Investment-company

This book examines the problem of financial misstatements with a special focus on Enron. The book is light on facts and analysis, but heavy on opinion. Most of the chapters just restate contemporary criticisms of contemporary management decision-making (e.g., greed). The authors have very little to say about warning signs and the accounting used by management to mislead investors. Those wanting a more substantive analysis of the issues and the perspective of an insider should read Arthur Levitt's new book, "Take on the Street."

In another era, we might have been tempted to shrug off How Companies Lie as just another polemic against corporate greed. In the wake of Enron, Global Crossing, Tyco and a host of other corporate scandals, however, we must (sorrowfully) admit that this book is as timely as it is insightful. Readers will gain much from the book's explanation of some of the actual accounting techniques that companies use to mislead investors, as well as its advice on how to spot telltale signs that a company might be cooking the books. While financial and accounting experts might find this analysis a bit basic, we from getAbstract recommend this book to all general business readers.

If your looking to share an opinion with someone and you feel like business leaders are letting you down, then by all means, pick up this book. This book stands on its own and appologizes to no one. The Wharton Business school's review is dead on in citing that the authors are trying to get at something much deeper than the shallow perspective of accounting. Something is fundamentally broken ... and these boys point it out. This book is not about greed, its not about Enron, its not about accounting methods, but its about a deeper and more fundamental issue that no one else seems to be getting to .... our system for understanding the current economic, legal and technological functionality of our corporations is broken. As the authors point out, "Have you been able to tell recently when you hear an earnings report on the news if anyone can tell the difference between them lying to you and the truth? I've been listening and I can't distinguish Xerox today from Xerox a year ago when I hear it on the news. The people these guys are talking about begins with us. Read this book and read it deep. There is a warning here that we all better pay attention to. Remember, this book is acknowledged to have been written before all this Enron stuff took place, and then a little Enron perspective was added. If the authors are actually that correct, we have a long way to go to fix the curret problems.

I just purchased a copy of Harmon's book Zero Gravity 2.0.
I am new to the investment arena and found this book extremely useful. In fact, I have already acquired backing for my venture.
My hat is off to you Mr. Steve Harmon...

Steve Harmon's reputation as one of the brightest stars in the stock world is well deserved. Steve has a gift for uncovering real value in this Internet age. I follow Steve's Broadband Report and my portfolio is up 220%.I rate Steve's new book with five stars because it's even better than his first...and I learned volumes from that book. I always say, the proof is in the pudding and I happen to be enjoying a rather large bowl thanks to Steve Harmon.

Steve has presented an in depth look at the venture capital world in this release of Zero Gravity 2. I appreciate his no-nonsense approach and his willingness to expose what goes on behind the scenes. Very good insights!

Drew Field wrote this book in 1997 to encourage entrepreneurs to bypass Wall Street and float their shares directly to individual investors. In hindsight, we can see that almost everything that Field predicted in the book was wrong, but it is precisely due to the enormity of his mistakes that this book is relevant in the year 2000. Field's premise was that brokers were ignoring equity issuance and individual investors in favor of big-ticket, M&A-style transactions and institutional deals like securitizations. This shift had created an imbalance in which struggling entrepreneurs were cut off from the capital that they needed to get their businesses off the ground. Of course, what happed in reality was exactly the opposite: A boom in venture capital and the stratospheric rise of the IPO market created an equity bubble of epic proportions, and many start-ups that should never have made it past the garage door raised hundreds of millions of dollars. All of this brings us to the present day, when an IPO backlash has dashed the funding hopes of many public wannabes. To the founders of these companies, we [...] ask: Direct Public Offering, anyone?

Considering how little has been written on the subject of Direct Public Offerings (DPOs), this book is a clear introductory text that is easy to read. As an entrepreneur considering a DPO, I am grateful for this book -- it convinced me that a DPO for our company will be successful! More than that, it convinced me there are a number of advantages to doing a DPO besides raising capital.

