Debt-securities

Where was this book when I was a kid? If I had read this book and known the truths conveyed here, I would be like Warren Buffet,today. Seriously, this book is full of helpful wisdom that everyone, young and old should know and use.

I think this book should be mandatory reading before a child graduates from HS. It could be a text book for an economics class. It's too bad so few people know about it. Get this book for your HS graduate and you won't have to support them the rest of their life. They will learn good habits and avoid making serious mistakes.

My hat off to the author for his insight and wisdom.

Well I have had a very rude awakening! I am nowhere near ready to retire...how sad for me. However, I have learned so great tools to get back on the path. I should be able to follow these simple principles, but only time will tell how effective they really are. Judging from Guy's experience he seems to know a heck of a lot more then I do about managing finances.

EXCELLENT! It should be mandatory reading for all school kids.

This is an excellenbt book on CDOs and has recently been bettered still by Ms Goodman's newest book on CDOs. I am pleased to publicly state that it is excellent, I have bought a copy and I recommend it highly.

Lederman and Sullivan have crafted an insightful review of the High Yield market in the early '90's.
Contributed chapters from thoughtful sources.
This is a MUST own for junk bond junkies.

Readable account of the Orange County financial blow-up. Particularly interesting is the description of Robert Citron, the hapless college dropout who controlled billions of dollars of public money. Also fascinating are the prescient comments of the obscure accountant who ran against unbeatable Citron in the election prior to the disaster. Jorion manages to educate the reader, in a very painless way, about the institutions of the bond market (such as repos).

On the minus side, the book is not particularly well documented (in terms of, for example, the graphs and the sources of the data) and some chapters seem suspiciously like lecture notes, hastily adapted to a book format. Still, an enjoyable trip to the dark side of financial market.

This book tells the story of a 1.4 billion$ financial loss by the Orange County municipality.
The author explains very clearly what happened.
The municipality, through its treasurer, speculated that interest rates would stay the same or fall. Into the bargain, he leveraged his position with a factor 3. The means for the speculation were repos on bonds.

When the interest rates went through the roof (from 5,25% to 8% = + 52%), the value of the collateral (the bonds) for his position fell (with a factor 3). He got a margin call, but couldn't pay it. The biggest part of the investment (held by FBCS) was liquidated with a phenomenal loss. Only Merrill Lynch didn't cover their position.

The author gives excellent explanations on some very specialized investments like reverse floaters and other high tech financial operations of which the value can only calculated by partial integrals.

Food for investment bankers.

Jorion should be commended for his insightful, first-class treatment of this history making event. Big Bets... is a fast, fluid read that is devoid of technical terms and is written in an active, conversational and explanatory voice that the typical layman can readily understand. In this book, which reads more like gripping fiction, we are treated to an excellent character sketch of the key culprit in the Orange county financial fiasco, Robert L. Citron, his rise to power, the environment he worked in, the exotic financial tools he carelessly wielded, an unforgettable cast of financial hucksters and ill-advised power wielding greedy misfits, and the ultimate downfall of the Orange county financial safety net and its after-effects.

From this book, we learn that Robert L. Citron was head of a large portfolio, had no oversight, and an inflated ego. His superiors and fellow investment participants (such as the county school district) knew full well what he was doing, but allowed him to continue unsupervised because of his past stellar performance- much of which was due to pure luck and favorable market conditions. We also learn that Citron, much like Nicholas Leeson, the orchestrator of the fall of Barings, was a financial neophyte. While on the one hand believing that he was fully invested in bonds, Citron had taken a heavily leveraged position in very exotic derivative securities, proving to Jorion's point that he really did not have a clue as to what he was doing.

We also learn that Citron (nor the people above him and his investment participants), who had no real background in finance, did not know the difference between market price and face value, nor did he know the difference between an option on an asset and the outright ownership of an asset. Based on one very bad bet on the movement of interest rates, Citron fully invested Orange County's finances in derivative securities that he did not understand at all, and compounded the problem by leveraging his position (basically using a little money to borrow a lot of money) to the extreme.

After reading this book, those of us who believe that our investments, from the retirement funds managed for us by fund advisors and our places of work to our bank accounts and our kids' education funds, are safe should have our heads examined. People such as Citron were not financial gurus, that is certain, but as the more recent derivative led failures at hedge fund Long Term Capital Management (which included the two Nobel laureates who literally wrote the book on derivative pricing on its stellar team of rocket scientists) and Bank of America demonstrate, no one is truly safe.

Nothing new in this book that hasn't already been mentioned in his other books.
Forget about getting rich with this guys advise.
Get a good broker and invest on the Dow, is my advice to you.
The only person who is gonna get rich from this book is the guy who wrote it.

I have to admit that the Amazon Board is pretty amusing. We have this guy claiming to be "the true reviewer from Chicago" giving this book five stars but Rich Dad Success Stories only 3 stars because there not enough business success stories to warrant 5 stars.

