with the book is that Mr. Woodward makes a great deal out of unused contingency planning in crises. These are dropped on the reader to suggest we were a hairs-breadth away from financial Armaggedon. That is like reporting the fact that we always had bombers in the air with nuclear weapons during the Cold War as suggesting that we were always about to bomb the USSR. All government agencies are always preparing for contingencies that will never occur. That doesn't mean that the contingencies are imminent. Mr. Woodward, for example, tries to make a case for having us think that President Reagan might have closed down the New York Stock Exchange in 1987 and that it could have taken a week to reopen. This is pure sensationalism in my view. It probably helps sell books.

The strength of the book is based on the fact that the Federal Reserve releases the transcripts of its deliberations. Mr. Woodward has liberally used these transcripts to give you a flavor of the consensus-building process he uses to lead in creating policy and interest rate decisions by the Fed. This raw material in interesting, even if Mr. Woodward's characterizations of these transcripts frequently are not. He makes a great deal about differences between Alan Blinder and Dr. Greenspan. That is much ado about nothing, and simply makes the book longer. Achieving consensus in Dr. Greenspan's Fed is a lot like the EDS television commercial about cowboys herding cats, especially after President Clinton began making appointments to the Fed.

One of Dr. Greenspan's great strengths is his approach to preparing for decisions. He is unusually open-minded, willing to listen, and eager to get better information. This makes others more willing to listen to him, and to pay attention to this views. It also allows him to improve his own views in useful ways. The book does a reasonably good job of exposing the benefits of this approach.

In two other minor areas, the book is clearly deficient. Mr. Woodward fails to discern the usefulness of Dr. Greenspan's complicated communications. You can read whatever you want into them. The Federal Reserve chairman is required to make more speeches, deliver more testimony, and to answer more questions than just about any other public official. Usually, the best result is to have to no impact on the financial markets. Dr. Greenspan is brilliant in performing these tasks in a neutral way. To listen to Mr. Woodward, you get a sense that Dr. Greenspan's convoluted communications are solely some sort of genetic defect acquired from his father.

Mr. Woodward does notice that stock price levels are high, but fails to fully appreciate how much the surging markets reflect a failure of Fed policy. Clearly, the interest rate raises we have going on now have been aimed more at the stock market (in a preemptive strike against future inflation) than against anything else. How will it all turn out? Much of Dr. Greenspan's final reputation will be determined by this open chapter in the story. I wish him well.

After you have finished reading this book, I suggest you consider the next biography you plan to read. Ask yourself these questions: What does the biographer have to know about to be competent in this area? Who would be an ideal biographer? How much time needs to pass before a reasonably objective and complete biography can be done? As a result, you may find your choice of subjects more limited than you like. Certainly, this book would fail these tests.

As for Mr. Woodward, please go back and write about crooked politics. You do that well, and your methods and skills are more appropriate there.

Woodward has already been blessed with his 15 minutes of fame. His latest work, "Maestro: Greenspan's Fed and the American Boom," represents neither earth-shattering importance nor an erudite treatment of his subject, Alan Greenspan and his reign over the Federal Reserve.

To its merit, "Maestro" does shed a surprising amount of light on a once mysterious and self-consciously secretive organization. The inner-workings of the Fed and its policy-making are depicted with excellent detail, as Woodward takes the reader through the bumpy rides of setting interest rates from 1987-2000. And for non-economic types, Woodward does a pretty decent job explaining how monetary policy works and what the implications are for increasing interest rates or expanding the money supply.

Yet it is a shame Woodward is not an economist himself because his book suffers from a lack of depth on certain issues. The work's treatment of developments over the last decade, including the savings and loan scandals of the late '80s and the Asian financial crises of the '90s, is rather superficial.

What is most bothersome about Woodward's work is its failure to point out many of the negative conclusions the details of the work might necessitate. The author's editorial on his subject is one of pure praise, as he attempts to elevate the status of Greenspan to that of a modern hero. The truth is far more complicated than the rose-colored picture Woodward would like to paint.

