Agency-securities Books

Though heavily censored, Melissa paints a clear picture of a decaying organization as it headed toward the great exodus of CIA management following the invasion of Iraq.

Kingmaker

Unlike alot of books, this author doesn't seem to be writing to grind an ax. Well written and provides great insight on some of the most recent terrorist events.

Denial and Deception is the story of the CIA from 1987 to 2004 as seen through the eyes of a former CIA spy. Although she was eventually forced out due to some admitted error on her part (now classified), she was generally supportive of the agency though often very critical of its leadership. The book is divided by the various CIA directors, Webster, Gates, Woolsey, Deutch, and Tenet, and provides a fascinating account of the unintended dismantling of our intelligence capabilities and the demoralizing of our intelligence personnel at the hands of Congress, numerous bureaucrats, various reformers and a few directors. Although reform was badly needed because the agency had gotten out of control, the endless reforms had the effect of paralyzing the agency, making CIA leaders and officers afraid of taking risks for fear of political repercussions. Rigid CIA leaders made matters worse by failing to come to grips with the new dangers of a post-Soviet Union world. Although the author acknowledges supporting Bill Clinton for president she admits that most of this took place on his watch and that between his distrust of the CIA, his preoccupation with the Lewinski scandal, and his focus on domestic issues (It's the economy stupid)--he greatly compounded the problem. Just before 911, the CIA was apparently so dysfunctional and afraid to take risks (for fear of political repercussions) that it is no wonder they were unable to predict 911 and messed up on the WMD call in Iraq. It's hard to know how accurate the author's version of this history is, but I found the book fascinating and hard to put down.

It frustrates me to read books lately that have many grammar and spelling mistakes. This book is full of misspelled words, improper grammar and sentences that have no meaning at all. I'm not sure if it is the editor's fault or the writer's fault. But, a simple proof-read would have caught most of these errors.

As far as the book goes, it's just okay. If I had to read it all over again-I wouldn't.

This book isn't meant to be a memoir about her personal experiences; instead, it's the author's perception of current/world events and related personalities during her tenure with her employer.

The beginning of the book is a little dry, perhaps not so much for those that aren't familiar with the Intelligence Community. This would only be about the first 10% of the book.

Once you're past this section of the book, it reads much faster and smoother. The author's "insider" views and interpretation of world events are intriguing.

It's worth your time to read to this book.

Excellent read. Very compelling record of events. I had checked it out at the library and subsequently ordered it as a Christmas gift for my son, a US Army major who returned from Iraq a year ago.

I received the book quickly and it was in excellent condition for a gift! Of course, these products are always less expensive than book stores--even with shipping costs.

OPERATION HOTEL CALIFORNIA is a unique and riveting book about war. The reviews here run hot and cold, and that's to be expected -- this is a war book like few others.

Mike Tucker and his interview subject, the US counter-terrorist soldier Charles Faddis, combine their voices in counterpoint here. Tucker frames and story in both historic and mythic terms, while Faddis provides direct commentary on what happened when he and his team were ordered to enter Iraq in mid-2002 before the US invasion. This fugue of voice and view does not pretend to be the final word on US Iraq policy or on the events that preceded the US invasion, but it provides essential insight in two areas: (1) the egregious lack of coordination between the Bush administration and its own soldiers and allies, and (2) the way counter-terrorist teams operate and think in real time and real situations.

Faddis's accounts of action on the ground mix heroism, frustration and wit. I love the account of his team playing "Grand Theft Auto" and watching the film "Sideways" in-country, but I also love the explanations of how the team managed to take out rail lines essential to the Iraqi army in coordination with the Kurds. Faddis does not skimp on expressing his frustration: with inaccuracies in Bob Woodward's recent book, with the unwillingness of Bush administration figures to listen to the military, with failures of nerve and intelligence generally in how the administration failed to trust its own officers and troops.

Tucker's commentary -- and his policy recommendations in the book's epilogue -- strongly credits the Kurds with being the best allies of he US in the region. Tucker also endorses a series of policies going forward from the present (ending the Iraq War, fighting in Afghanistan, moving on global warming, reconstituting the OSS, allying with China and India in the global war on Islamic extremism). You may or may not agree with these notions -- or with the two authors' affection for single-malt scotch and music -- but they come out of a factual narrative about the beginning of the Iraq War that needs to be absorbed by people who are thinking about how to succeed in this critical military effort.

OHC reads quickly and sheds a wholly new light on the recent actions in the Middle East. Anyone interested in the topic should welcome these two unique views.

Its always amazing to me when an author who knows his subject well takes a fascinating subject and produces such a mediocre book.

A testament to the remarkable skills and patriotism of the CIA team in Iraq prior to the war. The accomplishments of this team are only overshadowed by what could have been if not for the ignorance and incompetence of so many others involved in the Iraq conflict. A very interesting story and I highly recommend the book just for that reason. The reason I did not rate it at 5 stars is that writing is pretty dry and the author relies too much on long quotes from Charles Faddis, an extremely capable CIO operative (now retired).

I wish I had read the reviews here before I bought this book. A few pages into the book, I began to notice the word and idea repetition. Annoyed, I continued on, hoping that things would smooth out and the real story would begin. Unfortunately, it only got worse and by the time I got through the first chapter, I could take no more. Like another reviewer noted, I'll be selling my copy to a used book store. This book should have been edited by a competent editor before it was published. It was not and now I feel taken for $17.

We have established a whole industry in this country of refusing to believe anything the government says about Pearl Harbor, the Kennedy conspiracy, UFO's, and it was inevitable that the same would be applied to the 9/11 commission report. In fact, it was predictable that whatever they found, whatever they published it was going to be immediately considered a whitewash, cover-up, fraud. The scream louder people in the media, the books written by 'independent investigators,' the movies that will be produced will all point to some unknown direction. They will all be different directions than the official report, and different directions than each other.

This book is not about what happened on 9/11, instead it is on how the 9/11 commission worked. It's a story of how our government works. The commission was put together with both democrats and republicans (the Bush administration had the power to only put republicans on the commission but didn't). The next election was approaching. Government agencies were seeking to cover their own blame. The media was eager to report on stumbles and mistakes. On the whole, they seem to have done pretty good.

