European-Union

As its title suggests "Stars and Strife: The Coming Conflicts Between the USA and European Union" is supposed to be about the friction being generated between the US and EU over such things as trade, foreign policy, and civil rights. However, what it is really about is the choice that the United Kingdom must make in the coming years about what kind of a relationship they want with both the EU and the US.

"Stars and Strife" is written by a UK Conservative Party MP by the name of John Redwood. He has been a voice of caution regarding Britain's ever increasing ties to the continent and a staunch believer in the common market concept of the EU. Redwood seems to have written "Stars and Strife" with as much an eye to the American reader as to the British one, which would explain the misnomer title.

As Redwood sees it, the EU is a Franco-German alliance whose intention is to bind the continental powers to each other in such a way as to lessen the reasons why Europe has so often been plunged into war. Those reasons are namely territorial envy and overzealous nationalism. France and Germany have fought three wars in the last 120 years, each more destructive than the last. Both countries looked to the idea of common market as a way to prevent that fourth war from occurring, the one which might finally destroy both nations.

Britain initially opted out of the continental arrangement. They didn't think it likely to succeed and didn't really trust their European neighbors. When it became clear that the common market would succeed and could offer Britain help in its economic troubles (self-imposed through a flirtation with socialism), they decided to join. In the 1970s Britain voted on a referendum of whether or not to remain in that common market. The concept of political union, as well as economic union, had already gained life on the continent and Britain was wary about being dragged into that type of union. However, those in favor of the referendum assured British voters that they would never be dragged into such a political union and could opt out of the common market at any time.

However, time has shown this to be easier said than done. Britain is not as fully enmeshed in the trappings of union as France and Germany are; but, the idea that Britain may one day be pulled into a political union with the rest of western Europe is no longer far fetched.

This possible political union does have serious implications for the US. Britain has been the soother of egos and interpreter of intentions between the US and Europe ever since the end of World War II. It's often been said, regarding Britain's relations with the US and Europe, that the Atlantic is 3,000 miles narrow and the Channel is 30 miles wide. That may not be the case any more, as Britain has become closer to its continental neighbors since WWII; but, Britain is still firmly entrenched figuratively in the middle of the Atlantic.

Britain is America's most important ally in matters both political and economic. The US could act like an 800 lbs gorilla and get everything it wants; but, it is much easier to get those things by acting like a regular-sized member of the community with British backing. There have been times when the US and UK didn't see eye-to-eye; but, those have often been extreme circumstances, like when Britain refused to join us in Vietnam.

If Britain were to become a part of a larger European superstate, we would likely lose our closest ally on the world stage. British policy views would become a diminshed presence within a larger European nation as the Franco-German views would likely dominate.

Redwood's main aim in bringing this issue up is that those Franco-German views, especially the French ones, have often been diametrically opposed to the American ones. France has often chafed at the idea of an American led western alliance and has even opted out of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the past. Redwood believes that any unified European state would not necessarily be hostile to the US; but, it certainly wouldn't be as friendly as most of the individual states now are.

Redwood instead believes that Britain should attempt to renegotiate the country's role within the EU to something resembling a free trade relationship. He feels that Britain should be able to enjoy the economic benefits of free trade with the continent without having to cede any of its sovereignty against its will. Along with this renegotiation would go the acceptance of the UK into the North American Free Trade Area.

Redwood points to Winston Churchill for inspiration for what he calls an association of the English speaking peoples of the world. This effectively means the US and the British Commonwealth, plus a few other countries. Redwood believes that the ties that bind Britain to the other Anglophiles is stronger and closer than the ones with Europe. Ideas like free trade, representational democracy, and freedom of speech originated in England and have spread out with its empire. Redwood contrasts this with the EU and continental powers which have largely eschewed the type of free and open societies advocated by English speaking peoples. They certainly are not as repressive as they were only 60 years ago; but, free speech as it exists in the US or UK is a frightening prospect to continental European governments.

Whatever way Britain decides to go, it will have important implications for the US. I for one like Redwood's position and wish to see the UK remain a part of the special relationship that the US has with it. It's lonely at the top and having Britain as a close friend and ally has often bolstered American ideals and principles within our government and has acted as a deflector of world criticism. To lose that could do serious harm to our ability to steer world progress toward the open and democratic principles we ourself hold so dear, the principles of the English speaking peoples.

