In-the-tank Books
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Pretty good first person account of combat in a Sherman TankReview Date: 2009-06-29
an excellent personal WWII memoirReview Date: 2009-06-01
Solid but needed expandingReview Date: 2009-01-08
The author does go into detail but not to the extent that I would've liked. This said, he writes about fighting Tiger 2's, JagdTigers and the panzerfaust troopers lying in wait for him. He is the gunner and he scores a good number of `hits', though he doesn't give a face to those he fought and this has made his account seem less vivid. He is more forthcoming giving voice to his own fears and those he shares his tank with though. Again, interesting but without giving me the feel of being in that smelly tank with him. The other thing I suppose, is that his time in the ETO is in the few months before VE Day, there is no Bulge for instance. His experiences do include liberating the V weapon slave camp at Nordhausen and fighting those Tigers near the training facility at Paderborn. He also found himself to be the lucky recipient of one of the first Pershings. There's also some interesting street fighting, in support of infantry.
Overall, a solid read, with some different perspectives and experiences to those of the infantry. However compared to most of those, I feel it lacks depth, probably due to being a bit on the short side.
Memoir of a tank gunner.Review Date: 2008-12-10
One note is the fact that John Irwin was a crew member of a very rare type of American tank at that time- the M-26 Pershing (a Super Pershing in his case). As a history major, I found that informative. I have never read anything by someone who actually fought in any of the few Pershings in Europe during the Second World War. So Irwin gives a very positive evaluation of the future of American tank design; almost all American tank designs up until the M-1 Abrams are essentially variations of the Pershing. It was certainly a different Army than the one we know today- in some ways it was better; less mercenary. We would do well to heed that.
Authentic combatReview Date: 2008-11-08
In places, the book is humorous. I laughed where Irwin describes how he is temporarily captured before even entering combat.
One time Irwin is reprimanded for killed a German squad that had just surrendered. When you read the book you will find out why his action was justified.

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A must read for armor enthusiastsReview Date: 2009-02-13
Armored Thunderbolt Review Date: 2009-01-25
Armored Thunderbolt is a very well written account of the Sherman Tank and how it came to be the legend it is. It is essentially a chronological volume showing the development of the Sherman, the legend, the myths, and end results, of one of the most popular or unpopular tanks (if you wish) of the 20th century.
While it is not what you would consider a technical free for all type of book, it gives you the basic statistics and types of the venerable Sherman. The book describes the various types of the Sherman, while not getting too technical on the multitude of changes to production runs of the same series of tank. This means it is not going to tell you when a certain style of turret made its' appearance in the development, but it does give you a breakdown of the M4 series and the major advances or improvements made with the development of the Sherman over the span of the Second World War and on into the cold war.
Armored Thunderbolt in intended as a more general and understandable history of the Sherman without all the overwealming tech information. In depth technical Information is better retrieved from the R.P. Hunnicutt volume entitled the Sherman, well known as the bible for all Sherman enthusiasts.
There are many chapters in the book covering the use of the Sherman in the various theatres of war and how it was employed. It is quite interesting to see the differences in how the tank was used by the different branches of the services especially in how the crews stowed the tank with both personal and military equipment. While a tank in North West Europe may have been found to be covered in the crews baggage and war booty, tanks in the Pacific theatre of war had very little stowed outside them. This was due to the profound use of the tank in close combat with infantry where the stowage could easily be set alight by the enemy causing great difficulties for the crew.
A short section in the book also covers the use of the Sherman in the experimental role and its role as an armored engineer vehicle. This information is well received as it shows how the Sherman was adaptable to various uses throughout its' life. Armored Thunderbolt also gives you a good look into the changes made to the next generation of tank, The Pershing and how lessons learned with the Sherman affected its' development.
Armored Thunderbolt is a book well worth being in any military vehicle enthusiasts' collection with its excellent selection of photographs and informative text. Quite frankly, I had never seen many of the photos that appear in the book and I was truly impressed with the authors' exhaustive attempts not to reuse many photos that can be seen in other books on the Sherman. The reader must be aware though that this is a book on the American use of the Sherman and not one covering all the Allied armies use of it. While there are some photos of the Sherman in Lend Lease use but it generally sticks to American usage in all the theatres of war.
