Economic-union Books

Stanley Aronowitz is the most important (perhaps one of the only) public intellectual of our age. He argues convincingly for a new agenda for the labor movement, one that takes into account not only the interests of the working class, but opens the possibility for injecting new life into the movement by forcing unions to find ways to link its interests with the interests of all Americans. In other words, Aronowitz shows how labor can finally fulfill its promise to be the vanguard of democracy in America. Anyone interested in the future of our democratic enterprise -- be they middle class or working class -- needs to read this book.

From the beginnings of craft protectionism and built upon a number of militant worker movements from say 1875 to 1920, the Great Depression spurred the rise of industrial unions. The Wagner Act neatly bottled up, with union acquiescence, worker unrest and power to influence US industry. As Aronowitz shows, the limitations of that accord were revealed early on in the failed Southern organizing drives and the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act. But that was then. Now one has to wonder if the notion of a "labor movement" has any real meaning. Is there a recognizable philosophy of labor or worker empowerment in the general public's consciousness. I don't think so. Yes unions have hung on in some industries and teachers, whose situation in terms of public and contract-based employment is unlike that found in the private sector, have hidden the overall decline of unions. Also unions in this age of extremely small voter turnouts that can mobilize a dedicated minority can influence some elections much as can the Christian right. But those have been mostly defensive victories: elect the least conservative of two. One of Aronowitz's key suggestions is the organizing of the huge numbers of professional-technical and white collar workers. But that seems to be mostly hope. Many (probably most) of those folks accept all of the negative stereotypes of unions. Aronowitz briefly mentions European-style works councils, but US unions aren't about to allow that. There just is not much in this book, as well as in scores of others written since John Sweeney took over the helm of the AFL-CIO, that is a realistic assessment of the possibility of going from point A (corporate dominance of the economy and politics) to point B (genuine worker influence within enterprises and the overall economy and political process).

Not having read any of Mr. Aronowitz' other books, I came to this one looking for a guide to the history of organized labor and am glad I did. As he points out, labor seems not to exist as far as the media are concerned. Workers appears only in strikes, portrayed as grasping disrupters of business. My interest in organized labor and the plight of the worker came from direct experience in a lock out. Eyes opened by the event, I was eager to put it in perspective and this book was exactly what I was looking for. Things can't go on as they are. Aronowitz rightly points out how both political parties are pro-business, that the conservatives have framed the debate on the economy and labor is confined to a diminished spot with the Democrats, largely taken for granted. If you scratch the surface of material wealth you find discontent with society. The lack of protection for workers; the "temping" of the workforce and the shifting of the costs of benefits to workers from business is spreading like wildfire. Those who never dreamed of associating with organized labor are now having second thoughts. Labor, as Aronowitz points out, must appeal to social issues and working conditions in other countries if it is to survive. This book is a call to take a full place on the stage, a stage set for labor to re-enter from parochialism. Anyone interested in new forms that labor may take and why it should take them should read this book. If you work for a living and wonder about tomorrow, read it.

This book has been very informative. It has an abundance of information. As a new grad I refer to this book often and I have found it very helpful.

As a current OT student, this book is wonderful! The pictures and the understandable language is great!! This book helps with the understanding of the OT profession. I only hope that you get out of it what I have!!

As an OT you are often in doubt of what to do for your cliet. This book helps you to gather your knowledge and focus it on the actual problem. Almost everything is there. A great book to get ideeas! But don't take it for a bible. Remember - You have to add yor own exprinces and, perhaps,a'lot of other sources to solve the problem. Never forget you and your knowledge is the most valuable resource for your client.

I have just finished reading The Oligarchs - all 496 pages of it, and I just wanted to let anyone know who was thinking of reading it that it is an absolutely, incredible piece of quality work. I enjoyed every page.

