Current-dollar

Clear, documented, factual. Parenti has produced a magnificent gem. As relevant today as when it was first written.

Some will say this book is too out of date (which it is) and that Chomsky, Zinn, Brecher, and so forth give more descriptive analysis of what this book speaks of, and they do, in a much more "dry" manner. The magic of this book is that with a little bit of curiosity, a 16 year old could ingest the information quite easily. Parenti effectively provides the reader with a description of how capitalism works, why America has imperialistic elements, why corporate predators feed off of the third world, how clandestine operations work in conjunction with big business, and the outcome derived by multi-national corporations in the third world. The second portion of the book gives a conclusive summary of what the myths are of the then-Cold War, and what the intentions of the Arms race really are. A great book for the novice-leftist who wants to get a good start on what the truth really is and what myths our good friends at the top of the hierarchy provide us.

Contrary to a previous reviewer, this is not an objective book, in part, because "objectivity" does not exist; but also because Parenti clearly and honestly presents a point of view. However, the book is an excellent examination of the interrelationship between U.S. economic and military policy, specifically within the mythology of the Cold War. It is this Cold War focus which now dates the book. While its underlying premises are as valid today as in 1988, they should be placed within the context of Post Cold War economic globalism.

Over the last decade or so, there has been a substantial rethinking of the Nixon presidency.... Until the appearance of Allen Matusow's new book, however, Nixon's economic policies had not received a similar reassessment. In a very readable and well researched exploration of Nixon's economics, Matusow makes a compelling case that Nixon held no principled position whatsoever and that his economic policies were overtly and explicitly driven by his attempts to create a new electoral majority.... The Nixon presidency, as seen through Matusow's account, becomes an excellent case study in public-choice economics and the failures of interventionism.

Three major strengths of Matusow's book deserve special mention. First, he has made extensive use of archival materials that were inaccessible until recently. By using the presidential office files, Bob Haldeman's extensive notes, and the various books and recollections of Nixon's associates, he has assembled a large amount of material from a variety of sources to document various meetings and discussions in great detail. The result is a very ugly view of the politicization of economic policy that puts one in mind of the old saw about not wanting to know how sausages or laws are made....

A second strength of the book, of special interest to economists, is Matusow's careful documentation of the role played by well-known economists in the Nixon administration. Arthur Burns, Herbert Stein, Paul McCracken, Milton Friedman, and others all have starring roles in the drama. Except Friedman, none of them presents an appealing picture. Matusow extensively documents the ways in which Nixon's economic advisors were quick to sacrifice principles, particularly free-market principles, for political expediency.... Matusow makes extensive use of Friedman's Newsweek columns to illustrate the ways in which Nixon's policies did not correspond with the Friedman's free-market, monetarist line....

The book's third strength is Matusow's use of economics. In more than three hundred pages of analysis of Nixon's economics, I found very few places where Matusow made an obvious error of theory or history.... But in most cases he handles the economics nicely, especially in his discussions of inflation, where he keeps the behavior of the money supply always at the forefront, and the energy crisis, where he does a fine job of documenting the various government interventions that precipitated the crisis and the horrendous policy mistakes that exacerbated it.... Matusow deserves particular praise for his discussion of Bretton Woods and the gold window, in which he deals with some complicated issues in international monetary economics and does a good job of rendering them comprehensible....

Matusow has carefully and cogently documented Nixon's use of the instruments of power in pursuit of his own political goals and illuminated the disastrous results (double-digit inflation and the worst recession since the 1930s, not to mention a legacy of interventionism that has continued to the present) that Nixon's economics engendered. Matusow's book, though not couched in such terms, is an excellent case study in public-choice economics and is recommended to students of public choice and recent U.S. economic history.

This book fills a big gaping hole in economic history. There are probably hundreds of books on Nixon and Vietnam, China, and Watergate. But very few exist on his other policies, including his economic policies. This is especially strange considering that his Administration presided over the final destruction of the gold standard, first sustained budget deficits, and the beginning of the Great Recession of 1970s.

