Investment-history

Some of the unique things you will learn include

1. Who invented modern capitalism (hint: Tulips, 1700th century)? 2. The establishment of our federal tax system 3. What structure made NY city the US's largest city 4. Wall Street's first and greatest speculators 5. The creation of the Federal Reserve System

Gordon does a great job of introducing us to the most powerful people the world may have ever known. The most notable include JP Morgan, arguably the world's greatest banker; Hetty Green, the richest (and most paranoid) woman in the world; Charles Merrill, the man who brought Wall Street to Main Street; and Michael Milliken, the world's most famous Wall Street villain to wear a toupee.

The story of Wall Street is truly extraordinary. Its history is littered with courage, greed, jealousy, genius and lots of stupidity! John Steele Gordon does an admirable job of hitting all the salient points while making the journey enjoyable and memorable. Buy this book and read it!

Mr. Gordon covers 350 years of history in just 300 pages, however, don't let the title fool you, it really only covers Wall Street until about 1995, not 2000 (a minor quibble). The book contains many interesting stories along the way such as how Chase Manhattan started off as a water company and why Merrill Lynch was named after two brokers, not one (I didn't realize that).

As always no book on the history of Wall Street would be complete without the Erie Railroad, the "Scarlet Women of Wall Street." Mr. Gordon relives the Erie tale with relish! I could almost see Daniel Drew laughing as he printed additional shares of Erie stock as fast as Commodore Vanderbilt could buy them. The rest of the players of Wall Street take their turn in the book, including J.P. Morgan, Fisk and Gould, Joe Kennedy, Alexander Hamilton, and a few women such as Hetty Green also appear.

Gordon takes time to explain many concepts about how the stock market came to be today including stories on the first corner in Wall Street history to the most recent, the Hunt's brothers attempt to corner the silver market in 1980. Mr. Gordon also explains that each time a player uses the market to their advantage, the invisible hand of Adam Smith pushes the market to correct the "wrongs."

Though it is not one of Mr. Gordon's main points in the book, he does point out throughout the book that the "Robber Barons" of old had many friends/allies in government that turned a blind eye to their schemes.

This book is filled with the history of people of Wall Street, not numbers! Pick it up, you'll find that Mr. Gordon's cornered the market on the history of Wall Street!

The perennial features are these. Some seemingly new and desirable artifact or development captures the financial imagination of a large number of people (say, group 1). The arrival of tulips in Western Europe, gold in Louisiana, the advent of joint-stock companies (corporations), real estate in Florida, or the economic designs of Reagan are all examples. The price of the object of speculation goes up. The object when bought today is worth more tomorrow. This attracts new buyers and assures a further price increase. Those in group 1 are persuaded that the new price-enhancing circumstance is under control, and expect the market to stay up and go up, perhaps indefinitely. The individual or institution that discovered the novelty (in group 2) is thought to be ahead of the mob. Fewer in number, individuals of group 2 perceive the speculative mood of the moment, try to get the maximum reward from the increase as it continues, and plan to be out before the eventual crash. The affluence of group 2 is wrongly associated, by group 1, with a miraculous financial genius. When something triggers the ultimate reversal, group 2 decides now is time to get out. Group 1 finds its illusion abruptly destroyed. Both groups sell or try to sell. The market collapses.

Galbraith observes that, in this process, 'speculation buys up the intelligence of those involved'. The crowd converts the individual in group 1 from possessing reasonable good sense to stupidity. Those in group 2 also make errors of vanity by thinking they will beat the speculative game. It seems that 'all people are most credulous when they are most happy'. Reputable public and financial opinion reinforces euphoria by condemning those who express doubt or dissent by warning of a crash. The celebrated Yale economist Irving Fisher, for instance, spoke out sharply against Roger Babson, who foresaw the crash of 1929. But the critic must wait until after the crash for any approval, Galbraith laments.