David Hoffman's "The Oligarchs" documents in great detail the rise of 6 businessmen--Aleksandr Smolensky, Yuri Luzhkov, anatoly Chubais, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky--who became the "oligarchs" who shaped the political and economic landscape of the New Russia. They were merely ordinary Russians until the Soviet Union collapsed. So how did a mere handful Russians end up controlling such an epic proportion of Russia's economy and have such great influence in its politics? And how did they manage to rise at Russia's decline? Hoffman's book will answer these questions by piecing together extensive research and interview to create a well-balanced, serious but at the same time, a downright fun and readable book. "The Oligarchs" is a landmark.

Much better than I expected, a serious work with a great deal of research invovled. It avoided the typical lurid embellishments of the genre, and also made the point of the important period of transistion in the Gorbachev period, where nascent Russian capitalism started. It lacks somewhat in that it focuses on only six men, and they are of varying importance in the post-Yeltsin period. As Putin reportedly said when asked about Berezovsky--"Who?" Nevertheless, a good job, an interesting read and thankfully avoids falling into the tabloid style of so much of the literature on the topic.

This would make a great text for an upper division class on the EU or on comparative legislative politics. I am very impressed with its theoretical sophistication with the inclusion of simple spatial models that make its content comparable with a book such as Krehbiel's _Pivotal Politics_.

This book is for someone who has a pretty decent knowledge of the EU and of the governmental process. The book is crammed with information but is WORDY and Hix is a bit long winded at times. He provides a lot of references to other political theorists with whom the reader should be familiar with before he or she tries to dive into this text. I found it to be nice to read as a follow up text on the EU rather than reading it on its own.

In the preface to 'The Political System of the European Union' the author articulates that the central aim of the book is to provide an extensive review of the recent 'explosion' of empirical and theoretical literature, concentrating on the European Union's (EU) decision making and policy process. This aim is fulfilled admirably, in a comprehensive and accessible manner. The book begins by examining the EU system of Government. However, the conventional approach of examining separately each of the governing institutions is rejected in favour of examining in turn, the Executive (Council of Ministers and Commission), Legislature (European Parliament) and Judiciary (European Court of Justice). This classification not only increases parsimony, but also allows for the 'importation' of a wider body of political science literature in which the theories of governance have been developed to an extent far beyond those seen in the sub-field of European Studies. The book subsequently turns its attention to the politics of the EU, concentrating on public opinion, parties and interest representation. Drawing extensively on recent work by Mathew Gabel, and through original analysis of Eurobarometer data, a detailed picture is provided of the stratification of support for EU integration throughout European society. One major conclusion is made - the European issue cuts across the traditional left-right dimension - encouraging Europe's main political parties to play down the European issue in domestic competition. The consequences of this conclusion are analysed in the context of the EU's 'nascent political parties' and the prospects for majoritarian democracy - prospects which Hix concludes are extremely limited. In many respects this last point captures the essence of what Hix is attempting to convey in conceptualising the EU as a political system. For despite the author's initial claims, this book represents far more than a literature review. It represents an attempt to transfer the study of the EU from the paradigm of International Relations to the mainstream of Political Science. This has lead to the misperception that 'The political system of the EU' down plays the 'rogue' nature of the EU in comparison to other political systems. It does not. And the point is made clearly that the European Union is a political system but not a state. Amongst its many strengths, one weakness reoccurs. The book investigates and explains the EU using predominantly North American political science literature. In certain respects this is its strength: as in the transposition of US Congess literature onto the European Parliament. However, in other respects, where European literature would provide a valuable comparative framework, such literature is absent. Such a focus can be excused perhaps as a necessary counterbalance to the many 'Eurocentric' volumes on the EU. In 'The Political System of the European Union', Hix has produced an accessible and much needed literature review, whilst making a persuasive case for a change in the paradigm and methods of EU studies. It is for this latter reason that the book will become a seminal text.

