Governments

Dr. Sepideh Gharai Thornhill, Ontario Canada

Geoffrey Hawthorn University of Cambridge

Tu Weiming Professor of Chinese History and Philosophy, Harvard University and Director, the Harvard-Yenching Institute

The ideas here are entirely in keeping with the democratic principles that President Bush has laid out these past two years as the basis of U.S. foreign policy. What's radical about Mr. Palmer's book is that he suggests scores of practical ways in which the U.S. and its democratic allies can live up to these principles, not only in Iraq but around the globe.

Mr. Palmer argues that replacing dictators with democracy is a matter not only of human rights and decency but of global security. Reeling off a list of the miseries that still plague much of mankind -- "famine, refugees, poverty, environmental degradation, corruption, war, genocide, and terrorism" -- he classifies them all as "toxic weeds that bloom in the deep shade of dictatorship." He cites extensive evidence that free nations generally avoid the atrocities to which dictatorships are prone. "Even in its immature form," he states, "democracy offers a better world than the tyranny it displaces."

That is not always the view at the U.S. State Department, where custom and bureaucracy tend to favor the "stability" of established relations with dictators and to nurture the hope that "engagement" will moderate their behavior. Mr. Palmer believes, by contrast, that "softening repression does not eliminate its cause; eliminating the dictator is the only way to do that." He goes on to make the case that, for people living under tyranny, signs of democratic solidarity from the outside, especially from the U.S., matter more than most Americans might imagine.

So what to do? To begin, he recommends that the State Department create a new slot of "Assistant Secretary for Ousting Dictators." Maybe that sounds odd, but it makes a lot more sense than such State Department traditions as bowing low to the Saudis. Mr. Palmer is seeking levers to engineer a shift in the thinking, methods and reach of U.S. diplomacy. He proposes, reasonably enough -- and the italics are his -- that "dictatorship itself must be recognized as a crime against humanity."

For pressuring tyrants from power, Mr. Palmer lays out a kit of practical tools -- some as simple as "the uses of ridicule," which, he notes, really bothers Fidel Castro. He recognizes up front that "a strong defense among the democracies is an absolute precondition for peace and for ousting dictators." Early on, he quotes with approval Michael Ledeen of the American Enterprise Institute saying: "The best democracy program ever invented is the U.S. Army."

Mr. Palmer offers case studies ranging from Chile to the Philippines and draws on his own experience as ambassador to Hungary during the final years of the Soviet empire. He focuses on ways to make contact with democrats inside tyrannies, support them and help them peacefully free themselves. With China, Mr. Palmer recommends tactics as simple as having the U.S. ambassador visiting Beijing parks to perform exercises favored by the persecuted spiritual group Falun Gong. He suggests calling for an annual China Democracy Day, world-wide, which might summon a big display of support abroad and "help undermine the legitimacy of the communist dictatorship."

He also includes brief profiles of the world's current dictators, calling them the "Forty-Five Least Wanted" (now down to 43, with Saddam Hussein captured and Liberia's Charles Taylor forced from office). In these sketches is plenty to ponder. When America earlier this year went seeking a final vote in the United Nations Security Council to oust Saddam, and ended up dickering with the likes of Cameroon, how many Americans knew that Cameroon itself, ruled for the past 21 years by President Paul Biya, is a dictatorship where state security forces routinely torture and murder dissidents?

Not that this book is perfect. Mr. Palmer's prose style is more utilitarian than lyric. And there are a few items I would quarrel with, such as his reverence for South Korea's former President Kim Dae Jung as an exemplary democrat -- something belied by Mr. Kim's own "sunshine policy" sellout to North Korea, mistakenly pushing detente with a regime clearly beyond redemption.

But by and large, "Breaking the Real Axis of Evil" is an invaluable foreign-policy guide. It needs to become a well-thumbed manual on the desk of every diplomat and leader who claims to represent the Free World. An honest United Nations might even want to replace its politically correct lobby exhibits with a portrait gallery of Mr. Palmer's Least Wanted -- and cross them off as they fall. That would be the real start of meeting all those grand U.N. Millennium Development Goals, not by holding endless conferences on ending poverty, hunger and war but by eliminating their root cause: dictatorship.

Ambassador Mark Palmer puts to rest all those generally unfair stereotypes of Foreign Service Officers as "cookie pushing" softies who fall in love with their host countries and blame America for any flaws in the bi-lateral relationship. With this book he provides an inspiring model for precisely what every Foreign Service Officer should aspire: to understand, to articulate, and then to implement very great goals that serve democracy and help extend the bounty of the American way of life--moral capitalism and shared wealth--to every corner of the world.