One of the scariest points Woodward's book fails to make is that the position of chairman of the Federal Open Market Committee is perhaps the most powerful seat of economic policymaking in the United States. Many students of the Fed's operations grow up believing that interest rates are set by the democratic vote of a committee of economists. In reality, the monetary power of the last 13 years has rested in the judgement of one man.

Greenspan's career epitomized the struggle to push the envelope on limitations to power. The chairman was the master of the FOMC, and before each meeting, he polled and called every member to figure out each one's stance on whether to raise or lower interest rates. Since the chairman always speaks last at an FOMC meeting, Greenspan often could plea for the universal support of his decisions, and his careful rhetoric frequently was enough to achieve the policy outcomes he desired. There were even times from 1988-1999, when the committee voted to allow Greenspan to make minor adjustments in the Fed Funds rate between meetings, giving him complete monetary control.

We are all lucky that Greenspan has handled the responsibility of his power with such sobriety. What if Greenspan had not been so judicious? An America where the sovereign economic policymaker was a bumbling idiot would resemble the despair of 1929, when interest rates were raised even after the stock markets crashed. The very idea that determining the Fed Funds rate could rest in the hands of a moron is a scary thought.

Another frightening notion Woodward doesn't elucidate is the number of problems with the way our system allocates its human capital. Many of those on the FOMC were there simply because they had political ties and connections. If Greenspan were to resign tomorrow, party friendships and political allies could influence the new appointment.

Often when economic policymaking is submerged in politics, short-run prosperity is prioritized, and little thought is given to where things will head five or 10 years down the road. If we had a Fed chairman who - because he was a pawn of politics - strove for break-neck growth without regard to price stability, disaster could occur. Woodward strives to make the point that Greenspan always has tried to put his job above factionalism, but Woodward fails to recognize that future Fed chairmen may not behave the same way.

Overall, Woodward's "Maestro" gives a decent overview of the history of economic developments and monetary policy in the last decade. The book's flaws lie not in the display of facts but rather in its pure, unquestioning praise of its central figure, Alan Greenspan. I would not disagree with statements that Greenspan has done his job especially well. He, however, has been fortunate, as circumstances beyond his control contributed to the record expansion of our economy and our subsequent prosperity. Greenspan's ability as Fed chairman surely will be tested as our economy slows, and whether we continue to prosper will determine if he really has, as Woodward says, a "mastery of process."

For the most part however, Keynes brand of economics has been a dismal failure. One need to look no further than the stagflation of the 1970's to see this. Keynes work is outdated and discredited. If youre looking to gain a real understanding about economics I suggest you read "Basic Economics" by Thomas Sowell.

The key Keynesian argument is that there can be an imbalance between savings and investment: savers may try to save more than they invest, in effect taking money out of circulation and thereby throwing the economy into depression.

Of course, they have to do something with this money, presumably holding it as cash in some form. Therefore, if you follow through the analysis to the end, Keynes is saying that people are trying to hold more cash than is available: the demand of savers to hold savings in cash rather than as investments is what causes depressions.

Keynes and his followers accept this conclusion: the term which came to be used was that there was a "liquidity trap," the desire to hold more cash ("liquidity") than was actually supplied in the economy is what produces depressions.

However, as soon as the matter is phrased in terms of an imbalance between the supply and demand of money, anyone who passed economics 101 should remember that market economies are _very_ good at equilibrating supply and demand. If the current demand for a good is too high, then the current market value is too low, and a rise in the market value of that commodity will solve the problem.

It works for money, too. A rise in the value of money is called "price deflation," and economists have known for centuries that price deflation does indeed naturally occur in depressions. As the general price level falls, the existing supply of money becomes more valuable -- in effect, the real supply of money becomes greater. It becomes more tempting to spend one's cash on now cheaper goods or investments. Price deflation, if allowed to occur by governments, cures liquidity traps.

