Free-stock

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Great Investment Overview
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Review of Journal of Economic LiteratureHardly a day passes without the financial press asserting that Japan's economic structure is responsible for the long recession and demanding "badly needed" structural changes. The results of a decade of apparently vigorous counter-cyclical policies have been disappointing. It is therefore not surprising that many experts agree with the Bank of Japan's argument that deep structural reforms are needed to enhance growth. A similar story is being told about Germany. Recent economic weakness is seen by the European Central Bank as evidence that structural re-form is "needed"-a view enthusiastically sup-ported by the financial press (who, according to Dore, constitute an interested party benefiting from the "financialization" that results from introducing U.S.-style capitalism). As Francis Fukuyama argued, the "Anglo-Saxon" free market and stock market based system has become the global standard. It is this mainstream view that Ronald Dore's important and refreshing book is directed against. It deserves praise not just for Dore's courage in defending an unpopular cause.
The book is very timely: it points out the advantages of German/Japanese welfare capitalism just when it is becoming an endangered species. It is rich in detail, yet surprisingly concise. It is analytical, yet highly readable and full of illuminating examples. It combines an eye for macro-economic implications with sound micro-economic and management- level insights. Finally, Dore's book provides an analysis of the ongoing pressures on welfare capitalism and how its salient features are now changing. Dore's readers benefit from his decades of experience and seminal work on the Japanese firm. The relatively smaller weight given to Germany is the book's main (though acknowledged) weakness.
Dore identifies key features that make Ger-man/ Japanese capitalism different from the "Anglo- Saxon" variety familiar from textbooks. The former produces benefits due to its cooperative nature and long-term orientation. The Anglo-Saxon model is good for the shareholders. The Germans and Japanese maintained market mechanisms, but eliminated shareholders as the main beneficiaries. Instead of serving the few, a form of capitalism was born that succeeded in creating a decent quality of life for the many- employees and society at large.
Dore is a must-read for any economist, precisely because he challenges our preconceptions. As is increasingly recognized in the literature, once unrealistic assumptions such as perfect information and efficient markets are relaxed, there is no guarantee that markets left to their own devices will produce socially optimal results. The designers of the German and Japanese systems based their institutional designs on a more realistic description of the world. By focusing on mutually beneficial cooperation and coordination, they managed to internalize externalities, minimize information costs, and, most of all, motivate individuals. They recognized that "utility functions" are interdependent, people compete in hierarchical fashion and have a common desire for justice and fairness of organizational arrangements. Recent growth theories acknowledge the importance of the human resource aspect of "labor." While neglected in static models and policy advice, human resources are at the center of the German/Japanese model.
With regard to the premise that capital is the scarce resource and that "labor" will normally be in fairly abundant supply, Dore says, "It is amazing that anyone can seriously sustain this view in a world awash with so much liquidity that its movement from one country to another keeps exchange rates in perpetual motion" (p. 15). Human resource mobilization requires institutional design. "The whole discussion of modal behavioral dispositions as a factor in the functioning of economic systems tends to be avoided among economists who wish to believe that what they teach their students are theorems about THE economy, determined by the universal utility function of MAN" (p. 38). Not so in Japan, where people tend "to be good at discerning possibilities of cooperation which can be of general benefit, and at devising organizational forms which can reap those benefits in ways which all participants can consider fair" (p. 38).
One such organizational form is the system of industry associations, which are modern incarnations of the medieval guild structure. Due to their public goods character, resulting cartels may be welfare-enhancing. The cooperative orientation does not mean there is no competition. As Dore explains well, competition can be fierce, as the system combines markets and hierarchies. The tendency towards the formation of cartels is counteracted by relatively low concentration ratios in many industries (due to bank finance and cross-shareholdings which result in fewer hostile takeovers) and inter-firm rivalry due to lifetime employment.