This is a detailed and practical book, not just visionary. It is useful and inspiring, not just a personal view. It is also a damning indictment of fifty years of US White House and Congressional politics, where in the name of anti-communism and cheap oil America--regardless of which party has been in power, has been willing to consort with the most despotic, ruthless, murderous regimes in the history of mankind. Still alive today and still very much "friends" of the U.S. Government are dictators that think nothing of murdering millions.

There has been some improvement, offset by an increase in partly free countries. From 69 countries not free at all in 1972 we now have 47. From 38 countries partly free in 1972 we now have 56, many of those remnants of the former Soviet Union. Free countries have nearly doubled from 43 to 89, but free and poor is quite a different thing from free and prosperous.

The level of detail and also of brevity in this book is quite satisfying. On the one hand, Ambassador Palmer provides ample and well-documented discussion of the state of the world, on the other he does not belabor the matter--his one to two-paragraph summative descriptions of each of the dictatorships is just enough, just right.

He distinguishes between Personalistic Dictatorships (20, now less Hussein in Iraq); Monarch Dictators (7, with Saudi Arabia being the first in class); Military Dictators (5, with US allies Sudan and Pakistan and 1 and 2 respectively); Communist Dictators (5); Dominant-Party Dictators (7); and lastly, Theocratic Dictators (1, Iran).

Ambassador Palmer makes several important points with this book, and I summarize them here: 1) conventional wisdom of the past has been flawed--we should not have sacrificed our ideals for convenience; 2) dictatorships produce inordinate amounts of collateral damage that threatens the West, from genocide and mass migrations to disease, famine, and crime; 3) there is a business case to be made for ending U.S. support for dictatorships, in that business can profit more from stable democratic regimes over the long-term; and lastly, 4) that the U.S. should sanction dictators, not their peoples, and we can begin by denying them and all their cronies visas for shopping expeditions in the US.

The book has an action agenda that is worthy, but much more important is the clear and present policy that Ambassador Palmer advocates, one that is consistent with American ideals as well as universal recognition of human rights. Ambassador Palmer's work, on the one hand, shows how hypocritical and unethical past Administrations have been--both Democratic and Republican--and on the other, he provides a clear basis for getting us back on track.

I agree with his proposition that we should have a new Undersecretary for Democracy, with two Assistant Secretaries, one responsible for voluntary democratic transitions, the other for dealing with recalcitrant dictators. Such an expansion of the Department of State would work well with a similar change in the Pentagon, with a new Undersecretary for Peacekeeping Operations and Complex Emergencies, my own idea.

This is a very fine book, and if it helps future Foreign Service Officers to understand that diplomacy is not just about "getting along" but about making very significant changes in the world at large, then Ambassador Palmer's work will be of lasting value to us all.

The book he has written is rife with funny anecdotes, touching scenes and aggravating politics as usual. Mandery keeps his perspective through the whole mess.

Mandery asserts that the book is about modern political campaigns in general, and only "incidentally about the 1997 mayoral campaign." Indeed, his position as research director for the Messinger campaign affords the reader a fascinating insider's view of the nuts and bolts of a political campaign at the end of the twentieth century. We are privy to all of the key players, the sometimes-stilted decision-making process, strategy sessions, various private letters between campaigns, focus group sessions, and the research operations. We are even told how much the famous political consultants are paid (it will make you consider a career change!).

At each step of the way Mandery offers his insightful analysis of campaign maneuvers and press coverage. He asks the commonsense questions that any thoughtful outsider might ask. His logic is consistently solid, systematically and lucidly cutting through the muck of political "spin" to reveal the truth of the matter at hand. Though he often wonders aloud whether he can possibly be objective given his position, Mandery scores points for his even-handed critique of both sides.

Perhaps more importantly, and most interestingly, Mandery brings into high relief the cast of characters involved -- the men and women who eat, drink and sleep politics, whose lives move from one campaign to the next. From his boorish campaign manager Jim to colorful rival Sharpton and hilarious longshot Menendez, Mandery describes real characters to rival any of fiction's most entertaining. As Mandery himself might agree, 'you can't make this stuff up.'