I figured this out for myself as a high-school student (there is an alternative but equivalent analysis based on "dimensional analysis" which, as a budding physicist, I found especially cogent).

I was not of course the first to work this out: even _before_ Keynes published the "General Theory," the British economist A. C. Pigou had worked through this analysis and the matter is often therefore referred to as the "Pigou effect." Since Pigou, various eminent economists have worked out the mechanism in great detail with careful mathematical analyses, but the basic idea is freshman economics. When I entered college, I found out that the advanced graduate-level "macro" books did indeed let the secret out that Keynes' analysis was wrong. It was only undergrads, politicians, and the general public that were expected to believe the Keynesian fallacy.

So why the decades of lying?

Just as the Communist governments of the old Soviet empire needed Karl Marx's goofy economics theories and laughable philosophical scribblings in order to prop up their own corrupt regimes, so also the rising mid-twentieth-century predatory military-university-government-industrial complex in Western nations needed an ideology to justify the corporatist-socialist regimes it was creating.

Keynes' prescriptions for monetary inflation, deficit spending, rejection of the gold standard, and high levels of government spending and taxation were tailor-made for the democratic-socialist welfare/warfare states then being erected in various Western nations.

As corporate liberals are so fond of saying, Keynes did indeed "save capitalism" if by "capitalism" one means not free-market capitalism but rather the corrupt crony capitalism under which we now all live.

Keynes himself knew this of course. The infamous statement he made in the introduction to the German translation of the "General Theory" ("theory of aggregate production, which is the point of the following book, nevertheless can be much easier adapted to the conditions of a totalitarian state than the theory of production and distribution of a given production put forth under conditions of free competition and a large degree of laissez-faire") obviously does not prove that Keynes was sympathetic to Nazism. But it does show that Keynes rightly recognized that his proposals were of great potential value for the oppressive political regimes that were being created during the twentieth century.

Even though Keynesian theories are now intellectually discredited "flat-earth" economics, they live on because they serve a political need. Even conservative politicians nowadays often spout Keynesian nostrums ("stimulating demand" via tax cuts or monetary growth) rather than make the painful acknowledgement that it is the corporate-socialist economic system under which we live which is the problem.

No regime lasts forever. Eventually, the present corporatist-collectivist regime will collapse, probably when the majority of the human race figures out how to free itself from the current American geopolitical hegemony. At that point, Keynes will be universally viewed as the economically incompetent charlatan that he actually was.

(For a more detailed analysis of the Keynesian system, I recommend Henry Hazlitt's classic "Failure of the New Economics" and the collection of critical essays Hazlitt edited, "Critics of Keynesian Economics." For an analysis that goes beyond Keynes in analyzing the process which causes the initial imbalance in the investment sector and the resulting liquidity crisis, see Murray Rothbard's "America's Great Depression." Keynes purported to believe that the triggering forces of the investment crisis were irrational and inexplicable "animal spirits." Rothbard shows that, on the contrary, these forces can be rationally explained and understood: in essence, it is incompetent financial policy, of the sort Alan Greenspan has provided in the last decade, which causes economic crises. Milton Friedman's and Anna Schwartz's famed "The Great Contraction" focuses solely on the monetary aspects of the Great Depression, thereby missing the causative process in the investment sector.)

Most educated Americans know something of John Maynard Keynes, the great British economist whose hugely influential work “T"The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money", strongly influenced economic theory and practice during the last half of the twentieth century, particularly with regard to the role of government in stimulating and regulating a nation's’s economic life. Nevertheless it remains true that almost all of the "intelligentsia" in general, and most economists in particular, have never read the book, despite the fact that it is readily available in today’s mega-bookstores such as of course, Amazon.com (at a reasonable price and) in a good quality paperback.

Indeed, by a curious twist, the people who seem most to have made some attempt to read Keynes' oeuvre are those who appear most outraged by it and determined to revile it. If one is skeptical about this, (read the reviews), where veritable "frothing at the mouth" denunciations seem to dominate. These would hardly be worth reading except for the mindset they reveal, which goes far toward illuminating some of the attitudes of the 1930's otherwise inexplicable at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Their very virulence convinces one that Keynes was clearly on to something; if an author enrages half the world he must be at least half right.

