EE Books

There is irony in my choice of title as well as in Risjord's. Risjord's first line is, "Jeffersonian Democracy is a movement that my be described as liberal but not necessarily progressive" (p.1). But in 1965, when this book was first published, people still used the word "liberal" with a sense of it's history. In the present day of talk radio, such a nuanced sense of history is largely gone.
But if you enjoy someone who did have a nuanced sense of history and who wrote beautifully then Risjord is the writer for you. This is a classic study of an important group of men who were followers of Jefferson (at least, the Jefferson of the 1790s): John Taylor of Caroline, John Randolph of Roanoke, Nathaniel Macon, Albert Gallantine, William Harris Crawford among others. Risjord follows the careers and philosophies of these men as they weather the Alien and Sedition Acts, define themselves in opposition to Madison during the Jefferson administration, support and contest against Madison in his own administration and finally fight the congressional and judicial wars against a national bank, for hard money, against the tariffs, against internal improvements by the national government and against any sort of military during peacetime.
I want to briefly emphasize that last point as that is an issue that tends to be glossed over by those who would have us go back to "the principles of 98". Those principles would leave us with hardly any national armed forces. We would mostly be reliant on state militias. I would like all of you to imagine how different the history of the world would be if we had stuck to those ideas over the last two hundred years. Can anyone imagine that this country would exist? In the spring of 1810, two years away from war with Britain, Nathaniel Macon was urging not to fix the army, not to make it more efficient or effective but to disband it altogether (p.109).
So what are 'the principles of '98"? Good question, really. The phrase refers to Madison's and Jefferson's anonymous counter-attack to the Alien and Sedition Acts of the Adams administration. M and J authored the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions which championed a compact reading of the Constitution and claimed that the states had the right to challenge the constitutionality of a federal law and to possibly nullify that law within the borders of individual states. I say possibly because there were differences between the two resolutions, between Madison and Jefferson at the time and later. Jefferson at least did use the word "nullification" in his draft. This is not the version that was adopted by Kentucky however and this fact that J had originally used that word wasn't widely known until almost the 1830s. There is a good discussion of these issues in The Last of The Fathers by Drew McCoy (pp.139-148).
Regardless of whether the resolutions as published supported nullification or merely requested the other States to examine what was happening and to band together to resist the national government, certain things are obvious about the Resolutions and those who adhered to them.
They championed a strict construction reading of the Constitution. They believed that the national government had certain specific and limited powers and that all other powers remained with the states. They resisted any attempt to justify new powers to the national government on the basis of anything other than constitutional amendment. They resisted any attempt to use "the necessary and proper clause", the "general welfare" clause and they resisted the idea of the superior jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court over the states court (it is an irony of our history that the most effect nationalist by far on our early political stage was a Virginian, John Marshall). These constitutional principles led them to their resistance to standing armies (inevitably used to increase the patronage and sway of the national government and to crush the liberties of the people (although, considering George II current reign of stupidity, perhaps we should change that thought from the armed services to intelligence agencies)), to a national bank, to direct taxes and tariffs, and to any sort of national attempt at improvements to roads, canals, and waterways.
The theorist of the movement was John Taylor of Caroline and its prophet was Randolph of Roanoke. Risjord is superb at balancing the play of political/constitutional theory and of local economic interest in the political careers of all his protaganists. Time after time he examines the way the Congress voted on various bank or improvement bills and notes the different motives that effected those votes. But he takes these people and their beliefs seriously. He never minimizes the sincerity of Randolph (although sometimes it is hard to know what that one was thinking), Macon, Van Buren or Gallantin.
For Risjord, the turning point in this history was the controversy surrounding the admission of Missouri to the union. This is the moment at which the nation as a whole began to address the issue of slavery and its spread to the new states of the union. The constitutional principles of The Old Republicans proved to be useful weapons against the efforts to admit Missouri as a non-slave state (I am not really sure how many states at that time, we could seriously call 'free'). New southerners on the national scene flocked to the states rights theories of The Old Republicans. There is irony in this as well as many of the older men were never really comfortable with Calhoun's doctrine of nullification nor with the actions of South Carolina in the Nullification Crisis. However, they felt equally if not more strongly opposed to Jackson's Force Bill (by the way, for an in-depth discussion of this crisis go directly to Richard Ellis' The Union at Risk).
All in all, this is truly an essential study in early American history. One of the later characters in Risjord's story is Amos Kendall, a lieutenant of Jackson, whose slogan was "The World is goverened too much" (p.271). In that slogan we have the vital essence of The Old Republican world-view. Risjord offers a superb witness to the birth of that philosophy and the way it effected the early history of this country. This book is considered the standard history of its subject for good reason. Read, learn, ponder and enjoy.