There are two caveats I would ask readers to keep in mind, however. 1) View this book as an introductory text. It does not contain sufficient detail to answer your every question, and no doubt, additional research will be required. 2) The author makes liberal use of trends and statistics, but many of the references are out of date: This seems to be typical of authors who rush to publish a subseqent edition of their earlier work, without going back and updating a lot of their detailed research.

Despite the draw-backs listed above, for anyone considering taking a company public, this book is a worthwhile investment at a modest price.

Drew Field writes from experience gained through more than a dozen direct public offerings in which he has personally participated. The book lays out the required rules for a corporation to raise funds by selling its stock to the public. This is a complicated subject which Mr. Field simplifies to a workable set of do's and don't's. You'll understand the steps to follow to raise funds and which regulations must be adhered to for your selected type of offering. The most compelling portion of the book contains the case histories of actual offerings. Mr. Field will show you, through real world examples, what can work for you to acquire the funds you need for your business.

I bought this book thinking that I could find out a bit about investing specific to small stocks. What I found was a book which has some common sense rules for investing - i.e. it helps to know about the company and business it is in. Unfortunately the book also contains incorrect facts. For example, Mr. Case puts forth the silly notion that investing the same amount of money in a $5 stock gives one better chances than investing in a $50 stock because you get more shares. Of course, this isn't true - if it were, there would be no $50 stocks. A great counterexample is the stock of Berkshire Hathaway whose stock has appreciated at a faster rate than most other stocks and has a per-share price of somewhere between $75,000 and $100,000. I could go on, but you get the point. Find another book on this subject - there are plenty of good ones.

The author deals with the everyday "Joe or Jane" that may be interested in picking small-priced stocks. Buy more shares with less money. Makes sense. One time I bought 1000 shares of Adac Labs at $1 when it had been accused of giving false information to the SEC. After they corrected the information, the stock soared past $5 and I sold it. Another terrrific book on this subject is MAKING DOLLARS WITH PENNIES: HOW THE SMALL INVESTOR CAN BEAT THE WIZARDS ON WALL STREET by R. Max Bowser. Bowser has a successful system he developed over 25 years, trading stocks priced $3 or less a share.

The Dot.com has dot.bombed--and this cipher selection stands as mute testimony to the reality that these two "rang the bell at the top" of the internet bubble by rushing this embarrasing collation into print.

Of their "Top 10" THREE are no longer in business, or are barely able to stay listed on exchanges, and the other 7 are equally ugly.

When Walden wrote his self-aggrandizing review, he stated there would be the potential for a 75% swing DOWN in a stock. HE A) wrote that after the bottom fell out of internet stocks, B) failed to warn that the "upper number" was closer to 98% swing down, not 75%, and C) failed to give eBay its due, a very very successful internet stock "to own."

And they BOTH missed PayPal, the young internet upstart--in business when they wrote this tout, who blew eBay's Billpoint in house payment service plumb off the race track as well.

Those who want to know what to short and when to short should be the only ones to buy Walden's advisory books...he's rung the bell at the top more than once by his cookie cutter, rush to press, just as the "game" is over and the momentum players surge to a new gambit tack. A review of his titles bears out this historic reality.

I agree with Peggy, this book doesn't have much meat even just for surveying the internet stocks landscape. "100 Best Internet Stocks to Own" by Greg Kyle does a much better job in this respect by providing more information on each company's background, major turn points of stock prices in their history, analysis of business challenges as well as opportunities. More informative and more insightful. Put these two books side by side, you'll notice the difference in no time.

Peggy Mannix has completely missed the point (and value) of Walden's latest book, and apparently didn't read his introduction. Yes, many of the stocks have gone down in value due to the correcting marketplace, but the point of the book is to provide guidance for those of us who want to include Internet companies as a part of our portfolios. I found the discussion about the many facets of the Internet marketplace extremely helpful in understanding how the new economy operates. As the title says, these stocks are "for the long run." If you're looking for get rich quick picks, look elsewhere. If you're looking for solid advice about incorporating internet stocks into your portfolio, Walden's book can be of tremendous help.