Written in 1993, it is fascinating to re-read "Russia 2010" today, 11 years later -- but still 6 years before the ultimate forecast date of the title -- to see how Dan Yergin and Thane Gustafson's predictions are doing. Given the events of recent months, with the school massacre in southern Russia and other terrorist actions, the ongoing brutal war in Chechnya, the continued clampdown on freedom of the press and civil society in Russia, the prosecution/persecution of leading business moguls (specifically, Mikhail Khodorkovsky), and President Putin's dramatic moves to increase his power, Russia should definitely be getting a lot more attention than most people have been giving it. Which makes the analysis of "Russia 2010" more relevant than ever.

Most importantely, what Yergin and Gustafson did in "Russia 2010" was NOT to make absolute forecasts or to simply (and mindlessly) extrapolate from the situation at the time, but instead to apply powerful "scenario planning" techniques to thinking through the most likely futures for Russia. Back in 1993, the authors laid out four main scenarios: 1) "muddling down;" 2) the "Two-Headed Eagle;" 3) "Time of Troubles;" and 4) "Chudo" (economic miracle). How did the authors do?

Today, in 2004, we can confidently conclude that #4 was wrong -- there has been no Russian economic miracle, although oil prices have certainly helped Russia recover from the post-Soviet low point of the early- to mid-1990s. It also turns out that #1, "muddling down," the scenario that came closest to simply extrapolating from the existing situation at the time (as most forecasters erroneously do) was somewhat off the mark in the long run, although its predictions of a "relatively free atmosphere" and "weak Russian central government" did hold true for a few years at least. Scenario #3 is interesting, as it accurately anticipates separatist tendencies (although not specifically mentioning Chechnya) and the reaction of the "Russian Bear" to reassert itself. To some extent, that's exactly what we see today.

It is Scenario #4 (the "Two-Headed Eagle"), however, that appears to have hit the nail squarely - almost eerily so -- on the head. In "Russia 2010," Yergin and Gustafson posit that an attempted assassination on the Russian President by a "petty hoodlum"/mafia type "from the north Caucasus" leads to: a) Russian military action in that unnamed north Caucasus republic; b) a popular call for a crackdown on "the mafia, on corruption, and the private economy, which are all rolled into one in many people's minds;" c) the central government taking advantage of this situation to consolidate its own power, rein in the provinces, strengthen the executive over the legislative branch, reassert its control over natural resource exports; and d) an "ambivalent" and half-hearted Western reaction to these moves. Sound familiar? It should, because Scenario #4 -- the "premature reconstitution of a strong state" -- is almost exactly what we're seeing right now in Russia.

What Yergin and Gustafson have done, among other things, is to have demonstrated the tremendous value of "scenario planning" -- rigorously thinking through possible future paths as opposed to mindlessly extrapolating from the present. Although the latter course of action may be the easier (and lazier) way of trying to predict the future, it is also the least helpful and least accurate. Why would we think the future would be just like the present and recent past? The simple answer? Failure of imagination, and the lack of courage to go out on a limb and stand out from the herd. As Yergin and Gustafson point out, the normal "extrapolate from the current situation" forecasting methodology failed us miserably during the past few decades, missing most of the major turning points of those years. For instance, just about nobody managed to predict the Iranian Revolution, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the rise of Al Qaeda, 9/11, the course of oil prices from 1973 to now, or just about anything else during that period. Yergin and Gustafson, however, by spending some time and effort to actually think through possible scenarios, hit the nail on the head regarding the future of Russia in one of their four posited "scenarios" -- with two of the three others having large elements of truth as well. True, it's not 2010 yet, but as of September 2004, Yergin and Gustafson are looking pretty darned smart!

Written in 1993, this book is still worth of reading today. Actually, it is more interesting to read today because some of the uncertainties in Russia back then had worked themselves out. The book was well structured and followed clear themes. The scenarios were plausible. I especially enjoyed the chapter on Russian transition from a market economy to a market one.