Despite the fact that common features in speculative episodes recur, history counts little because a financial disaster is quickly forgotten by a new, self-confident generation. Something is perceived as a financial novelty merely because the financial memory is short: 'financial operations do not lend themselves to innovation'. Insightfully, Galbraith notices that all financial innovation involves the creation of debt leveraged against more limited assets. This is the case of banks, whose debt is leveraged on a given volume of hard cash. This is also the case of the holding companies created in the 1920s, whose stockholders issued bonds and preferred stock to buy other stocks. And this is the case, too, of the junk bonds of the mergers-and-acquisitions mania in the 1980s, when high-risk, higher-interest bonds were issued in greater volume against the credit of the companies being taken over. As Galbraith puts it: 'the world of finance hails the invention of the wheel over and over again, often in a slightly more unstable version'.

However a crisis may strike at any moment whenever a debt is perceived to become dangerously out of scale in relation to the underlying means of payment. After the crash, group 1 expresses anger against the 'financial genius' of group 2. 'Financial genius is before the fall', Galbraith prophesies. Group 1 finally realizes that having more money may mean that a person in group 2 is indifferent to moral constraints. Group 2 could have even gone beyond the law, as far as leverage is concerned. Incarceration of some individuals of group 2 may follow. Leverage is seen as morally disputable at last.

Talks of regulation and reform follow. However, the speculation itself or the aberrant optimism that lay behind it will not be discussed. 'Nothing is more remarkable than this: in the aftermath of speculation, the reality will be all but ignored.' Why? Because it is easier for group 1 to blame one individual or a few individuals in group 2 than to take responsibility for its own widespread naivety. And also because there is a need to find a cause for the crash that is external to the market itself. After all, the market is believed to be 'a neutral and accurate reflection of external influences; it is not supposed to be subject to an inherent and internal dynamic of error'. The deficit in the federal budget was, for instance, blamed for the 1987 crash. Another anecdotal account of Black Monday has been that the crash was caused by portfolio insurance computer programs which sold stocks as the market went lower.

Galbraith's book is compulsory reading for economists, especially those working on behavioural finance or econophysics. Being an antidote to illusory financial euphoria, the book is thus of interest to the general public as well. Galbraith's own sense of déjà vu towards speculative financial bubbles enabled him to predict the crash of 19 October 1987. People really seem to be intrinsically unable to prevent getting stuck in the error-prone dynamics of bull markets, as in his 'bubble story'. But perhaps they have already learned some minor lessons on how to better protect themselves in the aftermath of crashes. Indeed despite the fact that the Black Monday crash was nearly twice as severe as the stock market collapse of 1929, it did not trigger a depression. Likewise the internet-bubble burst of 2000 had a surprisingly modest effect on wealth. Will we finally learn to learn from history?

Seems the overall point of the book is that no price is too high for stocks, and that you can't beat the market using technical analysis or fundamental analysis. His halting of his narrative to provide a physical description of characters are both annoying and distracting. Its an obvious attempt to bring some sort of writing style to his descriptions which are clearly not there.

Smith goes to great lengths to make a case for stocks being not overvalued in 1929, the early 70's (during the nifty fifty popularity), and before the 1987 crash. However, he fails to look back on whether the earnings and dividends produced by companies after these times would have justified these valuations. Such an analysis would have made this book valuable. Instead we get late 90's rhetoric to support his case.

He suggests that increased "productivity" through technology justifies higher p/e's. This garbage logic is coming back as the market rallies in late December 2003. Such logic was also used in the 1990s bubble era, just as productivity increases from the prohibition was used to support 1929 bubble valuations. I would suggest saving your money for now, and reading this book after the next stock market calamity which is coming to your neighborhood soon. The book will then be good for a few laughs.

Smith takes an interesting, very focused approach to this debate. His focus is the history of the U.S. stock market; his thesis is that the market is getting closer to rational perfection with each passing decade. The result is an eminently readable book.

In his march through twentieth century stock market history he introduces us to a host of characters - some are famous names you will already know; others are les well known scoundrels that taught lessons valuable to those who police the market.

Smith's story also introduces, and explains, various investment strategies and fads, placing each in historical context.

