Economic-union Books

When does a labor union cease to become the solution to individual worker struggles and start becoming the problem? Dr. David Prindle sets before the reader a titillating example of just such a case in his definitive; The Politics of Glamour, Democracy and Ideology in the Screen Actors Guild.

Tracking the sound reasons for forming SAG in the late 1920's, Prindle details the many early injustices visited on workers in front of the camera in uniquely American industry, the movie business. Adroitly, Prindle illustrates how SAG was born as a Guild and bred into a Union. This is a comprehensive history of the titanic forces at play shaping the most widely known yet little understood labor union in the United States. Dr. Prindle explains in careful detail the evolution of SAG from founders like Eddie Cantor and Jimmy Cagney through recent Guild Presidents Ronald Reagan, Charlton Heston and Ed Asner.

If you want to know how the Screen Actors Guild evolved from a scrappy, tough-fisted bunch of actors bent on decent jobs, wages and working conditions to a wimpy, politically correct pack of star-wanna-bees, then you will enjoy this book.

Prindles style has snap, crackle and pop because he doesn't take sides in the many ideological wars that ravage SAG politics even to this day. He lets the towering Hollywood legends call it as they see it. Then he documents the antics of their retinues, deployed in battalion strength to muscle political control over one of Americas most influential labor organizations.

This is a very expensive little book - well it was for me - it is a 67 pages long - still it was worth it - for me. It is an Adelphi Paper (#300) so that is partly why it was not so cheap. The Author - Rosemarie Forsythe is a career diplomat so she brings a certain bias to the direction of this work - but at least you know where she is coming from.

Divided into 5 small chapters - History of Oil in the region, Oil exploration and export, Major Projects, Export options and lastly prospects for the region. This work like Roberts' Caspian Pipelines - I would view as required reading - for a good general background to the issue of oil (not gas) in the Caspian Region - although written in 1996 - it is valuable to see what has changed - and what has not.

As a book I found it to be a good read - although it is a very short book - it only provides a brief overview of the main projects of 1996 - such as Tengizchevroil and the AIOC asperon sill project - these are of course the main projects but there are other possibliy bigger ventures in the wind - especially in the north Caspian. Passing references are made to the role of China, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey in the push for the pipelines to traverse their territory.

Written as a geostrategic work the underlying tone of this tome is just that - and to quite honest I think it is the only way to correctly interpret the issue of energy reserves and pipeline direction in the caspian region. This book - like many others does not provide a basis for what geopolitics/geostrategy is, so for some readers that are not aware of this, the subtle nuances may be lost

The author identies 7 policy options for contributing to the long term viability of energy reserve development in the region - and to date 3 of these 7 options are taking shape - albeit slowly. Firstly mutlipipeline routes as opposed to one MEP. Second devlopment of the littoral states technical and legal infrasturute - albeit piecemeal and lastly a slight increase in environmental concerns.