This book, guide, reference, ... or what ever you name it. is essential for all business, financial and investment guides.

I take issue with the reviewer who suggested that Tom Copeland/McKinsey's book "Valuation" is better than this one or is more directed at valuaing big businesses. ... On the other hand, it should be said that valuation techniques do not differ between big companies and small companies (especially if big/small companies are publically traded). Valuation techniques vary depending on (a) what sort of asset is being valued (public equity, vs. private equity, vs. business assets as a whole, etc) and (b) why valuation is being done (for M&A, litigation between business partners, divorce, ESOPs, for equity investment/divestment). If an investor is valuing a $50 Billion public company and a $50 million public company, the technique used for both is (probably) the same.

If anything, this book does an excellent job in reminding us of the diversity of valuation techniques in use, and the diversity of reasons for doing valuations. Given the frequency with which privately held companies are bought, one would think that knowing how to value companies whose stock is not publically traded is useful for general businesspeople, not just accountants and attorneys. But if you absolutely insist that you just want to know how to value publically traded companies and don't give a hoot for calculating "private equity discounts" or "minority shareholder discounts", then I would recommend Aswath Damodaran's books "Damodaran on Valuation", "The Dark Side of Valuation" or "Investment Valuation". Damodaran, professor of Finance at NYU, actually uses the same techniques taught here, but applied to public equity investing and with different names (for example, what is called the "Market approach" here is just what Damodaran calls "relative valuation" in a different context).

I have found Mr. Pratt's book to be an outstanding and practical general reference guide to valuing privately-held businesses. Due to the book's breadth of material and balanced focus on both the science and art of valuation, I have found "Valuing A Business" to be an excellent professional reference for anyone entering the field of business valuation. I highly recommend it.

In addition to the common "science side" valuation techniques, issues, and approaches that are found in many valuation textbooks, Pratt provides unique, valuable insight into the "art side" of valuation. The book also includes real life project execution considerations for litigation support, expert witness testimony, and taxation. "Valuing A Business" offers solid information to assist a practitioner in building a quality framework for conducting a comprehensive private company valuation.

This books contains names that we have all become familiar with over the past several years. There were several references to chapter 7 and how to value these companies. It was really lame and not worth the wait.

If you want a general overview of what everyone means when they say "internet company" this would do the trick. This book won't help you at all in becoming more successful in investing. The information in this book was not anything new and could easily be picked up by reading any general publication.

This book gives a good overview of what internet companies are. It talks about what kinds of internet companies there are and tells of the risks and benefits in them. It teaches the reader all the basic components of an internet company and what everyone should know before investing in this sector

Net Worth gives good sound investment advice that the layman can understand and can also be applied to different business sectors.

Wall Street Journal and CNBC Internet correspondent Stephen E. Frank has written a thorough basic book about where the Internet has come, where it is now, and where it might go in the future . . . and what that means for investors. His view focuses on the pros and cons of the different business models that are being employed and how a thoughtful investor can pick stocks and mutual funds to benefit from the Internet as a phenomenon. The book's only serious flaw is that it doesn't quite link to what you have to expect will happen with the Internet for such investments to be a better idea than simply owning index funds.

As to Internet stocks, "the days of easy money are over." On the other hand, "the time to get involved [with Internet stocks] may finally have arrived." The book "will help you know what to look for."

Where many Internet book authors comment that you should invest in the Internet, Mr. Frank has a different point, "every company will be, to one degree or another, an Internet company." He feels that "for you as an investor, it's important to know what that means . . . ."

He makes three fundamental assertions: (1) "The Internet is for real . . . ." (2) "It isn't too late to become an Internet investor." (3) Investing in Internet stocks requires the same disciplines as any other stock investing ("do your homework, know what you're buying, invest for the long haul, and don't buy stocks that will keep you awake at night").

He is also "assuming you know the fundamentals of investing."

Unlike most books that encourage you to beat the averages, this one often mentions and makes the case for buying the broad indexes through mutual funds. He correctly points out that the indexes are adding Internet stocks to them, and that companies in the averages are becoming Internet companies. So investing in the Internet is almost unavoidable for most.