If you already have a doctorate in economics, this book may teach you little. But if you read history, business and economics titles because you want to, not because you have to, buy this book.

Smith argues, quite persuasively, that the history of the stock market can be seen as a continual (if sometimes bumpy) upward movement in the valuation measures applied to the market. Smith brings us back to the days when common stocks needed to YIELD more than bonds because they were riskier. He then traces the advance of P/E ratios all the way to the present. Although I am still unconvinced by his arguments that the markets of the late 20s and late 60s were not bubbles (he seems to almost make bubbles definitionaly impossible), this book is a valuable contribution to the current debates about the state of the market.

This is not a get-rich-quick book or a how-to manual, but the story Mark Smith lays out is vitally important to all investors and is an enjoyable read to boot. Highly Recommended.

Maggie Mahar, a financial journalist since 1982, writes a coherent study of how the bull market came to be, what fueled it, and what can investors do now. It is up-to-date book and truly enlightening. Much of the material has been covered in financial journals and newspapers but never in such a concise manner; and you'll soon discover many surprises that you probably didn't know about the bull market.

Bull! does not pretend to predict the investment future (no book can do that, and everyone--including Buffett--has made, and will continue to make, some investment mistakes) but for any reader interested in an intelligent, historically sound account of the most recent bull run--and what it means for investing in the future--I suggest that you take a look at Bull!.

One of Schwab's greatest strengths is adaptation, but that means that any book written about him and his company will quickly be out of date. In this case, it was written before the US Trust acquisition and before he gave up the co-CEO role. It was also written at the beginning of the long, painful downturn following the crash of the NASDAQ that has hurt Schwab as much as anyone.

I can't wait to read the sequel.

He recants these tales with tongue in cheek humor, and he translates finance-geek-speak into a language which people outside of the business can understand. However, in his Vernacular translation, he loses some of the wind of the real story. Maybe its because I am in the business, so no details need to be spared for my benefit, but I would have preferred reading more technical accounts.

At any rate, Partnoy is a crusader, out to teach the world about the dangers of financial products. Frankly, I think he goes to far in his ranting, and this book is merely a vehicle for him to advance his agenda of reform and regulation. Its true that some people have exploited the market for less than altruistic purposes, but the truth is that derivatives have been more beneficial than harmful to the global financial system. To tell the tale all of the evil in the financial markets without mentioning the good is misleading.

I have a Ph.D in business and many finance courses under my belt, but I never quite understood the systemic dangers of the 'financial innovation' that is sweeping our markets. Now that I have, I will sleep much less well at night.

Partnoy describes the evolution of exotic instruments and the characters involved in this evolution. How CS First Boston made securites of virtually any type of debt, Salomon pioneered the CMO and so on. He details the specific wrongdoings of companies like Enron, Global Crossing and WorldCom. He shows you the enabling role played by gatekeepers like accounting firms, law firms, analysts and credit rating agencies.

Even more important, he shows you exactly how the collusion happened and why. He gives you both an aerial view of the markets and a down-in-the-trenches description. I often wondered why, in efficient markets, participants voluntarily involved themselves in such convoluted transactions that had high costs in terms of record-keeping and fees. The answer, as Partnoy shows, is that virtually all of these arrangements permit some set of parties to subvert law or regulation or both. This is true domestically and internationally.

He graphically describes how lobbying keeps regulators at bay and the venality and ineffectuality of politicians. The chairperson of the Commodities Futures Trading Commission, for example, exempted important parts of Enron's business from regulation and, just weeks later, joined Enron' board. There are many such stories that show exactly how self-serving our legislators and regulatory guardians are.

My quibbles are minor. While Partnoy is clear, his language is colorless. Perhaps his legal background has something to do with this. Given the strength of his material and the depth of his research, he could have made this book a popular bestseller if he had used more forceful colloquial expression.

Also, he does not talk at all about the role of technology in this evolving mess. Greedy, incredibly smart bankers have always been with us. What has permitted them to have this huge impact now is the ability of computers to churn massive amounts of data, pick out the faintest of patterns and keep records of incredibly complex transactions involving dozens of parties over vast stretches of time.