The author has been writing books on military matters for many years. Steve Zaloga is a well known historian as well as a military advisor having a wealth of in depth knowledge and superior access to various archives and collections throughout the world. He has given us a true definitive work on the history of the Sherman worth much more than the asking price of the book.
M4 Sherman Report Card...Zaloga's Best Yet!Review Date: 2009-01-13
Reading ARMORED THUNDERBOLT, one immediately realizes the author has a masterful knowledge of the subject. The reasons the M4 developed as it did over the years are many and varied. What is so impressive about Zaloga's book is his ability to illuminate all the various strands that led to the original M4 design - and its subsequent development - and interweave all those elements into a lucid, entertaining narrative. Make no mistake about it: ARMORED THUNDERBOLT is a valuable, instructive examination of American WWII tank development but it is also a great read.
There have been other Sherman books published but few have shown the clarity, the readability of ARMORED THUNDERBOLT. In my opinion, too many of those books buried the reader under nuts-and-bolts and stats. While Zaloga doesn't shy away from such material, he uses them judiciously to make his points. Consequently, this is a book to savor. While you can certainly read it from cover to cover, it might be more instructive to read a chapter at a time, mulling over the various points and observations Zaloga has raised.
Rather than belabor the point, pick up a copy and enjoy the work of a masterful, knowledgeable author at the top of his form. It is hard to imagine a better written 'report card' on the M4 Sherman. Likewise it is hard to imagine Zaloga topping ARMORED THUNDERBOLT...but I hope he tries! Highly recommended.
Counterpoint to Cooper's "Death Traps"Review Date: 2009-05-19
The Sherman had a bad rap as a "Tommy cooker". This tendency to burn after being hit was blamed on its use of gas rather than diesel as a fuel. Mr. Zaloga demostrates that the real cause was ammo storage. Once this problem was fixed the burn rate after being hit fell from 60-80% to 10-15%.
The Sherman's other main problem was that the Allies were winning. This meant that they were advancing. The most important factor in tank-vs-tank fighting is NOT technical superority. It is who engages first. Here the defenders obviously have the advantage. The Army found that when the defenders fired first, the attackers suffered 4.3 times more casulties than the defenders. So the Sherman tended to get the short end of the stick.
This explains why rear-area Lt. Cooper Death Traps: The Survival of an American Armored Division in World War II thought Shermans were death traps while Col Loza Commanding the Red Army's Sherman Tanks: The World War II Memoirs of Hero of the Soviet Union Dmitriy Loza thought they were much better than the German tanks.
It would be hard to overpraise this book. It is a masterpiece.
One of Steve Zaloga's best books yetReview Date: 2009-04-18
I have read most of Steve's historical works and his understanding of the technology and issues surrounding World War II armored development is unmatched by few in the military history field. This book represents the first time someone has pulled together the entire story of the M4 Sherman tank's technology and production developments, doctrine, fielding,and combat experience in a single volume. It is a complex story that addresses the many personalities, opposing concepts, bitter debate, innovation and expedients surrounding the Sherman tank's compressed World War II service.
Steve handles that story masterfully, particularly the debate between LTG McNair's "battle need" (today what we call requirements-based procurement), MG Bruce's high-speed tank destroyer concept, and LTG Dever's more perceptive view that the "best enemy of the tank is another tank." Steve also explains the difficulty faced by the U.S. Army in meeting the demand for tanks to fight in environments around the world, be reliable, be simple to operate, and that could be produced in large numbers for the U.S. Army and all of its allies. The entire requirement was compressed into a three-year time span where technical intelligence of German Army developments lagged American production by months.
Steve, building on his previously published research, assembles supporting technical documentation of Sherman tank production, fielding, and deployed strength for the first time in one book. Steve is one of the few authors to accurately compare Allied and German tank losses in Normandy. Too many authors stand in awe of the Wehrmacht's Panzerwaffe and criticize Allied armored operations in Normandy and northern France, completely missing how devastating the campaign was to the German Army's tank strength. Allied tank losses were actually less than the Germans between June and September 1944. The reasons for the disparity are clearly spelled out in Steve's book.
