Antitrust-laws Books

If you like logical discussions that lead to insights you had not anticipated, this is a book you will enjoy. One such insight is that the predatory commitments of government agencies are likely to be more credible than the predatory commitments of private firms. Lott's book is one of those infrequently found books that requires that you sip a glass of wine as you read one chapter each night, and enjoy taking both the book and wine slowly. Very highly recommended.

I haven't read the book, but I wish here to comment on Mr Hellard's interesting review.
Mr Hellard writes "Lott extends this idea by arguing that an entrant facing an incumbent with a reputation for toughness should take a short position in the incumbent's stock, enter, and reap trading profits" It's a good idea, but 1) not every company is quoted on the Stock Exchange ! and 2) the price variations of the stock can be dependent on many other factors besides the incumbent/entrant rivalry (especially nowadays...).

I agree that state-owned firms are especially prone to predatory pricing and other anti-competitive behavior. I have been working for 8 years in the French telecommunications market, and the French state monopoly (France Telecom) has always tried everything legal and illegal to stifle competition. Predatory pricing is one of France Telecom's many weapons.
Officially, the French market was open to competition in 1998, but in reality many key services have remained in the grips of France Telecom so far, which has allowed the behemoth to lower charges on competitive services, while charging sometimes the equivalent of 10 times the U.S. rate on some other vital services which are not yet fully open to competition (like leased lines).

Lott neatly dissects the case for predatory pricing in a logical manner that evidences a thorough grounding in the economic literature. He marshalls convincing empirical evidence through statistical modelling that dovetails nicely with the illustrative examples he provides. Taking each point in hand, he makes the case against predatory pricing in private enterprise, while developing a clear picture of why it can and does occur in the public sector. A must read for the policy-maker and anti-trust supporters, his thoughtful critique will stand as an important work for years to come.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the conventional wisdom in the economics of industrial organization was that monopoly power was pervasive and that a strong antitrust policy was needed to combat such power. A small band of economists and lawyers associated with the University of Chicago attacked the conventional wisdom, knocking out the theoretical underpinnings of antitrust law in general and the theory of predatory pricing in particular. The Chicago School analysts showed that, in theory, predatory pricing was unlikely to work because it required the predator to lower prices on an increased quantity of product, thereby taking large losses in the short run. Moreover, even if the competitor were driven out of business, the higher long-run price needed to recoup the short-run loss would encourage entry, and in the final accounting the predation would prove unprofitable. Empirical analysis backed up the Chicago School theory. Indeed, economists could not adduce a single clear-cut case of actual predatory pricing-hence, the title of the survey article by Roland H. Koller II, "The Myth of Predatory Pricing" (Antitrust Law and Economics Review 4 [summer 1971]: 105-23).

As the Chicago School ideas triumphed in Washington, they came under attack in the academy. One source of attack was the new industrial organization (NIO), based on game theory, which was revolutionizing all areas of economics. More recently, the analysis of "path dependence" has formed a second prong of attack. The game theorists created a host of models showing that with certain assumptions about information, strategy, and the structure of the game, a threat to use predatory pricing could, in theory, be profitable.

John Lott's book Are Predatory Commitments Credible? Who Should the Courts Believe? is the second major counterattack from the Chicago School.

If firms accused of predatory pricing do not seem to differ systematically from the control group, is any firm capable of following a predatory-pricing strategy? In effect, could any organization commit to not maximizing profits, if only for a limited period of time? Lott's answer is that one group of firms can make such a commitment: publicly owned firms. The basic idea comes from Niskanen's model (William Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative Government [Chicago: Aldine Atherton, 1971]): publicly owned firms maximize size rather than profit. Lott gives several examples, but none hits closer to home than the public university, which must maintain enrollment in order to maintain the size of the faculty and therefore sets prices considerably below costs.

Lott's second type of evidence that publicly owned firms practice price predation is the fact that dumping cases-the international version of predatory-pricing complaints-have been filed under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade more frequently against firms from communist countries than against firms from noncommunist countries. Lott shows, therefore, that the NIO theory of predatory pricing makes sound predictions (hawks practice predatory pricing more than doves), but it has limited application to the private-enterprise system, to which its advocates intended it to apply.