This said, this is the best book I have yet come across that explains how and why large scale financial malfeasance happens. And why it is hardly ever punished. You will understand why the perpetrators of Enron, Global Crossing, Adelphia, WorldCom, Sunbeam and so many others will walk and hold on to their vast gains. Start praying that there is justice beyond our courts.

NEGATIVE: Value creation, especially of derivatives, is not mentioned in the book. Thus, book rather critical. Book not as readable as FIASCO due to more difficult topics (and NOT authors fault).

Some of this territory has been visited in fiction (BOILER ROOM, New Line Cinema, 2000), but author Gary Weiss' true account of Pasciuto's world has it all: cash, sex, drugs, gambling, violence, humor. Did I say cash? Louis and his barely out of school buddies were pulling in a hundred, sometimes two hundred thousand dollars a month in the 1990's peddling dreams and phony hopes. Weiss is at home writing about this hard-boiled, street smart world. He captures the dialogue, the profanity, the ironies, and the simple money lust energy that drives it all. He gets inside the relationship between Louis and Charlie Riccotone, a violent, small-time extortionist with a slippery veneer, who comes to represent the Mob's influence in this world as he worms his way into Louis' life. Made for television scenes standout: Raucous teams of telephone pitchmen selling 'hot' new stocks; Louis and friend Buddy on sex and drug benders; a broker thrown through a plate glass window; a party boat adventure that goes badly wrong; Louis hiding his stripper girlfriend from his soon-to-be-his-wife sweetheart; and tense sit-downs with Guys of a certain reputation to arbitrate disputes.

In recent years the securities regulatory environment has gotten tougher, the press more investigatory, the public more suspicious. At the end of this fast-paced story corrupt enterprises go out of business, and people go to jail. A lot of people: Bad Guys, a mentor, and friends. Pasciuto's cooperation with the Feds lands him in the federal witness protection program. Where this young man goes from here, Weiss can only guess. It has been quite a ride and Weiss does his readers a service by taking them back all the wiser from this enlightening descent into the muck.

In my travels I also learned that the SEC and other regulatory bodies, while having many dedicated and honest people, often let larger crimes go unmolested while restricting themselves to smaller fish that they "can fry" within their budgets. That is they often pursue the "honest guys" who make administrative mistakes while letting the larger frauds continue i.e. the egregious accounting scandal at WorldCom perpetrated by Bernie Ebbers and his minions. Where was the oversight?

A positive for "Born to Steal" is that it's darkly funny and easy to read, and will receive wider exposure by being made into a successful movie. In this vein the more investors can learn about stock fraud the better. I would council everyone to read Manuel Asensio's, "Sold Short: Uncovering Deception in the Markets."

Also, the tendency for readers and reviewers with a preconceived mindset to see "corporate greed" behind every illegal action speaks clearly to the anomaly of the human condition; that on the one hand most wish to see themselves as morally virtuous while retaining an unquestioned capacity for self deception. Furthermore, it could be averred that just about everyone has a price when it comes to their complicity in a deal where "something for nothing" seems in the offing. These subsets of the most human of conditions do not restrict themselves to corporations, big business or wall street. One who holds to that notion just hasn't availed themselves of the vast trove of historical data and anecdote which would expose this self-contradiction.

A good read for the summer!

Giving an uneducated 20-year-old massive money is dangerous. As he doesn't trust banks, he develops a better use of him money, spend it. Spend it on toys, women, trips, and drugs until eventually his monthly living expenses are so high he has money troubles that end with a mafia guy entering his life for a monthly taste. Now that's a whole other problem.

Louis Pasciuto's personal history is a perfect overlay for a demonstration of how the mafia infiltrated the investment business. Stories of mafia guys coming in and slapping their brokers around for money are unsettling at best. As always, this doesn't end happily.

I strongly recommend this book for an entertaining educational read of what can go wrong in the investment world. For further info on this subject, see the DVD, Boiler Room with Ben Affleck for another perspective of this 1990s phonemen. Although starting a little slow, once you are engaged in reading this book you cannot put it down.

