Investment-history

Would recommend anyone intersted in this book to first read "Bogle on Mutual Funds" first as it's an excellent book and covers similar material. If you are still interested in learning more about Vanguard, then this book is an excellent compliment. It's not as critical of it's subject as I would have liked, and really doesn't cover the personal life of the subject so as a biograhy leaves a lot to be desired. It does, however chronicle the amazing story of Vanguard.

This book is very detailed. So much so that it is easy to get lost in the facts. However, the detail is needed to support the subject.

Mr. Sutton leaves the reader very angry with the "powers to be" for sacrificing the lives of so many in WWII for the sake of money. The reader discovers most of the horrors of this war could have been avoided.

He makes the danger of the Council of Foreign Relations more real.

This is a must read for everyone, especially if you are a believer in the Constitution of the U.S.

Be sure to read Appendix A.

Jerry

The central theme of this book is "the life and times of Thomas Mellon Evans". It encompasses the take-over style events at the american stock-exchanges between the 1930s and the 1990s. Evans played an important role in a large number of such events.

My only criticism of the book is, that it seems to cover too many topics in one go: a biography of Tom Evans, the development of the proxy fight/hostile take-over theme, the development of corporate management during the 20th century and its effects on society in general. In the passing it provides shallow biographies of a number of company raiders other than Evans. As a result the reader may at times wonder what the leitmotif of the book really is.

That having been said, could I have done it better? The answer clearly must be: No! One cannot understand Tom Evans' life without understanding his works and one cannot understand his works without understanding the men he worked with/against as well as the zeitgeist of his era. In the passing the author provides admirable insight into the public discussions and anxieties of the day and offers easy-to-understand but correct descriptions of a number of issues in finance.

The author has done much research to dig out a little known era of financial history and analyzed and described it well. As such this book deserves a place in the library of any self-respecting academic interested in the history of finance.

If, however, you are looking for a light-hearted novel-style biography, this book is not for you. As a matter of fact, if you're looking for anything thriller-like, move on to the next item on your list. That having been said, there are definitely elements of both in the book. The strong side of this work however are its discussions of the evolution of the take-over phenomenon and its effects in society.

On the balance, this is an excellent book for an intelligent audience.

Harry Dent poses as an economist but he is not. He also poses as a demographer but he is not either. As a consequence, he develops sweeping broadbased theories without solid scientific foundation. His main theme is that the large Baby Boom generation is going through its peak spending years during this decade, and as a result it will sustain an economic and stock market boom until 2009. He concludes that it is almost certain that the stock market will earn 10% and above returns throughout this decade.

However, when you look at the record so far, Harry Dent's prediction in 1999 for the first decade of 2000's is way off. The ink was barely dry on his book when the stock market actually peaked (first quarter of 2000) and then tanked. The stock market then suffered a three year bear market. Current outlook for the stock market is for increased volatility, but reduced growth in the single digit range (not the double digit range, Dent predicted).

Dent missed a lot of things. Some of them he could not have predicted such as heightened geopolitical risk, terrorism. Some other factors, he should have predicted. These included the overvaluation of stocks as a result of the Internet Bubble, the onset of World deflation associated with the flooding of cheap exports from China, the eventual slow down of the U.S. economy among others.

Dent also pauses as a futurist. In this role, he just repeats what Alvin Toffler stated in Future Shock almost 30 years ago. Technology will reform the workplace, will boost economic productivity, etc... Nothing new or informative here.

The only somewhat valuable part of this book includes several recommendations for successful investing, including:
1) Save at least 10% of your salary;
2) Use buy and hold strategies, don't try to time the market;
3) Use mutual funds to most efficiently diversify your holdings;
4) Use asset allocation. The greatest returns result from the correct asset allocation. Asset allocation should match your personal risk tolerance; and
5) Invest systematically not emotionally.

However, the author did not support these good investment strategies with adequate useful details. For instance, using a 401K is the best and easiest way to implement all of his five strategies mentioned above. Also, within his mutual fund recommendation, he did not mention the advantages of index funds (greater diversification, lower cost). Thus, he omitted much information for this section of the book to be as informative as it could have.

