Investment-bank

i found that book is very useful for me. it contains most important things about banking. and i need it.

This is a splendid book. Not only does it give an easy-to-read history of Mercury Asset Management of the UK up to its acquisition by Merrill Lynch, it also gives additional insights into the life of Siegmund Warburg (detailed in Ron Chernow's "The Warburgs") and represents a vivid insider's account of any business, told by Peter Stormonth Darling, chairman of Mercury from 1979 to 1992.

If you have read other investment management company histories such as Diana Henriques's "Fidelity's World" or Robert Slater's "The Vanguard Experiment", this book should be on your reading list as yet another view. Mercury, though not well known in the US, had something like US$180 billion under management at the time of its acquisition by Merrill Lynch, certainly not a small amount in the asset management league tables worldwide. Though Mr. Stormonth Darling is admittedly not an investment practitioner himself, he does appear to have a keen insight into people and the view from the top of the organization.

The book lays bare the importance of personnel (and their happiness) to the success of companies such as Mercury and Warburgs, and discusses at some length possible reasons why Warburgs was sold at very little premium to Swiss Bank in 1995, while Mercury was sold to Merrill Lynch at twice its prevailing market value in 1997.

It's also interesting to reflect that Mercury was at the top of its game in 1997, as a leading fund manager in Britain, yet it still sold out to a large foreign firm, as many leading British financial firms have done in recent years. I hope that the individual British personnel of these foreign masters, whether Continental European, American, or Asian, strive to maintain their intellectual independence as time goes on. The investing public continues to need alternative viewpoints on investments, such as that expressed by Andrew Smithers (also once part of Mercury) and Stephen Wright in their 2000 book "Valuing Wall Street".

Please do give "City Cinderella" a read, and enjoy Mr. Stormonth Darling's delicious follow-up details such as (p. 89) "...at last report [said person] was living in Panama with his fourth wife and their poodle, Chanel."

Jess Lederman, one of the editors of this book, has written or edited many books on mortgage banking, markets and interest rate risk - he is simply the most-informed writer on the subject, and if this is your area of interest I recommend you pick up anything he's been involved with and read it.

I am continually pleased with each and every fabozzi book I buy. The man is prolific and always provides you with real data, great overviews, and commentary by leading people in the field. This book is no exception.

This landmark study of leaked World Bank documents published in 1982 went out of print in the 90's while the issues of consolidation of wealth and economic power raised here grow in relevance. The erosion of political autonomy in Third World nations remains a crucial issue. Clearly written, this book highlights the need to read more than American news in order to understand the history of the postwar era in the Philippines. The West's economic colonization of the globe is glossed over in much of the current Western media. Based on over 6,000 pages of secret reports, memoranda, and assessments of the World Bank's programs in the Philippines by Bank Philippines is a revelation of the ideals of Western hegemonic policy hidden behind euphemisms of "development" and "modernization." The book is an early attempt to debunk ex-Vietnam War policy architect and World Bank president Robert McNamara's 70's 'relief for the poor' rhetoric.

The (former US ambassador to the UN Jeane) "Kirkpatrick Doctrine" which claims, according to The Nation's David Corn, that right-wing authoritarian governments (which often are amenable to U.S. interests) are more likely than Communist nations to move toward democracy, justified US governmental support of authoritarian regimes. In outlining the patterns of the US led World Bank's complicity in the repression of Philippine people the book highlights a litany of mistakes in policy judgement, botched development and relief programs, corruption and repression to facilitate debt service. The hypocrisy of the Bank's self-mandated non-interference in politics is revealed as mere lip service to sustain their public relations image as an organization based upon democratic principles. After displacing many tenant farmers already living in primitive conditions, and creating unmanageable debt, rural development degraded into infrastructure support for government military counterinsurgency. A reign of terror was initiated during the occupation of the island of Samar during which many farmers were not informed that their farms had been designated as military "free fire zones," places where non-military personnel were shot on sight. Justifications for similar occupations of "unstable" territories by means of destructive force is reminiscent of McNamara's Vietnam-era thinking. The way to save the Philippine economy is by deconstructing it.

Urban development was botched even more, if it is possible, than rural. Aid for the very poor was never harmonized with the Bank's repayment requirements. Industrialization created little net capital growth and imposed wage and price restrictions, devaluation of currency, removal of protective tariffs (decimating preexisting national industries), and established control over labor unions aggravating the hardships of the poor. The projected debt service ratio in the Philippines rose to over 30% of total exports. The cure of structural adjustment loans was worse than the illness, if one can call it that, of lack of development. Martial law and the regimens of economic liberalization, further devaluation, depression of wages, increased taxes, and the installation of a pro-Bank officials in President Ferdinand Marcos' cabinet only served to increase the Philippine's political and economic instability, and did little to rectify their unfair distribution of wealth.