Nevertheless, the book was an easy read and many of his points were right on target. I would also highly recommend interested readers to check out "The Value Imperative" by Marakon Associates and "Valuation" by McKinsey & Co for more information on value based management.

Two significant differences are that Smith and Emshwiller limit their attention primarily to a period in 2002 extending from October 16th (when Enron announced huge losses caused by two partnerships) to December 3rd (when Enron filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy); McLean and Elkind cover a two-year period of the company's "amazing rise and scandalous fall." Also, McLean and Elkind devote far more attention to each of the "smartest guys"; Smith and Emshwiller seem far less interested in them, except in terms of the impact of their mismanagement and corruption. Let's say there are two books about the collapse of the twin towers at the World Trade Center; one focuses on the human tragedies associated with it whereas a second book addresses design, construction, and structural issues. Obviously, both approaches are valid.

McLean and Elkind suggest that the eventual collapse of Enron was caused less by the greed of senior-level Enron executives than it was by their arrogance and incompetence. Their lack of basic business acumen is astonishing as is their defiance of regulatory agencies and contempt for customers. None of them seems to have had a moral "compass." They exemplified, indeed nourished a culture of brutal competition between and among their subordinates. Each used Enron as a personal ATM as well as a means by which to structure all manner of corporate partnerships and high risk/high yield investments without fear of any personal liability. If one prospered, so did they. If it failed, the loss was Enron's. On to another.

Primary blame for all this must be shared by Lay, Skilling, and Fastow. McLean and Elkind rigorously examine the inadequacies of each, suggesting that if only one of the three had not been involved, it is probable that Enron would not have had the problems it did. Attorneys, accountants, brokers (notably Merrill Lynch) and bankers (especially Citibank and JP Morgan Chase) apparently were aware of Enron's bending and then breaking of various laws but were earning so much in fees that they chose to remain at the Enron "trough" side-by-side with Lay, Skilling, Fastow, and other Enron executives.

Consider this brief excerpt from Chapter 10 (page 149):

Here's how another former employee explains the process: "Say you have a dog, but you need to create a duck on the financial statements. Fortunately there are specific accounting rules for what constitutes a duck: yellow feet, white covering, orange beak. So you take the dog and paint its feet yellow and its fur white and you paste an orange plastic beak on its nose, and then you say to your accountants, 'This is a duck! Don't you agree that it's a duck?' And the accountants say, 'Yes, according to the rules, this is a duck.' Everybody knows that it's a dog, not a duck, but that doesn't matter, because you've met the rules for calling it a duck."

There are so many other brief, equally revealing excerpts which I am tempted to include but won't. Earlier, I suggested that McLean and Elkind display in this volume many of the skills of a corporate anthropologist. I also commend them on their skills as storytellers. Of course, it helps to have many colorful characters and such an interesting narrative. Among business books, this is one of the rare "page turners." If Enron remains a classic example of organizational dysfunction, my guess is that this book will remain the definitive analysis of the causes and effects of that dysfunction.

Some interesting things you will learn in this book are:

- How Skilling was able to transform Enron's Busines Model from an "old Economy" Company into a "New Economy" Company similar to Tech-companies like eBay, Cisco, Microsoft, etc.

- Understand how Skilling's team transformed the way they handle their accounting. Concepts like Mark-to-Market accounting and Off-balance Sheets. (Something I never knew before I read the book).

- Learn about how they manage acquisitions and how they use acquisitions as a means for them to hide the true financial situation of the company.

- Learn about how Fastow has maneuvered himself in the inner circle of the Skilling Team and how he had made himself as the Czar of Finance and Accounting from the eyes of Investment and banking institutions like CitiGroup, Chase Manhattan, etc.

- Know about the working environment and culture in enron which Skilling has transformed into a "Make Creative Ideas... Nevermind the cost.." and a "Get the deals... we deal with delivering our commitments later." kind of culture.