It isn't pretty, but this is the way our government works. It's an excellent and most interesting book.

untill Kean was involved the ABC 9/11 show. The absolute lies involved in the film and Keans explaination of them is an insult to any intelligent people left in America. Blame Clinton? I never voted for him but try googling executive order 12947 or CNN july 30 1996 bill waters down terrorist bill. Or August 22 1998 Clinton freezes bin laden assets. ABC is backpeddling like crazy but Kean who was intrusted by the people of The United States of America to give the truth about 9/11 thru the 9/11 commission, gives us this. Have you no shame, sir?

I found this book fascinating. There are rarely Washington insiders with the narrative talent and an appreciation for process, and in this case, we have a book that provides both. The careful negotiations, resistance and calculations by federal agencies, the push and pull of partisan politics and the unique friendly-adversarial role of the 911 families provide for absorbing reading. If nothing else, the use of careful diplomacy by the authors in knowing when to wheedle and when to subpoena is a lesson unto itself. The delicacy of diplomacy and the ham-handedness of security considerations provide a rare insight into the difficulties of maneuvering inside the beltway, and the differences amongst and amidst the commission itself are more than simple sniping -- they are in many ways a laboratory for American political struggles. Recommended for policy wonks and aspiring diplomats, and for those, like me, who'd rather get the inside scoop on the White House than Hollywood.

To best judge the 911 commission it is logical to look at the commissioners themselves. As chief executive Philip Zelikow was the chief architect of the report. Zelikow is a personal friend of Condoleeza Rice one of the chief witnesses called to testify. He is also a rabid neo con who worked under Bush at the National Security council.

The families of victims wanted him removed. One of the commissioners Max Cleland resigned calling the commission a 'scam' and a 'disgrace.' Only Zelikow and Jamie Gorelick were allowed to see all the documents and then had to get clearance to even consider them within the confines of the 'investigation.' There is no mention of WTC7 ; a 47 story building that came down without being struck by a plane.

The vast majority of the questions given by the victims families were never answered. Important witnesses were never called. Only those who could support the 'official conspiracy theory' were ever called to testify and many of those did so not under oath. The commission was only given 15 million dollars; a measly sum.

All in all the report is a useless document that serves only to perpetuate the myths that surround the event, myths a large portion of the American people no longer believe.

Millions of words have been written about the personal devastation of the attacks on our country on 9-11-01. We've been inudated with pictures, books, accounts of suffering, and the coverup by the Pentagon. It's been almost five years, and we all remember where we were and what we were doing on that terrible day, as we did when John Kennedy was killed. Now, with the publication of this 20-month investigation by Congress, we learn of the inaccurate information, confidentiality claims, and repeated misstatements by the pentagon and FAA.

Personally, I am familiar with the name of Lee Hamilton as he has been instrumental in airing the facts on other tragedies. None were quite as devastating as this tragic day in September. I was at the hospital waiting for a test on my liver, and could not believe that America (the land of the brave) would have a suicide bomber. After my test, when I learned that I was not going to die so soon, I was made cognizant of that fact that it was not just one, but three flights of passengers who lost their lives on the day mine was given back to me. It was a scary aspect of this whole terrorist business.

The new movie is mostly about two rescuers who get trapped in the rubble and have to work hard to survive, but it gives a quick montage of people around the world, including the Arabs, watching t.v. reports in stunned disbelief. It is impossible to understand another's sorrow, but this indepth official report can help us to understand what happened on that fatal day, and why they happened in three different places simultaneously. It was well planned. Thank God, the fourth plane did not work out.

A panel of five Republicans and five Democrats were assigned to work out this report. We all know that the two parties are not exactly compatible and will automatically have opposing opinions on any subject. They were directed to investigate government missteps, but were thwarted from the presidency on down. They wrote: "We did not get all the information we needed to put on the public record." That's typical of the government's need to hide relavent facts from the public -- always has and always will. They were given access to government documents and worked from there to make it understandable for the general populace. We're not all geniuses but most can smell a coverup of a large porportion. After all, we don't want the same group to know what we know, as they will (and have) try again and again. They obviously have no respect for life, even their own, and use ploys to die in their places. Such is the way of a barbaric society.

This finding shows no collaborative relationship between Hussein and al-Quida, so let the man go. They will deal with him their own way. This trial has been a farce and he lost all his respectability and humanity by having to hide in a bunker underground and then be treated as he was in the courtroom. He was the leader of a country. How would we feel if our president was treated thusly!

The New York firefighters were indeed heroes, but so were the victims who were brave enough to fight back. Their rancor has caused a setback on the amount of evidence and public accessibilty to all the facts. We never will know the full story because some had to made such an issue. My town even bought and took a brand new, special fire truck and presented it to Mayor Guilani, a bad mistake. He just wanted the attention and adulation to cover up his messy divorce. Some people in politics will always take advantage to make show a false image of themselves. Mr. Hamilton and Thomas Kean did a remarkable job of correlating the mass of information they were given. It could have taken another year or so if they had been able to obtain more relevant reasons why it happened in the first place. We will always wonder.

I'm only 1/3 the way through this book and I have a hard time believing this story. Robert's brushes with danger read too much like a bad script to a "007" film, from motorcycle and car chases to his harrowing flight into Cuba with David Ferrie. In another chapter Robert is tortured by Cuban intelligence in his hotel room. This of course, only after he satisfies another one of his lovers. Many of those cast in the book are familiar characters, but Robert's interaction and dialogue with these people often comes across as quirky.

This book comes across as an exercise in self-indulgence and delusion and I doubt I will finish it.

Although this book is very interesting, I found it very hard to read. I got very sick very quick of the author talking about how he had an affair on his wife, how smart he was and what he did to hold all these very important government deals together.

I think that if even a part of this is true however, that this is very scary. There is a lot of information about the underhandedness of the CIA and other government officials and how much of this led to JFK's death.