Well Mr. "Reader from Chicago", if you truly bought the book, you should have reviewed it quickly at the book store like I did and I assume the others did as well. I enjoyed Rich Dad Success Stories and felt that it was five star material based on the content. You feel differently, that is your choice. Enough!

In Becoming Rich .... Without Cutting Up Your Credit Cards Kiyosaki expands on the philosophy that you don't have to cut up your credit cards and can do quite nicely by using your credit cards properly. This is also a five star book. Too many other so called financial "experts" seem to think that the answer to credit management is "just cut up your credit cards."
Sorry, wrong answer.

A certain amount of debt is good when used responsibly. Cutting up credit cards is not responsibility, it is only a feel good experience that gives temporary relief while you still have the long term pain of debt.

Excellent book Mr. Kiyosaki. I hope you keep them coming. Oh, "reader from Chicago", perhaps we will meet someday in Chicago. I frequent Ophrah Winfrey's restaurant and other places where people who do not cut up their credit cards but do own their own businesses and real estate frequent. Perhaps this section of Chicago is unfamiliar to you.

I downloaded the e-book yesterday and read it last night before going to bed. Once I started, I couldn't stop reading.

While some of the contents are similiar to the other Rich Dad e-books and programs, there is also new material here. The concept of not having to cut up your credit cards is interesting.

Too many so called "financial experts" are touting "cutting up your credit cards." My grandparents used to tell me the only way to lose weight is to push away from the table. Doesn't work - neither does cutting up your credit cards.

What Rich Dad teaches is responsibility - how to responsibly use credit cards and other forms of debt not only to stay out of trouble but actually to create wealth.

I highly recommend this e-book and will buy the paperback when it comes out next month. The stories were inspiring and a joy to read.

Kiyosaki has done it again - another winner.

This book combines expertise and readability in the style of Tavakoli's "Credit Derivatives". I would expect it to become a classic in this market as is her other book in the credit derivatives market. This book has particularly nice coverage on SPEs. Her explanation of the evolution of CDOs from balance sheet deals to arbitrage deals includes lots of practical examples and clear graphics.

Tavakoli's insights are especially valuable when highlighting caveats introduced by the rapid growth of credit derivatives technology in structured finance. She recommends structural approaches to getting fair value for both structurers and investors. Much of the information on synthetics is new material, and losses that are just now being realized in the market place might have been avoided had this book been available six months ago.

Tavakoli also predicts products that will wane and the products that will experience a growth spurt - such as the secured trust -in the Basel 2 environment.

I noticed the same reviewer seems to have posted multiple negative reviews for this book and Tavakoli's credit derivatives book. One of the reviews echoes the words of a fellow who is coming out with his own books on these subjects, so there may be a motive of self-interest. In that respect the one and two star reviews may be a form of envious homage.

I'm a 5-year veteran in credit derivatives trading. I hedge synthetic collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and manage the risk for single tranche CDOs. I was very glad to receive this book and like it as much as Tavakoli's book on credit derivatives. Tavakoli clearly defines terms. She then clearly explains the products. There are many aspects of the structuring I wasn't aware of that are explained as an entertaining read in this book. Our structuring group liked this book as much as I did, and bought copies for everyone on the desk, and bought copies for customers.

I work for one of the well managed banks that has been providing good value for customers, but I was happy to see Tavakoli talk about how customers have often been ripped-off and she suggests how customers can avoid this - for instance by dealing with my bank. I liked the way the various structures are explained from the bottom up. Tavakoli makes it seem easy to understand the various complex components and the structural options.

The section on language and gaming is especially important. The debate on deal managers both for and against, and the inconsistency of the rating agencies both internally and externally is clearly explained. That isn't necessarily a bad thing, since we want rating agencies to take independent views, but it is important to realize that discrepancies in the approach to rating structured products exist. Tavakoli did an excellent job of explaining this so that there are no misunderstandings.

I also enjoyed the account of non-CDO structured finance products, since I may gravitate to the structuring side of the business in future.

Collateralized Debt Obligations should be required reading for investors in the CDO market. Tavakoli gives a thorough overview of the market and explains the relative value traps and opportunities. Tavakoli explains several different kinds of possible structures in which cash flows can be diverted to either the detriment or the benefit of investors. The recommendations for the structural protections that investors should ask for repay the cost of the book - and the valuable time you take to read it - several thousand fold.

Rating agencies have a difficult time rating tranches of several structures and as an investor, I wasn't aware of these discrepancies before. This book makes major strides in improving transparency in structured finance.

The reviewer below suggests that Moorad Choudhry has posted a negative review of this book. To him/her I say this: Moorad Choudhry did not write it. I did. Mr Choudhry actually has a very high opinion of this book, and recommended to me I buy it when I attended a Bloomberg seminar he lectured at a few months ago. "Buy the new Goodman/Fabozzi book on CDOs, its excellent" he told me.
Well I did buy it, but I do not share his enthusiasm for it. It is totally US-centric and has no detail on European transactions.
However, the reviewer below, under internet anonymity, and with no proof whatsoever, decides that any negative reviewes must be written by Mr Choudhry. I am sure that were he to know his identity, Mr Choudhry would instruct his lawyers to sue this spineless, gutless idiot for libel and slander.
Get real, whoever you are. I bought the book and I do not like it. You throw around baseless accusations on Amazon, you have no proof, no clue and no idea. Just because you like the book is no reason for someone else to. And Mr Choudhry did not write that 1-star review, I did. So stop making up ridiculous accusations.