This observation is important because it helps the reader understand the importance of nationalism in the revolution. The Algerians did not fight with a detailed governance plan in their back pocket. Rather, they fought for a chance to establish themselves as independent people.
After discussing the Revolution and its rhetorical emphasis on unity, Quandt moves into the Boumedience Era. He notes that Algeria's first president, Ben Bella, lacked an institutional base of support and spent much of his time in office manipulating factions against each other. Ben Bella quietly faded into the background and Boumediene arose as the stable and rather "faceless" leader. He downgraded the FLN (the party credited with winning independence) in importance and suppressed any emerging opposition to his regime. Indeed, after 1968, there was very little internal opposition. During the 1970s, his regime had an Islamic cultural orientation but functioned in a secular socialist manner. There was definitely not much emphasis on a transition to democracy, but "Boumedience, at least, had brought stability to a country that had known far too much political violence" (29).
In the next chapter, Quandt explains that there was inevitable pressure to change, and Boumediene, as an authoritarian ruler, was unable to enact it. Chadli Benjedid became president in 1979, and long-suppressed demands for change came with the Berber spring of 1980. This initial movement for the rights of Berber-speaking people gave rise to other political movements, the most significant being the Algerian Islamic Movement. Beginning in 1982, the Islamic Movement took up arms and gained momentum, though for the most part the stability of the existing order kept protestors at bay. This all changed in 1988, when "the bottom fell out of the oil market." The rentier state was in trouble.
Quandt writes, "the mass protests of October 1988 proved to be one of those turning points that define a country's political trajectory for years to come. It was a nationwide youth revolt, but Islamic activists soon took charge. The military was called in and violence ensued. Hundreds of young Algerians were killed in the first use of the Algerian military against its own people.
As disturbing as this scene was, Quandt notes that it could have been a dramatic turn toward political expression and eventually democracy. Indeed, in 1989 reform-minded allies of Chadli drafted a new constitution. At least on paper, it created three distinct branches of government and guaranteed individual liberties--including what was to soon become a very significant free press. The army was supposed to now be above politics, and a significant new political party, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) challenged the government on a plethora of issues. Many young unemployed and disillusioned men joined this group. Through political mediums such as strikes and the 1991 elections (in which the FIS received about twice the number of votes as the FLN in the first round), the FIS established itself as the new power in Algeria. In June of 1991, however, the army stepped in yet again (it had stepped in during the strike and arrested FIS leaders) and showed itself to be right in the middle of politics-certainly not above it.
In 1991 the army cancelled the constitutionally mandated second round of elections and forcefully removed both Chadli and the FIS from power. Quandt explains the army's motives well:

Many in the military had fought for Algeria's independence and genuinely felt that they had a legitimate role to play in the political life of the country. The FIS was a threat to all that they had fought for and, like the Turkish military, they would not stand by and watch the principles of the state be trampled. (60-61).

Thus, the military took over the state and political violence and terrorism was the norm for most of the nineties. Within months, the FIS was declared illegal. The leader appointed by the military, Boudiaf, was assassinated, and thousands of ordinary Algerians lost their lives in the chaos. Quandt writes, "The inability-or unwillingess-of the state to provide basic security was shocking" (75). Many Algerians emigrated to other nations.
Thus, the political history of Algeria is a complex and sometimes sad one. Quandt's book covers it so well because he understands that there is hope for the country. It has experimented with liberalization and might just be able to make it work. After all, nobody really expected Algeria to rebel against France in the first place, much less win a war of independence. Quandt's book is good because it presents this history in a very detailed fashion (Part I), and then it presents various perspectives to clarify the events and give insight to the future (Part II). An alternate format, like an interwoven mixture of history and analysis, might be very confusing to the average reader.

A book that tears the mask off the fraudulent "War on Drugs". It exposes the growth of the war from two (highly mutually destructive) agencies in 1971 (Customs and DEA) to 55 and counting. It describes very extensive, high-volume CIA involvement in smuggling itself to obtain unaccountable funding.

It documents the cost of the fraudulent war. In dollars misspent, in innocent lives lost through raids gone amok and witnesses silenced, in the credibility of government agencies and the news media, and in the harm resulting from the 5-fold increase (his figures) in drug usage during the time $1 trillion has been wasted in the fight.

Recommend finding this book used or in a library, or reading Levine's chapter in "Into the Buzzsaw" by Kristina Borjesson.

In speaking to another reviewer's point, I don't believe the goal of this book was to present a biography of Ralph Martin. I also don't believe it does a disservice to the d.a.'s office of Boston. I believe, instead, that it sheds light on many of the most important cases and issues faced by the city's law enforcement officials. The writing manages to make the kind of grisly details we see on the nightly news interesting and informative without being pedantic.

I think the book rises to the top of its genre with a bullet, although I'm not sure that the distinction of bullets is really the point.