The Mexican war is a book that tells you everything about the Mexican war. From the astounding victories and fearless generals to the hardships of winter and war. It doesn't tell from a first person view. It gives you all the facts along with informative pictures. But, don't let that get you bored because there are jokes made by solders and hilarious Anti-war cartoons.

Personally, when I looked for a book about the Mexican war I choose the Mexican War. I chose it because the cover caught my attention. It has a cover that looks likes it's saying "read me, read me" and for good reason. After the first few pages I was immediately intrigued and couldn't wait to read more. I was intrigued because of the level of detail. It told me information on the generals and about everything else that other sources just left out. By reading this book you will find out everything you need to know on the Mexican War.

If you're doing a report like I was, or you're just looking for a interesting read this is the book that I recommend.

6th grader

but if you do, I want you to know that I just finished reading your first book, an account of your childhood, "Pochoronite menya za plintusom" ("Bury me behind the floor molding"). I know that it was published ten years ago but somehow I missed it and thanks to my mom who insisted I read it, I finally did. You know, I've read thousands books during my life - many of them made me cry, many - laugh hysterically but NEVER have I read the book that made me sob and laugh at the same time. I've never felt anything similar to what I did while reading your short but simply unforgettable book. There have been many memoirs about childhood years written in hundreds languages by celebrated writers but your story of love that moves sun and planets but suffocates, hurts, distorts, and destroys will have its own unique place in literature. To survive this love and to keep your sanity - is fascinating. To survive this love, to keep your sanity and to write about it - is incredible. To survive this love, to keep your sanity, to write about it AND not to judge but to understand the characters of your book who happened to be your closest people, is a heroic achievement. It takes bravery, honesty, talent, and yes, LOVE. It is all in your book.

Thank you,

Galina

The Compromise of 1877, in which Rutherford B. Hayes was elected President over Samuel Tilden, even though Tilden had more popular and (it seemed likely) more electoral votes as well, is usually explained rather simply (or simplistically): in exchange for removing Federal troops that still oversaw government rule in Louisiana and South Carolina, the South would give its electoral votes to Hayes and cease threatening a new civil war. The biggest loser, of course, would be the freed blacks, who would have no federal protection at all anymore. Woodward contends there was a lot more to the Compromise than just this, and that's what his book explores. Apparently in addition to the troops being removed, the South would get a few cabinet posts, promises of federal appropriations for internal improvements, and passage of the Texas Pacific Railroad Bill, which guaranteed a southern route for a trans-continental railroad at government expense. The deal was struck, Hayes was elected, the troops left, Reconstruction was officially ended, the Texas-Pacific was completed in 1892. Meanwhile, the South became a one-party (Democrat) section and segregation ruled the land. For the next couple of generations the fate of the South was sealed.

Russia Leaves the War, Volume I of George F. Kennan's history of Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920, describes the chaos that the Bolshevik seizure of power produced in US diplomatic circles in the months immediately following the November 1917 revolution. Kennan, who passed away in March 2005, was a leading authority on Soviet-American diplomatic relations and the author of the policy of containment which served as the basis for American policy toward the Soviet Union from the late 1940s to the 1980s.