Yergin and Gustafson present a series of three conceivable roads of reform along which Russia may travel between 1994 and 2010. The first scenario, "Muddling Down," which precedes all other roads in their model, is described as "the scenario that extends the present" (pg. 140). It is characterized by a weak central government and a lack of legal infrastructure. The three roads from this point are "Two-Headed Eagle" (the return of a strong state composed of both new and old elites), "Time of Troubles" (chaos and unprecedented decentralization inevitably leading to restrictive nationalism with overtones), and "Chudo" (the economic miracle, compared with both Germany during the 1950's and with Alice in Wonderland). Regardless of the path taken, the authors believe that the outcome will be the same: by 2010 "a capitalist Russia seems almost certain" (pg. 300).

As I write this review, Russia is now six years further along its path than it was when the authors penned their book. Naturally, the material in this book is dated. The authors could have done a better job in making this book more accessible to a future audience -- especially that of a future in which none of these scenarios seem to be taking shape as expected. I would not rule out the possibility that some of the events discussed could still come to pass, but not within the timeframe proposed. For example, in one scenario, Yeltsin steps down in 1996 due to poor health. Looking back, he remained in power for another four years after that, despite heart surgery and repeated ailments. Could that particular scenario still be valid in the future? That depends on many other factors, of course.

In their discussions on Russia's policy towards non-Russians (at home and in the Near Abroad), the authors overplayed the potential for problems with Ukrainians and underplayed the potential for problems with Chechens and other non-Russians to the south. The first Russo-Chechen conflict broke out at about the same time that this book was updated and revised. Yet even before that, one could have foreseen the potential for conflict in the Caucasus. The Summer 1993 issue of Foreign Affairs featured an article by Samuel Huntington entitled, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Huntington's influential article proposed that armed conflicts tend to occur along fault lines between civilizations. A prime example of such a fault line is Yugoslavia, where Islamic, Western, and Slavic civilizations come together at one point. By this rationale, the Caucasus and Central Asia are also fault lines. Ukraine, however, is not a fault line. Despite Ukrainians' dislike of decades of rule by Moscow, Ukrainians and Russians have too much in common for a serious rift to occur. After all, America overcame its antipathy towards its former ruler to become England's greatest ally.

Overall, I would recommend this book with a cautionary note to the reader that the book is not as useful now as it might have been half a decade ago. That being said, the book does still hold water with respect to Russia's future and has certainly retained its value as an academic exercise in scenario-building.

Jack Metzgar has achieved a rare feat with "Striking Steel" in that he writes a wonderful memoir of his childhood, his family and his father, Johnny Metzgar's days working as a unionized steel worker in Pennsylvania. A must read for anyone who is trying to comprehend their own father and for students of labor history. Its a wonderful read.

In these memoirs by the son of a steelworker union rep, Metzger does a great job explaining how steelworkers and their Union created a middle class in steel towns across the U.S. by repeatedly striking during the 1950's. He brings to life the dry legalistic contract language, that steelworkers walked off the job for 119 days to protect and shows how when backed by a strong union and dedicated union reps, these words gave ordinary workers the tools to get respect on the job even when the boss wasn't keen on giving it. His history of the 1959 strike is well documented and he does a good job explaining why so many others got it wrong.

Striking Steel is well written. The author did a massive amount of research and shows an understanding of the deeper underlying labor issues. While we may not always agree on the issues, I came away with a better understanding of why it is sometimes necessary for unions to strike. Even though Mr. Metzgar did not drive the point that all of us--even those of us with comfy office jobs--have better working conditions because unions have demanded them, his recitation of working conditions in the 20th century, made me realize this is so. It is when he brings the issues home--literally--to show how they shaped his family and neighborhood that the book takes on life. Statistics, theory, and conjecture are fine--but the reality of the lives of the workers is where the book has its greatest impact.

Covers pretty much everything about unions in national politics from the early 1960s to 2001, with a strong argument for the resiliency of the union/Democrat alliance.

