Exports Books

Although this book is published end 1998, it has many inaccuracies, especially the efforts of Malaysia's Multimedia Super Corridor. The author got many facts wrong, and he tends to be very negative of the situation. I think the contents will not give Westerners a correct view of the situation.

Although published in 1999, the facts in this book is either out of date or inaccurate. It is not worth the buy.

If only there was a choice for zero-star rating, I would have given this book what it really deserves. Bullis is so biased with his views on Malaysia's IT efforts, blinding readers with his politically-insighted views. He must have a personal vendetta against Prime Minister Mahathir's policies, and resorted to discredit him further with his biased writing. This book is total blasphemy and one-sided - so much that one might tend to believe that it was the Singapore govt engaging Bullis to discredit Malaysia. Bullis was inaccurate in his views and readers should not take them into consideration. In fact, DO NOT BUY THIS BOOK AT ALL. If you want to get a fair view on doing business in South-East Asia, go read some other book.

This guy is one of the men who started the quickie republican PAC, the [...]

they spent more money email fundraising than actually doing anything of substance except spreading their hate mongering one sided and very biased view of the world.

Made up of two pin heads and probably a front for even more fearful of change Bush supporters, these people are really just closet racists who fear an Obama Presidency.
Why else would they create racist inflicted ads, based on Wrights, a non issue at this point, and the fear of illegal immigrants getting drivers licenses and stealing american jobs. Jobs one might add, that most americans just don't want!
They created some smear ads at the end of the campaign that were so filled with lies and innuendo that even fact.,org came out against them.
What a piece of work this guy is.

boycott his books!

Dr. Peter Leitner was the principal policy representative for the US Department of Defense for export control negotiation during the late 1980s and early 1990s, a time period which saw a revolution in national security policies and priorities triggered by the end of the cold war. This era saw the national and international technology export control mechanisms, like the Soviet Union that they were primarily designed to contain, weaken, and ultimately shatter. The book was written as a response to the liberalization of export controls on dual-use technologies such as high-speed computers and precision machine-tools which occurred at the end of the Bush administration, and during the early years of the Clinton administration. Dr. Leitner's message is very simple - the United States has implemented short-sighted policies liberalizing the export of dual-use technologies that potential adversaries may someday use against us. These policies, developed by self-serving bureaucrats following flawed decision-making methodologies, are damaging national security. It is unfortunate that Dr. Leitner chose to cloak this simple message in techno-bureaucratic jargon, and package it in a sloppily written book.

Dr. Leitner begins by providing some scholarly quotes concerning the differences between descriptive and inferential analysis, then goes on to describe various Congressional, military and diplomatic reporting requirements. He also explains to us in great detail what a case study is, and what constitutes "real/demonstrative" evidence. Unfortunately, nothing in the first two chapters contributes to his core message, and they seem to be there primarily to prevent his book from being a leaflet.

When Dr. Leitner finally gets around to discussing the topic of his book, he does provide a useful overview of the history of export controls, and the international and US national organizations involved in administering them. Foremost among the international groups was the Coordinating Committee on Export Controls (CoCom), which was established in 1949 and was disbanded in 1994. CoCom members included Australia, Japan, and the NATO nations (except Iceland). Shortly before CoCom ceased operations, it was busy decontrolling a wide array of technologies that Dr. Leitner shows could be used to upgrade weapons systems such as combat aircraft, tanks, and missile systems, as well as command, control, communications and intelligence systems. The point that the US allowed CoCom to release valuable military technologies is well made - but Dr. Leitner concentrates on the former Soviet threat to the exclusion of any other. Russia's military was recognized by most observers at the time of publication as being quite weak. In fact, Russia was unable to mount a fully successful invasion of a tiny portion of its own territory in Chechnya at the time Decontrolling Strategic Technology was being published. The author's message would have been more persuasive had he been able to find a more credible threat, such as the People's Republic of China facing Taiwan, or the North Koreans. In fact, in Dr. Leitner's testimony to the US Congressional Joint Economic Committee, given in June of 1997, he names China as the chief threat to the United States, though China is barely mentioned in his book, published only two years prior.