- Learn about the personalities of the key players. What type of social life do they have from Bike Safaris in Mexico to exotic bars.

I find this book quite interesting (considering I have never ever had any interest in reading books cover-to-cover. Though most of the books I read are technical and IT-related, I find this book very good to read.

The book is well written and proof-read (no grammatical or spelling errors).

In terms of reading time and efforts to read this books (here I go again with my technical statistics)...

- I find it good to read on flights. It allows you to pause for sometime to actually let you reflect.
- Total Reading time for slow readers like me is around 15 hours. For a long-haul flight from Los Angeles to Manila, you'll probably finish the book by the time you arrive to your destination.

Summary, you will like this book.

Good Day!

The book attempts two difficult challenges: first to model the potential timings of instabilities conducive to crashes in financial markets, and second to describe both the resulting models and their underlying phenomena intelligibly to the lay reader unfamiliar with much, or even all, of the mathematics involved. I found the author remarkably successful on both counts. The book reads uncommonly well provided one does not get distracted by the inevitable unfamiliarity of some of the mathematical terms, and in support of its main argument presents a wealth of interesting and uncommon information. Importantly, it also reflects a familiarity with the realities of financial markets, typically lacking in academic studies of market phenomena.

This appraisal will not be shared by all readers. If you are a fan of Kramer and Kudlow or prefer information about financial markets in sound bites from CNBC, or if you are looking for specific guidance on how to make money in markets, this book is not written for you. Furthermore, the book contains references to a considerable amount of serious mathematics which is likely to annoy some fraction of its readership. This can be circumvented, as suggested, by simply skimming whatever is unfamiliar. What is missed will have been addressed to a different audience, and not much of relevance will be lost. However, if you are frustrated by (or hostile to) unfamiliar mathematical terms and references, however inessential to the gist of the argument, best give it a pass.

For the rest, this is a deep study of engaging interest which repays more than one reading.

To give you a flavor of the book's perspective, consider what happens during a typical day in the market when all of the momentum players, trend spotters, value hounds and growth seekers meet up with each other via buy and sell orders. Typically, the market doesn't move very much, though billions of trades execute. As the author explains, this is possible only through what may be described as complete chaos. That is (simplifying here), for every person who thinks the price is going to fall, and acts on it, there is someone who must be doing the exact opposite. So, the market is stabilized only through complete disagreement (disorder). It's those rare times when agreement (order) rules the day that you get HUGE market swings. The good news is that order is something we can wrap our minds around, identify driving forces, build models, and make predictions -- and this book does all that.

There are not many equations in this book, and you can skip them without losing lock on the book's theme. The concepts and tools covered in this book are at the cutting edge of science and probably new to you, but new analytical insights are valuable, and the author explains them all in layman's terms. I look at this book as a scientific study into Warren Buffet's statement that money managers are "lemmings".

Funny thing though, this was not written by an economist, but by a geophysicist.
It seems physicists and psychologists in particular are writing more interesting economics books these days than economists themselves.

The core focus of the book is a derivation of a market model that includes value investors, momentum investors and the herding effect of individual economic agents acting in a world of partial information. The final model is stunning.

Sornette points out the main problem with predicting bubbles: even if all the signs say "yes," there is still a pretty good chance that the bubble will be self-correcting. Turns out chasing market bubbles is a little like chasing soap bubbles - they may simply disappear at any moment. Thus, the book and the model are of limited use in any type of market timing. Indeed, the model suggests that the market should now be in the tank, and yet it continues to hover on the higher side of its expected range.

As much as I loved the book, there was a slight aftertaste that this was all nothing but a very mathematical and high-minded type of technical analysis. That at base, when all was said and done, this was not all that different from the various "tools" in the chartist's handbook, e.g. MACD, RSI and OBV, etc., etc., etc. The difference may be solely that Sornette knows his statistics and would easily and readily dismiss any model which did not perform significantly different from chance.

Finally, this book will have you trotting out your old high school calculus book. It brought back memories of just how much fun mathematics can be.

All in all - I give it 5 stars.