*The Unions & the Democrats* is a decisive rejoinder to those who claim American labor is in a period of resurgence and renewal. In fact, as Professor Dark amply illustrates, labor's role as an adjunct to the Democrat Party has remained consistent over the years, fending off challenges from 'Left' and 'Right' alike, so far as those terms have any real meaning in the lexicon of reformist American politics. The book is especially strong on the period since 1964, when American labor came into its own, emerging from its anti-Communist past to actively promote Democratic party values from the war in Vietnam to civil rights, all the while remaining firm as an agency of class control. The fundamental relationship between the labor movement and the Democrats remains, as Professor Dark is happy to remind us, fundamentally unchanged.

There is, too, excellent sections detailing the controversy surrounding labor spending during the 1996 presidential campaign and the effect of 'New Democrats' like Clinton to better 'rationalize' the union/Democrat relationship. In fact, an argument can be made that Clinton himself better exemplifies the values of the traditional union member than his more 'activist' counterparts. Professor Dark's conclusions will challenge, in fact, a number of activists' sacred cows, though in an even-handed and fair manner.

Anyone looking for a good resume of 'New Labor' and its possibilities would be well-served by reading *The Unions & the Democrats*. Pay special attention to section on contemporary organizing. Professor Dark himself appears a likely candidate for the new type of union member, seeming as he is one of many 'casual' workers in the new non-tenure academic workplace.

A good overview of sources is included, many of which suggest avenues for future research.

This book provides a thorough and well-written account of the role of labor unions in the Democratic party since the 1960s. I found its argument that the unions were more effective than commonly believed to be quite interesting and (mostly) convincing. Simply put, this is the most comprehensive and detailed book on this subject currently available, and should be the starting point for all future discussions of union political activity. The chapters on Congress and on the Clinton administration were especially good at overturning some commonly-held notions about a break in union/Democrat relations.

This work should be of interest not only to academics, but also to union activists and anyone interested in the current nature of Democratic party coalitions.

The Cogs is revealing many interesting operations that were going on in an experimentive society. Sometimes the style is extremely bitter, but sometime it is very funny: Obviously the historian is speaking not only about dry facts, but from an experience. Note the year of first publishing 1980:Geller was ahead of his time analyzing so sharply the mechanisms of subject technology- this book tells us about a totalitarian operation over personality.

A Polish joke from the book :

Poland, Soviet Union and USA were competing over who has the most modern computer: The test was done with a sentence "Why is there no meat?"

After feeding the test sentence to all the computers, first of all the Polish computer noted that it could not solve the question, because its dictionary did not include word "meat".

Secondly the USA made computer failed, because its dictionary did not include word "no".

After some time the Soviet computer failed due to the fact, that the computer's dictionary did not include the word "Why".

I do recommend this book.

Heller has written definitive book on what the Soviet regime was all about - an attempt to create a new human being. It goes into great detail of how the Soviet government attempted to reshape the human mind and society, with obvious disasterous results. It is a must read for students of Cold War history, and for anybody wanting to understand what the Soviet Union was all about. Reading this book confirms the fact the the Soviet Union was The Evil Empire.

This book is a really superb piece of labor history. It is well written and the details are presented in a clear and concise manner. It endeavors to focus on intra-union efforts to reform the Teamsters unions; efforts which the author believes have been neglected by historians. It also argues that the militancy and power of the Teamsters has been the primary concerns of its enemies in the American establishment rather than the corruption of its leadership.

Witwer starts off with the beginnings of the Teamsters union. The Teamsters brought significant improvements in the wages and hours of drivers. For instance in Chicago, Witwer, citing the early 20th century labor economist John Commons, notes that milk drivers in a union's local had their average weekly hours reduced to 52 from 80 to 100 hours prior to the union contract.

The Teamsters were strongest in Chicago, where they were often used to enforce cartel agreements among transport employers. They also used their fists to enforce picket lines and engaged in secondary strikes and boycotts. A Teamsters strike in 1905 left about 21 people dead and the Employers Association in Chicago worked hand in glove with the Cook County District Attorney's office to use the courts to try to destroy the union. Witwer shows how the Cook County DA was unable to find enough evidence to press charges against the union. The Grand Jury was forced to content itself not by pressing formal charges but by issuing denunciations of Teamsters leader Cornelius Shea for visiting brothels. The ability of the Teamsters to take over the streets of Chicago by striking and using their fists was also denounced as un-American.