The book is not without a few minor errors. These revolve around the American 90mm gun's capability compared to the German 88's and the British 17 lber. The chart that compares the M3 90mm versus the German KwK 36 and KwK 43 is invalid. The 90mm's standard M82 APCBC shell is compared to the 88mm tungsten-cored AP40 shot which has a higher velocity and was produced in extremely limited numbers (800 rounds in 1942 and 8,900 rounds in 1943. Of these only 5,570 were actually consumed by the end of 1943 and 1,600 rounds were returned for use in machine tools). Likewise the performance figures for the KwK 43's Pzgr 39/43 is for the higher performance tungsten-cored AP40 shot, only 5,750 were produced and fewer still were fired. (see Fritz Hahn's Waffen und Geheimwaffen des Deutschen Heeres 1933-1945) The correct comparison should have been the standard German Pzgr 39 APCBC shell, which for the KwK 36 gun penetrates 111mm at 500 meters while the KwK 43 gun penetrates 185mm.
Likewise the the comparison of the American 90mm with the British 17 lber understates the superiority of the American 90mm gun. First the American 90mm was a good all-purpose tank gun with an excellent high explosive round, a round used more frequently than armor piercing in combat. With post-war developments it was also used extensively in Korea and Viet Nam. Second, the 90mm M77 AP shot was capable of penetrating the Panther's front glacis out to 600 yards, the gun mantlet out to 1000 yards, and the front turret out to 1500 yards. This was demonstrated in the test shoot at Balleroy, France in July 1944 and Isigny in August 1944. The 17 lber could not penetrate the Panther's glacis with standard APCBC ammunition even at point-blank range of 200 yards. With tank versus tank engagement ranges in Western Europe averaging 800 meters the 90mm was gun was more than adequate. This was demonstrated in battles along the Roer in the Ardennes, and in Alsace wherever,the M-36 TD's were on hand.
Despite these minor discrepancies this is an outstanding book and one which should be on the shelf of those interested in understanding World War II armored combat developments.
Keith Wooster

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Life in a TankReview Date: 2007-06-13
Superb First-Rate Tank WarfareReview Date: 2008-09-25
It gives a clear and precise account of what being inside a tank was like and the technical problems involved in tank fighting of that era. It also provides valuable insight into the command of armored formations, in particular why the British "left hook" attempt to outflank Rommel at the end of Crusader failed: the "left hook" commander, Brigadier Alec Gatehouse of 4th/22nd Armored Brigade, was afraid to confront the Panzerarmee and was willing to give away his position in Rommel's rear, alerting Rommel to retreat.
It should be noted that it was Crisp's driver who gave the M3 US-built Stuart tank its alternative name, the Honey, by exclaiming something like: "Lord love us, what a honey !".
Contrary to the impression many readers have, the Stuart, while dubbed a "light" tank by the US Army,was vastly superior to the then German and British light tanks (Panzer I, II) both in armor thickness and gunpower. The 37mm gun of the Stuart had a vastly more powerful armor penetrating ability not only of the puny 20mm guns of these earlier light tanks, but was also considerably more powerful than the German 37mm gun (a lower velocity gun on early versions of Panzer III)and roughly equal to the British 40mm (2-pounder) gun or the German short 50mm gun (on some versions of Panzer III).
In Crusader, the US 37mm gun gun was only inferior to the German long 50mm gun (just then appearing) or the German short 75mm gun (on Panzer IV). Checking tables of armor penetration and armor thickness, it was equal to or slightly superior to most German (and all Italian) tanks in Crusader. However, it was Crisp's keen observation and skill in picking off stray German tanks that enabled him to destroy so many.
Spell bindingReview Date: 2008-08-22
My only complaint is that the book is too short. That is a reader's highest compliment.
The Classic First Person Account of Tank Warfare in North AfricaReview Date: 2007-06-06
Crisp gives a great first person account of being a tank commander during Operation Crusader in 1941. This book is great for the vivid descriptions of battles where he survived, though under-gunned and under-armored compared to his Panzer opponents, by using terrain and mobility to advantage. However it is also an accurate account of the mundane activities between battles without becoming boring in the process. All this is accomplished with Crisp's characteristically British flair where he continually relays how important was the need for British troopers to brew their regular pot of tea.