Just when economists are beginning to recognize these issues, Germany and Japan are moving toward adopting the Anglo-Saxon model. These changes increase "financialization" and thus the share of economic activity devoted to profit-seeking by shifting ownership certificates from A to B. Adopting U.S.-style capitalism means that Germany and Japan are importing its disadvantages and social problems. Dore asks: Can it be efficient to devote ever more people to servicing "gambling on uncertainties in financial markets" with analysis, advice, appraisal, advertising? As increasingly strong shareholders demand "value," will social welfare or overall fairness increase? One issue remains: If it is so successful, why is Dore one of the few to defend welfare capitalism?
Recent weak economic performance is blamed on the system, and it is seen to have out-lived its usefulness. Whether this is really true must be investigated, though it is beyond the scope of Dore's book. In my forthcoming book (2003, Princes of the Yen, Japan's Central Bankers and the Structural Transformation of the Economy, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe) I provide evidence that the Japanese recession was not due to the economic structure but instead to a central bank aiming at dismantling welfare capitalism.
All in all, Dore's book succeeds in raising and illuminating these challenging issues. It deserves much attention. It also shows the need for further research on this topic-and soon, before this species of capitalism becomes extinct.
Stock Market Capitalism
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All reviews appear to be written by the same person
A Very Good PrimerI have set up my IRA account to implement the covered call/ stock program set forth in this book.
It works!
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Not a book for EveryoneBut there are some valuable lessons you can learn from reading his not so easy-to-understand writing. He talked about a phenomenon in business world, in which an industry feeds on its own success and grows bigger and its stock prices higher, until it tumbles. Then, the fall will trigger more to fell, until it seems there is nothing left. Sound familiar to the dot com bloom and burst of 2000? Actually, he was talking about the electronic industry bloom-burst cycle in the 1960s in America.
An electronic firm buys components from other electronic firms. When one was successful, say, its new TV model is a big hit, it buys more from its suppliers. And it get imitates and its competitors are buying more from their suppliers. Suddenly, there are many electronic firms and everyone seems to have a bright future, i.e. ever growing sales. This in turn makes investment in electronic firms seem a sure ticket to win. And they do, their stock prices just shoot off the roof.
But then, the public can only take so many new TV, even you buy an extra one for your mother-in-law, because it is a cool new trend, there is a limit how many they can sell. Then one of the TV manufacturer fells, so are their suppliers, and the suppliers¡¦ suppliers. Once the chain reaction begins, there is no going back. Companies fell and their earnings become losses. Stock prices of electronic firms tumble and tumble. With that goes the money of many papas and mamas, and ¡§intelligent¡¨ investors like you and me.
George Soros¡¦ way is to buy during the up-trends, take profit and wait for a while, then sell shorts during the downward cycle. He described what he did during those days in details.
Another boom-burst cycle he described is on LBO ¡V ¡§Leverage Buy Out¡¨ in the 80s. I am going to leave you to read the book to find out.
Or until, I have time and read it again.
There is an account of his biggest winner ¡V the bet on Pound against Bank of England. But it is not very good, because I can¡¦t remember a thing about it.
Lesson in Dealing with UncertaintyHis philosophical tenet, Reflexivity, denotes a feedback loop: Individuals act on their views of a situation, thereby changing the situation. For example, if traders believe a stock is going up, they buy it, thereby bidding it up. But their belief caused the result; there may be no fundamental reason for the rise.
Thus what we think determines what we do and has consequences, but typically it is not correct.
Inspired by Heisenberg's rule about quantum particles, Soros proclaims a human uncertainty principle which suggests our understanding is often incoherent and always incomplete. From his case study, one notices that uncertainty continually besets Mr. Soros in managing his hedge fund, which has the same name as the particles subject to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle.
General models do not always translate into money making practice. But Soros provides an insight of great practical significance: traders need to be adaptive, because there is no way of knowing beforehand how a market situation will turn out.
The Quantum Fund experience demonstrates how that works. This exercise in global macro strategy, a master speculator's take on commodity, currency and equity markets, is a a litany of doubts and hazards.