The US Department of Defense lost almost all of its influence over CoCom negotiating positions and export controls during the period from 1988 to 1994, and the influence of the State and Commerce Departments expanded proportionately. From an outsider's perspective, the reason for this shift in relative bureaucratic clout is obvious - the primary military threat which CoCom and the US export control apparatus was designed to counter disappeared - almost overnight. As the military threat decreased in severity and importance, the relative importance of economic factors increased. As an insider, Dr. Leitner cannot see this elementary dynamic at all - rather he sees the waning power of his fiefdom as a result of bureaucratic maneuvering, corruption, politicization and decision making mechanisms which suddenly became flawed. Of course, the maneuvering, backbiting, and the rest were always there - it was the changes in the external situation that altered the relative strength of the inside players. Ironically, if the author would have provided a fair and balanced examination of the benefits of relaxed export controls, he would have strengthened his own case. As the book is written, Dr. Leitner appears unable to grasp any part of the opposing viewpoint, and thus discredits his own.

Neither is Dr. Leitner's case helped by inexcusably careless editing. Perhaps the most egregious blooper is found in Chapter 11, where the first paragraph of his section entitled "Suboptimal Decision Making," is precisely, word-for-word identical with the last paragraph of the same section on the next page. The only explanation for this kind of error is that neither Dr. Leitner nor anyone else seriously read this book before its publication.

The poor quality of the book is unfortunate, because this reviewer happens to agree with the fundamental message it is trying to convey. The Persian Gulf war, the Korean situation, and, above all, an increasingly strident China show a requirement for continued US military strength and technological superiority. The price for technological inferiority - or even parity - with an adversary has always been large quantities of blood.

The breakup of the international system of technology export controls on dual-use technology essentially ends these controls, because the opponents of export controls in each state can always use the argument that "if we don't export it, someone else will." Consequently, technology is moving at tremendous speed to our potential adversaries, and to assume that they are too incompetent to take advantage of these technologies risks the lives of our military personnel. Oddly, Dr. Leitner never speaks in terms of potential American casualties, but instead discusses the potential monetary loss associated with B-2 bombers that might be shot down during the course of a nuclear war with Russia. Were a nuclear war with Russia to occur, it seems unlikely that the survivors would crawl from the incinerated rubble of their cities only to bemoan the cost of the B-2 bombers that were unnecessarily lost due to radar and computer technology transfers, nor would one expect a great deal of discussion concerning how to fund replacements.

Some would argue that export controls are of no use in reducing the military capabilities of our potential adversaries - or that any advantage provided by export controls is temporary, and hence of greater cost than worth. Of course, all technological advantages are temporary - but so are all wars. The author could have provided valuable historical examples in which technological transfer had an impact on the course of a war, or on casualties suffered. One famous case was the licensing of the manufacture of British Rolls-Royce jet engines to the Soviet Union immediately after World War II. The "Nene" engine, far superior to anything the Soviets were able to manufacture previously, was integrated into the MIKOYAN-GUREVICH MiG-15 in 1948, which provided the North Koreans, Chinese and Soviets with an aircraft superior to any the United States could field at the beginning of the Korean war (and some would argue, at the end). If Dr. Leitner would have provided a few historical examples of the consequences of technology transfer instead of telling us the viewscreen dimensions of radar displays, or discussing the relative merits of "cybernetic paradigms" vs. "political haggling," he might have been more persuasive.

A more balanced and precisely targeted treatment by Dr. Leitner, without the strained and pompous pseudo-academic writing style he employs, and without the obvious bureaucratic sniping, could have made a valuable contribution to US security.

Thia book is out-dated.. the information it provides is to broad

this was somewhat of a disappointment. i ordered through entrepreneur magazine, and the shipped product did not seem like the same thing i read about in their magazine. i was going to photocopy it and return for a refund, but the book was so awful i forgot i had it until after the return expiration date. althoug the book is somewhat helpful, the information (especially the info regarding the type of computer needed for office) was extremely outdates. i bought this in the summer of 1999, and it mentioned something about buying a 386 computer with an 8800 bps modem. i would pass on this, and stick to the more informative and less expensive selections available in the site. many of the pages seem like photocopies or even black and white printouts from an old laser printer, the folder accompaning the information is nothing special either.