This book highlights the complexity of the decision making process of one of the most 'hot' topics of EU policy. The historical review of the development of the technology programs is very helpfull to understanding the process of their creation.

Let's face it, Anton Chekhov's works will always be a masterpiece, no matter which pieces of work one decides to read and evaluate. These essential plays (The Seagull, Uncle Vanya, Three Sisters, and The Cherry Orchard) were very well selected for their inclusion in the "Essentials".

I only give four stars not because I didn't enjoy the plays, but because I believe there could have been others replaced by the ones they decided to include. Once again, that is perhaps only personal preference. All of the plays included are dramatic and comical in their own witty ways. Thorough enjoyment is almost guaranteed in this Modern Classic Library edition of Chekhov. Out of respect for the author and the translator, I will refrain from mentioning other stories that could have been added in lieu of the ones chosen. Maybe I'm being selfish in only giving four stars based on a personal opinion of the plays included, but, after all, that is why this is a review, right? Enjoy the book anyway. A great addition to your Checkov collection.

The starting point of the book is that trade unions operate in a triangular environment with vertices of markets, class, and society: they all contend with economic forces or markets, represent workers as a collectivity distinct from employers or as a class, and are necessarily a part of the larger society. However, according to the author, unions tend to gravitate to functioning between two of the vertices. He draws his examples from European trade unionism. Thus British trade unionism is depicted as operating between the dictates of markets and class considerations; German trade unionism exemplifies the tradeoffs between markets and society; Italian trade unionism represents a compromise between class and social considerations.

To act both as a market bargaining agent and as a class actor has contradictions. It is widely held that most workers desire a union to be a body that focuses on and stabilizes their particular employment and wages - not those of an entire class. And resulting bargaining agreements tacitly assume that unions will exert control over workforces. It is a position that essentially leaves unchallenged the rights of capital to control workplaces and the economy, but it has proven to be quite vulnerable, as economic pressures have increased in the last of the 20th century. Early 20th century Italian factory councils or the more recent British shop steward system gained some degree of worker control on a location-specific basis though largely outside the purview of bureaucratic unions. But no trade union body has ever consolidated working class interests sufficiently to be able to cause a transformation of capitalism in favor of working class interests.

Political power or standing permeates the entire discussion. Repeatedly it is the ability of working class interests to be a part of the political process that is key to their relative standing in both the larger society and in workplaces. The social integration or corporatism that is found throughout continental Europe includes trade union central bodies in peak-level macroeconomic discussions as well as other working class considerations, such as the establishment of works councils in workplaces. Trade unions are, in essence, social partners in this climate. They are also class actors in their ability to aggregate working class political power. A purely collective bargaining approach seems to be indicative of minimal political power and, in this era, of minimal effectiveness.

There is no doubt that the book is thought provoking. Do the poles of market, class, and society provide an adequate framework for understanding trade unionism? For this reviewer, class and society would be subsumed under political power with that power countering and influencing economic power. The discussions of the three particular trade union movements are quite tedious and sometimes provide confusion as well as clarity as to how those movements fit in the author's general framework. The more theoretical parts of the book are also a little difficult to follow with the qualifiers and exceptions sometimes diluting the central argument. But I think the book should be read by anyone wanting to take a new look at understanding trade union orientation.

This book forces you to rethink the common world view and the relationship between Europe and America. Kagan's prose is very clear, well-written and easy to follow and he argues quite convincingly. He has a good point that Western Europe has lived under America's protecting umbrella since WW2 and made the Europeans to believe that machtpolitik, that is the necessity to use military force, no longer is needed and that laws and international cooperation is the only way to build a better world. It worked fine for civilized and well-behaving European states in the EU, but it obviously doesn't work that well with more badly brought-up leaders as Kim Jong-Il. Or Hitler for that matter.

Clearly the rift between Europeans and Americans is deeper than many think, and clearly both sides have some serious issues to discuss. But I don't agree with Kagan's implicit conclusions - that the rift is almost impossible to heal and that Europe and USA have different roadmaps that are bound to clash an increasing number of times in the future.