If you can concentrate on the story and get past the self bragging, this book is very interesting and disturbing. However, for me, the constant self importance of this author got old fast.

Intriguing reading, but . . . the main problem is that what he offers as "first-hand" information really is only a narrative of events that have already appeared in the conspiracy-theory literature. One could argue that this book confirms what's in the assassination literature, but the better argument is that Morrow is just making up a story based on what he's read. I support this position by suggesting that his only claim to be involved in the assassination was the "job" he was given to purchase rifles and rig up a radio transmitter and receiver system. If the CIA employed him only as a shopper and electronics whiz-kid on this mission, then why would they tell him the whole nefarious story and introduce him to gangsters? The other major problem is that much of what he writes can't be backed up by facts. For example, he writes of a James Bond-style quadruple murder in a south Florida motel. But there is no record of these murders in the press nor in police reports. Maybe the "powers-that-be" could hide one murder - but four murders out in public? Yeah, right.

This is all so interesting, but who ordered and allowed the CIA to direct the hit on JFK. The head of the CIA would have been told what and where. Hoover was up to his scrawny neck in it, so was Lyndon and Nixon. I'd like to know who ordered it. So much for big business, undermining the intelligence of the ordinary American with wheeling and dealing and determining who lives and dies. It appeared to be like a game of dominoes with consequences beyond a laymans comprehension. They have no right, as good peoples lives have been cut short because of it. Its all very well to mention Marcello, Gambino family, Roselli, Hoover and half of the CIA, but who were the so-called respectable moneyed persons pulling the strings? Thats the mystery. Otherwise great reading.

The main complaint the people below seem to have against Morrow is his arrogance and so-called encounters with women (this is a normal trait for many in that line of work anyways). If you get past that, the book has much infomation and details of the political and intelligence perspective/views of that time. Morrow's dealings with the underworld is quite interesting, and his chapters on the Kennedy brothers is very revealing. If Morrow threw in a few "007-ish" parts to beef up the story a little, just take it in stride. But the information he shares about the D.C community and main figures of that era is quite fascinating. I definitely recommend this book if you have any interest in JFK assassination history.

This book's ultimate value for future historians, I predict, will be as a guide to source documents. Its analyses are already dated and rendered anachronistic by "facts" on the ground.

Illustrative of most everything that is wrong with fact-thick, morally vacant analysis, the forest of footnotes and obsession with the minutiae of diplomacy remind one of those thick studies of the Congress of Vienna (which settled Europe for a half-century after Napoleon's defeat & exile) from the 19th century. The pro-Clinton bias is also evident despite a superficial attempt as "balance." Much analytic acrobatics is performed to portray the Clinton administation and the ineffectiveness of NATO (and the cowardice of French and German leaders is almost entirely overlooked).

The authors also miss one of the central points proved so recently: war by committee, in Beltway speak, "multilaterialism", will always fail, especially when it is coupled with an Administration which plans its actions on the basis of polls and an obsession with a tainted legacy.

Nor is William Jefferson Clinton properly criticized for enganging in an adulterous affair and then committing perjury and half dozen other felonies in an attempt to hide his illicit affair. Instead some reviewers bring to task those who held Clinton accountable for his multiple crimes involving the Lewinsky affair (a Federal judge did hold him in contempt and publically label him a perjurer).

Other reviewers laughably attempt to blame Clinton and his Administration's base incompetence upon what they partisanlly call a "frivolous impeachment" (Richard Nixon faced impeachment over the VERY SAME CRIMES! Perjury, subornation of perjury, conspiracy...yet apparently when a Liberal-left Democrat commits these crimes, in the minds of some, they aren't crimes at all; after all, the Watergate burglary was, according to one of its primary perpetrators, carried out to find proof of John Dean's wife's past as a call girl; oh well, since it involved sex, it can't be a big deal).

To blame the Republican House for doing its Constitutional duty (while congratulating the Senate on failing to do its duty) and impeaching a President who brazenly committed crimes involving the abuse of his official position is breathtaking in its supercillious desperation.

This book also demonstrates why history should not be written until a significant amount of time has passed (at least ten, more profitably at least twenty or twenty-five years): lack of perspective. In the haze and smoke of recently concluded battle, any analysis is bound to be deeply flawed--as this one is.

Time must be allowed to past, scholar must be given time to digest the facts and the primary sources. Above all, time must intervene so that the actions of the immediate past (just a few years ago) can be judged in light of the lasting consequences (and results or failure) on the ground.

Even today, while it is obviously that earlier, forceful intevention, instead of the usual futzing around with the UN and NATO, bodies designed to delay action not facilitate it, no one can seriously say what the ultimate outcome of NATO's intervention or the horrors of the Milosevic/Mladic push for a Greater Serbia empire in the Balkans will be. The claims about a push for a Greater Albania are little more than Serbophilic nonsense given the economically prostrate state of Albania (as close to a "failed" state as one can get without actually being one) and the non-existence of an Albanian military. The Macedonian Army, for example, was well on its way to crushing the Albanian terrorists when the Clinton-Albright intervention halted the police action against what were an ill-equipped, poorly led band of rag-tag terrorists. (And the idea that FYROM should have to given into Albanian demands of autonomy and lingusitic equality are quite ridiculous when juxtaposed with France's long-time refusal to grant similar rights to the Bretons, Basques and other minorities; likewise with the Spanish gov'ts similar policy toward the Catalans and their own Basques; sauce for the goose is NOT apparently sauce for the gander, a point the book completely ignores).

Just as the notorious Bomb Damage Assessment of the strategic bombing of Germany during World War 2, conducted in the immediate aftermath by the US military, led to seriously flawed conclusions that distorted military policy makers appreciation for the very significant role such bombing played in destroying Nazi Germany's ability to fight, this book too will most likely be shown to contain short-comings not yet recognized.

The "instant-book" phenomenon is not, like so much else, a product of the 24-hour, internet-wired world, but one that goes back to at least World War 2 when a slew of books came out in 1940 and 1941 by, especially, journalists purporting to provide an "inside view" of Hitler's Germany. Few of these books have much value at today because their immediacy to the events they examine and the author's consequent lack of access to critical information (especially information concealed by totalitarian and or criminal regimes)render them useless.