Ms. Goodman's book is a much needed resource on CDOs. If you are just learning about the CDO market, Ms. Goodman clearly defines key terms and explains the structures from beginning to end. Those with extensive Wall Street experience will enjoy having one of the few well-written references available in the market. It is also a good marketing tool to give to potential investors. This is a good comprehensive reference guide.

It seems oddly convenient that a negative review of the late Marcia Stigum's book, The Money Market, recommends The Repo Handbook by Moorad Choudhry. Ms. Goodman's book has a similar title to a book he has coming out and has been attacked with one star reviews that seem very similar to the attacks on books with similar titles and on Ms. Stigum's book. The envy is easy to understand, since this clearly written book with pleasing type-face is selling well and is a valuable resource.

Don't miss the chance to buy this excellent reference work on collateralized debt obligations.

This book addresses the problem of growing government entitlement programs for Americans in light of limited resources for providing them. Yes, everyone should be aware of the funding problems. Mr. Peterson should be thanked for bringing out a book on the subject. The color graphs are quite attractive. The writing is quick and easy to read, but even though he says he is not an alarmist, that's the impression he gives. There are many assumptions which readers usually swallow whole and that's what is wrong with the presentation. The book states that Americans do not "save" enough and that the Japanese save more. It infers that the Japanese are better off. In comparison to the amount Americans have in terms of goods and services, the Japanese have much less to consume. First, Americans as a whole save as much as any people in other industrialized countries. Our saving is not just at the bank, but involves mortgage payments, insurance premiums and employer pensions. Very few people in Japan own or are buying their homes. If we counted ALL savings of Amnericans, it would equal savings of people in other countries. If in fact, greater "saving" is responsible for a growing economy and a higher standard of living, why has Japan with its high saving rate been in a recession for the past seven years? (During the same time period the U.S. economy has been growing more prosperous.) The graph on page 24 shows how many American workers are needed to support each U.S. social security beneficiary for selected years between 1955 and 2040. In 1955 it took 8.6 workers, in 1995 it was 3.3 workers per retiree and by the year 2040 there will be only two workers per beneficiary. (In 1995 workers AND retirees all had more of material goods than in 1955.) This is the same kind of projection that was used years ago when at the turn of the century it took 50 percent of the working population to provide enough food for everyone else in the country. Everyone thought it was an ominous sign that so many young people were leaving the farms and that there was sure to be shortages of food unless the trend was stopped. Well, by the 1930's we had food surpluses which continued right through the 1980's even though only two percent of the working population is in farming. Even now, if we did not sell our surplus farm products overseas, we would have surpluses. In the U.S. today it takes one average farmer to produce enough food to feed 90 people. Only a few decades ago it would have seemed impossible. Its not obvious what method was used to get the numbers on the federal government's "red ink" chart on page 18, but just recently a review of the federal government's report for 1995 indicated that the accumulated federal debt of approximately $20,000 (liability) per U.S. population is compared to $205,000 of public assets per U.S. population. There are very few organizations of any kind that have such a favorable balance. Yes, there should be more reliance on private funds for medical care for the elderly and also some level of means test. But also keep in mind that spending on medical care causes people to live longer and people living longer results in more spending on health care. If old people had to pay for life-lengthening medications, they might not spend as much and health care companies would not have the profits to fund more advanced products to keep more people living longer. Think of the implications--investments, employment, life spans, etc Out of the complications we see that with or without government involvement, the industries that grow and prosper are the ones that get funded, either privately or by government. Each area of decision-making is made up of lots of individual choices which together move mountains. We agree that no one should have the idea that people should rely on social security benefits to fund their retirements. As far as the past is concerned, people with ONLY social security have NOT lived real high. Mr. Peterson is right when he says that young people do NOT expect to live on social security benefits when they retire. And, so, THAT finding may be the solution yet.

I have read this book and it scares me to death. People my age must realize that doing nothing is tantamount to giving our futures away. We must come to terms with the fact that there are 76 million Baby Boomers approaching retirement age, and there is no national plan to accomodate their pension and health needs. And to complicate matters, the problem is already occurring elsewhere around the world. Just read Peter Peterson's newest book, Gray Dawn.

The issue of distressed debt resolution is a key issue in the world of finance and economic development - and one which this book in large measure clarifies. The technical issues were superb - indeed masterful - but the book did not address the broader challenges of distressed debt - how to package distressed debt, how to establish centralized entities to deal with NPLs, how to preserve viable (but overleveraged) businesses from the depredations of the real estate oriented vulture funds. However, to the layman, this book would be a terrific resource

Although informative, the author needs almost 400 pages to say what could have easily been said in well under 100.