This is the first in a series of books looking at the Internet after the bust. Based on some of the examples, I would guess that this was completed back in 2000 before the awful fall in stock prices during the first three months of 2001.

Mr. Frank uses AOL Time Warner as an example of how there is a convergence occurring between Internet and non-Internet companies. Amazon.com has physical warehouses, and e-Bay owns an auction house. Car companies now buy their parts through an on-line auction.

The book looks at business to consumer, business to business, Internet infrastructure providers, proxies for the Internet (like UPS), incubators, mutual funds, and most importantly . . . valuation.

Each chapter is filled with mini-profiles of some of the more successful companies in that particular space. Most people will find some examples to be new to them, especially outside of business to consumer.

Pay particular attention to the valuation section. It will help you understand when high multiples may be warranted and when they are not. Using this methodology, you will realize that many Internet stocks are very overpriced even now in light of the slower growth expected.

I found many of the forecasts quoted in here to be ludicrously optimistic. At a time when most people will not even use a credit card on-line, the book talks about very large percentages of basic consumer goods being sold on the Internet by 2004. I don't think so.

I couldn't make a case for buying stocks that are mostly on the Internet from reading this book. So I think the book is irrelevant to almost all investors in the current market.

The discussion of the risk you have to take to match or exceed the market averages was inadequate here. In the early days of most new technologies, over 95 percent of the public companies become ultimately worthless. That process still has a long way to go on the Internet. I suspect the arguments here will make more sense in 2-5 years when the future prospects are clearer.

Mr. Frank's arguments were also light on considering the risks of future technologies. For example, in a time when bandwidth is about to become virtually unlimited, the Cisco router technology becomes not very valuable (as George Gilder and others have pointed out). Many of the hardware and software suppliers described here are riding outmoded or soon-to-be outmoded technologies.

Also, the Internet business models are very primitive and usually ineffective. I suspect that we have not yet seen the first good one. So take much of the work in here on business models with a large grain of salt.

Still, I think Mr. Frank did a much more creditable job on this subject than any other book I have read about Internet stock investing. Until something better comes along, this book will be the gold standard on this subject.

I do believe that very few people should be buying Internet stocks, except as part of owning mutual funds invested in braod stock indexes such as the Standard and Poor's 500.

To put this book in perspective, imagine that you were reading about buying the companies that were participating in the radio boom in the 1920s. How well would you have fared if you had taken this approach then? I haven't figured it out, but you probably would still be losing money. After all, something else better will supercede the Internet someday in the same way that television dominates radio.

Measure your downside risk first, then see whether or not there could be enough potential to repay you for taking that risk.

In his introduction, the author attempts vainly to put Merrill in the same category as Morgan and other great financiers. The problem is that he was not a financier, just a guy riding the trend of retailing in the 1920s. But his gratitude for his own personal pension fund appreciating in the 1990s and attributing it to people like Merrill is extremely embarrassing. This suggests that the author is trying to ingratiate himself to Merrill's company. A little balatant. More to the point, Mr. Perkins did not seem to understand his topic very well. He constantly refers to the backroom at Merrill as "backstage." The backroom and its problems was a big topic on Wall St from the 1950s through the 70s although Perkins seems unaware of the whole problem and constantly refers to it as backstage. Did anyone ever research a topic so poorly? Whether Merrill deserves a full fledged biography still remains unclear after reading this amateurish attempt.

I learned a lot about Wall Street history from this book. The relatively overnight successes of technology driven Wall Streeters should not obscure the more remarkable achievements of Charlie Merrill. The author skillfully describes the times in which Merrill operated and gave me a balanced view of Merrill's strengths and weaknesses. The story moves swiftly along and I gained a real appreciation of the future Merrill saw, the opportunities he capitalized on, and those he inspired along the way.