This is a short volume that gives an almost day by day account of the campaign in a very readable fashion. While detailed enough to keep any expert turning the pages, it is also basic enough for the casual reader who just wants a good 1st person account of the War in North Africa.
Very Limited in ScopeReview Date: 2007-05-17

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Terrific book following a tank-infantry unit in action in Southern FranceReview Date: 2009-05-09
I don't have much to add to the general praise for this book. I did want to comment on the story and the various reviews that others have written for this book - the story is much more complex than others have described, and I got a distinctly different take on the tale than several reviewers did.
The Germans were in the midst of what can best be described as a fighting retreat at the time the author's grandfather entered the town of Allan. Leaving one Panther tank and one Marder assault gun behind in town as a rear guard could hardly do much more than slow down the U.S. Army's advance. The engagement was not some sort of major German assault against a U.S. Army small unit, which is what the Amazon blurb about this book would seem to indicate.
The key story point of this book for me was that the author makes it clear that his grandfather, Lt. Danby, fresh from his job as a tank crew training instructor, and eager to get into combat, simply did not have the real-life tank experience to not get himself and his crew killed in his first ever major combat engagement. Lt. Danby was advised by the other tank commander with him not to drive straight into town, but as this guy was a non-com and junior in rank, Danby brusquely chose to ignore this advice.
There was no "rampaging Panther" in this engagement as described in the Amazon review. All that happened was that Lt. Danby drove his tank straight into an ambush, pure and simple. In hindsight, it was pretty obvious that the Germans might have the approaches to the town covered with anti-tank weapons. And so it was the stupidest thing any tank commander could have done to drive in without scouting these approaches first, and doing so got him and two other crew members killed.
The author also states that nobody even clearly saw which of the two German AFV's in town fired the fatal shot, that about half the witnesses thought it was the Marder, and half thought it was the Panther. In his reconstruction of the story, most of the witnesses could not even clearly identify the German tank as a Panther, only that it was a "big German tank", with most thinking it was a Tiger tank (the author figured out that it was a Panther from other military records). In any case, neither German AFV had enough infantry or other support to be viable for long against the much larger U.S. force, and both were knocked out shortly.
In combat, size matters, getting the first shot matters, and good judgement matters. Throughout this engagement, small groups of soldiers from both sides would run into larger or better armed units and get wiped out or captured. That was the nature of the sort of chaotic small-unit engagements that characterized much of the battle for France.
As far as combat tactics with an M4 Sherman goes, you can learn a lot about the quirks of the M4 by reading Dmitriy Loza's "Commanding the Red Army's Sherman Tanks". Loza knew well enough never to drive his tank around a corner or into any new place without first scouting ahead, sometimes getting out on foot himself to do so if he didn't have infantry with him. German anti-tank weapons by 1944 had developed to the point that they could knock out almost any tank, and the M4's thin armor provided little protection against an ambush.
All in all, a superbly written book, and a terrific read. I just seem to have read a somewhat different book than some of the other reviewers.
A nice snapshot from a little-known campaignReview Date: 2009-03-28
This invasion has never gotten the literary coverage of the Normandy invasion, but it was important in the grand Allied scheme of winning the war. While the book doesn't present a complete "big picture" view of the invasion, it does provide a nice little snapshot of what a few small units went through. The narrative flows really well and is filled with various recollections of some of the men involved. If small unit actions are what you like, this will be a book you'll enjoy
Great Book For World War II BuffsReview Date: 2009-02-02
Superb book on the US invasion of Southern France, with a twist...Review Date: 2008-11-19
Well written, splendid research and a very nice background profile of the major personalities. I felt as if I had served and known many of these brave men.
Highly recommend this book.
Very good, if at times a bit overwrittenReview Date: 2008-08-07
The battle took place during the pursuit north from the beachheads towards the southern portion of the French border with Germany. German troops were retreating along a main supply route north, and part of the 3rd Infantry Division, with attached armored units, tried to capture a village near the line of march with the intention of setting up a base of fire onto the main road. However, the Americans inadvertently chose a village occupied by a German Corps HQ, and those Germans defended the position rather stoutly to avoid capture. The resulting battle killed a number of Americans, including the tank platoon commander (author Danby's grandfather) and cut off some others, resulting in their capture. Eventually, the Americans drove the Germans out of the village, and continued with their pursuit of them north towards their homeland.