Gaddy's study focuses on three important issues - the precise size of the Soviet military-industrial complex, the shape and effect of reforms targeting this sector under Gorbachev and Yeltsin, and the multifarious effects of the oversized defense sector on the present-day Russian economy. The first question is discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. Gaddy chooses to measure the relative size of the defense sector through estimating the number of people it employed. Unfortunately, Gaddy dramatically overestimates the economic importance of the sector as, surprisingly for an economist, he fails to recognize that any direct conclusion about size based on the number of employees has to take into account the fact that the Soviet economy was labor-intensive. Comparison of numbers of people employed in any branch of industry (not just the military-industrial complex) would have yielded similar results in comparison with the same figures in the US. Thus while 10 or, according to the most inclusive estimate, 15 to 18 percent of the Soviet labor force appears to have been employed in the defense sector, it is difficult to draw any meaningful conclusion about the relative burden of that sector on the economy. Chapter 3 discusses the evolution of the military doctrine of the Soviet Union as it pertains to the economy. The earlier view, elaborated in the 1950s, called for a massive defense industry, geographically remote from the front lines of a possible future conflict and for maximally self-sufficient enterprises that would be able to move to a full military mode of production at a short notice. In the absence of meaningful measure of costs in the Soviet economy which, in Gaddy's view, would have indicated the burden of implementing such a program, the Soviet economy did follow the imperatives derived from the doctrine. The costs, in Gaddy's view, were transferred downward in the hierarchy -- to the Soviet citizens themselves, who had to put up with the secondary status and shoddy quality of civilian production under the Soviet system. The more modern version of the doctrine emerged only in the 1980s and it called for a dynamic economy which could be readily adjusted to rapid technological changes. The weakness of this chapter, which surfaces elsewhere in the study as well, is that Gaddy falls victim to a view of decision-making capacity and bureaucratic capability of the Soviet system that has long been rejected. He gives the impression of systematic and rational (in the Soviet context) pursuit of goals without much conflict. In fact, the Soviet elite, we now know, was far from monolithic, and its grip on the bureaucracy progressively weakened thus impairing both its ability to formulate relevant policies (due to lack of information) and its ability to put any policies to work. Chapters 4 and 5 look at the fate of the military-industrial complex under Gorbachev's perestroika and, after 1991, under the various Russian governments. At the same time, Gaddy dispels the simplistic perception that conversion implies simply that enterprises making weapons begin producing civilian goods. The main theme for the Gorbachev's period appears to have been Gorbachev's illusion that the high quality of military production was somehow due to more efficient management, that the defense sector possessed the "secret of success" (p. 55) that could be applied to the rest of the economy. Thus until 1988 defense budgets continued to grow and Gorbachev made a numeber of personnel choices that reflected his belief in the managerial abilities of the defense sector. An attempt at a conversion from above in 1989-91 failed miserably and compounded the problem of the unwieldy defense sector. Under Yeltsin, the sector appeared to be losing ground as a special interest in the early stages of the reform, but especially after 1993 regained its special status and was largely protected from radical reform. Chapters 6 to 9 form the core of Gaddy's study. Focusing on thew human costs of demilitarization, he examines the legacy of the defense sector in several important aspects and demonstrates the painful adjustment of the defense enterprises to the conditions of market economy. In fact, at least until 1993/94 due to the soft budgetary constraint and a loophole in Russian law, enterprises could still produce vast quantities of weaponry even if noone was bying it, simply by accumulating mutual debt. The conversion that occurred was far from the dreams of Russian reformers - instead of building on the industrial capacity of the defense sector and turning it to civilian production, the market dictated incentives for direct export of raw materials previously used by the defense sector, such as aluminum and titanium. What is more, the civilian production of the defense sector (such as machines for the textile and shoe-making industry) declined sharply as Soviet producers faced the stiff competition of high-quality western commodities. Gaddy suggests that the defense sector's decline has resulted in an internal brain-drain (p. 125) whereby the most highly qualified employees leave the sector in pursuit of better careers and higher income. Another aspect associated with the decline of the defense enterprises is the related decline of company towns, or the so-called defense cities. Gaddy asserts that the Soviet-era enterprises provided numerous social services to their employees that they are no longer provided, resulting in an even sharper deterioration of living standards. He believes that the solution to these problems is, prosaically, a dynamic and aggressive regional leadership that will improve the investment climate and bring new jobs to their respective regions. The future, which Gaddy discusses in Chapter 10, is highly uncertain, as defense enterprises have largely been unsuccessful to adjust to the demands of market and find either marketable civilian products to replace their military production, or larger markets for their weaponry. It is in a way a vicious circle - their future depends on the overall future of the Russian economy, and yet, being a large and unwieldy part of that economy, this sector is, in effect, impeding its emergence from the valley of transition.

Dismantling the Soviet Union had rarely-examined effects on remote rural families. This book documents the impacts of transition on pastoralists,through multidisciplinary field studies at several sites between 1998-2000. Topics include: Asian agrarian reform, vegetation dynamics, livestock nutrition, grazing patterns, marketing and pastoral income, land degradation, institutions for managing pasture and livestock. The fourteen authors include five Central Asian scientists, and range from social anthropologists, animal scientists, economists, pasture agronomists and climate ecologists. The book will be of interest to researchers on range and livestock in semi-arid areas and to policy analysts of transition in the rural areas of the former Soviet Union.

I should have received this product two weeks ago and still no sign of it.
I wonder if there is something I should/could do to find out what happens.

This book is a good reference tool for the novice Union Organizer. I recommend it highly. It goes over alot of stuff you already know, but it is good to be reminded of such!

Solshenitzyn's "Rebuilding Russia" is a look past tradition and modern paganist values into the "how-to" of starting a nation/civilization from scratch. His analysis of the paralysis that afflicts modern Russian in every area is brilliant and his solutions apply not to just Russia but any nation that is experiencing broad social decline, which would include nearly every nation in the West. He starts with the correct premise that government is incapable of building any enduring civilization and, therefore, social structure always precedes political structure with the former a more fundamental entity. He also points out that any who cave-in to fleshly appetites will never rise from being mere beasts. Those who do this choose anarchy instead of order and peace. However, it has generally brought a mere "ho-hum" from the great in US society because Solshenitzyn starts from Judeo/Christian theism - an abomination to most here. He correctly sees that the battle for civilization has been lost in the United States because our nation has plunged into the tide of neo-paganism and has abandoned the foundations for a just and peaceful society. It is insufficient to save the environment, for example, if basic social order is collapsing, and in the end such a cause will merely be a stepping stone to tyranny. An excellent book that should be a best seller but most don't want to hear what Solshenitzyn has to say.

I use this book as required reading for a graduate course on European Union Enlargement in a US university (where i spend the academic year away from the Europan Commission as a visiting EU Fellow). Prof. Mayhew clearly knows what he is talking about, as former high official at the European Commission at the centre of developments with Central and East European countries on EU Enlargement. He provides a complete and detailed overview of the roles of the various players and the long and complicated process of EU-CEEC relationship and EU Enlargement, one of the biggest historic challenges of European integration ever undertaken. Perhaps not very critical on some issues (Other academic authors definitely use a more critical line) but still fair and balanced, generally well-written and clear. Recommended for study and reference for all students interested in EU integration.