He's been losing on currency trades for several years. Then in September 1985, he makes a killing by buying a lot of yen just before central banks switch to a new exchange rate system and the yen rises. There is a pattern: he sustains losses, reduces positions, gets out, then sees a great opportunity and pounces. In short, he constantly and quickly adapts to events.
Despite various setbacks, Quantum Fund's NAV per share rose 121% in 1985 and 43% in 1986. Such numbers make for legend and Mr. Soros became one.
How did he do it? He keeps an open mind and continually modifies his outlook with new information. As he remarks, "the markets provide a merciless reality check," and Mr. Soros never stays with an idea that fails the test. Most of the time he can't predict what's coming, but he promptly corrects course in response to feedback. That limits losses. On rare occasions he can see through the fog of uncertainty and hauls in the booty.
This is not an easy book to read, but as another hedge fund manager, Paul Tudor Jones, describes it in the foreword, it is a timeless guide.
The Best Book on Finance EVER
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Helpful for the novice investor
Helpful, But in Need of UpdatingBut in many ways, this book has lost a lot of relevance. Now one can go online and purchase stocks in any amount with fees of as little as $3.00. And the fact that the book has not been updated since 1996 weighs heavily against recommending it be purchased by anyone today. Perhaps Carlson has not bothered to further update because of the ease with which stocks may eb purchased on-line.
Still, for someone who is a long term investor, it provides some choices as far as investing without involving a broker. And it is definitely an option if you have no desire to use the internet to make stock purchases. Just be aware that your options are limited; most companies do not offer direct purchase of their stock or Dividend Reinvestment Plans (DRIPs) to the public at large.
Truly a walk in the park.
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Succinct and readableKurtzman writes on page 148 that "Markets may move to the beat of their dumbest members." He adds, "In my view...markets are not rational." To back up his claims he reports that at the height of the Internet bubble in 1999, Yahoo! with sales of $456 million (that's million with an "m") had a market capitalization of $93-billion which he compares to GM, which at the same time with revenues of $177-billion (billion with a "b"), had a market cap about half that of Yahoo! (p. 147) This observation caused Kurtzman to ask, "Yo, Mr. Market, is anybody home?"
Well, it depends on when you knock on the door. In October of 2002 Yahoo's market capitalization was down around $5-billion or so. The real truth is Mr. Market may be irrational for some period of time--indeed for some EXTENDED period of time, especially when you're holding the bag--but eventually a correction occurs, and for a brief shining moment (not the same moment) every stock is priced at what it's worth. (Of course it could also be pointed out that a stopped clock is exactly right twice a day.)
I very much liked Kurtzman's conversation tone and his obvious acumen and the way he explains the underpinnings of the capital markets with an emphasis on understanding rather than mechanical details. (Although an explanation on how the weekend or overnight buy and sell orders received from Internet traders are reconciled at the New York Stock Exchange and at NASDAQ into an opening price would have been nice.) His championing of Michael Milken as one of the great financial geniuses of our times was tolerable, but did Milken really (as Kurtzman insists on page 144) take "an often bloating and ailing American economy" and make it "lean, mean and resilient"? And, although one does not doubt the genius of Warren Buffet, might Kurtzman have pointed out during his several fawning references to the man, that when you have as much economic clout as he has you might well be able to influence the markets to your advantage and to get information that others cannot, and in a nutshell prove beyond a shadow of doubt that money makes money and big money makes even bigger money? He might even have (to be topical and timely) pointed out that Shari'a law, which does not allow interest to be charged on credit, is not in keeping with the realities of the effect time has on capital.
But Kurtzman is an ambassadorially polite man who saved his barbs for the failed communist system and the recent irrational exuberance in dot com land.
Perhaps the highlight of the book, and maybe the most important part, is Kurtzman's explanation of what money is (not obvious) and how it is created and how it can be made to dissipate. For anyone wanting a kind of Reality Economics 101, Kurtzman's book is an eye-opener. He has a gift for explaining things in a succinct and clear manner that other writers on economics might well emulate.