I enjoyed this book pretty well. I thought at times it was a bit over-written, the prose getting a bit purple in places, and it occasionally has an amateurish quality to it, as when there's an anecdote about a guy who served with the unit but doesn't appear in the narrative who was killed after the war, driving home from his discharge. The book also has a lot of build-up to its one chapter that deals with the actual battle, which is only about 20 pages in length. Definitely recommended for World War II buffs.

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Better than expected!Review Date: 2009-02-17
Peabody Gets it RightReview Date: 2008-12-03
Must readReview Date: 2008-06-23
Praying For Slack is the best!!!Review Date: 2008-12-02
5 STARSReview Date: 2007-07-04
The book also includes a fair amount of action and interesting events from the Vietnam War.
I enjoyed reading it.

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Well Done!Review Date: 2008-11-16
ExcellentReview Date: 2008-11-13
arrived immediatelyReview Date: 2008-08-08
Tank Top Arms, Bikini Belly, Boy Shorts BottomReview Date: 2008-05-05
Get Started !Review Date: 2008-06-04

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Very well written and documentedReview Date: 2007-07-01
Careful what you wish forReview Date: 2006-10-03
RAND analyst David Johnson hammers home on a few themes in "Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers." First, he stresses that the primary lesson learned coming out of WWI, at least from the perspective of the top Army brass, was the central importance of mass mobilization of personnel and efficient, large-scale production of supplies and machinery, which to, among other things, the establishment of the Army Industrial College in 1924. Technology was viewed as important, but clearly auxiliary to men and manpower. In the 1920s a deep sense of isolationism and then in the 1930s the economic impact of the Depression kept Army budgets low. The Army chose to allocate its limited resources to maintaining their manpower, which was less than 50% of the limits set by the 1920 National Defense Act. As Army budgets dropped 20%, personnel never slipped more than 5%. Johnson's central argument is that the Army slipped behind in tank technology and doctrine primarily because the Army leadership made a conscious decision to not invest resources in those areas. In the end, it was wrong of them to point a finger at a stingy Congress or an ungrateful American public. They could have invested more in technology and experimentation; they just chose not to.
Second, the tank and the bomber were developed under starkly different organizational and cultural conditions. The tank was developed in parallel in the 1930s by the infantry and cavalry. Each sub-service saw the tank as an instrument to aid in their strategic mission, not as a fundamentally new way to fight. The cavalry likely missed the greatest opportunity with the tank. It is shocking to read to what lengths many went to defend the horse cavalry, first holding up Poland as an example of a great modern cavalry force and then arguing that German armored success in Poland in 1939 and France in 1940 didn't prove anything. Johnson's book is populated with a number of well-meaning senior Army officers that come off as real boobs in hindsight, but none more so than Major General John Herr, the chief of cavalry in the late 1930s and early 1940s. The armor doctrine created in this environment, where radical ideas were shunned if not outright prohibited, thus reflected traditional missions and tactics. As last as 1938, Johnson notes, there were more hours in the Command and General Staff College curriculum dedicated to horseback riding than to either armor warfare or air power.
The bomber, on the other hand, developed under a much more permissive intellectual environment and one that put a premium on technology over manpower. The story of US airpower during the interwar period is one of a small, elite renegade cadre of officers fighting for independence. In many ways, it was the example of the air corps that prevented a separate armor force from emerging in the infantry. The end result was a dedicated and highly professional core of officers with top technology and a coherent strategy and doctrine for their service, albeit not without serious shortcomings.