Lott's third argument supplements the theory of predatory pricing. He extends Jack Hirshleifer's observation that inventors of public goods can internalize at least some of the value of their invention by taking long or short positions in assets whose price will change after the discovery is made public (see Jack Hirshleifer, "The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity," American Economic Review 61 [1971]: 561-74). Lott extends this idea by arguing that an entrant facing an incumbent with a reputation for toughness should take a short position in the incumbent's stock, enter, and reap trading profits. In effect, the incumbent firm with a reputation for toughness finances the entry of its own competitors. The entrant can also make profits by exiting. If the entrant enters and finds that it cannot withstand the attack of the hawk, it can take a long position in the incumbent's stock, exit, and collect the trading profits. Either way, trading profits increase the incentive to enter because whether or not entry ultimately succeeds, trading profits allow the entrant to make a profit. As Lott puts it, "the more successfully a predator deters entry, the greater the return that trading profits create toward producing new entry. Creating a reputation to predate can thus be self-defeating" (p. 115).

Lott's trading-profits theory is alone worth the price of the book-a credit to Lott and an indictment of the NIO. One of the basic insights of economics is that well-established markets threaten rents. Lott's simple application of this wisdom ought to change the way economists think about antitrust cases and the way they are litigated both as private and as public cases. The notion that trading profits can mitigate or eliminate the private damage from predatory pricing should certainly give antitrust experts cause to worry about the efficiency of treble damages. I await the day when the defendant in an antitrust case will respond, "If my actions were predatory, why didn't the plaintiff just buy my stock short and use the profits to stay in the market."

Predatory practices occupy a peculiar position in economic analysis. Empirical studies have debunked most claims of actual predation. At best, less than a handful of case exist in which predation might have been employed. Nevertheless, the problem has been analyzed extensively. The work in the 70s dealt with how to identify predation when it occurred. In the eighties, theories were devised to show that predation might be a sensible strategy in certain cases. However, no evidence was produced that these new theories had practical relevance. Lott seeks to deal with the issues. His work starts with a neat summary of the debate on predation. He formulates a clever model indicating what chacteristics a firm must have to encourage predation. He undertakes statistical tests to see whether firms accused of predation actually have the special characteristics that are needed. They do not. He goes on to add that because they are not concerned about profitability government enterprises are more likely than private firms to engage in predation. Data problems force him to rely on an indirect test, whether government-owned firms are more often accused of unfair practices in international trade. They are. He then adds an extension to the theory that considers the advantages a newcomer possesses. This is a valuable contribution. It clearly presents the basics and their tests.

The book was in pristine condition, as reported, and it saved me a buttload of money because I didn't have to buy it new for class.

Aiding Students, Buying Students charts the history of American student aid. Rupert Wilkinson provides an intriguing account of the progress of assistance over the past 300 years and the underlying factors behind its provision. Beyond the historical perspective it goes on to provide an insightful review of today's systems and proposals for reform. This book is written with authority and wit and unwinds a story that anyone with a professional interest in education will find both fascinating and thought provoking. Also, don't miss the pictures, a brilliant gallery from the 17C to modern times, with informative captions, sometimes funny, sometimes moving.

If we were to invent the ideal author for writing the history of American student aid, we might specify a person who knows the college scene very closely but has a distance on it, who has long nurtured a concern with the way elites are educated, and who writes with grace and vigor. Rupert Wilkinson began his career with a brilliant comparative study of how English elite schools such as Eton and Winchester prepared young men for leading roles in what was then an empire. He writes like an angel. As a professor of American studies at Sussex, Wilkinson had the opportunity to travel repeatedly to colleges in the U.S. to monitor his institution's exchange programs and as he went, to mine the archives on students aid and conduct searching interviews with officials. Aiding Students, Buying Students lays out a history engaging in itself and with obvious relevance to today's challenges in student aid.

America faces growing economic and social inequities--a problem that threatens the roots of our democracy. I was delighted to find that Wilkinson focuses on the the impact of financial aid on actual educational opportunities faced by students from low-income and middle-income families. I was also glad that he got beyond the erroneous conventional wisdom of addressing this problem solely in terms of ethnic minorities, and that he ends this historical study with a review of the current situation and proposals for reform.

Providing financial assistance to students has always been a complicated matter for academic institutions, and the complications have grown increasingly impenetrable, partly because of the mixture of motives that lie behind the provision of such assistance. Rupert Wilkinson has carefully examined a wealth of historical information on this topic, and he has achieved an admirable understanding of what lies behind that information. Possessed of a graceful and lucid writing style, he has elucidated his subject splendidly. Oberlin College is one of the institutions that he has studied, and as a retired member of its faculty I can attest that his treatment has been thorough, fair, and illuminating.

