Agency-securities Books

Kessler takes the reader into the world of counterterrorism and paints a realistic picture of today's world. I learned a lot about the Joint Terrorism Task Force and the National Counterterrorism Center.

The book contains the good, the bad, and the ugly of the evolution of the U.S.'s effort to counter Islamic terrorism.

The bad begins on page 12 when Robert Muller gave Bob Dies a list of software he would require upon becoming Director of the FBI--Microsoft Office for example. Dies informed him that none of it would work on the FBI's current (ancient) computers. It seems the current director, Louis Freeh did not like computers and never used them. This is but one example of what had gone wrong in the 1990s. The FBI was unable to process information and could not communicate with each other or other agencies.

The ugly is "the wall" created by Richard Scruggs in a 1995 memo. Instead of realizing Scruggs was an ill-informed idiot, Deputy AG Jamie Gorelick and the AG, Janet Reno approved Scruggs memo.

The remainder of the book is devoted to the good, how things have improved. The wall has been torn down and the CIA, FBI and other agencies are communicating.

Before making any type of judgment on how well, or how poorly, the U.S. is doing in combating terrorism, read this book.

FBI Special Agent Piro's eight months interview with Saddam Hussain is work the price of the book. Saddam confirmed that he had fooled his generals, Iran, and the West into thinking he had WMDs. He did not think the U.S. would invade, and his fear was Iran. Should be ours too.

Lee Boyland author of two techno-thrillers dealing with current events: Behold, an Ashen Horse and The Rings of Allah.

Wake up America! This book is a must read. It reveals the truth about what the press does not want us to know.

There is a lot of interesting material in Kessler's book. I enjoyed the look inside the government's counterterrorism efforts, and the interviews and data from FBI and CIA agents/officers provide a great perspective on how things have unfolded over the past six or eight years.

However, I was shocked at how clearly biased Kessler's work is. You expect any writer/journalist will have a bias, but Kessler is almost non-stop in his unmitigated praise of Mueller/Tenet/Bush and he misses no opportunity to take shots at Clinton, Freeh, and the "media elite." This is not to say that his opinions are wrong or misguided, it's just hard to swallow the idea that Mueller/Bush/et. al. have been 100% right and effective in everything they've done while nearly all failures are attributable to "liberals" and "the media."

Kessler defends every policy and action of the current administration without any critique at all. Everything from Homeland Security to the Patriot Act to the outing of Valerie Plame, is discussed and supported without question or critical analysis. It's as though the book was written strictly from notes provided by the White House Press Secretary.

Another area of concern is Kessler's use of statistics. He is happy to quote statistics printed in the NY Times or Washington Post and then tear them apart as misleading or representative of "liberal media bias." That's fine - statistics are a dangerous tool, so hearing multiple interpretations of them is always valuable. However, Kessler then goes on to cite his own sweeping statistics (e.g. FBI "terrorist" arrests in recent years) in support of his views but does not explain or analyze them in any critical manner.

Don't get me wrong, I like the book, and it is refreshing to get a perspective on these issues from a source other than politicians and their spokesmen. It just makes me question the otherwise sensible-sounding data and conclusions in the book given the authors uncompromising bias. Kessler often comes across less like a journalist / investigative writer and more like a political hack / windbag like Limbaugh or Franken.

After watching Kessler on Book Span TV, I immediately browsed the book at Borders and thought it was just part of the neo-con propaganda machine. More fear mongering and complaints about the so-called liberal obstructionists. I take issue with his statement that some FBI or CIA agent might compromise their work because they fear lawsuits; they should fear more for not doing their jobs and should be able to get the necessary approvals to charge ahead. What is a democracy without safeguards!

As for the recommendations, it's the usual suspects - Woosey Woolsey et al. It would have been simpler to say that Joseph Goebbels approved it; that would have summarized it best. I don't think a NewsMax hack like this adds to the intelligence debate that the nation is currently engaged in.

"The Terrorist Watch" reads like a recruiting brochure - oversimplified and biased hype. Example I - attributing the FBI's computer backwardness entirely to former Director Louis Freeh, ignoring the fact that Attorney General Ashcroft heatedly refused requests by Mueller (Freeh's replacement) for funds to improve computer systems and anti-terrorism efforts. Example II - asserting the U.S. has won in Afghanistan, and ignoring how blunders allowed bin Laden to escape into Pakistan.

Another problem is sometimes muddled statements - eg. whether the "20th hijacker" was Zacarias Moussauoi (taking flight lessons in Eagan, Minnesota) or al-Qahtani (refused entry in Orlando after providing vague answers to immigration questions).

As for the claim "rolling up more than 5,000 terrorists worldwide since 9/11," that's non-credible given the almost non-existent resulting convictions. Nor is it supported by the confirmed fact (per U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services) that an estimated 75 percent of 3 million applicants for immigrant benefits - green cards, work visas, and a host of other documents - at a major federal processing center were not screened through the U.S. terrorism watch list over the past four years.