On first blush Harry Dent looks like a genius. After all, years before everyone talked mutual funds and daytrading he predicted a stock market bonanza. What's easy to forget, though, is that in his earlier book (admittedly, I only read one and it was years ago so I'm a little sketchy on the details) there were lots of predictions--such what would happen to Asian economies-- which turned out to be way off the mark. No doubt, there is something to Dent's boomers- leading-the-economic-boom theory, but any theory that simplicistic, is well, overly simplicistic. I, for one, wouldn't throw caution to the wind and take his recommendations blindly. For an excellent book on creating a truly satisfying financial life (both fiscally and emotionally) no matter what happens in the coming millenium, check out my new favorite recommendation: The Mindful Money Guide. It succicntly, but comprehensively covers a wide range of money issues; The author isn't afraid to take a stand. Don't let the serious-sounding title scare you, it's entertaining.

It may seem odd, even perverse to give a positive review to a ragingly optimistic book at the current time (the start of the second half of 2001). Originally published in 1998, Dent's relentlessly optimistic book will turn off some sober readers by his somewhat breezy style and dramatic and sweeping claims. Yet, much of the foundation of this book's case for a prolonged economic boom lasting until 2009 in the U.S. (and later in some European countries) lies in respected academic work such as the books Generations, and The Fourth Turning. Dent's message boils down to an argument that predictable generational spending waves coming with a combination of generational innovation and implementation will combine with a range of information technologies and biotechnologies to propel a sustained boom. The current downturn does not refute his thesis, unless it becomes protracted.
The Roaring 2000s is aimed at a general readership, including anyone wanting to understand the major changes ahead and how to take advantage of them. Dent makes some dubious assertions, perhaps over-applying his driving forces, so the book needs to be read with a critical eye. Still, the major forces behind his claims seem to be real and compelling. Business strategists who skim this book may find that it makes sense of the current turbulence and helps them plan for the decade ahead. At the very least, Dent's irrepressible optimism can only do you good in today's gloomy business conditions.

I found the book to be totally engrossing and entertaining, but also amusing (not always in a good way), a little inaccurate, and probably more than a little embarrassing to the participants in hindsight. If you are looking for an entertaining read about the highest fliers in the internet bubble, this is a great choice. But if you are hoping to learn more about venture capital from an insiders point of view, this book will lead you astray.

The author's description of the prevailing attitudes and lingo at Benchmark and other venture firms seems out of place. He seems to be describing the macho environment of an investment bank rather than the more subdued approach of venture capitalists. But maybe that's the way things actually were at Benchmark in the late 1990s.

As a venture capitalist myself, I was surprised by the apparent lack of due diligence and the thin premises upon which the partners seemed to make their investment decisions. I'm sure this perception is in part a consequence of the author's intentional decision to gloss over the nitty gritty details. But explicit dialogue between the partners shows that the partners did in fact have a shoot-from-the-hip style. I am hardly qualified to question the partners' instincts when they were so successful. But I do think it is a wildly inaccurate portrayal of the industry as a whole.

This book offers a "fly-on-the-wall" account of the inner workings of Benchmark Capital, a Silicon Valley venture capital firm. This book details the events surrounding the funding and growth of such companies as E-bay, Priceline, Webvan, and Art.com. Additionally, the book brings the reader inside the partner meetings so one can see the heuristics of this venture capital firm. The only downside is that the author portrays the partners as sensitive to the needs of the varied people seeking funding from Benchmark. It is possible that this portrayal is accurate, however, I suspect that Benchmark is as ruthless as other VC firms. In the end I would highly recommend this book to anyone interested in the process of seeking funding and the dynamics of early-stage companies.

I have owned this book for a while and just now got around to reading it for a class I am taking on venture capital. I should have read it sooner, but I am glad that I read it AFTER the web-business meltdown. It isn't that the book hypes the web or that the guys at Benchmark are wild-eyed web partisans. In fact, as the web bubble begins to deflate towards the end of the book the author captures some insightful comments from the partners about the shift in focus because of what they saw coming.