This book should be read, if for no other reason, as a clarion call to scholars and historians to avoid the "instant" analysis bug. Time matures and improves human beings. The same is true of historiography.

The impulse to influence future historians--as well as reap quick profits from the topical immediacy of the subject matter seems as irresistable now as it was seven decades ago.

The phenomenon still continues today during the Liberation of Iraq and the democracy aborning. The vast majority of books like this will be consigned to the "dustbin of history". If they have any staying power is usually negative: cementing one political factions version of events that helps only to muddy the waters for later, more detached and impartial analyses in the decades to come. I.e. converting one political factions biases into received wisdom which only hampers serious history.

A book of straight reportage would have been far more helpful than a thick tome cluttered with stiff, wonky prose and politically influenced goals (however superficially impartial the authors attempt to be).

Newt Gingrich is right when he praises this book, and the international reviewers that give it 1-3 stars are also right when they point out that it is seriously incomplete and arguing from a very American point of view.

In my view, this book is essential reading together with the following four books, all of which I have favorably reviewed here at Amazon: first, Kristan Wheaton, The Warning Solution: Intelligent Analysis in the Age of Information Overload, Cees Wiebes, Intelligence and the War in Bosnia: 1992-1995 (Perspectives on Intelligence History), Wesley Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat, and Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime These four books cover what this book does not: 1) a full explanation of why "inconvenient warning" fails time and again; 2) a full explanation of the complete inadequacy of Western intelligence in relation to historical, cultural, and current indigenous intelligence as well as small arms interdiction in lower-tier unstable regions; 3) a useful itemization of the weaknesses of both NATO and the US military in responding to unconventional challenges in tough terrain distant from the center of Europe; and 4) how "supreme command" is most often exercised without regard to intelligence.

Having said that, let me enumerate what I regard as the very positive features of this book, one that makes it central to the discussion of NATO, Air Power, and US politics as they affect "engagement."

First, the authors are to be commended for graciously but no less effectively nailing the Clinton Administration, and especially Sandy Berger, Madeline Albright, and William Cohen, for inattention and indecisiveness and a complete lack of any coherent sustainable strategy.

Second, although the author's do not stress this point beyond highlighting it in the opening sentence of the book, it comes across as a continuing theme: the entire conflict could have been resolved early on had the NATO allies had a capability to deal with *one man*, that is, Milosevic.

Third, the authors note clearly (on page 10) how there were many non-violent precursors to the violence and ensued, and that the Albanians finally concluded that only violence would get them international attention. This is a major theme within Jonathan Schell's utterly brilliant and comprehensive book, "The Unconquerable World" and one that any future Director of Central Intelligence must be held accountable for: warning in the *non-violent* stage.

Fourth, the author's, who between them have considerable expertise in defense analysis, indict the Clinton Administration for over-selling the peace negotiation efforts of Ambassador Holbrook, and the very bad campaign planning of General Clark.

Fifth, the author's document the pattern of Madame Secretary Albright, whose own book I recently reviewed along these lines, of rhetoric rather than reality--or words rather than actions with consequences. NATO bluffed while Madeline talked. Milosevic, no fool, understood all this. Albright is, however, credited with understanding that ultimately force would be needed to achieve the policy objectives.

Sixth, and this is something I learned the hard way in El Salvador, the author's very correctly make the point that such conflicts cannot be controlled with pressure on only one of the belligerents. *Both* parties to the conflict must be challenged and contained.

Seventh, the author's are helpful in pointing out that the Administration erred in failing to consider partition and independence as an option for the conflicted parties, and they emphasize that one must never under-estimate the will of any one party to achieve independence.

Eighth, and on the head of the Republicans we place this one, the authors point out that the impeachment proceedings against Bill Clinton because of his personal relations with Monica Lewinsky severely distracted and handicapped the Administration. Indeed, I recall that in all our Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) reports at the time, we had to modify all of our search strategies to include "and not Monica", so over-whelming was the trash that would come up on Bosnia and other places we were looking at, all "hits" corrupted unless we excluded the Monica factor from US foreign policy. The lesson we take from this is that impeachment, especially frivolous impeachment, has major national security consequences, and is not merely a matter for domestic consumption or impact assessment.

The book is flawed, but not grievously, for failing to have any serious treatment of intelligence. There are just four over-lapping references to CIA, and to intelligence reports, in the entire book. In as much as this book is up to the norm for beltway policy books, we conclude that until such books have the deeper coverage and understanding of intelligence shortfalls as a matter of routine, intelligence and policy in Washington DC will continue to co-exist without reform and with a deliberate choice being made by policy experts to ignore intelligence and what intelligence, properly done, can bring to the process of peacemaking.

The author's final policy recommendation merit listing, and their elaboration is a highlight of the book:
1) Interventions should occur as early as possible
2) Coercive diplomacy requires a credible threat of force
3) When force is used, military means must relate to political ends
4) Airpower alone usually cannot stop the killing in civil wars
5) The Powell Doctrine for the use of force remains valid
6) Humanitarian interventions need realistic goals
7) Exit strategies are desirable but not always essential
8) Other countries need better, more deployable militaries
9) UN authorization for intervention is highly desirable, even if it is not required
10) Russia's support is valuable in these types of operations
11) NATO works well in peace and in war but only if US leads
12) An effective foreign policy requires that the president lead with confidence.
13) The US is not a hyperpower, but rather a superpower prone to *underachievement* instead of imperial ambition (this was pre-Bush and pre-neocon)

This book stands as the core reference on NATO and Kosovo, and as one of the more helpful references on principles of intervention and foreign policy that all future presidents and their staff can learn from.