Thus, this book is extremely useful. Almost month-by-month it describes the swinging pendulum of booms and busts that resulted from Nixon's economic mismanagement and the world economy's response to it. This is a very thorough work, meticulously documented. The author carefully documents endless cases of sacrifice of economic policies to blatantly short-term political goals.

It's also a good narrative, it weaves all the facts and explanation together, and it's organized very well. I found it very easy to read and understand it. It sheds much light on the economic causes of all those strange events of the 1970s. It's also a great companion to a more general history of USA during those years.

Try reading this book. It incites the desire in me to shrink it down to something else, like any psychiatrist would approach a case of psychotic multiplicity. There are a number of individuals with credible positions presented in this book, and the summaries of those positions express matters that are highly important. The problem with the story is that, instead of hinging on the things that are important, the whole picture is in danger of becoming unhinged whenever a decision approaches the bottom line. This is like great art which has no conception that the whole world might see this picture and consider it absolutely nukers. As crazy as all the other nukers in the world might seem to us, it takes a lot of effort to keep from applying the same judgment to the system which inflicts the costs mainly on ourselves. There are things in this book, like William Greider's comment about "payoffs for layoffs" on page 200, which make it too obvious which bottom line matters. His personal suggestion to "turn out the lights rather than waste all this money waiting for world war three" (p. 201) is coupled with his knowledge of officers who "question this choice of toys over boys" (p. 202) because of what's happening: "they're being rolled by the industry." (p. 202) Even Wilson has to report that "There are too many fiefdoms." (p. 202) That might be the main conclusion here, except that it is followed by some comment about a president who would rather "chat by the side of the road until a compromise route is agreed upon." (p. 203) The index doesn't have an entry for "depleted uranium" weapons, but we are still planning for some part of the world to become a dumping ground for our bombs, and it is highly unlikely that there will be much of a chat by the side of the road before the choice of mistakes on where we can hurt our enemies the most is made. The story of how "the American military's fighting edge was being lost for lack of money" (p. 90) hardly makes sense in a world that keeps complaining when we do destroy things.

George C. Wilson is simply the best reporter alive writing about the American military. THIS WAR REALLY MATTERS brings into the cold light of day the federal budgetary process and its effect on national defense issues. The book is relatively short--just twelve chapters--and is written in the clear, easy-to-understand style of the professional reporter Wilson certainly is. He tackles the tough questions: Why is the military orgainzed the way it is? Does it have the weapons it needs to fight now and in the future? Why and how are new weapons systems procured? As you might suspect, Wilson confirms, It's the money, Stupid! THIS WAR REALLY MATTERS is a literate, lucid masterpiece that should be read by every military officer and candidate for federal office. It should also be read and re-read by every student interested in the way decisions are made in a major democracy.

Haven't read it yet, but on Thomas Sowell's recommendation, I will.

This is a well written and concise account of the mechanisms by which wealthy individuals and corporate interests manipulate the legislative process. Anyone who wants to understand why, despite clean-air legislation, we do not have clean air, or why tax cuts always seem to be for other people, should read this book. The authors supply cogently argued solutions as well as detailed analyses of why the political system needs fundamental reform.

Bruce Jansson is credited for spending 10 years researching "16 trillion dollar mistake" including a large chunk in presidential libraries. This careful research makes the book worth buying. However, the book is unfortuantely inconsistant with respect to what is considered "waste." Jansson will make an excellent point or unearth interesting data only to follow by glaring errors in basic knowledge of economics. This is unfortunate because it there is much good among the bad. (For the record, my own polititical perspective is almost identical to Mr. Janssons', so this is not the issue. He is a liberal by indicts the left and the right in the book.)

This would make an excellent resource for economics or business classes where the student would be asked to separate the wheat from the chaff. Fortunately, there is more of the former than the latter thereby earning it 4 stars rather than the 3 stars I'm inclined to rating it.