This book is informative and enlightening. It was a good help in writing a paper for my economics class. I recommend it as good reading for any business student.

Dr. Armentano's book is remarkable and indispensible. Since it it short, do not expect it to be an all-inclusive study of the entire past, present, and future of antitrust law. It is simple, straightforward logic that is often missing when analyzing complex legal problems - even from most economic work in the field.

Antitrust: The Case For Repeal looks closely at the Microsoft case and uses it almost allegorically to condemn the entire practice of antitrust law in the United States. He showcases the inherent contradictions, the arbitrary law, and the self-defeating nature of antitrust legislation. His scholarship is impeccable and the writing is smooth. This book should be a tremendous resource for any research done in the field and also excellent intellectual reading for anyone interested in a common-sense approach to antitrust.

Armentano analyzes and lays waste to the fallacies underlying the standard Chicago school economic analysis of monopolies, and how it has been applied by courts interpreting the antitrust laws.

This book is short and easy to read, and it is an essential supplement for anyone trying to make sense of antitrust law and economics.

For the length of this book (106 pages, sans index), the delivery was very concise and dense. The book is both layperson and student-friendly; the text has citations that direct a more thorough understanding of the book (including a good article by Thomas DiLorenzo concerning the Origins of Antitrust that can be had for free on mises.org), and also utilizes enough mainstream economic theory to allow students to cross-apply arguments to current economic studies.

Armentano delivers an acute, crisp take on the principles at the base of antitrust policies. He addresses widely-used assumptive errors underlying economic models used as justification for antitrust laws. And if you're wondering who benefits from antitrust: Over 90% of the cases, he explains, are begun by private companies against private companies. So much for benevolent government watching out for intellectually lackluster consumers.

Speaking of consumers, why is it that whenever antitrust advocates speak of that mystical class of individuals, inevitably they are caricatured as bereft of any sense concerning what to do with their own money? This is just one of the numerous fallacies underlying antitrust-advocates' arguments that Armentano addresses.

An excellent introduction to the basis of antitrust argumentation, with overviews of relevant court cases, and a good companion to courses in antitrust law or industrial organization.

Before you waste your hype or start whining about Microsoft's case, please read this book right away, you will see how antitrust laws are in fact against you and especially your freedom of choice in a market that is supposed to be free.

You will see why the Microsoft antitrust case must be dismissed and why the US government abused its power against AT&T and others.

This casebook is yet another testament to the genius of Prof. Jonathan Baker, a true guru of antitrust law. The book provides a detailed and comprehensive overview of the relevant concepts, tying them together with case studies. It is a great resource for law school students wishing to gain a solid understanding of antitrust concepts and analysis, also providing them with historical background, underlying economic theories, and policy perspectives.

After two years in law school, it is refreshing to use such a well-organized, comprehensive casebook. I have the additional pleasure of learning the subject from one of the authors. Professor Gavil conveys the same passion and clarity for the subject in the classroom as he does in this book. Definitely a great investment, and I would even suggest as a study aid to those law students unfortunate enough to be using another casebook! Good luck in law school.

I took a course with Prof. Carnell some time ago in banking law and this was the casebook we used. Of the many casebooks I used in law school this one was one of the best. It makes what might seem a complicated subject easy to understand, and more importantly (in my opinion) it doesn't skimp on history while learning about the current state of the law. Unlike most casebooks, this one was actually a pleasure to read because instead of just being a collection of cases and statutes, it provides a decent narrative putting everything in context.

This book is my bible. It is perfection itself. It is the most up to date resource of its kind, and of any kind. The author is a god. Please call him Zeus, all of his friends do. I do not know the author, but he is one of the voices in my head. If you read the book backwards, you will find inner peace. Buy it

This is a brilliant book and needs to be atop the credenza, within easy reach, of every business executive, manager, AND lawyer in America. The author combines all the best cutting-edge management research available with a superb summary of the current state of the law and she provides a synthesis to help your bottom line. You will learn many practical, step-by-step strategies to seize opportunities, manage risk, and optimize your returns...all by doing the right things in the right ways for the right reasons. [I hope the Enron guys read this book in the prison library!!!]. Every page contains superb advice for Fortune 500 entities as well as start-ups.
For the record I am a lawyer with an LL.M in Tax Law and 29 years of experience in law firms and as a General Counsel.
If you only have time to read one book about the interplay of management and the law: this is THE book.