Kagan is exaggerating the differences. Europe lacks the Americans' military power and is occupied with the European integration most of the time, but it does not mean that they will disagree in all important matters in the future. They still share the same visions. But I think that Europe, and especially France, feels a strong threat to be sidelined and ignored by America. Europe is not as important for America as it was during the Cold War. Instead, it is directing its interest towards Southeast Asia where the next superpower, China, is. Kagan's opening phrase - "It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world" - more or less feels like an excuse to cut the old traditional ropes with Europe and start building new alliances that are better suited for the coming world order. If this is true both Europeans and Americans have a reason to be worried about the future, espacially as Kagan will start working for vice president Cheney this summer.

The many months of debate prior to the invasion of Iraq highlighted a conflict in philosophy and viewpoints between America and Europe. America, as Kagan describes it, maintains a "Hobbesian" view of international affairs, especially after September 11th, 2001. That is, the world can be a dangerous place where existence can be "nasty, brutish and short" and diplomacy, negotiation, pacification, simply do not work and can in fact lead to the death of many more innocents. On the other hand, there is Europe, which Kagan labels "Kantian," with an outlook of perpetual peace with emphasis on diplomacy, negotiation, etc. Kagan emphasizes that much of Europe's rejection of military action and power politics stems from American military protection since the World Wars as well as a weakening of Europe's own military force.

Kagan draws a comparison between Europe of today vs. America at its founding. In both instances, the countries were militarily weak and diplomacy was the wise thing to do. (Conversely, Europe during the 1700s and into the 1800s was militarily powerful as is America today.) This is significant in explaining Europe's pacifism and America's perceived "aggression." When one has a "big stick," he will likely see threats more clearly and will act on them with greater conviction. Those without such a "stick" will seek to avoid trouble or atleast not confront it until necessary. Hence, most of Europe's constant rejection of invasion with Iraq and America's insistence that Iraq was already menace and was bound to harm millions with WMDs.

Kagan's explanations are concise and usually clear but his ending was puzzling. After arguing that both sides are far apart, he concludes by emphasizing the importance that both the US and Europe "communicate" with one another. Has that not been happening all along? Communication can occur and need not lead to agreement, right? He gently criticizes the US advising it to "play nice" with Europe and not "fear" it. Kagan does not point out that if any fear is occuring, it has been Europe fearing any use of US military force (unless that US military force is protecting Europe, then all is well); it is not the US "fearing" anyone else.

In this fascinating little book, author Robert Kagan (author of Sleeping With the Devil: How Washington Sold Our Soul for Saudi Crude) presents the reader with a piercing and evenhanded analysis of why the United States and Europe have become so alienated from each other, and how we have come to this point. The author sees the alienation as being caused by two facts. The first is that there is a substantive difference in military power, with America having the might to do what it thinks best, and Europe finding its options limited by its lack of might. Secondly, both Europe and the United States are products of their own histories, with Europe finding its future by binding its members with multilateral agreements and forbidding unilateral military operations, and with America being shaped by its understanding that it faces enemies throughout the world that must be dealt with by force.

OK, let me say that the summary above is completely inadequate to describe this thoughtful work. I found Mr. Kagan's analysis to be quite enlightening, and thoroughly balanced. He does not look for good guys and bad guys in the trans-Atlantic rift, but instead explains quite clearly why it exists. If you wish to understand the present rift between the United States and Western Europe, then I cannot recommend another book as highly as I do this one!

...not very helpful, if you study economics and need something to help you in writing your term paper on EMU issues and problems (as it was the case with me). It is not very balanced: it either gives very basic info (the info you would rather get from your local instructor or library), or it goes too deeply into examples. Plus, again, 1997....uh, a bit dated, considering that world and EMU changes so quickly. Anyway, my opinion is just that of an average student.

Logically laid out, the problems arising from 'ever closer union' and their consequences are outlined in a nutshell, while delving deep enough to uncover the essential determining factors. One of the essential guides to the scale of the effect of Economic and Monetary Union in Europe will have on Both the US and global economies

Engaging but, as another another reader points out, Siedentorp is no de Tocqueville.