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Why Am I the First?The little money I have invested in Wall Street is in a company 401k. recently I've looked into ways of investing without the craziness that surrounds much of the market; the speculation is insane at times. I was looking into vanilla index funds and equity-linked funds. In the research process I saw this book and decided to get a quick primer on what the street is about.
That's what you get here, a crash course in the economic history of the United States. It was interesting and suprising to learn that "bubbles" have occurred over the last 200 years. And it's always the same jumping on the bandwagon of new technologies or financial instruments that drives them.
And then there is the inside info that's behind the major wealth of the street. Wall Street, and the book shows this, is really one big clubhouse, if your not in the club don't count on getting cheese on your crackers.. as a matter of fact you won't get crackers at all, you'll get the 5-7% crumb at the end of the year and think your in the big time.
No complaints. I see this as how the game is played. The thing is to know the rules and realize what your getting into, know the risk involved and how the engine operates.
Without pointing fingers at conspiracy theories and laboring that point, it shows you how the system has worked in the past and continues to this day.
It's a good read, especially if you have money in the market.

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More money machine secrets!
Good, solid advice. On the money.I have been an investor for over ten years and have a brokers license but never knew you could do this. Unfortunately, brokers are never taught these strategies, only license requirements.
I highly recommend Wall Street Money Machine Vol. 5 for anyone who wants to make some real money in the market.
Get your stocks for FREE?There is a saying that when something sounds too good to be true it usually is right? What's the catch you may be asking yourself. Is there a catch? To be brutually honest, yes there is, but it's not what you may think it is.
There is a way to get your stocks for free, which, if you get to the bottom-line root meaning of FREE, is simply that you do not pay for your stocks yourself. We're talking about quality stocks that you get to choose! You can be as diversifiedas you want. And get this-you can pretty much start with any amount of money you have.
This is not a get rich quick plan. Nor is this some ambiguous, nebulous method that only a few people can master and use. It is also not a theory, but an in-the-trenches, workable, cash flow stock market machine. This plan takes a simple yet overlooked aspect of the stock and options markets and puts it to full use. The results are dynamic and far-reaching.
LOCC has a beginning, middle and an end. It puts the emphasis where it should be; on generating income so you can retire. Yes, huge assets are nice, but let's go for simple ways to build steady monthly income so we can do more of the simple yet wonderful things that life has to offer.
If you like the buy and hold strategy of investing, in FREE STOCKS, you will learn how to get the market to pay for your stocks in 5 to 7 months with the LOCC system.
In FREE STOCKS, you will learn:
- Option cycles and market makers
- How implied volatility affects option pricing
- Buybacks and Rolloouts
- Stock Repair Kit
- How to put volatility on your side
- Be a seller, not a buyer
- When to get your money
- Exploration of ways to increase gains and reduce taxes
- What to do if the stock dips-Make more money!
Finally, if you followed more traditional forms of investing and lost a ton of money in the stock market over the last three years, FREE STOCKS may be just what the doctor ordered to get back on track and make that money back.
During the Bear Market of the last three years, I and others used the strategies in FREE STOCKS to recover losses on deep dips. Question: How much money did you lose by not knowing these strategies? And how much money will you lose by not applying these strategies going forward?
Get the book. It's a must read!

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Should 401ks TIP?"It seems somewhat ridiculous that the government is not recommending these," Bodie told the 401kWire.com. "The simplest way would be for the government to mandate that one of the core options under 404(c) to be TIPs."
So far he reports that his recommendations have fallen on deaf ears in Washington (no members of Congress have contacted him and he has not contacted the Department of Labor). That should reassure industry insiders. What should catch your attention though is that Bodie's ideas have a small chance of catching on inside the US Treasury.
"There was a call by the Treasury department for ideas on how to stimulate the demand for TIPs," explained Bodie. In response he shared his ideas with Peter Fisher who manages the national debt issued by the Treasury. He also landed an opinion piece on the topic in the Financial Times of London.