A big part of the book deals with corruption within the union which had become a noticeable problem by the 1930's. Entrepreneurial organized crime began to discover the potential of union treasuries at the end of the 1920's and began to use threats and violence to force their way into control of unions. Witwer gives examples of mafia infiltration into Teamsters locals in New York City. In one milk drivers local, small milk company owners used the criminal organization of Jacob Bernoff to enforce a cartel agreement among themselves. The Teamsters local became the device with which to enforce this arrangement. In one instance members of a large local Teamsters union in New York were able to brave intimidation and engineer the replacement of their leaders who were backed by a waterfront mob boss, John Dunn. In another New York local, reform efforts against a mob backed leadership failed miserably. Witwer explores the reasons why the fight against corruption failed in the one case but not the other.

Witwer examines internal Teamster correspondence to show how Dan Tobin, who was president of the Teamsters from 1907 to 1952, tried to deal with corruption in his organization. Tobin and his right hand man Michael Cashal showed considerable fear regarding the threats made by mobsters against the Teamsters national leadership's efforts to clean up the union. Teamster leaders in recent years had been murdered for opposing mob elements in various locals. Tobin wrote to the leaders of the two main garment workers federations in the US, David Dubinsky and Sidney Hillman, for advice as to how to combat corruption. They had problems with the mob in their own organizations and advised him that not a whole lot could be done. The presence of the mafia was an important source of stability and strength in these industries. Moreover in fighting corruption within the union, one's life could be in danger.

Witwer extensively discusses the Senate McCLellan committee, which from 1957 to 1959, focused on corruption within unions. The committee seemed to focus most of its attention on the Teamsters. Jimmy Hoffa of course, had brought organized crime for the first time into the inner sanctum of the national Teamster leadership. Witwer shows that members of the Committee seemed to focus not so much on Hoffa's enablement of mafia use of his organization for embezzlement and extortion but on the economic and political power of the Teamsters. Goldwater argued that corruption was only a symptom of the excessive power of unions in American life. The Committee's chief counsel Robert Kennedy portrayed virtually the entire Teamsters organization as infested with corruption from top to bottom, a gross exaggeration according to Witwer. Kennedy and other committee members indulged in much paranoid rhetoric regarding the ability of the Teamsters to control the American economy. The Committee argued that the presence of organized crime within industries was almost entirely the fault of unions. Employers were portrayed as having organized crime forced upon them by unions. Of course there had long been cases of employers who had initiated relationships with criminal elements in order to control competition within their industries. In any case, in 1959, congress passed the Landrum-Griffin Act which, while giving union members a few tools to fight corruption and autocracy by their leaders, also tightened restrictions on strike activities.

Witwer discusses the efforts within the Teamsters to resist Hoffa, which he feels have been greatly underappreciated by historians. He shows how members of a mob ridden local in Chicago were able to brave violent retribution and successfully succeed from the Teamsters while an anti-Hoffa leader in Cincinnati, James Luken took his local out of the Teamsters, in spite of intimidation from Hoffa's goons. The fourth largest local within the Teamsters, located in Philadelphia, seemed also likely in the early 60's to defy the thuggery of Hoffa's goons and succeed from the Teamsters. However Hoffa eventually stopped this rebellion using the carrot and the stick. First he threatened that he would convince truck operators to close the job site where the local's members worked. Then he acceded to some of their reform demands but the local remained mob dominated through the late 80's.

One sign of the decreased power of organized labor in American politics since 1960 is the ways in which conservative politicians have charged unions with corruption and faced little opposition in doing so. Professor Witwer explores some of the historical bases for this trend in this excellent monograph, using as his case study the Teamsters Union, an organization most Americans probably view as synonymous with labor boss cynicism and disregard for the working man's welfare.