Ravenhill and Noble have edited a disappointing collection. The topic is of great importance, but the collection is shallow. This might be because it was brought together rather quickly, when the discussion of the Asian Crisis was still somewhat recent. However, the contributors do not come to grips with the long term consequences of the crisis and nor do they offer a very deep analysis of the genesis of the crisis. There is little deep discussion of over-production, global production trends, inequality or poverty. I expected more from the editors and authors.

This book is a total fraud. Don't buy it. It's just reprints of political documents.

As an academic specializing in Latin American business, I have frequent contact with senior managers, politicians, and other academics in Mexico and throughout Latin America. As such, the inaccuracies in this book are plainly evident, and there are many. For a contemporary understanding of Mexico, I would instead recommend Bordering on Chaos by Andres Oppenheimer. An excellent introduction to Mexico's Colonial and Revolutionary history can be found in Blood Drenched Altars by Francis C. Kelley. But stay away from this one.

This collection of essays,edited by Nistico and Tosato,is not successful in comparing Keynesian and Classical-Neoclassical theories because the many authors of the essays have no real idea what Keynes's theory was,either in the(TP) A Treatise on Probability(1921) or in the General Theory(1936).A good example is the essays assembled in Part IV.The authors,Carabelli, De Cecco,Jussa,Rotheim,Rodano and Musu,are supposed to discuss The Legacy of Keynes.None of these authors understand the core of Keynes's approach to probability,which was the interval estimate approach outlined in chapter 3 of the TP and developed in great detail in chapters 15,17,20 and 22 of the TP.The estimation of probabilities requires two numerals ,in general,not one.Instead,these authors follow the convoluted and poorly thought out conclusions reached by Frank P. Ramsey in two reviews published in 1922 and 1926.These two reviews reveal that Ramsey did not have the slightest idea about what Keynes was doing in the technical sections of the TP.Let us know turn to the General Theory(GT).None of the authors have any idea about what the specification of Keynes's D-Z model ,introduced in chapter 3 and developed in chapters 20 and 21, requires.Simple integration(taking the antiderivative of Keynes's differentiation analysis)reveals that D,the expected aggregate demand function, must be equal to pO,where p is an expected price and O is real output ,which is a function of the amount of employment,N.Z, the expected aggregate supply function, must be equal to P+wN,where P is expected economic profit and w is a constant money wage.Setting D=Z generates a set of expected possible results,only one of which can occur at any given time.This set specifies the aggregate supply curve ,which is constantly confused by the authors with the expected aggregate supply function,Z.The actual aggregate demand function,Y,is then compared with the D-Z LOCUS in Keynes's theory to determine the amount of involuntary unemployment existing in the economy.However, none of the authors attempts to integrate even one of the derivatives specified by Keynes on pp.55-56,ft.2,pp.280-286,pp.304-306,p.126 or pp.271-278.The failure of the economics profession to integrate Keynes's clearly specified derivatives means that they write about Keynes's model even though they have no idea what that model is.This approach can only be categorized as anti-scientific,to say the least.

This download contains 7 (!) pages:

1. Headlines and common risk explanations (worth nothing)
2. Letter of credit (terms) + money transfer situations (worth nothing)
3. Economic indicators + Currency development (look that up in the internet)
4. Currency development statistics (again), which can be found everywhere in the net or newspapers....
5. Mentioning of four Export Credit Agencies + Short Risk Factor Summary (half page only!)
6. Glossary + Definitions (worth nothing)
7. Copyright (worth nothing)

HELLO - what is this???
I personally think that this is the biggest joke ever!

You could get more from the library. For [money] maybe it is worth it but not [money]. Plus if you don't like it you can't return it. Notice that the description is quite inadequate.

You should pass on this one!

I have read the direction of trade statistics yearbook 2003 for my dissertation and I've a problem of incomplete data in this book. In page 452, Singapore 576, there is no Indonesia Exports and Imports data. I'm hurry to finish my research, so could you please help me to find this data? Thank you very much