In Russia Leaves the War, Kennan provides many valuable insights into the earliest diplomatic relations between the US and Soviet governments. Some examples:

The Tsar was deposed in February 1917 and replaced by the Provisional Government led by Alexander Kerensky. This event appears to have been one source influencing the US decision to enter WWI in April 1917 because it allowed President Wilson to present his decision as one to support the forces of democracy against the forces of authoritarianism. (Naturally, Germany's unrestricted submarine warfare and attempts to incite Mexico against the US were also major factors in the decision.)

The perception of Russia by the US in the months following the February Revolution was based on the wildly idealistic and optimistic view that Russia would rapidly develop into a western democracy sharing our values and goals. In reality, Russia had no heritage of democracy and individual liberty remotely comparable to the one we received from England going back at least to Magna Carta (1215).

The treaties creating the Triple Entente (Britain, France and Russia) contained secret provisions regarding territorial adjustments, spheres of influence, and indemnities to be paid by the Central Powers after their defeat. The US was not a party to these treaties and, in fact, insisted on referring to itself as an "associated" rather than "allied" power after entering the war.

In late 1917, Russia was a defeated power. The army was demoralized both by military defeat and Bolshevik agitation; the troops were deserting. The Provisional Government was incapable of simultaneously continuing to fight the Central Powers and establishing itself as the new government of Russia. The Bolsheviks exploited this situation by openly calling for a general peace without annexations or indemnities, without prior consultation with Russia's allies, and by openly publishing and denouncing the secret treaty provisions as imperialist plots. The Bolshevik goals were to rapidly negotiate a separate peace with Germany, consolidate their power in Russia, drive a wedge between their former allies to prevent them from pressuring Russia to continue the war, and to promote communist revolutions throughout Europe by appealing to the masses to rise up against their governments.

The US diplomatic presence in Petrograd in November 1917 was almost as chaotic as the Russian political situation. The US Ambassador, David Francis, the former Mayor of St Louis, Governor of Missouri, and Secretary of the Interior, had little knowledge of either Russia or diplomatic service. Although Francis was, as ambassador, the official representative of the US President to the Russian Government, President Wilson apparently had sufficient misgivings about his ambassador's qualifications that he designated as many as four additional representatives of the US Government to Russia who were to various degrees independent of the Ambassador. The most striking of these independent representatives was "Colonel" Raymond Robins, head of the American Red Cross mission to Russia who attempted, at every opportunity, to influence and maneuver American policy into recognition and support of the Bolshevik regime. The most complimentary description of Robbins is the one provided by Felix Dzerzhinski, head of the Cheka, the Bolshevik secret police, who described Robbins as "...the only true and faithful friend we had among the foreigners...who understood our aims and fully sympathized with us and was ready to support our government...".

Having destroyed the Russian army, Lenin was in a bind. He reached a truce with the Germans to temporarily halt fighting on the eastern front. In the negotiations of a peace treaty at Brest-Litovsk, the Bolsheviks under Trotsky's lead took a hard negotiating position demanding no annexations of formerly Russian controlled territory. When the Germans refused, Trotsky declared the negotiations ended and that there would be "no war, no peace" in the naïve belief that the Germans would not pursue their military advantage. As the Germans approached the then-capital of Petrograd (St Petersburg), Lenin had to step in to demand that his colleagues accept whatever terms the Germans chose to offer.

In the meantime, the Allied powers had been shipping huge amounts of military supplies to Russia via Vladivostok in the Far East. As the Bolsheviks consolidated their power over other Russian factions while caving in to all German demands, fear grew that these supplies might be seized and transferred to the Germans. The British and French both approached the Japanese, also an allied power, to suggest an allied occupation of Vladivostok and a portion of the Trans-Siberian Railway. The Japanese were only too eager to cooperate but wanted an American approval or, at least, a statement of no objection. After a significant period of dithering in March 1918, in which a statement of "no objection" was drafted and shown to the British and French, President Wilson notified the Japanese that the US could not support an intervention in Russian affairs because it might antagonize the Russian people and drive them into alliance with the Germans. To prevent or delay this intervention, the Bolsheviks were actively hinting through Robins that if the US would keep the Japanese from intervening in the Far East, they might not ratify the Brest-Litovsk Treaty which would result in a Russian resumption of the war with Germany. Kennan leaves no doubt that this was a tactical maneuver without any intent to actually delay ratification. As long as Lenin was leading the Bolsheviks, the US, Britain, and France were viewed as enemies along with Germany. At this point, the Bolsheviks ratified the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and the book ends. Presumably the tale continues in Volume II, The Decision to Intervene.