Jansson's book brings clarity and insight to a subject that normally glazes our eyes and becomes quickly boring. Whether or not you agree with the specifics of Jansson's analysis, his carefully researched book lays out the underlying choices necessarily made in the annual adoption of the federal budget over the last 70 years. These matters are regularly debated by economists and federal spending policy makers, but little understood by even the most well-informed citizens. Readers of this book will have the knowledge and the tools to do their own analyses of budget debates generally thought to be too arcane for general understanding. Hopefully, it will be widely enough read to raise the level of debate on these important subjects and encourage all informed citizens to participate more knowledgeably in this critical political decision making.

The United States bungled its national priorities from the New Deal to modern times, making fiscal and tax mistakes which have totaled over 16 trillion dollars from FDR through Clinton. The Sixteen-Trillion Dollar Mistake charts federal waste and how it's harmed this country's plans, providing the first book to examine politics, national priorities and federal spending.

This was an extremely detailed book about our problems leading up to September 11th in the Islamic World. It's a different perspective because the author isn't American. I was a Political Science major in college, so I was interested, though it is probably much more detail than most people would like. The book's best audience would be people involved in International Affairs. It would be interesting to see the author do an update and see if any of his assessments have changed.

This book is profoundly relevant in light of the recent events. For anyone truly looking to understand the history and politics leading up to September 11th, this book is an excellent source. Added to a little pre-existing knowledge about history, it illuminates an entire chain of events, drawing connections and conclusions that proved to be amazingly on target. I would highly recommend this book to anyone seeking to grasp the different angles of the situation in the middle east.

With a smidgen of slack at the beginning of this book, for awkward passages which I attribute to the fact that Labeviere is Swiss and is just getting his keyboard warmed up, this book ranks as one of the most important books on international relations, terrorism, Islamism, blowback of foreign policy postures and decisions prior to and during the Cold War, and a litany of other subject headings made not only important, but crucial, since the September 11th attacks on the WTC and Pentagon and the ongoing low intensity/destabilization campaign being waged against the USA and the West. Once he gets cranked up, Labeviere gives rich insight and valuable historical overview in addidtion to posing useful questions which arise au naturel from the unfolding landscape of discourse. He gives the reader the who, where, how, why, when, and the linkages. He shows us the chinks in our security, the cracks in our armor, and challenges us to take heed. Originally published in French in 1999, before our current crisis, his observations are robustly clear and alarming, and steer one away from the comfort of oversimplicity in casting the shadow of blame or in the proposal of tidy solutions. Every public official should be put in a jumbo jet and told that they will not stand on terre firma again until they have read every word of this book. It is an outstanding summary essential to understanding our world and our time. It is a must read for every citizen who wants to know what we are really facing domestically and internationally. It is an excellent introduction for the student of world affairs who wants a solid foundation from which to dive deeper into the complexities which drive our modern realities. It is a challenge to the modern thinker, strategist, or armchair optimist to survey and prioritize the real problems and find real solutions for the world where we live, which will leave the politically sensitive and politically correct bobbling and abandoned in the wake of national security imperatives like garbage behind the Islip barge. A must read in real politik. I have extensive notes and marked passages all throughout my copy. For the connoisseur, two flavors, English or French. Very interesting passage on page 297, quoting Egyption President Mubarak's adviser, Dr. Ossama Al-Baz, after the Luxor massacre, which will echo with all Americans. Every chapter could inspire dozens of satirical caricatures and political cartoons, were the subject less serious. Given the truths which emerge, the face in the mirror is our own, and it is ourselves who must answer the gauntlet, who must set aright the chesspieces scattered across the floor of civilization. The stakes are indeed high. Caveat: There are distracting prejudices reflecting the author's personal bias woven in the last two chapters which are less than professional, but the body of the book can be corroborated by other authors, such as Mark Huband and John Cooley, both experts in the area.

In their book, Perverse Subsidies, Kent and Myers adequately demonstrate how global tax revenues can at times adversely affect the economy and the environment. The book is an expanded version of a 1998 report on the topic of perverse subsidies, focusing in particular on the OECD nations. Given the magnitude of these pervasive, deleterious subsidies, the authors were genuinely perplexed to find that the subject received scant attention from specialists in economics, public policy and the environment. As such, the book's subject matter would serve as an excellent springboard for hundreds if not thousands of graduate level research projects in the fields of economics, public policy, urban planning and development.