Other more recent books I recommend, with reviews:
The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence, and the Will of the People
The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic (The American Empire Project)
Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy
Breaking the Real Axis of Evil: How to Oust the World's Last Dictators by 2025
Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik
War Is a Racket: The Anti-War Classic by America's Most Decorated General, Two Other Anti=Interventionist Tracts, and Photographs from the Horror of It

There are 724 footnotes in this book, of which 720 seem to be for English-language sources, mostly American. And the trust in American sources is complete. For example: there's a section on the Racak massacre, with no mention that some French and German papers have cast doubts on the evidence, only a 200-word quote from American observer William Walker. For example: the famous appendix to the Rambouillet accord (granting NATO troops the right to bivouac and billet and make use of any facility anywhere in Yugoslavia) was just boilerplate that would have been deleted on request -- and the backup for this revelation is interviews with an American general and an American envoy. Why didn't they ask Yugoslavs too?

Serb criminals and crimes get full coverage along with epithets like "murderous" or "cowardly" or "atavistic". But nothing on killings of Serbs before the war, and nothing in the text about the Belgrade TV station slaughter, or the cluster bombs that hit the Nis marketplace (though that's in one of the appendixes). As for the Chinese embassy attack, it was obviously inadvertent because there was no sensible reason for it. Thus irrationality connected to Serbs proves they're murderers, while irrationality connected to Americans proves they're innocent.

I found no errors in fact, and I don't expect some balanced presentation of non-American views. But a book that doesn't even note the other views, and excises facts which don't fit with the presentation of the American view, has no value except to those who want to believe that NATO was right. Others will prefer Judah's "Kosovo: War and Revenge" (which at least checked multiple sources), and Parenti's "To Kill a Nation". Or at the extreme there's Noam Chomsky's "The New Military Humanism" which is filled with anti-NATO bias ... about enough to balance the pro-NATO bias in "Winning Ugly".

Daalder and O'Hanlon make the claim that the 1999 NATO air campaign against Milosevic's Serbia was a good thing, since it stopped the ethnic cleansing and left everyone in Kosovo better off than they would have been without NATO's military intervention.

Viewed through the lens of subsequent headlines, this argument becomes hard to support. The ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians by Serbs has ceased, to be replaced by similar outrages against Serbs by Kosovars. Net improvement? Nil.

Was the Kosovo air campaign justifiable as a fire-break against further bloodshed in the Balkans? The citizens of Macedonia would demur, I'm afraid.

It is hard to escape the impression that the Kosovo campaign was not only the last of the Wars for Greater Serbia, a point Daalder and O'Hanlon dance around in their conclusions, but also the first of the Wars for Greater Albania -- a point the authors utterly fail to address.

One is ultimately left with the conclusion that the authors have done a very good job of researching and arguing the wrong thesis.

This is a serious and worthwhile study which analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of American leadership and the NATO system in its first offensive war. It is particularly useful to read this book after Kaplan's The Coming Anarchy (also reviewed). Kaplan makes clear there will be a lot more destruction of humanity that will require American leadership and the use of force. Daalder and O'Hanlon make clear that we have a lot to learn if we are going to engage in campaigns like Kosovo.

Anyone who plans to advise the next Administration would be well served by reading these two books together and pondering their implications for improving American decision making and coalition leadership skills in the context of interventions in dangerous places. The clearest points in this book are Daalder and O'Hanlon's judgments that this was the right war, it was ultimately a success, airpower had a powerful but limited influence and without the threat of a land campaign and the Russian abandonment of Milosevic. In their view, airpower by itself would have failed, and that the United States has to lead for these interventions to work and the Clinton Administration consistently failed to lead the public, the Congress or our allies and because of the Clinton's Administrations prior vacillation on Saddam Hussein (loud threats, tiny attacks that ended quickly without coercing Saddam). The confused posturing of the Clinton Administration actually increased the likelihood that force would have to be used because Milosevic had no reason to believe they would actually fight to the end. Once NATO had consolidated its position and the Administration had launched the gamble of forceful coercion Daalder and O'Hanlon give Clinton and the allies high marks for realizing that NATO had to win or cease to be relevant and they stepped up to the challenge. Their critique of the Clinton Administration is decisive and thorough: "Having failed to make a public case for the use of force, the Clinton administration opted for a minimalist strategy. Its hope was that a bit of bombing would work. This was the military equivalent of the 'Hail Mary' play in football. Not only was this an irresponsible way to go to war, it also was unnecessary. A case for decisive military action-at a minimum, a robust air campaign from the war's outset--could have been made. The American public would probably have supported such a strategy given its disdain for Milosevic and memories of the Bosnian war. The tragedy of this case is that, in fearing the absence of public and congressional support, the administration embarked on the use of force lacking both. That is no basis for taking the tremendous risks that the use of force necessarily implies." (pages 224-225). This is a book worth studying and thinking about.

In 1995, my high school history teacher gave me a copy of the World Factbook. It has information about every area in the world including all UN Members, dependencies of nations (Puerto Rico, Aruba, American Samoa), and areas under dispute (West Bank, Gaza Strip, Taiwan, Western Sahara), and the five oceans. I have used the book for six years since then. This leads us to this edition. This edition is in black and white. Because of this flaw, you cannot tell the colors in the various flags. The publisher left out a series of maps that are published in the back of the Factbook. Despite what the publisher says, this leaves the Factbook incomplete. Another flaw is that the publisher dates the previous years Factbook with the next years date. This could leave users confused. A previous reviewer faulted this edition for having the former Yugoslavia as 'Serbia and Montenegro'. There is a reason for this. Until Slobodan Milosevic's defeat in the 2000 Yugoslav elections, the US Government acknowledged the fact that Serbia and Montenegro - the two remaining republics left of the old communist Yugoslavia (the four other republics had left the former Yugoslavia by 1991-92) had formed a new nation - the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). In saying that, the US (and the United Nations) felt the FRY was not the replacement for the old communist Yugoslavia. The CIA, being apart of the government followed suit. Another review claims the World Factbook does not have Vatican City. In fact, the book has the Vatican under the name of Holy See. The reason the Holy See is not under the name of Vatican City is that the Holy See and Vatican City are two different entities. The Holy See is the center of the Catholic church. It signs treaties and sends diplomats to various countries. The Vatican owns the Holy See's property but doesn't sign treaties and send diplomats around the world because it chooses not to. Because of this, the latter is listed. You can't fault them for these things. The bottom line: go to the CIA site first to preview the factbook before you buy. If you decide to buy, get the Factbook from the government and not this flawed edition.