Kennan is not only a master diplomat; he is also an accomplished historian and superb writer. Russia Leaves the War is a valuable addition to the history of the formation of the Soviet Union and ranks along with Richard Pipes' The Russian Revolution and Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime as essential to understanding this period.

In 1946, at a time when most Americans were still under the thrall of the benign image of Uncle Joe Stalin, a handful of Americans had their eyes wide open about the Soviet Union. One of them, General John R. Deane, former head of military liaison with the Soviets, wrote a prescient book. In it, he describes with fairness and detachment his experiences working with the Soviets from 1943-1945. He also anticipates the Cold War, and, in a remarkable last section, outlines the strategy which President Reagan eventually used to bring down that corrupt and bloody dictatorship.

General Deane goes to great lengths to find explanations for the paranoia and incompetence of the Communists, but he is too honest an observer not to show how self-defeating they were. In fact, one of the most valuable lessons in this book is how the centralized decision making and the rule-by-fear inherent in the Communist system brought disaster on the people of the Soviet Union. We hear a lot about the 20 million Russian dead, but after reading Deane's book, one is convinced that that death toll would have been less than half of that horrible number if a rational government had governed Russia.

Rare for an autobiography, this book is a delight to read, still informative 60 years after it was written. General Deane is not out to boost his own reputation. General Deane's memoirs are self-effacing and full of humorous asides and astute observations. Ironically, by not using his memoirs to blow his own horn, he demonstrates just what a superior person he was.

If there is one criticism to make of this book, it is that General Deane is such an engaging character, that you want to know more about him, not just about his two years in Russia. Aside from a brief reference to service in China and a tour of duty with Tooey Spaatz at the US Army Command and General Staff School, we know nothing about his prewar career.

This book is Ground Zero for anyone who wants to learn about the Cold War.

This book is written in Spanish, with emphasis on Puerto Rico and the Caribbean. For some English language learners, this reinforcement through reading one's native language is useful. The teacher may find that many Latino immigrants cannot read Spanish any better than they can read English. For students who can read Spanish, however, this book offers an option for delivering some content. The identical book is available in English, which will enable the students to compare content in the two languages.

Mr. Allen Smith is great! My first exposure to Mr. Smith was from a book I picked up at a flea market for fifty cents. I have been seeking out and buying his books ever since. Mr. Smith is a teacher. He states his case, he explains his case, and then he repeats his case. But when you are done reading one of his books you will (or certainly should) understand the material. So far I have read his book dealing with the national debt, his book on inflation and his latest on the struggling Social Security System. They are all basic primers. This is the guy you start with. He does the job.

Books written by Richard Noble - The Hobo Philosopher:
"Hobo-ing America: A Workingman's Tour of the U.S.A.."
"A Summer with Charlie"
"A Little Something: Poetry and Prose"
"Honor Thy Father and Thy Mother"
"The Eastpointer" Selections from award winning column.

A high level and very useful guide for teachers and practitioners on the field. A treasure. I should have bought it years ago.