What is really useful about the book in the context of the post-web-bubble experience is the excellent way it captures the mood and thinking of the time and the story behind some ventures whose outcomes were still unknown when the book was first published. We now know of e-Bay's staying power and WebVan's demise as well as the stories of several other companies discussed in the book.

Benchmark is still going strong with a talented team and an enviable portfolio. It would be wonderful to get a follow up article (maybe it has already been done) that shows how the Benchmark team handled the heat of the web meltdown and what their current portfolio thinking is. And, of course, it would be nice to get information on the whys and wherefores of Benchmark's foray into the international arena (it was contemplated in this book and, from the Benchmark website, it is now a reality).

This is well done (even if the language is real-life rough) and I am very glad to have read it. I recommend it highly.

This could have been an interesting book -- a black man who fights his way to Wall Street, makes millions, and ends up in tangled web of lies and corruption. I picked it up because the story of Joseph Jett seemed intriguing, but sadly, the book ends up being dragged down by the fact that Jett is a very unlikeable person, the way he tells the story makes it obvious that he is lying about what actually happened, and in the end the book doesn't say much more about Wall Street than we already know.

Jett was fingered as the guilty party in a bond trading scandal at the firm of Kidder Peabody and black-listed from Wall Street. This book is Jett's attempt at his side of the story in an effort to prove his innocence. The main problem for me in reading this book is that Jett comes across as a real jerk, and as a result, I really didn't empathize with his position and I really didn't care about what happened to him -- my feeling was "This greedy arrogant jerkwad got what he deserved."

Secondly, the parts of the book detailing what supposedly happened at Kidder Peabody just don't seem realistic. I've worked in the securities industry, so I have something to guage Jett's story by, and it just doesn't come across as 100% accurate. I think the real truth is somewhere in the middle of what Kidder Peabody said, and what Jett said.

The early chapters of the book, where Jett describes his upbringing and life before Wall Street, were the best ones, because you get to understand the forces that drive him and the barriers he had to overcome. The book rapidly degenerates after the early chapters and I found it quite boring. If you haven't read any books about Wall Street or the real world of finance, then you might find this interesting. If you have, you won't miss anything by skipping Jett's tale.

It's been a few years since I read and first reviewed this book. In that time I have come to appreciate the details quite a bit more.
Kidder Peabody was a trading operation, just like Enron. If we had taken Mr.Jett seriously, perhaps a few people would still have their 401k's at the Houston company. For those who say Jett is a liar, compare his situation to what brought down Enron. Read June's issue of L.A. magazine, there's a story of a young Enron trader who couldn't quite figure out how his company made either.
If by now you still don't believe Mr. Jett, I've got some swampland......

As a African-American I found this book to be very informative. It helped cultivate my knowledge of blacks in corporate America. Moreover, Jett is a great writer, I've also learned many new vocabulary in this book.

This book also teach you to trust no one.

Ok let me get this straight. Here is a guy that believes in the efficient market theory but was a salesman/trader. There are tons of conflicts in the book. Partnoy is obviously a professor now. He is practically begging for more regulation in investment banking and feels that financial reporters and professors are not only smarter but deserve more money compared to the investment bankers. He starts out at First Boston and is doing well financially. Then moves to Morgan Stanley and does complicated derivative deals and makes a ton of money. Now a professor and investment banking is pure evil (now that he made a ton of money). Another conflict is Partnoy said he quit Morgan Stanley but on page 277 he writes "...I am not referring what Morgan Stanley did to me." This is where he is talking about another Morgan Stanley employee being fired. I rate this book 2 stars because it was somewhat entertaining but think about this before you buy it. Do you really want to read a book by an author who believes in the efficient market theory but also worked as a salesman/trader? I only bought this book for $3.29 used on amazon.com. I definitely wouldn't recommend paying full price for it.

Now that there is a proven market for recent financial history/humor books, after the stunning success of Liars Poker, Predator's Ball and Den of Theives, this book FIASCO is another one of these books that tries to emulate the financial stories from the 1980's.