Bodie first started working on the concept for JP Morgan. The New York City based firm engaged Bodie to explore ways to add the instruments to the 401(k) plan that it offers to its own employees. Bodie told the 401kWire.com that his understanding was that the product would eventually have been rolled out to other JP Morgan defined contribution clients. The engagement ended when JP Morgan merged with Chase.
Undeterred, Bodie is still pursuing the concept even without government fiat. He is now forming a new company in partnership with Harvard's Nobel Prize Winner Bob Merton and an unnamed but "senior level and experienced Wall Street executive" to pursue the concept of offering TIPs to 401(k) investors. "There will be a press release in the next couple of weeks" detailing the effort, he said.
"Everyone who we have mentioned this to responds quite enthusiastically," said Bodie.
Bodie's idea is theoretically simple. "Participants in 401k plans are not made aware of the risks of investing in their own employers stock. And they are not made aware of the risk of even investing in diversified equity funds," explained Bodie. "People say that if you invest in equities for the long-term that you do not have risk -- that is wrong."
That idea is buttressed by the fact that the price for options rises as the maturity of the instrument lengthens. If the risk of equities decreased over longer holding periods that price should be falling instead of rising. He adds that none of the investments in 401(k) plans, including stable value funds, are guaranteed to beat inflation.
"Most plans do not have an investment that allows them to make a long-run hedge against the inflation risk," he added. "Suppose the rate of inflation from now on is 3 percent per year. You want something to guarantee that the dollar would be worth a dollar in 30 years."
It was this fact that led him to idea to add TIPs to plans. With those instruments participants could lock in a real, and known, return for their retirement.
The concept faces at least to major hurdles, either of which could sink a product build around the concept. The first is that to lock in the return participants must buy TIPs in their raw form and not as a part of a mutual fund. For the industry that would likely add a recordkeeping headache that few providers would want to take on for so unsexy a product.
The second is that small market for TIPs. That market is estimated to be less than $150 billion in total assets currently. Meanwhile, nearly $2 trillion is now invested in 401(k) plans. Moving even a small proportion of those assets to TIPs would swamp the market.
Of course, it would also juice demand for the bonds and please the Treasury. Let's not give the Feds any ideas.
-Sean Hanna
Good Case OverplayedThe authors make the case for investing in inflation adjusted, government protected I Bonds and TIPS (Treasury Inflation-Indexed Securities also called Treasury Inflation Protected Securities). Focusing on the major goals of saving for retirement and providing for college education costs, Bodie and Clowes show how much an investor needs to save today. If the calculations seem a bit heady, readers are referred to the book's companion web site 'calculator'. At the heart of worry-free investing as defined by the authors is the defense of an individual's future buying power rather than the building of incremental wealth.
Stocks have been widely touted as the only reliable hedge to inflation. However, during the 1970's sustained inflation ravaged stock market returns on an (inflation) adjusted basis. Had TIPS and I Bonds existed, they would have outperformed a diversified basket of stocks. Indeed, most investors today should use TIPS and I Bonds alone, we are boldly told. And all investors should invest at least some of their retirement assets in these two investment tools. Unfortunately for those inclined to follow this last advice, it is not clear if many (or any) company sponsored retirement plans (401(K)'s etc.) offer these products.
The author's focus on inflation at a time when it is barely detectable may seem problematic, but a recovering economy, growing budget deficits, and a weakening dollar carry their own consequences. In the end, Bodie and Clowes overplay their case for I Bonds and TIPS. Not all products and services in the economy adjust in lockstep as do these bonds with Bureau of Labor Statistics measures of inflation. As a consequence a near exclusive reliance on these bonds may prove comforting but ultimately ineffective to reach a desired goal. Still, the understanding and use of these investment tools could prove important in a balanced portfolio in the years ahead. Now is the time to look at the issue.
Excellent book
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too out of date
Stick with classics - Benjamin Graham and Peter Lynch
Free Lunch on Wall Street - Great Christmas Gifts!