The Bank does not seem to have learned from its mistakes, but we may see what we can expect if the principles of free trade are permitted to reorganize the global economy. The political and social fallout of such policies on fragile economies may very well be an element of the political instability in many possible trouble spots now causing anxiety around the world. If poverty is an indicator of an unfair distribution of wealth, then the World Bank has contributed to the growth of that poverty with the resulting political instability. This book is a must for anyone interested in an alternative history of World Bank policy, and some background on the current rush to globalization. END

Provided as a foundation to my employer's internal training programs, this is a fantastic book. Often arcane financial terms made accessible and understandible, even to the uninitiated. I highly recommend it to anyone working in the financial sector, or with a keen interest in their own financial matters.

this book is a valuable reference for the researchers in the international business field. I recommend it to the academic world.

My Piggy Bank is a colorful, rhyming picture book by Tom Lewis about a young girl discovering the joy of saving money for a rainy day. When the opportunity comes to spend part of her savings, she elects to buy something unexpected - another beloved piggy bank with which she can save twice as much! An upbeat, charming story with impressionable and appealing color illustrations by K. L. Darnell, My Piggy Bank is simply wonderful reading and a very highly recommended addition to school and community libraries.

This is a review from the Financial Times in London. JRB Copyright 1994 The Financial Times Limited; Financial Times (London) November 2, 1994, Wednesday By CHRISTOPHER HOWE 'OPENING JAPAN'S FINANCIAL MARKETS' By J. Robert Brown Jr. Routledge, Pounds 45, 272 pages ... The Japanese began systematic preparations to penetrate the western economies about 130 years ago. Serious, large-scale efforts to reverse the process date only from the rise of the Japanese trade surplus in the early 1980s. Given the linguistic, psychological, institutional and other barriers between the parties, it is not surprising that the balance of economic advantage in recent years has seemed to be so much in Japan's favour. Furthermore, although the west is beginning to catch up, at least in consciousness of the problem, the problem itself gets more difficult. For whereas the main challenge used to be how to penetrate the markets for goods, there is now increasing concern with the markets for services and with the obstacles to making a success of direct investment in Japan. J. Robert Brown's book is one of the most interesting accounts of these subjects yet to appear. Based on careful study of the literature and on more than 100 detailed interviews, it throws new light not only on the banking sector, but on the wider issue of how public and private sectors can interact in the process of market opening. A small number of western banks had established themselves in Japan before the Pacific War, including the old British Far Eastern banks, and Citibank, representing America. These mainly supported foreign trade and the banking needs of foreign companies in Japan. In the case of Citibank, at least, care was taken not to compete with domestic banks, on whom it relied for advice on local creditworthiness. During the post-war occupation, foreign banks had a new opportunity to re-enter the market and three prominent American Banks did so. Again, however, the foreigners were sidelined rather than integrated into the mainstream of the financial system, focusing on trade finance and short- to medium-term dollar lending. After the occupation, the Japanese government and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) resumed control. No new foreign entrants were allowed in for many years and a highly regulated financial system was established. In this system, Japanese institutions were assigned designated, highly specialized roles and the volume, direction and price of credit flows were each tightly controlled by an MOF with enormous legal and discretionary authority. The only way in which foreigners could be fitted into the picture was to restrict them to specific classes of business, such as foreign exchange, trade and dollar lending. Foreign banks acquiesced in these arrangements through much of the 1960s and early 1970s partly because their niches were exceptionally profitable. So much so, that in the early 1960s Citibank's profits from only four branches were larger than those of Fuji Bank, the largest of the Japanese City Banks. The other reason for acquiescence was that in the Japanese system, since banks rather than security markets were the main source of industrial finance, they were called upon to provide what was in reality a form of risk-sharing, equity finance, and were also expected by the authorities to provide both leadership and, when necessary, bail-outs for large companies. At the time, western bankers, with their short term, balance sheet approach to lending, found these practices unacceptable and hence were unwilling to undertake a lead role in company lending, even had they been encouraged to do so. All this began to collapse after the oil shock of the 1970s and the rise of US-Japan trade frictions in the 1980s. What Brown brings out so clearly is that liberalisation and market opening occurred because it was in the interests of both the western banks and the Japanese City Banks. Both sides wanted new instruments and avenues to funds and both wanted abolition of the old division between banking and securities business. The government had ultimately to agree to change, and all that this entailed, because of its need for large-scale bond financing to cover its budgetary deficit. Brown also shows that, although driven by these underlying factors, the occasion of the big breakthrough was the Reagan-Nakasone summit of 1983, when an embarrassing absence of business allowed the Americans to put the financial services issue on an unexpectedly high-level agenda. In spite of all the change and the formal steps towards liberalisation that have taken place, the longer term results remain disappointing. On the positive side, examples such as Citibank have shown that by taking a long view and making a careful analysis of the market, by a shrewd combination of conformity and innovation, and by good training and personnel policies, it is possible to make a success of business in Japan. On the other hand, the overall profitability and market shares of western banks as a group, remain very low. A fundamental reason for this is that there remain strong traditional elements in both the relationships between the financial system and the MOF, and between the institutions and their customers. Whether the political economy of the post-'Bubble' era will change this, or whether western companies will adapt even more flexibly to Japanese ways, remain fascinating questions for the future.

I deal with European law and financial services for a long time now...this book simply comprises the most complete and best scientifically argued volume on the legal, economic and political framework of European financial services regulation and supervision!