On the organizational front, the authors divided the book into three uneven parts, with the second of the book comprising the majority of the text. Part one of the book consists of two chapters that for the most part are readable and understandable. The first chapter covers basic concepts associated with subsidies in general such as: what subsidies are, the various types of subsidies given, the advantages and disadvantages of subsidies, social equity concerns, scale and externality issues associated with subsidies, and finally an extended discussion of how the authors derived their rough estimate for the size and extent of subsidies globally. The authors astutely note the difficulty of tracking down information regarding subsidies in general, and openly admit that their estimate for global subsidies may not accurately reflect the true value, given the hidden nature of subsidies and the active roles of governments to contain detailed information about payments and transfers. The second chapter tells the reader what constitutes a perverse subsidy (which the authors define as having deleterious and distorting effects on both the economy and the environment), delves heavily into economic and environmental values and costs associated with perverse subsidies, and tersely explains the role of (negative) externalities, focusing almost exclusive on the role perverse subsidies play in exacerbating global warming.

Part two contains individual chapters devoted to the agricultural, energy, transportation, water, fisheries and forestry sectors of the global economy and each chapter outlines the type and magnitude of the subsidies given to each sector, and offers specific policy recommendations for policy intervention, change, and/or overhaul. In each chapter, some countries are emphasized more than others, and this I believe reflects the availability of reliable data more than the political and economic importance, however great or small, of the countries emphasized. Part two also contains a final chapter that discusses the combined effects of perverse subsidies across all sectors presented, as well as their political, economic, and social implications. The last part of the book consists of one chapter, and

For the curious layperson, chapters one, two and nine of the book contain the most useful information, albeit of a general nature. Specialists with an interest in the various sectors emphasized in the book may find one or more of the chapters in Part Two of the book to be of some utility. In addition, researchers in the field may find the book's extensive notes section at the end of the text immensely helpful.

I found the book to be somewhat lacking in three key areas. First, the authors devoted much of their attention to explaining the flaws and holes in their research methodology, data and conclusions. Judicious readers will expect a considerable degree of uncertain in the numbers, data and results, given the magnitude of the challenge before the authors. Because of the breadth of the topic, rigorous statistical analysis may have been difficult to perform, and any attempts to perform such analyses, given the lack of hard data on the topic, may not have been of sufficient utility. However, I felt that too much space was devoted to justifying their numbers in every chapter, and such detailed justification could have been sufficiently presented in the first chapter. Second, graphs and charts would have done much to make the text more readable, and key points presented within the text-rich format would have been better understood in graphical or tabular form. Pie charts, bar graphs and other descriptive, graphical methods would have the reading much more brisk and enjoyable. Third, some key concepts, such as the subsidy, were explained in great detail with skill and precision, but other concepts and issues, such as externalities, costs, values and political dimensions of subsidies, were not very well delineated. Yet, in spite of these moderate criticisms, the authors have managed to write a good introduction to the Hydra-headed, shadowy and amorphous topic of subsidies in the global economy.

Frankly speaking, expositions on dry economic subjects such as subsidies tend to be more effective at eliciting yawns and putting people to sleep than sleeping pills. Nonetheless, not only did the authors convincingly argue that the problem of perverse subsidies is a gargantuan one indeed, they also made their case using an active writing style that engaged the reader, as opposed to making him or her yawn. One can not expect one small volume to do adequate justice to a topic of such magnitude, and for these reasons, the authors should be applauded for bringing some aspects of this gargantuan topic to the public.