Third, despite great differences in organization and culture, both the armor and air forces made similarly disastrous assumptions about how their weapons would be engaged in the next war. The US tanks - greatly inferior to the German tanks, which were designed to fight other tanks - were in fact precisely what the US military asked for. One of the crucial differences in US armor doctrine was the view that the Armor Force (only created in July 1940) was to exploit gaps in the enemies line, not create the gaps themselves. In this sense, US tanks were seen as rather akin to the traditional horse cavalry - a lightly armed and highly mobile force used to harass rear areas and reconnoiter the battle space. The US focused on tanks of high speed, relative light-weight (to allow the crossing of temporary pontoon bridges) and great reliability; firepower and armor were readily sacrificed to achieve these design objectives. The result when going head-to-head with the Panzer Corps - an eventuality the US Army did not see as the prime role for armor units - was slaughter. The key message is that the US Army was NOT supplied with inferior machines, but rather they did not appreciate the looming nature of modern armored warfare and thus entered the war with the "wrong weapons" but they were the weapons they asked for. Moreover, the US Army was convinced that the best way to fight an armored attack was with anti-tank guns. Tank-on-tank battles were seen as wasteful and never really wargamed.
For their part, the Air Corps doctrine and strategy rested on several key assumptions that turned out to be false in practice. First, it was believed that the B-17 and B-24 could defend themselves from fighter attacks because of their rich complement of .50 caliber machine guns. At first this proved to be the case. However, the German Luftwaffe quickly developed new standoff weapons, such as a .37mm cannon that could hit bomber formations outside the range of the bombers' .50 calibers, and the effective use of dive-bombing tactics on unescorted bombing formations. By late 1943, the odds of a US air corps bomber crewmember surviving a 25 run tour were about 35%. Second, it was presumed that the bombers would be able to accurately bomb their targets in daylight hours. By and large, that was not the case. Finally, the strategic air power theory posited that massive bomber formations could cripple a country's ability to make war by knocking out key industrial nodes, such as the production of ball bearings. Again, that thesis turned out to be far from accurate.
In the end, Johnson makes a convincing case that the failures of tank and bomber technology and doctrine in the Second World War were not a product of limited resources or support, but rather the unwillingness of the Army to invest scarce resources into those technologies and reluctance to engage in spirited and realistic experimentation. Thus Johnston concludes: "The Army, in short, was responsible for its own unprepared ness."
An Excellent Study in Military TransformationReview Date: 2002-05-09
Johnson was a career soldier before going to RAND. He has a deep sense of how military cultures operate. His portrait of the cavalry wing rejecting modernity is humorous and tragic simultaneously. It is a case study in how large bureaucracies protect themselves and their caste system from being threatened by new developments.
Equally, if not more fascinating, is his conclusion that the Air Corps was equally one sided in favoring its theory of big bombers. While the cavalry drove out officers who believed the time of the horse was past, the Air Corps drove out officers who believed fighter planes were powerful opponents for bombers. In some ways the Air Corps self-blindness was as dangerous as the cavalry's total identification with an obsolete past. The refusal to recognize the vulnerability of the bomber meant that bomber crews in Europe would have the greatest risk of dying of any elements of the American military.
Johnson also reports on the tankers fixation with lighter, less powerful "fast tanks" rather than the heavier, more powerfully armed versions the Germans settled on. The American fixation was on a fast tank that could break through and run amok behind enemy lines but was incapable of standing up to German tanks in one on one fights. The result was a tank that led to many more American casualties than necessary. Interestingly, all post World War II American tank designs have been based on the German model of heavy armor and heavy guns.
This is a very thoughtful book filled with quotes from sincere, serious professional military men who were dead wrong but determined to protect their views and to use their position in the hierarchy to get the job done.
It is a sobering story for anyone who would modernize a large, complex military bureaucracy.
Failed TransformationReview Date: 2007-01-03
This reviewer would suggest that anyone interested in this book would be well advised to also read a second book, "Beyond the Trenches" by General William E. Odom (ret). In it Odom traces the development of U.S. Army doctrine between the wars and the factors preventing the emergence of a really sound set of doctrines and plans.
Absorbing story illuminates future as well as pastReview Date: 2001-11-02
The story Johnson tells is not one of inevitable historical forces but of human decisions. The decisions were made under the influence of institutions and events, but were not determined by them. They were not catastrophic, but they were well short of optimum. Many Americans died as a result of deficiencies that could well have been avoided.
Because it does not tie the story up in a neat theoretical package, Johnson's book offers no canned recipe for success in responding to present and future challenges and opportunities. Instead, it provides a rich source of inspiration and caution, and a stimulus to thought.