I don't know about the printed edition, but the online version has Vatican City listed under "Holy See" and clearly states, "Serbia and Montenegro have asserted the formation of a joint independent state, but this entity has not been formally recognized as a state by the US. The US view is that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) has dissolved and that none of the successor republics represents its continuation." If the printed version omits these statements, or if the Yugoslavia was recognized as a state by the time this was published, just ignore this review.

Someone mentioned that the factbook lists a country as "Serbia and Montenegro" instead of as "Yugoslavia" as a big complaint about possible factual errors. Serbia existed long before the name "Yugoslavia" ever existed to be put on a map; and with the dissolution of Yugoslavia (for whatever reason one chooses to explain it), it has become Serbia once again, irregardless of what CNN uses on their news reports.

If we substitute "Wales and Scotland" and "Great Britian" for "Serbia and Montenegro" and "Yugoslavia", those complaints sound rather silly.

This is a superb reference work. I note, with some surprise, that there is a spate of negative reviews, which all involve (1) printing the flags in black-and-white (2) the Vatican (3) Yugoslavia. I don't think that any of these issues is important.

So I am buying the new book, because the old one is out-of-date. The latest information is on-line, of course, and I refer to that frequently, but actually having the book is extremely convenient, and sometimes a lot faster. (I live in Thailand, and use a dial-up modem connection to the Internet, and if I get curious about the GDP per capita in China versus India, the book is just a whole lot quicker.)

Where else can you find reliable reports on all the nations around the world?

If you like tables, charts, graphs, and maps, this is not the book for you. Everything in the book is available for free on the CIA website. Check out the website before you decide to buy the book, so you can see how little (in the way of anything interesting, useful, or detailed) the book offers.

First and foremost, I think the POV is the CIA's "intelligence" wing(s) vs. the "Ops" goons, a longstanding civil war in the CIA and the other clandestine services where Trento, who has covered intelligence for 35 years, clearly sources to the inteligence side of the battle.

Those of us following scandals from Nixon's treason in 1968 as a private citizen who sabotaged Vietnam War peace negotiations, through Watergate, through Bush I's treason in Iran as a private citizen negotiating the continued retention of American Hostages, through Iran/Contra, through Bush II's treason as a private citizen interfering in Mideast peace negotiations, noticed the same small cabal involved in everything - Ted Shackley, Thomas Clines, John Poindexter, Richard Secord, John Singlaub, George Herbert Walker Bush, James Angleton, Chi Chi Quinterez, Ed Wilson - and at various times, people like Oliver North and even Zbiegniew Brzezhinski operating on their behalf on a regular basis. Two of these, Angleton and Clines, were interviewed by Trento.

This book goes back to the days of Dulles and ahead to the present and shows how the CIA's old boy network can always bite back harder than it's bitten. It deals peripherally with things like BCCI and Nugan/Hand. It's much more critical of Stansfield Turner, whom I have met on a couple of occasions, than I would be, but it nicely fills in the back story on his period as director of the CIA.

This book has nothing about Adnan Kashoggi but does talk about Sarkis Soghnalian, a Turkish/Armenian power broker. I think one of the weak links for the rogue operative network is in fact the information held by their non-American allies. It's possible the US or Israel will attack Iran, and if so, people should be educated enough to understand any revelations the Iranians might have for us in retaliation.

This is not a perfect book. It has inconsistencies and errors but this book has helped connect many dots from the other 690+ books I have reviewed.

I had no idea while I was at CIA as a clandestine officer that there are really multiple CIA's and that there are three *external* CIAS: the "Safari Club" led by Saudi Arabia, with France, Egypt, Morocco and Iran (during the Shah's time, not since); the murder network (South Africa, Israel, South Korea, and probably also Chile and Argentina during their worst years); and a privatized CIA running drugs and arms, laundering money, and generally doing things that were "off the books and out of control" as the author titles one of his chapters.

According to the author, Allen Dulles has the first private intelligence service at 44 Wall Street, relying heavily on the recruitment of former Nazis. There is a direct path from the CIA's fascination with former Nazis to the presence of Karl Rove in the White House.

The author draws on good sources to document the long-time relationship between Wall Street and certain companies such as the house of Morgan and Brown that leads us right up to when Buzzy Kronguard, formerly of Alex Brown, was executive director of the CIA at no salary. Prescott Bush, farther of the first President Bush, features heavily in the corrupt relations between CIA and the Wall Street mafia. These people financed the Nazis and weapons that killed Americans.

Interestingly, the Dutch are known to have all the details on the Bush family ties to the Nazis, and I have personally heard from the Dutch that they also have full details from the Chinese on drunken teen-ager George W. Bush, of whom photos are said to exist while he is incoherent and perhaps posed in naked compromising positions with his male Chinese tennis teacher). All of this is inevitably going to be in the public consciousness--right now it falls into what one author calls "Fog Facts"--known openly but not "computed" by the public.

This entire book is a tale of the corruption of intelligence, caused in part by the abysmal failure of US intelligence in the early years, ranging from failing to predict the Korean invasion to trying to assassinate Chinese premier Chou En Lai.

The Viet-Nam era empowered people like Ted Shackley (who died in 2002 and whose memoirs are coming out shortly). CIA learned to run drugs and arms, launder money, start its own banks, and generally avoid Congressional funding limitations and Congressional oversight. Unfortunately, creating a rogue CIA further incapacitated "CIA proper" of which I was a part, and the author reasonably points out that the fall of the Shah of Iran, the failure to understand the 1975 concerns about Shiite terrorism training camps, the assassination of Sadat, the CIA coup plans that were pre-empted by Qadafi, the growth of Al Qaeda, the fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban (which deprived Wall Street of its drug crops, now restored courtesy of the U.S. Army)--the list goes on.