To my knowledge it is the first book to take on the derivatves trading industry, which is extremely volatile and can be the most risky sector of the financial markets, if you choose to speculate in it. More importantly, there will eventually be a derivatives disaster outside of the Long-term Capital one that occurred a couple of years ago.

This book, as I read it, is highly sensationalist. I have worked in the financial service industry with institutions and chose to leave the industry about a year ago. Here are my thoughts on this book as it relates to the derivatives markets.

1.Mr. Partnoy gives a high level description of some of the transactions that he was involved in

2.He seems to be indicting the market in derivatives, which I disagree on since he is dealing with institutions, which already should have a fiduciary responsibility to their clients. If they are dumb and allow an investment bank to "rips their face off" as Partnoy claims then they shouldn't be 1) in those financial products or (2) doing business with them. It is their choice!

3.From the reading it seemed as though Partnoy doesn't understand his role in the machine known as Wall Street. He is a salesmen, pure and simple. He gets paid to ring the register, nothing more. Other people construct the deals and he is the marketer to clients. If he makes clients money they should come back more and more. Often times, there are MANY other factors that cause business to vary from firm to firm. LOTS of different agendas/goals in mind.

4.Some of his anecdotes, particularly those in which he discusses the atmosphere in an investment bank around bonus time (pg.40 - 42, 202 - 205), are pretty amusing and dead on accurate.

5.The author's descriptions of some of his deals are clearly told from a junior banker's perspective, but they do a good job of putting forth what was being done, how it was being done, what everyone's perceived incentives for the transaction were, the work required to get the deal done, what kind of money, and importantly what kind of fees were involved.

In conclusion, like all books written by former investment bankers the book contains liberally sprinkled anecdotes regarding job interviews from hell, the ridiculous daily escapades that can occur on a trading floor, strip clubs, the lack of personal lives, gambling trips and other stories which could easily have been pulled from the pages of Mr. Lewis's book or "Monkey Business" by Rolfe and Troob. Folks, not all folks on Wall Street are like that but a HUGE percentage are. Nothing wrong with that lifestyle but it is a choice everyone is free to make. Hope this helps everyone.

The book has the merit of going through the most complex derivatives and structured products explaining to a fair extent business motivations behind the deal, an information that is not only confidential, but that constitutes the bread and butter of investment banks.

I loved the book until I got to the last chapter. I would have rated this book ... if it wasn't for this last chapter that the author has added in more recent editions.

I would like to make two comments:
The book tends to explain the concept of present value in simple words, but still wants to go through the most complex derivatives. As a result, certain parts are boring to someone without the financial background, but I would doubt that anyone without the financial background would make it to the second chapter or even be attracted to the book.
My second criticism is regarding the last chapter, "Epilogue". This chapter ruins the book. The author develops an anti-derivatives theory that turns to be amusing. As everyone knows, a tool is neither good nor bad by itself. It is what one achieves with the tool that is good or bad. This principle is also valid for derivatives. It is useless, not to say irritating to go through a list of lawsuits and settlements. This is not proving any further that derivatives are bad or that investment banks are evil.

I spent 30 years at Goldman Sachs as a senior risk arbitrage trader in the equities division. I retired in 1995. The information contained in the volume has been carefully and thoughtfully researched and the result is a wonderful historical analysis of Goldman Sachs. The book is eminantly readable and easily understandable, even for those uninitiated in the banking business. My only negative criticism refers to the excessive space given to the recent history of the firm. There was a clear change in the firms' culture after the greedy portion of the 1980's. The author is right on the mark when she tells how important the people (not only the partners) were to the creation of the special atmosphere that pervaded the firm and how very special it was to be a part of it. Although profitability was always a clear motive, it surely was not the sole purpose for which the firm existed. To profile a few bond traders and enumerate their spectacular successes (and failures) in the 1990s clearly indicates how things have changed from previous decades. I worked with Gus Levy for 10 years and Bob Rubin for 20 years and from a trader's point of view these were the spectacular people at least in the Equities Division. I doubt that the client interest is foremost in the culture of Goldman Sachs today as it was for the first 125 years. Although the importance of the client remains high today, it is profitability and risk taking that are the motivating forces.