This book provides a refreshing perspective of the legal pitfalls that face business managers, sales personnel or anyone within an organization who maintains contact with their customers. The discussion of smoking guns gives clear and concise examples of what not to say or write and provides a means to develop competent communication both with the customer and internal to the company without the "litigation lighning rods" that can happen in our fast-paced business world. This is a must read for business majors entering the workplace, as well as all sales and business managers. The writer has a sense of humor which keeps you turning the page.

The contributions to this work are all excellent, well written articles by the most respected experts on the leading edge of antitrust analysis.

With all the various information available concerning the Microsoft monopoly, it was wonderful to find an objective source that followed the events before and during the Microsoft case, analyzed the monopolistic tendencies of the software market in general, and compared this information with previous monopolies. The best characteristic of this book is that it explains the events and legalities of the case in such a way that it is not at all difficult to understand.

I agree with the others here who commented on this book as a history of the "trust issue" and the rise of large-scale capital enterprises. However, the opening portion of the book deals also, as background, with the impetus in America toward economic imperialism beginning not later than the post-Civil War era and in doing so presents another means of understanding it, in addition to that presented by the British economist John A. Hobson in his 1902 book, Imperialism, and especially in its chapter "The Economic Taproot of Imperialism". Hobson's work was well known to the players in Sklar's work, and the topic was discussed frankly and openly by mainstream capitalists and and theorists of the day.

I read this for the first time in the mid-1990s, and have just finished teaching large sections of it to a group of undergraduate Law students in Canada. This is an exceptional book. Sklar's focus is seemingly narrowly concentrated on certain aspects of law, politics, and economic theory at the turn of the last century. The cummulative effect of his argument, however, extends much further. I am struck, for instance, by one brief paragraph at the begining of his chapter on the Sherman Act. In it, he lays out a clear, coherent, and radical thesis about the inter-relationship of law and the market that succintly summarizes not only his own position, but a tradition of scholarship in the US, the UK, and elsewhere, that had been building over the 40 years before he published. These flashes of brilliance do a wonderful job of relating the peculiarities of the Progressive era in US history to the histories of other coutries, and to our own time today. I highly recommend this book for anyone interested in the rise of the corporation, and the relationship between law, the market, and politics.

Purchasing the book by chance as am having competition law course. It is comprehensive with introduction and illustration of the legal principles prior to showing the cases, in particular, the authors have listed lots of question for reader to think about the cases, as well as questions for the legislation and comparison between the US and EC law, in which only the book from Areeda in the Antitrust Analysis do in the same field. Take it...

I had great success using the galleys of Global Competition Law & Economics to teach comparative competition/antitrust law at the University of Haifa Law School during the summer of 2006, to both American and Israeli law students.

This textbook is the first and only one on the market that is extremely well suited for use in a comparative competition law or antitrust law class. When I taught comparative antitrust/competition law in Scotland a few years ago I had to put my own material together because there was no comparative textbook on the market suitable for classroom use. It is simply astonishing that, even though knowledge of European competition law has been important for a United States antitrust lawyer for more than a decade - and vice-versa! - until now there was no single volume that bridged these fields comprehensively. But at long last the market has filled this considerable gap - by producing Global Competition Law & Economics.

This is an extraordinarily teachable book that contains everything you might want to present in a comparative competition or antitrust law class. It always contained exactly what I was looking for - the relevant background, and both the similarities and the areas of greatest contrasts between the United States and the European systems. Moreover, it contains so much of each type of material that the instructor gets the pleasure of picking and choosing which of their favorite topics to cover.

Both the law and the economics are extremely clearly and interestingly presented. I used it to teach a class of students who has never before taken a class in antitrust or competition law. For this reason we had to omit much of the book's more sophisticated material. However, I have no doubt that anyone teaching an upper level class for students who already have taken a basic class in United States antitrust law or EU competition law would find this more advanced material extremely useful. Its mix of background material and state-of-the art material should make it similarly valuable for competition/antitrust lawyers who have an international practice.

I believe I speak for comparative competition/antitrust teachers everywhere when I say "thank you". Finally, the comparative book we have been waiting for has arrived. Finally, the comparative competition/antitrust field has a standard textbook to use. And what a wonderful standard it is.