According to the author's sources, the CIA opened the Far East to the US mafia, and helped develop pipelines for the drugs that included piggy-backing on US servicemen corpses coming back into Dover AFP. Fast forward to CIA using Special Operations Forces to protect transmitters that allowed hundreds of drug airplanes to land in Panama where drugs could be traded for money and arms.

The author centers the book on Ted Shackley as a bridge figure among many "external" intelligence activities, but Clark Clifford is also key in the founding of the BCCI bank and in asking the Saudis directly to fund an alternative CIA to be known as the Safari Club. BCCI had overtly good intentions--to attract terrorist and criminal funds, but at root it represented the complete "sale" of US intelligence to the Saudis.

The politicization of intelligence is the other major theme in this book, and the Bush family features very prominently.

Side notes:

Ted Shackley recruited Zbigniew Brzezinski as a young Polish-American student, and had full access to him later when he was National Security Advisor.

Don Rumsfeld, today Secretary of Defense, was instrumental in persuading President Ford not to appoint Eliot Richardson, a reformer of known integrity, to the DCI position, and instead got Kissinger to invite Bush from Beijing, all to ensure that Kissinger's role in subverting Chile would be concealed.

As DCI, Turner shut the Israeli's out, essentially forcing them to adopt Shackley as their "black CIA" partner, and then Bush as DCI turned CIA over to the Saudi government.

Shackley fought Inman for the soul of CIA, and the evidence suggests that Shackley won, in part by blackmailing Inman in collaboration with the Israel lobby.

CIA placed officers under cover on the Hill, notably in Senator Dan Quayle's office.

The book left me with three thoughts for reflection:

1) 9-11 was the culmination of decades of CIA corruption and politicization. Of course there are other factors, but from 1975 forward CIA "sold out" and it can be safely said that Viet-Nam killed CIA and opened the doors to the privatization of dirty tricks, murders, and generally very bad out of control covert foreign policy and a consequent subversion of national security.

2) Cheap oil resulting from our support of ruthless dictators set the stage for the radicalization of the Muslim world against America. People are not stupid--they see the link between the US situation, US support for dictators, and their own suffering and exclusion from the wealth.

3) One day, someday, I am going to fund an ABLE DANGER analysis of the history of secret intelligence, starting with Richard Secord, who is in charge of GRAY FOX (the successor to YELLOW FRUIT) and who is not killing terrorists, which is what he is supposed to be doing, but instead continuing the for-profit external CIA, and Ted Shackley.

This is an important book.

There is one overwhelming problem with Joseph J. Trento's PRELUDE TO TERROR. After a number of fascinating chapters showing how the CIA has become an increasingly criminal institution, he stops short of drawing the obvious conclusion. In his final chapter he says that today's CIA has become "at best irrelevant and at worst a joke." Try telling that to the poor wretches it is torturing in prisons all over the world! In fact the CIA has had the most profound influence upon American political life, corrupting our entire government to the point where it is by now beyond hope of reform.

Trento's focus upon George H.W. Bush is appropriate, for no one has had a greater influence on this process. The Bush presidency-- the first ever in which a former Director of the CIA held that office-- represents the "Rubicon moment" in American history, when the road to totalitarianism which is now reaching its climax was set in a manner which made it impossible to turn back. Bush moved quickly to end a Cold War which was becoming useless to the American intelligence elite, and initiate a confrontation with the Muslim Middle East. Yes, initiate, for it is abundantly clear that Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait was no surprise to the Bush Administration but rather a set-up. After all, the Iraqi dictator had gone to Bush's ambassador to Iraq to sound her out on the possible reaction of the United States to such an invasion, and she had given him a green light. Saddam's response could not have been better suited to the interests of a military-industrial complex which was trembling at the prospect of peace breaking out.

Most telling of all was something I heard a policy analyst say on what was then the MacNeil Lehrer News Hour: He said that Aemricans should expect terrorist attacks on their own soil. This scared the hell out of me, not because I thought that there was any prospect of such attacks occurring, but because I knew then that the Big Lie was being born, and that its purpose could only be to deprive us of our civil liberties. The first war against Iraq ended without any such incidents, but then, it takes a long time to get such things rolling, and maybe Bush was having a hard time convincing his friend Osama bin Laden to take the rap. Besides, he had a son who was very likely to run for president in his turn. What better legacy to pass on to him than 9/11?

It is time for Americans to realize that they are being manipulated. Trento's title, "Prelude to Terror" is a good one, but the terror about to be unleashed on our society is the product of our own government.

Unlike the previous reviewer I wasn't that impressed with this book. The author puts Felix Rodriguez at the Watergate break-in, when in reality he had no involvement in it whatsoever since he was in Vietnam at the time. That was one one the mistakes I noticed. I'm sure there were more.
Some of his theories are viable, yet others seem far-fetched. In fact a lot of these theories have already been refuted by reputable journalists in the past. Overall, something you should read with an open mind. By the way, to make a correction to the previous reviewer it's Chi Chi Quintero.

After reading Mr. Trento's "The Secret History of the CIA" (see my amazon review of this book) several years ago I thought Mr. Trento could sink no lower. I was wrong. This book is so full of rumor, innuendo, slander, and just plain innaccuracies that I don't know where to start, so I will just provide a couple of examples. On page 271, discussing one of his primary sources for this book, the late Colonel William R. Corson, the author writes, "Corson...returned to Vietnam as the only American on the ground at Dien Bien Phu and was marched out with the French prisoner after their surrender. General Vo Nguyen Giap sent him back to President Eisenhower to tell the American that they faced the same fate as the French..." As anyone who studied the Indochina War knows, there were no Americans at Dien Bien Phu when it fell in 1954, and Corson certainly wasn't anywhere close to the place. On the same page the author also says Corson "had been sent on an unsuccessful mission in 1950 to try to bribe Ho Chi Minh to launch a diversionary attack against China to limit China's help in North Korea." Not only is this claim ridiculous on its face, at the time of the supposed mission (1950) William R. Corson was a raw, newly-commissioned Marine Corps second lieutenant, hardly the type of person to be selected for such a mission.
This book is not worth the paper on which it is printed. I had thought that Avalon was a reputable publishing house. I guess I was wrong.