As one of the most successful Wall Street titans, Goldman Sachs has a history of empowering very smart and dedicated people. This is that story. It addresses the personalities and culture that drives Goldman to success. For anyone interested in the financial markets, it is a joy to read. Some things I did not know:

1) GS focuses on the client and maintains a long-term focus. Long-term greed.

2) During the 1980's, GS set itself apart from its competitors when they refused to represent any company that was the aggressor in a hostile takeover. As such, they billed enormous business as a "defense" investment bank. (pg 19)

3) "You cannot just be an employee. The firm demands that you be a contributor." (pg 21)

4) There is a culture of understatement. "A mild shabbiness seems to be almost a status symbol." (pg 25) The main office does not say Goldman Sachs on the front. It just reads the first two numbers of the address: 85.

5) GS started out as a family firm specializing in commercial paper. By the 1960's, it was handling 50% of the country's commercial paper. (pg 34)

6) GS was almost ruined when it was involved in the speculating leading up to the crash of 1929. The investors lost 92% of their investment in the infamous GSTC investment trust.

7) Sidney Weinberg is considered the father of modern Goldman Sachs. (pg 49) He worked at Goldman for more than 50 years and started out as a helper to the porter: cleaning shoes, and brushing hats.

8) Gus Levy became the next senior partner in 1969. Levy was from trading, not banking, and would "prepare the company for the trading-oriented work of the 1980's." (pg 63)

9) The next leadership was in teams: John Weinberg & John Whitehead, then Steve Friedman & Robert Rubin, then Hank Paulson & John Corzine.

10) In the 1980's, the profit centers were M&A and arbitrage.

11) Historically, GS was known for its excellent people, but not its innovation. One JP Morgan banker said that GS bankers were incredibly good, but predictable.

12) Partners were making incredible money in the 1990's, but naturally the competition was fierce: 4000 Vice presidents competing for 32 partner seats. (pg 135)

13) Numerous stories of GS's great traders (Becerra, O'Brien etc...) and how they would make $80 million in trading profits one month, then lose $100 million just one month later. At times, the speculation would get out of hand. One person commented that GS's London trading desk was "testosterone alley." (pg 192)

14) In early 1994, the firm was in a crisis. Its top management had stepped down and the company was losing $200 million a month due to heavy trading losses and a bear market. (pg 202)

15) GS invented, and still dominates, the block trading market. Great story: Kuwaiti Investment Office (KIO) gives three investment banks one hour to price $2 billion of British Petroleum (BP) stock. GS wins the bids, transacts the stock smoothly and gains a reputation as the firm able to handle block trades. (pg 248)

16) Paulson said, "Good firms worry about competition, great companies worry about clients" (pg 250)

Although it is clear from Ms. Endlich's tone that she nearly workships everything about Goldman Sachs, this is a well researched and competently written book. It covers in detail the history of the bank, paints portraits of some of the key players in some detail and presents a compelling overall picture of the bank's history.

Where the book falls short is in its financial and overall business details (compare to "The House of Rothschild" by Niall Ferguson). Overall, and interesting and insightful read.

Dot.con: The Greatest Story Ever Sold lacks the same level of insight and originality. For most readers who stay abreast of current events in technology and the Internet, there is not a lot of new information in the book. The Internet bubble crashed some years ago, so a book on the subject can't be expected to be too original.

The book details the anecdotes of such Internet personality as Jeff Bezos, Mary Meeker, James Cramer, Jeff Walker, and Henry Blodgett. Nonetheless, such stories have been detailed in numerous places numerous times.

Cassidy does provide some rather good insights of the personality and mindset of Alan Greenspan, and he does a great job of showing an economic overview of the atmosphere that helped create the Internet bubble and how it led to its ultimate demise. If anything, Cassidy's brief biography of Greenspan is a well-written defense of the Fed Chairman.

But for anyone who reads Forbes, Wired, or the New York Times on a regular basis, much of the details of Dot.con have already been told. This is proven in the book's bibliography, which references such periodicals numerous times.