Charles Merrill is an authentic American genius and today's capital markets bear his distinctive stamp in many ways, as Edwin J. Perkins' book proves in fascinating detail. While the book works as a business history and as a professional portrait, it is less successful as a biography because Perkins deliberately chose to focus on Merrill's professional life. By keeping Merrill's personal life very much in the background, Perkins declines to bring Merrill's personality to life. We learn about his career, but we do not seem to get to know the man himself. Happily, Merrill's achievements and business innovations are well worth examining. His commitment to service, integrity and the good of the common customer - even when that angered the elite customer - made him richer than most of the aristocrats who fought against him. We [...] recommend this worthy portrayal of a riveting role model to entrepreneurs, finance professionals and any business history buff.

Wouldn't it be interesting to know what really goes on inside Fidelity? They own every company in America and their proxies ought to control the outcome of every boardroom battle, what a subject! Plus, this is one man's creation and certainly a discussion of who he is and what he does would be interesting.

But, no. Unfortunately, you can't look here for much of any insight into any of these subjects. Too bad.

This is a book that needed to be written: the explosive growth of the mutual fund industry in the past 20 years is one of the seminal events of our generation, and Fidelity is the most important mutual fund company out there. That having been said, I think that Diana Henriques could have done a much better job. The text is often jumpy and disjointed, and the actual events as Henriques relates them often don't warrant the build-up that she gives them in her introduction to them. More disturbing, I disagree strongly with many of her criticisms of Fidelity. Don't get me wrong: there are many valid criticisms of Fidelity that can be made, from the exorbitant fees it charges for average performance to the many ethical lapses that have plagued Fidelity in the past 10 or 15 years. But Henriques carries it too far. In one breath, she criticizes Fidelity for selling massive amounts of stock early on Black Monday in 1987 to meet the equally massive redemption requests that its funds had received over the previous weekend because most Fidelity funds did not have sufficient cash on hand; in the next, she criticizes the Fidelity Magellan fund for having too much cash on hand in early 1996, thus missing the big market rally that was in progress then. Likewise, she criticizes Fidelity's active role in corporate governance and then later criticizes Fidelity's policy that Fidelity funds in the aggregate cannot own more than 15% of any company. You can't have it both ways -- any organization which controls more than 15% of a publicly-traded company is going to have a big influence on the way that company is run. At its core, I think that Henriques's fundamental problem is that she believes that the Americans are and ought to be complete financial waifs who cannot be expected to make decisions about their finances in a responsible and informed manner. This assumption causes her to take Fidelity to task for things that Fidelity should not be taken to task for, and it undermines her books credibility.

The author tells the very interesting history of Fidelity Investments and FMR, from Ed to Abby Johnson, and through it, a history of the mutual fund industry in America. The author makes a case for Fidelity being an autocracy geared to selling shares in mutual funds at all costs. Certainly, the last few years have shed a lot of light on the seamy side of Fidelity. In Fidelity's defense, little is told of the "good guys" at Fidelity like longtime manager George Vanderheiden, and even the tale of Magellan is told haphazardly (what happened to Morris Smith?). Still, I found that I was pretty much unable to put it down for long, and it was pretty good read.

If you're lookin for an extensive overview of all the basic theories of IPOs, this is a good book. It's like an "IPOs for Dummies". Focus is a bit too much on Underpricing, however. I missed good overviews of Long Term Underperformance and Hot Issue Markets. Quite old (1996) so a lot of important work is not covered. New version was released 1999.

Financial economists (academics) have an interesting way of interpreting the world. When it comes to IPOs, what practitioners think and do and what the academics "think" that they do are often different.

This book is a solid contribution for those who what the academic IPO literature interpreted for them. It succeeds admirably at what it does, which is to interpret the findings of a lot of published studies in the finance journals that are hard to wade through unless you are a PhD in economics.

I teach finance to MBAs and this book was an excellent review and synthesis for me and fairly accessible to my MBAs. I understand the book has been updated in '99. That is good, since this topic is still in flux.

This is NOT a "how to" go public book. It is a valuable conpendium of how economists think about IPOs.