Keynes detractors are right about one thing: "General Theory..." is a tough read, though not for some of the reasons they indicate. Keynes actually uses very little mathematics, the alleged prevalence of which is one of the points usually cited in criticism. He uses a little elementary algebra and a little differential calculus, hardly enough to swamp even the most modestly gifted sophomore who has been exposed to the subject.
He does not generally contradict himself, as some allege, beyond the level of ambivalence to be expected of anyone who realizes he is treating an inexact science where many conflicting views can hold some claim to legitimacy. Rather, what makes Keynes' work an ideal bedtime companion for those inflicted with insomnia is the obsessive care
the author takes to be absolutely precise, the somewhat antique 1930's British English
employed (though some, including the present reviewer, may see that as one of its charms)
and the regular use of Latin phrases familiar to Keynes and his contemporaries, such as, e.g., "ceteris paribus" (roughly translated "all things being equal", meaningless to American readers whose formative collegiate experience included little in the way of foreign languages of any kind, let alone classical ones. The trick in reading Keynes is to get beyond these inconveniences of packaging and unwrap the very real gift of ideas enclosed.

Keynes' economic prescriptions are now so generally accepted, even by most conservatives, certainly including "W", that many of us find it hard to recognize what the argument is all about. These days it is taken for granted that the government has a responsibility to stimulate the economy out of recession, at least to the extent of reducing interest rates, and modestly applying the brakes during overexuberant expansion. It is accepted that two of the factors exacerbating economic downturns are the fearfulness of investors in the face of declining corporate earnings and the reluctance of consumers to to put down money they suspect they may need later if they are laid off from their jobs. It was not always so.

Some imagine that Keynes work, along with the massive nineteenth century tomes of Karl Marx, constitute a response to Adam Smith's "Wealth of Nations" a work at least as misunderstood, often deliberately so, as "General Theory...". That is not the case; Keynes hardly ever, refers to Smith and, in any case, those who have read "Wealth of Nations" are well aware that Smith, a truly charming writer quite apart from his undeniable genius, is far more sympathetic to the average worker and much more critical of monopolistic business practices than imagined by those who have deified him but never read him. Instead, the dragons which Keynes sets forth to slay are those who later built a truly "Dark Tower" on Smith's rather benign foundation. Those dragons include, most notably, David Ricardo, Alfred Marshall and "Professor (A. C.) Pigou".

Keynes cannot help but admit to the suspicion that these economists' written views on the question of employment, or the more pressing question of unemployment, reflected their identification of the social classes most likely to buy their books; he never states it quite that baldly, of course. It seems almost incredible to us in this age that the prevailing opinion expressed in those writings is that all unemployment, at the organizational if not the individual level, is voluntary; that depressions and large scale unemployment result from the perverse refusal of workers or their labor union representatives to recognize their labor as just another good in the market, subject to a reduced price in the absence of demand occasioned by downturns in economic activity.
One wonders if some of the tolerance for Adolf Hitler manifested by large segments of the British upper and middle classes, and smaller segments of their American counterparts, in part reflected his action on accession to the Chancellorship to reduce German wages by one third all around. Whether that, by itself, increased German employment numbers or simply made economic room for a huge rearmament program that effectively eliminated labor redundancy is a good question ?but for some other essay.

Keynes argues quite persuasively that a perception of fairness is essential in a democratic society. (10 points to Adolf for fairness?) Wage reductions in capitalist economies tend to be spotty and opportunistic, rather than universal, typically affecting those who can least afford them. Keynes also argues that they do virtually nothing to solve the problems of the economy, partly because employers may very well decide not to decrease prices comparably and, more importantly, because of cascading effects on overall demand; workers on reduced wages don't rush out to buy new automobiles.