Robert H. Lande
Venable Professor of Law
University of Baltimore School of Law

This amazing collection of essays makes a tremendous contribution to the world of international politics. It makes ever more clear why the United States should always bear in mind that democracy comes first. The United Nations pits democracies against each other and has a negative effect on US foreign policy and freedom all over the world. I particularly liked the opening chapter by Anne Bayefsky and the incredibly insightful poll by Frank Luntz in the annex which provides a very enlightening view of the UN's inability to fight the war on terrorism and contribute to international poeace and security. The book is beautifully illustrated. Its essays are from a powerful conference that mmade a tremendous impact for posterity. A very good education on the UN!!

The contributors in this small volume have done a good job. They have shown how far the United Nations has strayed from its original goals. They have shown the UN to be a perverse institution that is incapable of reform. And they have a recommendation, namely to work towards creating some sort of "United Democratic Nations."

Let's look at this idea for a minute. Why would a United Democratic Nations work any better than the UN? Well, it might not. But a key aspect could be the concept of a "coalition of the willing." That's what Herbert London discusses at the start of the book. And this coalition could begin with just a few nations, say the US, Canada, the UK, Japan, and Australia.

I think London is on the right track, but I still do not fully agree. After all, the problem with the UN is that it got itself a good name and then became perverse. It was not only unable to solve new problems; it became a contributor to them. I see the solution as something else: have no standing organization at all. If problems arise, come up with ad hoc coalitions of the willing who are determined to solve them and then disband. Most of the work among nations can be performed individually or bilaterally, and the rest can be done without having a prior established organization. I think the lesson of the UN is that such organizations make matters worse.

Many of the contributors show that the UN has been corrupt, ineffective, and wasteful. And some deplore the fact that we Americans pay for so much of it. But I think this misses the point. Even if the US stopped paying for any of the UN, and even if the UN stopped being corrupt somehow, it would still be perverse and irresponsible, and it would still support the some of the most aggressive and counterproductive nations and gangs. I do not wish to see the UN "reform" in such a manner. Instead, I wish to see it outlawed.

That suggestion may seem outrageous and extreme on my part. But my answer is that one can not keep selling poison as food indefinitely: eventually people will quit buying it, one way or another. If civilization is destroyed, the UN will go with it. If civilization survives, sooner or later the UN will vanish. And I hope it is sooner. We won't miss it.

Some of the contributors make a few points that are worth special notice. Anne Bayefsky, a human rights expert who truly does support human rights for all, says that it is tragic that the UN is against us, "but the tragedy will be far greater if we refuse to say: enough." Ayann Hirsi Ali says that the UN "has been outright complicit in a great many conflicts and human rights abuses." Natan Sharansky says that "moral clarity is the key" and shows how one can put pressure on nations by adopting a moral stance.

Claudia Rosett states that the model that best explains the UN is the Soviet Union, adding that if one spends enough money, some of it may accidentally be used to accomplish a few good things. Of course, it is better to use money to do a lot more good things, on purpose! Jed Babbin shows how the UN, by removing diplomatic options, leaves us with the unappetizing choices of appeasement and war.

Michel Gurfinkel tells us that while immigration can be good or bad, it is bad for democratic countries when immigrants do not want to abide by democratic necessities and also bad when immigrants are "under the sway of ochlocracy" (mob rule, which often demands conformity or death). And he also points out that the UN "is the chief world producer of political and geopolitical lies." He finishes by quoting Francois Mitterand who, upon deciding to disband the State Security Court, said "You don't reform bad things. You just scrap them."

Bernard Lewis shows why he realized the UN was hopeless back in the 1940s: it refused to respond to the Arab use of force against its Mandate in the Levant. He mentions that the reason the partition of the Levant, although so much smaller than the one of India, failed while the one of India and Pakistan has pretty much worked "is that the United Nations was not involved in the partition of India." He shows how silly it is for those who support Arab tyrants to be called people with a "pro-Arab point of view." As he says, such a view is in no way pro-Arab, instead showing "ignorance of the Arab past, contempt for the Arab present, and unconcern for the Arab future." And he finishes by warning us that we need to make the effort to help the Arab nations become free, even though it won't be easy and even though the UN will not help, "because either we free them or they destroy us." I'd rephrase that as "either they become free or they will hurt everyone, including themselves."

Norman Podhoretz shows us that the League of Nations deserved contempt, given the way it did nothing in the face of aggression. However, as he says, the UN is much worse: it "manages to compound every evil it confronts or that the UN was founded to prevent."

The book is dedicated to four great Americans who served at the UN: Eleanor Roosevelt, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and John Bolton (who is also a contributor to this volume).

I recommend this book.