There are a few disappointments, although minor in comparison to the book's strengths: (1) I would have liked to have seen a deeper analysis of the part played by technological factors. While we are too often treated to on-dimensional purely technological approaches to such questions, I feel Johnson goes a bit too far in the other direction. (2) Johnson's citation system for sources, while adequate for a brief article, becomes frustratingly cumbersome at book length. It is too often a real struggle to unearth exactly what his source for a given point is.
Another book that can profitably be read as a complement to this one is William O. Odom's _After the Trenches: The Tranformation of U.S. Army Doctrine, 1918-1939_ (Texas A&M U. Press, 1999).
Will O'Neil

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Everything to do with early N.Africa Tank battlesReview Date: 2002-03-09
There are many official after action reports included as to the effectiveness of the tanks both in reliability and fighting performance. Also the official recommended tactics for battle are given.
Most battles are covered with tactical movements and a map showing them, also battle reports and at the end a summary of the tactics each side used and what conclusions can be made.
The B/W plates are of very clear reproduction and show many details not normally visible like the extra armour plates added to early Pz4D. The Matilda is definately the "star" of this book but there is still a full appeciation of the Italian tanks and guns.
This book covers next to everything those interested in early North Africa Tank battles & tanks could want to know. Like the other reviewer I am eagerly waiting the next 2? books in this series!!
A Gold Mine for WargamersReview Date: 2002-08-30
Absolute Necessity for any Military EnthusiastReview Date: 2001-07-28
Of course, no work is ever perfect. If I had to mention some negatives of the book, I would point out that the maps should be colorized. While useful, these would have been improved with color renditions of the various forces, instead of the black-and-white that is used in the book. Trying to discern the dynamics of the battle was made more difficult since all of the arrows were in black ink.
In sum, this book is an excellent addition to any military library. It covers areas previously untouched and makes a valuable contribution to the field. I highly recommend this work and eagerly await the next two promised volumes that will comprise the whole of the North African campaign.
A wonderful study.Review Date: 2007-01-11
Italians revengeReview Date: 2003-01-18
The author introduce the reader with the complete list of the italian, british and german tanks operating on the theatre and reporting not only the tanks datas but also the ones of the guns and the kills capabilities of all them explaining why the italian army, supported by no more than 100 german tanks was able to keep the entire british army at bay for three years.
Inside this book you'll find tactics notes, use of formation and how not to use the radio in combat, how to plain a tactical operation and how to plain a complete failure overstimating the enemy and completely forgotting the Von Moeltke lessons about the uncertain nature of the battlefield and the strange enemy use to have its own plans...
If you are interested about the tank warfare and the desert one, you must have this book

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An inexpensive photo essay of the King Tiger in serviceReview Date: 2000-12-16
An excellent source on the King Tiger tankReview Date: 2004-01-07
Detailed enoughReview Date: 2007-01-14
An excellent source on the King Tiger tankReview Date: 2004-04-28

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A great contribution to the history of armored warfareReview Date: 2008-12-16
"Rolling Thunder against the Sun" it's the perfect companion for the Oscar Gilbert's "Marines armor in the Pacific" and Bryan Perret's "Tanks tracks to Rangoon", now the question is ¿when somebody publish a similar book in size, deep and price :) about the japanese point of view of armor in the WWII?...
Tanks in the Pacific; Who knew?Review Date: 2008-09-29
I also build WW II model tanks, and this book is an endless source of information, ideas, inspiration, and photos for future armor modeling projects.
Another Side of the Pacific WarReview Date: 2008-09-23
Mr. Salecker's book is a crisp, well-paced narrative of battlefield actions. It avoids the voyeurism that books about fighting the Samurai easily fall into. With the bigger picture of the Pacific War rather limited in his book, Mr. Salecker has done a fine job of producing a micro-history of U.S. Army armored operations in the Pacific campaign. The author is a reliable, informed and entertaining navigator -- he tells a lot of good stories, and tells them well.
As his historic survey makes clear, U.S. Army tanks struggled against the environment almost as much as the Japanese. Tanks lost their tracks burrowing along dense, mine infested jungle paths -- sank into deep underwater shell holes in coral reefs -- got hung up on coconut stumps -- flipped over climbing muddy dirt trails.
