Engineering-risk Books

This is a collection of writings from several different writers. What makes is so hard is that it does not flow, there really is not style to the book. I used this in a class for my Masters and it was really not a good book. We got the professor to change books after our class because it was so bad. Don't waste your money.

This book is a good purchase for those of you with no insight about process safety. You will gain some basic knowledge about alarms, sensors etc. Also, you will find some info about methodology. But dont expect much more. To conclude: good for very beginners, no referenfe book for seasoned professionals.

At the outset, it should be noted that all efforts placed in writing any book is appreciated.

The book emphasizes environmental justice from a social aspect and presents case studies that discuss adverse impacts resulting from environmental pollution.

The environmental pollution is considered as social injustice typically exposed to minority groups, the impacts of which are infringement on individual liberties and rights.

In my opinion the books theme is more of a political statement that a scientific appraisal. Risk Management is mentioned in broad sense. Crucial aspect related to EPA legislation and Management Systems requirements are not discussed or mentioned in depth; as a result the book seems outdated.

Regards

While the compendium of thoughts on safety & risk in this book are interesting, I find that Dr. Scarry's hypothesis that electromagnetic interference may have caused TWA 800 and the Swissair 111 tragedies to be grossly misinformed and inaccurate. Dr. Scarry cites a case of military aircraft in Lybia. Such aircraft communicate with each other and with command and control systems using very sophisticated RF messaging. It's my impression that the incident in Lybia is probably a case of bugs in these complex systems that resulted in messages intended for one aircraft being received and throught to be legitimate by another. Dr. Scarry relates this incident to SR111, but fails to point out the vast differences in scenarios.

She also cites numerous examples of EMI "incidents", asserts that these support her views on TWA 800. But she fails to point out that none of these involve fuel vapor explosions or wire arcing. Rather they are examples low energy RF interference, the result of which is far less dramatic.

In the debating club at school, we were sometimes required to argue a point of view that we didn't necessarily believe in. We learned that there are techniques for doing this. First we simply focus on the evidence that supports our position,
even when the evidence favoring the other side of the argument is overwhelming. Other techniques include quoting notable people or authorities on the subject. Of course we do not present the reservations, qualifications or doubts that our cited experts might have also expressed.

Dr. Scarry is smart, a good writer and an adept advocate. She should not be mistaken for an engineer or a scientist ... who by nature and training deplore the idea of analysis based on data that is hand picked to support the desired conclusion.

Ultimately, Dr. Scarey's motive is what I find most curious. In the form of discourse in which she engages, a point of view is defended not in isolation, but in opposition to another (or others). Does she believe that there is a conspiracy afoot to cover up a grave danger? Is she a consumer advocate? I'm certainly not suggesting that she herself is a conspirator, deliberately promulgating dis-information, perhaps to deflect blame from some vast secret aviation industry cabal. But I'm concerned that her approach may have the effect of blurring public focus on issues that, unlike EMI, are supported by hard evidence. The arced wires recovered from both TWA800 and SR111 (see CTSB's final report released March 28th, 03) are not theoretical. They are real and I believe they point to a very clear and present danger.

Big surpise. The Product Details on the Amazon website states that the book has 400 pages. The book actually has 93 pages. It gives a very skimpy introduction to some terms. About 60 pages provide listing of basic and obvious 'risk events' with suggested mitigation strategy. At best this may serve as a simple checklist for beginners.

Avoid this book at all cost -- including the $$$ the publisher is asking for it. It is one of the poorly written textbooks I have ever encountered. I gave up after reading the first 60 pages. They were enough to convince me that the book is dated (published in 2002 but no citations dated after 1990). But much worse is the terrible stream-of-consciousness writing "style."

Evidently, the principal authors recognized that they needed help, so they list an editorial assitant on the title page. But that assistant must not have seen the manuscript, or he would not have let through such howlers as "... it carry's (sic) with it the probability ...". Or how about the list of criteria for causal inference (pages 54-56). It consists of one non sequitur after another.

And if all of this isn't bad enough, the brief discussion of statistical methods in Chapter 3 should demonstrate that the authors are clueless about basic biostatistics.

So, save your money.

The work proposes a new technology from the marriage of in-service inspection, probabilistic fracture mechanics and probabilistic risk assessment. It founders on the violation of an axiom of probability theory by in-service inspection.

In brief, the preservation of lives and property sometimes depends upon the integrity of a structure which functions under mechanical stress. In-service inspection (ISI), using ultrasound, xrays or other nondestructive techniques for detecting flaws, offers a mechanism by which these risks might be mitigated. Engineers apply ISI to a variety of critically important structures, including the pressure boundaries of nuclear power reactors.

Seemingly, one could improve decisions about when and how to use ISI by marrying it to a pair of recently developed disciplines. One of them, probabilistic risk assessment, estimates the probabilities of events with dire consequences for people, such as reactor meltdowns. The other, probabilistic fracture mechanics, estimates the probabilities of failure of structures which are subjected to ISI. Does ISI not have an effect on the probability of reactor meltdown? Don't do it, would be the conclusion coming from the new technology. Does it cut this probability 10-fold? Do it, would be the conclusion.

However, there is a fly in the ointment. A recently published paper demonstrates that ISI violates an axiom of probability theory (see "Erratic Measure," in NDE for the Energy Industry 1995, pp. 1-6. The American Society of Mechanical Engineers, New York, NY.)

by Michael See (Author)

Hardcover: 300 pages
Publisher: Springer; 1 edition (August 9, 2001)
Language: English
ISBN-10: 3540678891
ISBN-13: 978-3540678892
Product Dimensions: 9.1 x 6.2 x 0.8 inches
Shipping Weight: 1.3 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)

This book is extremely basic. The text is double spaced and not very detailed. Sample FMEA forms are blank templates; no filled in examples are provided. In the process mapping chapter, symbols are missing from Table 9-1. A filled in example of a process map is presented with no descriptive text. A functional block diagram is explained in 21 words - absolutely inadequate though the example in Figure 9-2 helps. A reliability block diagram is shown and is described in 22 words - impossible to decipher! Definitely not worth the price, go elsewhere!

I have used (and liked) "Jane's Chem-Bio Handbook" for the past four years.

This book, however, is another story. What little information presented is poorly organized. Information is scattered throughout the book. Some of it is duplicated. Information that is presented as being targeted towards a particular section (such as Hospitals, Utilities, Entertainment Facilities, etc.) is most often of a nature that should have been presented as base data. As a result, the targeted sections loose their "punch".

The book is very good at telling you that you need do something, but often doesn't tell you how to do that thing...So we have a document that manages to fall short as a checklist (for those that have a knowledge of the basics), and which also fails to provide much in the way of fundamentals (the discussion of explosives hidden in the Utilities section fails to mention ANFO (ammonium nitrate/fuel oil).

A good idea for a book, but wait until Jane's revises it.