In addition to Cogburn's primary themes, there's a lot of innuendo and insider gossip, and some interesting short digressions into religion, medicine, and teen sex. This is an entertaining and informative book for John Q. Public. For a much deeper probe of term limits and similar topics, I would recommend RESTORATION, by columnist George F. Will. But then Will is a professional writer, whereas Cogburn's book is ghosted by John Hart, who lends it a sprightly writing style.
Reviewed by Moeursalen (Amazon nom-de-plume)

Mr. Stern seems to believe that dynamic principals can single-handedly reshape a school. That is true to a point. But there are two problems he fails to address. One is that these dynamic leaders are hard to find, and even harder to identify. I worked for many years in public schools and knew many principals. Among the worst was a charming and pretty lady who knew the jargon, conveyed authority and confidence, and was "for the children." She was a PR prize, known in the community and valued as an "expert." She was also a very bad principal. Cronies were in positions of authority, cronies who were always "downtown" or "at a conference" but never around. She wanted everything to run wonderfully, and did not want to know anything about the details. So details were kept away. I am reasonably certain that standardized tests were "corrected" by the teachers, giving comparatively good scores to very weak students. Even in a world of choice, it would be hard to pinpoint her school as anything other than a success. Good scores, great leadership, happy staff. It all looked good. And it was all a charade.

Principals have plenty of other ways of jiggering the books. And giving them additional unregulated power will only allow those with a deceptive streak to provide jobs for friends and lovers, keep critics away, and create personal fiefdoms where their word goes. So, though a dynamic, dedicated principal, willing to work slavishly long hours for low pay, may be the answer, just how many of those guys are there?

But his devastating critique of the New York City public schools, with their entrenched unions that ultimately make the only rules that matter, and his comparisons with (admittedly selected) private schools doing far more with much less should be required reading for those who believe the Chicken Littles in the education world who run screaming whenever any change is proposed.

Public education is a near-total failure. It is outrageously expensive. Teachers control the language of debate, the politicians pretending to debate, and the future voters, so their terms and their ability to exclude critics make them apparently invulnerable. But enough people are avoiding public schools, even the best ones, that change will have to come. I just hope we don't wait until the entire system is in ruins.

The interview is online

There's a transcript for those using dial up.

--J. R.

The reasons for school failure and how to significantly improve our public schools are frequently debated. Proposals include "raise teacher pay", "get more teachers certified by our schools of education", "build better schoolhouses", and the incredible demand, "send us better kids". With a parent's perspective and a keen eye, Stern sweeps aside all the self-serving nonsense and gets right to the point: if the public wants public schools to perform, then schools must be managed to achieve that performance. Management means a controlling authority (most importantly, a principal) with the power to select teachers and other staff who will collaborate to achieve measurable goals. In today's public schools, the principal's inability to hire, fire, or to define work content and compensation, is a fatal blow to any attempts to dramatically improve school performance.

Stern goes on to document how, with $2 billion in annual dues and unprecedented political power that ranges from the local to the national level, the teachers' unions have dominated the political process. On the national and state level, wielding hundreds of millions of dollars worth of political clout, the teachers' unions have generally dominated the legislative process. On the local level, school districts are forced into signing labor contracts running to hundreds of pages, loaded with provisions that effectively eliminate teacher accountability and the principal's control.

Talented teachers and principals are disgusted and often demoralized when they see their profession become a dumping ground for incompetence, protected by a union that only cares about teacher prerogatives, including the "right" not to be judged, and who actively obstruct any drive for standards of performance. Principals with enough integrity to put students' interests first must struggle with a morass of rules and procedures that would be considered farcical in the private sector. The teacher's classroom is a fief impenetrable to any objective evidence of success or failure.

Stern focuses on the massive New York City public school system, where an antiquated administration is helpless to defend the interests of the individual school. In the case of Stuyvessant High School, where the City's finest students are assembled, Stern documents how an aggressively pro-student principal is "grievanced" into retirement by a diligent union representative wielding nothing more (or less) lethal than the teacher contract.

Stern's primary concern is the fate of students from poor homes, where parents are unable to supplement their children's education, and who attend schools where "to teach" is a process, not a result. These students fall behind early and never catch up. The significance of this academic failure is disputed by faddish school-of-ed-talk about "the inner child" and "learning to learn" and "critical faculties". Nevertheless, in the real world where reading, writing and math really matter, these children are stamped once and for all with the mark of the underclass. Meanwhile, down the street, with half the money, the City's Catholic schools are doing a significantly better job with the same students.

"Breaking Free" is a plea for school choice, to date the only school reform movement that has opened a chink in the Berlin Wall of public education. Charter schools and vouchers have proven the enormous pent-up demand for alternatives to the public school monopoly and the potential to do much better with our education dollars. Both programs, ferociously opposed by the unions, are struggling to meet their potential, hobbled by grossly inadequate state and local legislation. Behind these great public battles lies an even greater battle: to create public schools that work.