Early in the war, fighting for Luzon, Bataan, and New Guinea, the M5 Stuart light tank was effective at wiping out machine gun nests and blasting snipers out of palm trees with canister shot. The M5 was fairly vulnerable to all types of the Japanese antitank guns. More of the armor losses, however, involved untimely mechanical breakdowns, blown tracks, getting hopelessly stuck, and roll-overs. If disabled tanks could not be towed away, crews had to destroy them.
The M3 Lee medium tank and the M4 Sherman medium tank proved to be nearly immune to lighter artillery. Japanese infantry resorted to close assault tactics with magnetic mines, grenades, satchel charges, and Molotov cocktails. Tankers had to provide covering fire for each other as Japanese soldiers attempted to scramble aboard.
Land mines continued to disable tanks throughout the entire Pacific campaign. Encounters with Japanese tanks were very few, and they were always quickly dispatched.
On coral atolls, like Makin, Biak and Kwajalein, the Japanese enjoyed wide fields of defensive fire from pillboxes, bunkers, and camouflaged entrenchments. Faced with fanatical resistance, infantry could make little progress against them without armored support. Tank losses were mostly from floundering in coastal waters, getting deeply stuck, and untimely mechanical breakdowns. The value of flame-throwing tanks was soon recognized.
The Japanese became more knowledgeable on how to destroy tanks as the Pacific campaign progressed. To be sure, the author's respect for the Japanese soldier is apparent. On Saipan, Guam, Peleliu, and Okinawa, the Japanese fought from a interlocked system of caves, tunnels, and spider holes. U.S. Army infantry teams could make no headway against this resistance without major assistance from artillery and armor. Here the 37mm M5 Stuart was ineffective -- the greater firepower of the 75mm M4 Sherman, 76mm M10 tank destroyers, 105mm assault guns, and 150mm artillery were necessary to blast the Japanese out.
Needing to reach remote battlefields, tankers relied on bulldozers to cut trails into the rugged back country. The narrow mountain trails were often guarded by Japanese anti-tank guns, heavy artillery, and machine guns installed in caves. Japanese artillery first drove off accompanying infantry teams, then suicide troops hiding nearby in spider holes would attack stalled tanks.
We learn, for example, that once a tank is disabled, the crew was easily killed trying to abandon their tank. And as Mr. Salecker points out, many men died attempting to tow away disabled American tanks.
As the Japanese were pushed back into smaller areas, they would launch frantic hordes of infantry to overwhelm their besiegers. This often resulted in large groups of Japanese being cornered and annihilated in short order by tankers firing canister and machine guns backed up by covering infantry teams.
"The American's answer to the enemy's strong and integrated defenses was the tank-infantry team, including the newly developed armored flamethrower, and supported by artillery," declares Mr. Salecker. The author shows the almost supernatural bond between these tankers and the infantry.
The author writes in one passage, "Guns and howitzers battered Japanese cave openings, dugout, and pillboxes, forcing enemy gunners back into tunnels for protection and decreasing their fields of fire. Taking advantage of the resulting 'dead spaces,' infantry and tanks crept up on the most vulnerable point, the tanks attacked the position point-blank with cannon, machine guns, and flame, while the infantry prevented Japanese 'close-quarters attack troops' carrying explosives from closing in on the tank." There are some fascinating details to be found among these battle action vignettes.
Mr. Salecker curiously refrains from analyzing Japanese weapons and tactics, preferring to focus on those of the U.S. Army. The author successfully shows the step-by-step development of ground tactics that most likely would be needed to conquer the Japanese home islands. "At the time of the Japanese surrender, there were fourteen independent tank battalions in the Pacific theater of operations."
"Rolling Thunder" has 60 excellent photographs and 25 good maps. There is much to recommend this new work. This book provides a good contrast to armored operations in North Africa and Western Europe. The best moments in the book are the fascinating cameos of buttoned up tankers fighting the fanatical Japanese.
Fresh research on an overlooked subjectReview Date: 2008-06-09
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The biggest problems with the book is that it is too short.