_Corruption and Reform in the Teamsters Union_ focuses on three time periods -- the first decade of the twentieth century, the 1930s and the 1950s to highlight the various "environmental" factors leading to corruption in the Teamsters Union. Dr. Witwer stresses these environmental factors over some older accounts of union financial peccadillos which tended to stress the moral cuplability of union leaders. Professor Witwer disagrees with those more traditional narratives, arguing that economic and social factors inherent in the Teamsters position in the national economy were far more significant. For example, men transporting good by wagon, lorry or truck (depending on the era) tended to work with small entrepreneurs in such areas as diary products, ice, and fruit and vegetable provisioning -- economic activities with severe competition and incentives to undercut prices of rivals to survive. Later in the twentieth century, interstate companies transporting goods long distance looked to stablize transport rates to raise profits. In either case, the incentive to collude to set prices often included partnerships with unions such as the Teamsters. The Teamsters would refuse to transport goods with businesses that refused to enter into pricing agreements with relevant business assoications. Over time, however, the importance of the Teamsters to these monopolistic practices, combined with their key positions in a growingly national economy, made them irresitable targets for organized crime who themselves were looking to muscle in on profitable legitimate economic enterprises. Juicy pension and retirement funds garnered by favorable collective bargaining agreeements made the temptations even greater.

In explaining these complicated historical processes, Dr. Witmer enters into all manner of scholarly debates. For example, many leftist historians view Teamster leaders such as Dave Beck and Jimmy Hoffa as "business unionists" concerned only with lining their own pockets and creating a docile rank-and-file concerned only with shorter hours and higher pay. _Corruption and Reform_ rightly argues that though this took away the social insurgency potential of this important union, the efforts to improve the lives of the rank-and-file in the brutal Darwinian American capitalistic system was justified. Similarly, rank-and-file members viewed "corruption" differently than conservative politicans and businessmen. Corruption to the rank and file didn't necessarily embrace "aggressive" unionizing tactics such as secondary boycotts, or even financial hanky-panky on the part of officials, so long as the basic ability of the union to preserve worker dignity and financial comfort continued. Workers did tend to object though to corruption which hurt the ability of unions to bargain collectively and gain benefits for workers and their families.

In making these arguements, Dr. Witwer runs the risk of serving as an apologist for corruption and cynicism. What makes this book so good, though, is his ability -- in my opinion -- to score union leaders for their corruption. He devotes one chapter to the malfeasence of Dave Beck and three to the often extortionate practices of Hoffa. He then shows that reformers attempted to end the decades-long practices of felonious pecuniary activity by reforming their union via secessionist movements. In doing so, rebellious rank-and-filers drew upon a rich tradition in Teamster history. They generally failed until the federal government created mandatory trusteeships in the 1980s and 1990s, but Dr. Witwer puts an effective kabosh -- again in my opinion -- to those journalists and scholars in the past who have argued that docile workers were either too stupid or cynical to protest against the likes of Hoffa and his organized crime cronies.

So what about the issue I started this review with? Professor Witwer indicates throughout that conservative politicans, businessmen and journalists were always willing to give broad interpretations to the word "corruption." Using a broad consensus that its not right to commit extortion or shake down people or bribe officials, conservative groups excelled at linking these corrupt practices with behavior that wasn't -- secondary boycotting (protected, I believe, by both federal statute and the First Amendment) and organizational boycotting. He shows Senator John McClellan (Dem-Arkansas) as a man who used broad terms like "crime" and "corruption" and folded them within deeper anxieites over internal subversion and communist power in the 1950s to introduce legislation cutting back on New Deal pro-labor statutes. Dr. Witwer's book, in short, is yet another example of the power and diabolical brilliance of southern conservatives in the halls of Congress to effectuate a conservative socio-political agenda decades before Ronnie Reagan emerged from California ... tanned, rested and ready.

Yet another reason to purchase this excellent and balanced book.