Richelson does his homework and provides a volume about the structure of the intelligence community either citing current data, or the most recently released declassified data concerning currently classified programs. Ultimately the book is a reference, not a read. He offers only a few pages of analysis on his work, so there is no new perspective on hot topics concerning the structure or function of the IC. That being said, there are not a lot of other books out there about the USIC, so you may have to go with this one if you want to know anything.

I have copies of editions 2, 3, 4 and now the 5th edition of this book - and it has gotten better each time. Dr. Richelson's study of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) is amazing, and a testament to how useful open source information is. While some of the information is inaccurate (and I *can't* say what... ;-), it is to the benefit of the reader that this book offers so many sources. If its wrong, its not because he guessed wrong - it has been mentioned elsewhere. While not being 100% accurate, I would render a guess that 90% to 95% hits near the mark.

That aside, the organizational charts are amazing and very useful. This book has been used in the American Military University's intelligence studies program as a foundation textbook for many classes (coupled with other good books too!). While some spooks stick in their niche areas, others have copies of this book on their shelf to see what the rest of the IC does...

The only downside for this book - the cost. I would have never imagined paying near $50 on a paperback book. It was worth the cost though...

I have just received the 2008 (5th) edition of this book and performed a quick scan of projects I am familiar with. All of the information presented in the present tense is out of date and some of it is just flat wrong (was never true). Just because there are citations doesn't make it accurate.

Thanks to Google Earth, it is a trivial matter to verify some of the installations mentioned within this book. Richelson should try it some time.

This one was a great reference up to 10 September 2001. Then everything changed and much of what is in this book is out of date. To be fair though, there is stll considerable value here, but that value puts it into the 'buy a used one' category (but hey, that slightly dog-eared, somewhat out of date, reference work on the shelf behind your desk gives you that 'old hand' 'been there, done that' credibility, so this isn't all bad.)

What's good about this one:
-The description of the intelligence cycle.
-The discussions of challenges facing the U.S. intelligence community post Cold War (but pre-9/11; belay that, many of the issues addressed are still challenges that have not been resolved, just set to one side in the pursuit of the global war on terror).
-The description and discussion of the processes and policies surrounding the intelligence cycle.
-It is a good reference work for tracing the establishment of several of the agencies.

What's not so good about this:
-The world changed two years after this book's publication in 1999. And all the shortcomings of this book stem from this. The description of the strategic organization of the U.S. military is not accurate. The Dept. of Homeland Security is not mentioned. The National Intelligence Director is not mentioned. Bin Laden and Al Qaeda aren't mentioned. The patriot act isn't here. The National Geospatial Intelligence Agency is here under its old name, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. And so forth...
-There have been some bigger changes that are mostly technology driven. At the time this book was written, the idea that one could get 1 meter resolution satellite imagery for free (though a little dated) was pretty shocking for most folks, but if you go to Google maps right now...

Over all, 'The U.S. Intelligence Community' is out of date for descriptions of the current establishment and much of the technology, but is pretty darn good for processes and some of the big concepts. Caveat lector: be mindful that technology changes constantly, and what's in this book was declassified, hence even further out of date than the copyright date would indicate.

Post Script: Thank you, W. Blair for pointing out that there is a newer edition. This review only applies to the fourth, not fifth and current edition. Darn you, W. Blair, for forcing my hand to get the new edition 8-)

E. M. Van Court

Richelson does an excellent job of providing a link and detail to all of the U.S. intelligence successes and failures over the last 35 years. This is a superb reference book for the young and old intelligence officer in a Joint or Interagency environment that needs to know how the intelligence system in the United States works. Richelson does not write in theory. All of this book is practical, useful and hard-hitting. It will give you excellent depth and insight into those often heard but little known intelligence successes and debacles. From the USS Pueblo to the origin and current status of satellite intelligence, this book covers it all.

The book is far far far ... far away from the truth. So far, that this book is complete non-sense. By the way, the reality is much more excited than the book.
The biggest crime of the former FBI Director Freeh is that he lies the society. The uninformed society does not have the possibility to protect itself. This is big crime. An excellent example is the killing of the CIA Director William Colby. Freeh preferred to kill Colby, instead to charge him officially. The FBI stories of Ames and Colby are far far... far away form the truth. (If you are interested to read the real story, read the memoirs of Dekov at the Web, Google Groups, Search, "Dekov, Colby".) The society is the loser. The society will pay big money. The society will give victims. This is very dangerous criminal activity against the American people. The persons who praise the Director Freeh will pay the price, too. Their children will die, as the whole nation. The USA Senate must accept a special law, forcing the FBI to say the truth. The truth is the only chance for salvation of the American nation. And the most important - Freeh must go into the jail, as killer of the American nation.

Step by step we are moving to the truth.
The fiction is banal. Hence - one star for the book. The reality is amazing. Hence - 5 stars for the next book on the Ames-Colby case. The next book will be based on Dekov's memoirs.

Not only is this a masterfully written book, but Wise (I suspect) reveals tidbits that many within the ranks of the CIA were surprised to read. Best read in one sitting.

David Wise displays his through knowledge of the CIA and the business of intelligence in this excellent book. Well written, highly readable.

Perhaps the most disturbing element of the story is the refusal of CIA leaders to consider the posibility that someone ( or perhaps more than one) as damaging as Ames was deep inside with access to some of the most potentially damaging secrets.

Highly recommended

Jeffreys does an excellent job describing a complicated and secretive organization. He does not spend as much time on Hoover himself as on the modern Bureau. He is fair, ascribing blame and criticizing policies and efforts when necessary, but also extolling the overall effectiveness of the FBI. The FBI is the most powerful and effective law enforcement agency in the world, and this must not be forgotten, even if one can look at some of its recent past and find fault in its management or political intrigues. The book is dated: its most recent event described is the Waco incident. It would be interesting to read a sequel with the Oklahoma City bombing and the TWA disaster, describing the intricacies of the FBI's investigations and the human interest stories of agents unravelling trails of evidence and dealing with tragedy and death. I am glad to have read this book. It has given me insight to an organization I highly value.