The first thing you'd say about this book is that, however clever the title, it's erroneous: this isn't the story of a "con" at all, it's the story of a speculative bubble.

The whole point is that no-one was "conned" by the hot air. As Cassidy mentions from the outset, the prospectuses all contained large print health warnings in prominent places: "THIS COMPANY HAS NEVER MADE ANY MONEY, MOST LIKELY NEVER WILL" - but the punters still bought and bought. There were many psychological and sociological factors at play, but deception was not one of them.

For all that, Dot Con is well researched, well written and entertaining into the bargain (my copy was the paperback second edition in which the typos & manifest errors spotted by keen Amazonians (none of which, in my view, was earth-shattering) had been corrected). Cassidy describes briefly and competently the history of the internet and the general financial environment of the last 50 years, and then takes you into the maelstrom of the bubble from 1995 to 2001, all of which he portrays in suitably stunned-mullet fashion. The new edition features a lengthy epilogue which surveys the wreckage and covers the subsequent inquiry into the practices of investment banking firms and their uneasy relationships with their research analysts, all of which is still very current.

While he doesn't really dwell on it, I think Cassidy would come out in favour of more market regulation and intervention: He's especially critical of the Fed's approach to monetary policy and the atmosphere on the street which led to the boom in the first place.

In some ways (though it's hardly fashionable to say so) the investment banking firms and fund managers were as much victims of this as anyone: while the roof is blowing off the market and the choice is to join in and make hay, or watch your competitors annexing large portions of your market share while you sit on your hands, it is a singular Wall Street firm indeed which chooses to sit the boom out.

In any event this is a thoughtful and well put together book and serves as a pretty good overview of some of the most remarkable times in the history of modern finance.

New Yorker financial writer, John Cassidy, says it all in this brilliantly rendered, highly entertaining account of the biggest economic scandal of the last twenty-five years--Enron who?--the crash and burn of the relentlessly hyped dot.com sector. One part historic overview, two parts searing indictman of the financial-technological-media nexus, Dot.Con--as the Wall Street Journal said last week--will be read by generations of Wharton and Harvard B school grads still unborn. Not since John Kenneth Galbraith have we had a popular economist with this kind of reach--or depth. Bravo.

How do you rate a book that has some excellent advice, but 90% of the text is redundant filler? I chose three stars because even one good idea is worth a few hours of your time. I think I would have enjoyed the audio CD more because it's probably more condensed.

The book warns of many financial obstacles, but has little in the way of strategies to avoid them.

Here. . . I'll save you some time:

The stock market is going to crash around 2016 because of a law called ERISA, so prepare yourself accordingly.

You can make money in up and down markets if you know what to do.

Don't trust your money to mutual fund managers.

Buy, hold, and diversify is not the great strategy you think it is.

Educate yourself financially, but if you don't, stick with buy, hold, and diversify.

Real estate is a better investment for many because you can control it more readily.

There. . . now you don't have to read the book. That'll be twelve dollars.

I did not expect to get much out of this book. I expected the usual litany of admonitions and suggestions available in hundreds of articles and basic books on finance for the masses. Despite that low expectation, the first chapter had me hooked.

With an aging population, turmoil in the stock markets, and lack of knowledge about how much money is needed for retirement, author Robert Kiyosaki gives specifics to support his theory about predictable problems facing those who hope to retire.

The book won't appeal to people who are satisfied with their current job and have no plans to change in the future. But for those who care about government policy and how these policies and demographics are impacting our society, the book is eye-opening as well as easy-to read.

The "rich dad, poor dad" vehicle gets old but is stiff an effective and sometimes entertaining vehicle for conveying information.

If you take a look at the date when this books was released and then go back and check the stock market, you'll find that everything Rich Dad predicted is in fact coming true.

What is really scary is that Rich Dad predicted this years ago!

I highly recommend this book along with Rich Dad's Guide to Investing for anyone who wants to become a successful investor.

If you want to continue to loose money and get broker, then listen to your broker. That is why they are called "brokers" Listen to them and you'll become "broker."