Professor Peter Kenen is a leading US expert on international economic relations. In this excellent little book, he analyses the prospects for Economic and Monetary Union.

Firstly, he shows the difficulties that countries are having when their governments try to meet the criteria for Economic and Monetary Union. He points out that in 1994 none of the twelve European Community countries met all four criteria; Italy and Portugal met none of them. Six countries failed the inflation test; two had interest rates too high; ten had fiscal deficits too high, and eight had excessive public debts.

Since then, European Union economies have stagnated or shrunk, so they are even further from meeting the criteria. Four of the six countries with debt ratios above 75 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1993 ran bigger budget deficits in 1994 than in 1992, so they would have to make even bigger cuts in their deficits before they can start to cut their debt ratios.

The Governments are in a dilemma: they cannot cut their budget deficits quickly to the stipulated three per cent without depressing real economic activity. And the more they deflate their economies, the less popular support there is for Economic and Monetary Union. Professor Kenen sums up, "It is thus unlikely that a majority of EC countries will be ready for Stage Three in 1997, when a majority is required to set a starting date, and it may be hard to muster a majority in 1999 - although a majority is not needed then." Stage Three is supposed to start automatically in 1999!

Secondly, Kenen studies the likely results if Governments seriously try to meet the criteria. He cites Buiter et al, writing in Economic Policy: "Greece, Italy, Belgium and Ireland need serious fiscal retrenchment, but getting even halfway to the Maastricht debt targets ... involves dangerous fiscal overkill. A blatantly unrealistic debt target is unhelpful for these countries in designing effective fiscal programs." They write that the necessary scale of retrenchment would involve "the economics of the lunatic asylum."

Kenen also cites the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels, which says that "If the Maastricht targets are adhered to, something significant will have to give in terms of public expenditure in many EC countries, with social consequences which could be highly disruptive. Clawing back public deficits which are across the Community higher in GDP percentage terms than they have been at any moment since the EC was founded, at a time when more and more 'legitimate' demands are made on the public purse, looks increasingly like trying to run up a downward moving escalator."

Thirdly, Kenen looks at the costs of joining Economic and Monetary Union. He cites the economists Ghosh and Wolf who estimate that joining it would cost as much as 2.5 per cent of the European Union's total GDP. The European Union's own employment committee said that Economic and Monetary Union would destroy ten million jobs in the European Union.

Supporters of Economic and Monetary Union like to claim that it would curb the speculators, tame finance capital, and end financial crises. But what does Kenen conclude? "In the first years of Economic and Monetary Union, then, the G-7 countries may find it harder to agree on policies and strategies for exchange rate management, and Economic and Monetary Union may thus lead to exchange rate fluctuations wider than those seen since the Louvre Accord [of 1987]. That would be truly ironic. Economic and Monetary Union is meant to replace the EMS (European Monetary System), which emerged from the desire to create a zone of monetary stability in Europe. Yet the achievement of that goal may have the effect of producing greater exchange rate instability at the global level."

A single European currency would not end speculation. It would still be operating in the world of global speculative flows. A single currency would be the focus for speculation against the dollar and the yen, and a smaller number of currencies could generate even more rapid and destabilising speculative flows.

So, to sum up, Kenen's book shows us that Economic and Monetary Union would be extremely difficult and painful to achieve. It would mean savage cuts in public spending (an estimated £18 billion in Britain), a 2.5 per cent reduction in GDP, and greater exchange rate instability. The cuts in public spending would also increase unemployment, reduce wages and worsen our public services...

EMU is the most important international economic event since the Bretton Woods Agreements of 1944.It will represent a further step in the process of economic integration within the European Union. The effects of the monetary union will be felt primarily in the Euro area participating countries. At the same time, Euro will affect international monetary system. Euro's taking its place among the major international currencies is going to be gradual. This process will be quite important for the countries those with the close economic relationships with the European Monetary Union member countries. This book is a must read for all interested in the Euro...