Norman Myers and Jennifer Kent have written a comprehensive and engaging book about what turns out to be one of the biggest impediments to environmental quality and sustainablity - perverse subsidies. The book does a splendid job of documenting and quantifying perverse subsidies in six main sectors globally. One thing it lacks, however, is a really concise definition of what perverse subsidies are. Here is what is meant: A subsidy is a payment by a government to an individual or firm. In theory, the intent of this payment should be to decrease the divergence between private and social costs/benefits - to internalize externalities. A perverse subsidy is therefore a payment by a government to an individual or firm which, instead, increases the divergence between private and social costs/benefits. This can include both direct and indirect perverse subsidies. Direct subsidies are direct government payments to agriculture, fossil fuel and nuclear energy, road construction, water, fisheries, and forestry (the six major sectors documented in Myers' book). Some part of these subsidies are, of course, not perverse. They serve the intended purpose of reducing the divergence between private and social costs/benefits. But a large proportion of current direct subsidies are perverse. Myers and Kent estimate that globally 60% of conventional subsidies are perverse. This amounts to $860 Billion annually. Indirect subsidies are the failure of government to internalize externalities (especially environmental externalities) - leaving an unaddressed divergence between private and social costs/benefits. All of these indirect subsidies are (by definition) perverse and Myers and Kent estimate their total at $1,090 Billion annually. The total direct and indirect perverse subsidies worldwide are therefore estimated to be almost $2 trillion annually. As Myers and Kent point out, this is almost three times global military spending, larger than the annual sales of the twenty largest corporations, and four times the annual incomes of the 1.3 billion poorest people on earth. In other words, perverse subsidies are a huge problem, but an inherently "solvable" one whose solution would yield a "double dividend." Eliminating perverse subsidies would first help to reduce the divergence between private and social costs/benefits, thus making the economy function more efficiently. Second, it would free up funds to help solve other pressing problems. Critics will, of course, ague that these estimates are far too uncertain and "mushy" to have any meaning. Myers and Kent acknowledge the huge difficulties, but point out that "As long as the issue of perverse subsidies remains untackled, there tends to be an implicit presumption that their total must effectively be zero: there is the asymmetry of evaluation at distortional work. Of course, this is not what is intended. But as long as a problem is not accorded adequate attention, it is implicitly viewed as if it is not a problem at all." (pp. 21). Myers and Kent "resist the temptation to say we simply cannot appraise perverse subsidies in quantified fashion at all." (pp. 21) Instead they take on the challenge and ask the reader to accept the well documented qualifications that must always accompany any difficult analysis such as this. They also point out that their estimates are almost certainly conservative - further analysis and better data would reveal even larger numbers. Why do perverse subsidies persist? The answer is obvious, given the way our political systems work. One example is enough to demonstrate the magnitude and recalcitrance of the problem. Between 1993 and mid 1996, the American oil and gas industry gave $10.3 Million to political campaigns and received $4 Billion in tax breaks. This represents a benefit/cost ratio of about 400 to 1. Few investments in our economy are anywhere near as lucrative as this! Given these kinds of returns, it is little wonder that perverse subsidies exist and that they will be very difficult to eliminate. But they can be eliminated if they are exposed to the light of day and the substantial public benefits of their removal are brought into the political debate. Campaign finance reform is finally beginning to be seriously considered in the US and removal of perverse subsidies could be the next in line.

This is a hard-hearted practical look at development aid, and so it should be. The "official development assistance" (ODA) element of Program 150, the international affairs budget commonly recognized as the "preventive diplomacy" budget that runs alongside Program 50 (the traditional military budget), is evaluated by the authors in terms of amounts (are we doing enough), allocations (are we giving to the right countries), and directions (are we doing the right things). It is a small amount of money that is being discussed--$9 billion a year in 1997 for ODA alone-said to represent a half penny of each dollar spent by the U.S. government. This works out to about $15 per year for the members of the targeted populations. Larger more populous states receive less aid per capita than smaller states. India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and China are especially disadvantaged. In contrast to today's $15 per person nvestment, the Marshall Plan provided in excess of $100 to $200 per person in Europe (but for only several years, working out to an equivalent amount when compared to sustained aid flows today).