The ultimate conclusion is flawed although paradoxically this may be more apparent to British readers.

Europe is not the USA, it doesn't have the founding vision, it doesn't have the founding impetus and moreover it isn't starting from scratch with a relatively homogenous culture. In the EU, there is no sight of a single people or "demos" or anything remotely approaching one.

France, Germany and Belgium (or "Old Europe" in the famous words of Donald Rumsfeld) may be different (although even that is questionable).....but these countries are not synonymous with the EU.

Siedentrop is however to be congratulated for not being a "blinded europhile". He has approached his subject with some vigour and the fact he suggests that any other nation on earth might be a model for the EU is contrary to true "believers" who have stopped suggesting such models. This is because (a) it tends to suggest that they are trying to build a superstate which they consistently deny and (b)they are usually shot down on various points of detail by Euro-sceptics.

This is a most impressive book. Drawing lessons from the American experience of creating a continental, federal union and inspired by 19th Century French liberals such as Tocqueville and Guizot, Siedentop takes a skepticial (but sympathetic) look at the current project to create a "United States of Europe". The book is grand (even majestic) in its scope and (deliberately) provocative in its claims. The author is a political theorist and intellectual historian, which is the key to its appeal. There are countless books on the EU out there, written by political scientists and economist, full of arcane details and figures. This book, by contrast, is written from a larger perspective, drawing on the author's apparently vast knowledge of European social, cultural and intellectual life. The style is engaging and straightforward. The book will appeal most to journalists and very senior bureaucrats, I think. (Judging by the endorsements on the cover, this is indeed the case.) It will probably be judged too sweeping and general by most academic specialists and too intellectual and abstract by most ordinary readers. It is a work of popular scholarship or "high journalism", in the highest and best sense of that term. There is still an appreciation for such things among British journalists (although it is diminishing), unlike their American cousins, for whom this book will probably seem far too substantial to engage their attention for long. The principal villains of the piece are the French elites, who (the author alleges) have so far successfully imposed an elitist, centralist, statist vision on the construction of the European Union. The Germans have been too politically weak and self-absorbed to resist this aggressive French agenda, and the British are trapped in their own social and constitutional ancien regime, unable to offer any practical alternatives to their traditional rivals. So Siedentop turns to American federalism for an alternative conception of how the New Europe should develop. He is a Tocquevillian liberal who favors decentralization spiced with Rousseauian democratic republicanism. One of his principal complaints about the debate on Europe is that economics has completely eclipsed the political, resulting in a union that is politically retarded and dangerous (one of his favorite words). At the very least, his assessment of the many dangers on the road to union in Europe deserves very serious consideration. Hopefully, it will help to raise the standard of debate on its future course.

Overall, a highly stimulating, engaging, insightful book that no one who is even remotely interested in the future of Europe can afford to overlook.

This is a very engaging and readable primer on federalism, its history and various forms. Siedentop advocates not so much a British solution to EU federalism, as a German one with a written constitution and clear seperation of powers between Union and member states, and judicial review. He also advocates creation of a European Senate indirectly elected by national legislators to preserve the Federal character of the union.

The book need some work

Though this book is flawed, the "small" European states are so often neglected it is nice to see someone looking at them.

In this book of collected essays, one gets the feeling and sense of the small and medium sized states of the European Union and those Western European nations that are looking at one day joining the EU.

For the average American this book will teach you a few things. Unfortunately a lot of the things you learn will be misleading, "americentric", or outright false. Let us not forget, as the first customer/reviewer of the book mentioned, the countless typographical errors, which do not lend themselves to credibility. Overall, the book provided an interesting overview and presents a few issues that are of note, for example, Turkey's desire to join the EU but its lack of "high profile" preventing it from doing so. Also the ongoing problems in Cyprus are described. Unfortunately Newhouse does not provide a thorough analysis of the future/growth of the EU and completely neglects the facts, particularly with the regard to the realities of many Eastern and Central European countries' economic situations. One particularly irritating problem is Newhouse's overemphasis on what the Czech Republic predicts about itself and its future, not relying at all on unbiased fact and "hard numbers". The book depicts Czech Republic as a progressive and dynamic economic reform success story. The number will tell a different story. The economy of the Czech Republic is dismal. This may be lack of research on the author's part or perhaps a question of the material growing outdated, as the previous reviewer stated.