The unenthusiastic accommodation reached after WWII between employers and labor unions began to be shredded in the late 1970s as employers took advantage of the weak labor laws of the US to de-unionize and defeat new organizing efforts. Anti-unionism now permeates the corporate world with devastating effects on unions. Labor theorists and academics, unions, and union members have absolutely been at their wits' end in coming to grips with the siege on labor and in devising strategies to resist employer onslaughts. _Reorganizing the Rust Belt_ is one man's attempt to do just that. In a research project, the author, a graduate student of sociology, is permitted to become an organizing intern on the staff of Local "A" (not the real name) of the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), generally operating in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, to assist and report on efforts to organize a nursing home. Choosing the SEIU to follow is highly pertinent because the service sector now dominates the US economy and the SEIU is virtually the only union that has substantially gained membership in an era of precipitous union density decline.

Large elements of the labor movement are now proponents of "social movement" unionism. It is a rather fluid concept but it has at its core the mobilization of rank-and-file workers. The importance of union staffers is supposedly reduced as workers constitute the organizing committee, orchestrate face-to-face home visits, and conduct any number of workplace solidarity enhancing exercises like tee-shirt days, leafleting, petitioning the boss, etc. Another element of the "social" approach is drawing upon community interests and resources to enhance labor's position. In one case described by the author, an attempt to privatize a cluster of nursing homes was seen by the community as potentially threatening to elderly residents due to the clear implications of reduced services. A coalition involving the union and progressive and religious groups in the community defeated the proposal, but the self interest of the union was a secondary factor to those community activists. A contract campaign later conducted by the union did not resonate with the community, though it was successful largely because of the earlier rebuke of the county officials. In the more general case, the dispersion of workers' homes from the vicinity of a firm would make community support problematic; where is the commonality? The author did not stress that forming labor-community coalitions is difficult and usually involves special circumstances.

Though the author is a staunch advocate of social movement unionism, his analysis clearly shows that so-called business unionism is well entrenched. Labor unions have been sold for decades to workers as providing bargaining and contract enforcement services. Union staff people, perhaps assisted by member stewards, are expected to perform the work. If unions are not successful in providing those services, or even worse, unionized factories are shutdown, members or potential members are inclined to place blame on the unions. The author repeatedly encountered disenchantment with unions on the organizing drive.

A contradictory fact is that social movement unionism requires more staff, not less. Rank-and-file mobilization does not just spontaneously occur. Union staff or paid member organizers have to carefully nurture an activist workplace mentality. And that is costly to unions. An earlier unsuccessful attempt to organize the author's nursing home was attempted through the less staff intensive methods of mass mailings and sparsely attended union meetings. Union staffers are often disinclined to get involved in worker motivation preferring to provide the services for which they are obligated. In addition, activist workers can often undermine the more limited, but predictable, power base of union officials. Costs and the concerns of staffers and officials will continue to part of the union dynamic, stated or otherwise.

The author is concerned with not only the sustainability of worker mobilization from a psychological standpoint, but also whether unions even know how use worker activism beyond organizing or contract campaigns. He finally seems to be content with the notion that workers once mobilized can be ramped up again when needed. It is an irony that a key component of business unionism, servicing the contract, remains most important once mobilization has passed.

Is the successful nursing home campaign applicable to other sectors of the economy? Clearly, the author's experiences demonstrate that the general public is concerned with conditions in nursing homes for both residents and employees, but working conditions for Wal-Mart workers seem to be of minimal interest. In addition, closing a nursing home to avoid a union would tend to be less tolerated than shuttering a retail establishment. Despite the difficulties, organizing a nursing home is one of the more favorable situations that exist in today's economy.

The author does not really probe the SEIU version of worker mobilization in terms of its limitations and what it could be. Achieving enough solidarity to vote for a union is commendable, but hardly exhausts worker solidarity or empowerment. A vote for union representation will not change the fact that workers have no say in a business beyond wages and some aspects of working conditions. It was not that many decades ago that US workers were concerned with actual worker control in workplaces. Even now the codetermination found in European workplaces gives workers more real voice in workplace decisions than do contracts that largely seek to constrain workers. Worker input is definitely not tolerated.

The author makes much of his findings that movements are defined by what they must overcome as opposed to the view that movements take advantage of existing conditions. The point seems rather minor as the campaign on which the author worked had both situations. The book is sad commentary on the status of working Americans. So much effort must be made to simply achieve a place at a bargaining table where decisions that have long-term consequences for workers cannot even be discussed. Corporations, if they must, will make that trade every day: a few cents an hour in exchange for nearly complete control of the business and its profits.

Peronism managed to control the Union movement in Argentina. Working from the national state, Perón moved to legalize long-sought rights of Argentine workers (like paid yearly vacations). He also took the time to crush or isolate any dissent with him within the Union movement. And guaranteed to the Union "bosses" some privileges (like having only one Union legalized for each kind of workers).

The book tells the story.