This was required reading for a graduate course in the history of American military affairs. Barbara W. Tuchman's book is a "riveting" biography of General "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell, who was one of America's ablest military leaders asked to perform the near impossible in World War II--train and command a Chinese Army to fight against the Japanese. Tuchman`s purpose of using Stilwell's long connections with China which started in 1911 when he was a U.S. Army 1st Lieutenant, was to explore three historical strands. First, by using a plethora of sources, including Stilwell's diaries, she excelled in her purpose of providing an unusually candid biography of Stilwell's remarkable life. Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, who personally observed Stilwell's first-rate military abilities as a trainer and leader of men, "...selected Stilwell for the post and felt responsible for having consigned him to an ill-supported mission and wasted the talents of an officer he respected as one of America's ablest field commanders" (391). However, early in Stillwell's career he came to be known by his moniker "Vinegar Joe," for his scowl whenever he thought someone or something went awry. His diary was full of pejoratives describing most British officers as "limeys," the French as "frogs," and when he soon lost all respect for Chiang he referred to him as "peanut." Though Tuchman throughout her biography displayed a great admiration for Stilwell, her caricature of Stilwell is as a man who did not possess the political skills necessary of a high-ranking officer to effectively lead a multi-national coalition in the China-India-Burma theatre of operations.

Tuchman's second purpose was to use Stilwell's four visits and postings in China as the backdrop to explain China's turbulent years--1911 through 1945. This part of her book lacked the depth necessary to provide the reader a good grounding in truly understanding the ever-shifting political situation in China. However, through this strand of her book, Tuchman was able to show how Stilwell had a "missionary's" love and concern for the plight of China's "teeming masses." Throughout his various observations of China's military in his capacity as America's military attaché from 1935 to 1937, Stilwell came to have, "...confidence in Chinese soldiers as fighting material and believed that if properly led they could become the equal of any army in the world" (172).

Third, Tuchman used Stilwell's life to explore America's foreign policy relationship with China, starting with America's Open Door Policy, but mainly focusing on President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's (FDR's) desire that America could find in China a democratic partner to help block and eventually crush Japan's increasing influence in Asia. Unfortunately Tuchman, through no fault of her own because there is a scant written record on the subject, was unable to understand the crux of FDR's strategic purpose in first supporting Chiang with a naïve reverence, which ultimately undercut Stilwell's ability to get the Chinese Army to engage the Japanese in battle. However, once FDR witnessed Chiang's ineptitude at the Cairo Conference of 1943, he saw Chiang in the same light that Stilwell did. However, it was too late to provide Stilwell the political help he needed to use the Chinese army in a truly meaningful way to affect the wars outcome. Tuchman's book serves historians best as a biography of one of America's most able but tragically wasted generals of World War II.

Recommended reading for anyone interested in military history, and American history.

How far will the united States go to support a ruler on the words of others? Stilwell was, first and foremost, a soldier; a general of uncommon skills. Not so much the common touch as the respect by the troops for putting them first, their welfare was his top priority. His years in the east made him the obvious choice for the China post. No general has been asked to do as much as he had to do on the political front, treating with allies who were concerned above all for their place in the sun, while at the same time, fighting a tenacious, skilled, dedicated enemy. Surely a harbinger of what was to come in a place tro the north, called Korea.

As much as I think this books has provided a lot of information/insight during the period, I found author's comtemptuous attidude towards Chinese a bit hard to swallow. In a way, she was somehow biased when she wrote the book. In no way I'm accusing her of distorting the fact, but, how the fact is presented will shape the opinion of a general reader about Chinese. This is probably not the main point of the book, but for a book that has won putlizer prize, I would have expected more.

This book very elegantly and faithfully documented the Stilwell's point of view of what happened during this part of history, but it is very one-sided.

First of all, the KMT commanders were not mostly corrupt and incapable like Tuchman had described in this book. A direct quote from TIME artile titled "The Army Nodbody Knows" in the June 16, 1941 issue:
"...Four years of war have hurt China a lot, but have also taught China a lot. The most spectacular discovery, for a nation in which military leadership has classically been an affair of coin and cunning rather than martial skill, has been that China could turn out first-class officer talent.

There is no younger officer class in the world than that of the Generalissimo's crack divisions. Generalissimo Chiang is 53, Chen Cheng is 41, Chen's Field Chief of Staff is 34. It would be hard to find a divisional or regimental commander in those divisions over 40. Regimental colonels are sometimes in their 20s.