Certainly, read this book if you are interested in the state of European affairs, but read it skeptically and critically.

These books get out of date very fast. However, the background information and analyses of the relationships between countries were very informative. I do think that the copy editor of this book was 'adrift', though. Lots of typos and grammatical errors that even the simplest word processor should have caught. PLUS some glaring factual errors. Not right, especially for a non-fiction book.

This book was a wonderful reference to me when I was taking my 20th Century Europe Class at the University I attend. Although the information is out of date now that is in it, but the history isn't out of date. We build on history, which is the foundations, so I recommed this book to get a firm foundation on Europe from after the Cold War to the present (1998). THIS BOOK GETS AN A+ IN MY OPINION. Plus it is an easy read and not hard on the eyes or mind.

He rewrote history and left out the facts. I would suggest to go to the Simon Wiesenthal Center for your factual history of Yugoslavia and the Serbs.

Remember what Hitler's propaganda minister Dr. Joseph Goebbels said: "Tell a lie a hundred times and it becomes the truth!"

The author conducted a great deal of meticulous research to shed light on an under-researched area: Serbian anti-Semitism and Nazi collaboration. As such, "Serbia's Secret War" provides a wealth of information both to the general reader and more serious students of the former Yugoslavia. However, just the fact that this book appeared in the 1990s in the wake of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia makes it seem like a contribution to the propaganda war among the Serbs, Croats and Bosnians and their various sympathizers abroad. Often this propaganda has involved diatribes about the various atrocities committed by members of one or more of these nations during World War II, which is then projected onto the current situation. To his credit, Cohen does try to avoid such polemics, but his very treatment of the interwar and W.W.II period in Yugoslavia sometimes falls prey to a certain bias. Thus, there are some sections of the book which seem to take a very heavy-handed view of Serbian complicity for crimes against Jews and others during the Second World War, while downplaying (but by no means denying) those committed by the Croats. Even so, this book is worth reading, and particular attention should be paid to the writer's sources, because the most revealing and essential aspect of Cohen's text is the fact that far from being free of anti-Semitism (which Serbian propagandists often claim), Serbia was just as susceptible to this form of racism as any other Central and Southeast European people.

During the wars of 1991-95 in the former Yugoslavia the military aggression of Milosevic's Serbia involved also a campaign of historical revisionism. Serbian nationalists falsified Yugoslav history, claiming that during World War II it was only the Serbs who had resisted the Nazis while the Croats, Muslims and Albanians had all been collaborators. In presenting to the world this dishonest picture of events, the Serbian nationalists sought to demonise their fellow Yugoslavs so as to justify their own war of conquest.

Dr Cohen's excellent book sets the record straight. As a Jew who is disgusted by the way Serbian nationalists exploited the history of the Holocaust for their own genocidal purposes, Cohen sets out to expose their historical revisionism and does so convincingly. He proves on the one hand that Serbian nationalists collaborated extensively with the Nazis; wartime Serbia's quisling leader Milan Nedic was one of Hitler's most loyal allies while the Chetniks of Draza Mihailovic joined with the Axis forces in attacking the Partisans and even handed over Jews to the Nazis. On the other hand, Cohen demonstrates the overwhelming participation of Croats, Slovenes and other Yugoslavs in the Partisan resistance. Tito after all was a Croat.

It would be wrong to conclude from this book that the Serbs as a people are somehow inherently pro-Nazi or prone to violence and aggression. The Serbs, like the Croats and Muslims, had their share of fascists and war-criminals; but like the Croats and Muslims they also had their share of anti-fascists and resisters. The xenophobic propaganda of Milosevic and his supporters in the West has done much to obscure the history of extensive COOPERATION between Serbs, Croats and Muslims that took place during World War II. In countering this propaganda, Cohen has helped to restore a more balanced picture of events.

A MUST READ FOR ANYONE INTERESTED IN THE RECENT HISTORY OF THE REGION...AND MUCH OF WHAT PRECEDED THIS LATEST CONFLAGARTION.