Several thoughtful observations jump out from the book:

1) Foreign aid is not preventing conflicts from emerging (if anything, and this is not implied by O'Hanlon but is explicit in William Shawcross' book DELIVER US FROM EVIL: Peacekeepers, Warlords and a World of Endless Conflict (Simon & Schuster, 2000), foreign aid contributes to instability by giving rise to warlords and black markets);

2) Foreign aid is of limited use in reconstructing societies ravaged by conflict, especially those with limited infrastructures that cannot absorb resources as well as European nations;

3) Foreign aid's best return on investment appears to be the education of women-even a few years of education has a considerable impact on birth control, health, and other areas of interest;

4)Foreign aid shapes both our own philosophy of foreign affairs, and the perceptions others have of our foreign role-it also shapes our domestic constituencies perception of why we should have a foreign policy arm;

5) Foreign aid does not play a significant role in most countries where there is access to open markets and stability does not frighten away investors-indeed the emerging expert consensus appears to lean toward debt forgiveness combined with private capital investment as the best approach to economic reform;

6) Foreign aid is least effective in those countries that are either unstable or have a range of harmful economic policies including trade barriers, large budget deficits, oversized public sectors, and overvalued exchange rates. Roughly half the countries receiving aid today have poor economic policies in place;

7) The U.S. is the least generous of the Office of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) members, providing just over one third as much of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as the other OECD countries-0.10 percent instead of 0.27 percent.

Having said all this, the author's document their views that our ODA investments need to rise from $9 billion to at least $12 billion a year, with other countries increasing their combined contributions from $51 billion to $68 billion per year. The authors favor increased foreign aid investments in poor countries with good economic policies, for the purpose of building transportation infrastructure, enhancing local health and education programs, and accelerating the expansion of utilities and communications services.

They also recommend a broader distribution of foreign aid for countries in conflict throughout Africa, and suggest that Public Law 480 food aid should be focused only on responding to disaster relief rather than indiscriminate distribution that benefits U.S. farmers but undermines foreign agricultural programs.

They conclude with the somewhat veiled suggestion that all of this could be paid for by a reduction of foreign military assistance to Egypt and Israel. One is left, at the end of the book, with two strong feelings: first, that U.S. foreign aid is on "automatic pilot" and rather mindlessly muddling along; and second, that this is a very small but very important part of the total U.S. national security budget, one that merits its own ombudsman within the National Security Council, and one that is worthy of no less than a penny on the dollar as we plan our future Federal investments.

What is left unsaid by the authors is whether the other $60-80 billion in foreign aid by various actors including the United Nations agencies, is well managed--one is left with the impression that the U.S. really faces two challenges: an internal challenge of improving its performance with respect to foreign aid, and an external challenge in demanding a more rational and coordinated approach to various forms of aid being sponsored by others.

I am very well read on the middle east and terrorism but this book which I checked out of the library is completely different.Assuming her facts are true (my mother told me not to beleive everything I read)then I was seriously flawed in my knowledge.

I liked this so much I brought it back to the library and then purchased it.

Loretta Napoleoni is a brilliant writer and thinker. Her knowledge of history and finance is encylopaedic.

She is true to her mission of not falling into the "trap of politics" and stays with the global economic analysis.

Brilliant analyses and brilliant syntheses.

If her suggested solution is simple, it is not simplistic. It is perhaps impossible because it appears that our economy is too dependent on the illicit economies--money laundering, drug money, arms deals, and so on.

It is a shame that there is not more interest in this book.

I feel like buying it for everyone I know.

If you get bogged down, start speed reading--you will quickly come to numerous passages that will be as revelations, and you will want to read them twice.

As a previous reviewer commented-it's the global aspect of this book that makes it significant.

The section on our government's conniving with the Taliban for the oil, as well as the explanation of the situation in Chechyna, even if it may be too quick and dirty for the scholarly, makes an excellent starting point for those of us who are in the dark.

I found much of it to be an astonishing revelation

Highly recommended.

I generally do not write reviews, but I decided to do it because Loretta Napoleoni book is one of the fews I have read recently which offer a global explanation of what is happening. I know the Middle East well and can say that her facts are accurate. She also writes beatifully, I could not put down the book.
i reccomend this book to those who want to find answers to the many questions of our complex world.