These baby officers are tough babies. They are trim as well-kept guns, big fellows, by Chinese standards, hearty and jolly in rest and brutally energetic in action. They lead in person. With their divisions they clamber up mountainsides which would put most corpulent U.S. colonels hors de combat. In nearly four years of fighting, the young officers have mastered the arts of the field--silent de ployment, timely retreat, sudden concentration, plausible ambuscade, dependable supply of vegetable camouflage..."

But as this book has gone out of its way to emphasize, it is true that Chiang's administration towards the end of the second Sino-Japanese war was becoming weak and corrupt, which eventually led to his lost of mainland China to the Communist. However, this fact needs to be put into context as well. China fought alone for 4 years against a vastly more superior enemy. Therefore many of the best Nationalist Chinese generals were KIA or incapacitated early in the war of resistance against Japan. There were 73 KMT generals KIA during WWII (plus 1 Chinese Communist general), more than any other country Allied or Axis. It is reasonable to assume that many of the KMT military commanders that managed to survive and rise in ranks to the end were more interested in self preservation and personal gain, rather than defeating the emeny. Chiang knew this all too well but could do very little to alleviate this problem, all he could do was execute one or two of them from time to time to warn others not to go too far. So Tuchman's analogy comparing KMT to AVRN is not only inappropriate, but also failed to take into account the context of China fighting a 8-year long war with marginal industrial capacity and grossly inadeqate military supplies. It is a miracle that Chiang did not surrender and broker some kind of peace agreement with the Japanese.

Finally, this book has indirectly proved that Stilwell spent (and wasted) way too much time and energy accusing the KMT leadership and fighting Chiang and Chennault, instead of accepting the tremedous shortcomings of his Chinese Ally and try to work out a less than perfect solution to fight the Japanese. His despise and hatred toward Chiang got to a point when Roosevelt gave Chiang an ultimatum to hand over command of all Chinese armed forces to Stilwell (with explicit instruction to keep this confidential), he rushed to have the letter read out loud in front of all the Chinese and American generals attending a meeting, for the sole purpose of embarrass and discredit Chiang in public. This event led directly to his recall as Chiang replied to Roosevelt that the KMT would rather fight alone than cave in to this ultimatum.

This book is of exceptional quality and stands up very well after nearly forty years. If not for Tuchman, Stilwell, who was one of the best generals in the U.S. Army during World War II, would be lost to history given his unrewarding work in a backwater region.

Tuchman does an excellent job of letting Stilwell speak for himself. His integrity, brilliance, and humble nature come through. So do his pugnacious and combative personality, which while quite useful for a general in an operational command, were counterproductive in China. Having written a book on Stilwell myself, I believe she is absolutely right that he was the wrong man for this posting, which was about diplomacy as much as it was military campaigns. If he had not gone to China, he probably would have lead the U.S. invasion of North Africa instead of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Given their differing personalities and Stilwell's Anglophobia, Vinegar Joe would not have done well there either. He was an exceptionally able military leader, but he needed to be commanding field armies rather trying to be a diplomat.

This book, though, is more than a biography. It is a life and times study with Stilwell being a tool to study the U.S. relationship with China. Many people blamed Stilwell for poorly managing relations with China that ended up weakening Chiang Kai-shek and allowed the Communists to come to power. An easy claim to make since Stilwell died in 1946. Tuchman is balanced in her account and gives Stilwell's critics their moment. She also develops Chiang's point of view and shows that he and Stilwell were pursuing different policies because they had different goals. This leads to her main theme that China has never been under the sway or control of the United States, and that we have many experts on China, and ignore them at our peril. Tuchman was writing with the Vietnam War in mind, seeing Stilwell's experiences as setting in motion events that brought U.S. involvement in that region. That assertion seems a little simplistic, but this book is still highly, highly relevant given the current nature of U.S.-Chinese relations.

With all these points made, this book is not without certain shortcomings. She skimps a bit on operational matters, which is understandable given her focus. While this biography is good, very good, it is not Tuchman at her best. "Guns of August" is better. That comment, though, is like complaining that you won an Olympic gold medal without setting a world record. Most of us would take Olympic gold under those conditions and Tuchman really deserved the Pulitzer she won for this study.