Then there's the periodic reports of failed airport security checks, unchecked materials shipped via airplanes, and ocean-borne cargoes; terrorists' names not added to the "Do Not Fly List," and infants and government critics who are listed.

Finally, Kessler is also totally oblivious to the unsupportable costs of U.S. terrorism efforts. Bin Laden's weakening of the American economy means he's winning the "War on Terror" even if there's never another attack on the U.S.

This is a book that is important to read to understand the slippery slope `logic' used that has led to a curtailment of some civil liberties within America--this opinion I expect will generate some opposing opinions. The author tells the story of how various government agencies were aware of the activities of some 9-11 terrorists, but the agencies were unable or unwilling to communicate internally and externally with each other--turf wars run amuck describes the situation. This inability to communicate ensured a failure to connect the dots thus ensuring the success of the terrorist attack.

The simplified solution generated by the professionals was to propose and initiate changes to allow for the surveillance of all Americans instead of fixing the communication problems and targeting the bad guys. The solution appears to be more of a power grab at the expense of overall individual Constitutional and legal rights. This book provides a discussion about the telecommunication laws in America and how they were used and abused in the past, primarily by the NSA. Some historically unsavory figures in U.S. history (for example, Admiral Poindexter of Contra-gate fame) reappear with connections to some of the most potentially intrusive surveillance projects imagined. But the information generated and stored is so vast that the NSA has admitted difficulty storing it much less processing or reviewing it for intelligence information and operational information with all its advanced super computers, technology and expertise. General Hayden (head of the NSA and then the CIA) is the key figure to follow due to his leadership position, and I'm not sure he was up to the task despite his promotions and continued service.

This book is upsetting at the least, but is important to understand where America may be headed (i.e. less free with "Big Brother" listening and watching). I do not argue with the need for the intelligence agencies to operate in a covert matter but it has to be within the law. This book should be read in conjunction with Jane Mayer's "The Dark Side" to see where America has lost its mythical moral high ground.

Mr. Bamford displays an intricate knowledge of the workings of the NSA and the book is a commendable explanation of its function and structure. Anyone wishing to understand what is going on in the field of signals intelegence today will find his research fascinating and informative. He has developed the subject matter very well and has built on his previous work of the subject. Unfortunately his anaylsis of the facts is colored by his own ideology this detracts from his objectivity and credibility. Mr. Bamford seems to have a notion of privacy that is out of proportion with reality both factually and jurisprudentially

It would be helpful to develop a more balanced anaylsis of the role NSA plays in providing security for the continued existence to this constitutional Republic. Maybe it is time to ask what is privacy and where does personal privacy impinge on public deception. The Republic cannot last if the people dedicated to its demise are shielded by an exagerated and lochnerized notion of constitutional privacy.

I found this book to be fascinating and repellent at the same time. The author opens up the shadowy world of the NSA in a clear and detailed way. I'm surprised that he was able to obtain and write about all the details without coming under NSA surveillance or pressure himself.

I found myself repelled by the overreach of the NSA in terms of their obvious unconcern about civil rights. I'm sure that Bamford probably knows more than he's revealed here, and that is truly scary.

Very slow going in spots. Way too much detail about company profiles and the like that didn't move the narrative along.

Definitely worth a read if you wonder what the NSA actually does.

Quite an eye-opener into the "vacuum cleaner" methodology for monitoring the world's communications. Completely engrossing from start to finish. James Bamford provides wonderful insight into the workings of NSA, and the changes in collection techniques necessitated by our constantly evolving technology. Highly recommended reading for anyone interested in the business of intelligence gathering methods, and for understanding the magnitude of the analysis task of the "take."

The book is interesting, although not too surprising if you know anything about current events. While the content is good, the read is a little slow at times. Also, there are a few instances where the facts are just plain wrong...

Although very informative with lots of facts I had not previously heard, the presentation is scattered. Kessler jumps around a bit and often spends too much time making a single point with multiple examples, rather then providing any real depth into one case. Ultimately a good read, but the lack of structure doesn't make it a page turner.

I am impressed with "The FBI: Inside the World's Most Powerful Law Enforcement Agency." Kessler explains the workings of the FBI in great detail. He stays on track most of the time, although rambles now and then. His story is very intersting.

The FBI is one of the most respected yet least understood agencies in the federal government. Given it is frequently misunderstood, this is an excellent book to inform the public about the FBI's history, the good and the bad.

The book focuses on an important concept, and that is the difference between the occupant of a position in the government, and the position itself. While past directors of the FBI may have had questionable integrity (Hoover, Sessions), this does not cast a negative light on the institution itself. People are corrupt, not institutions. No one is above the law, and yes, the author makes a good point that everyone who works for the FBI should be subject to the same rules and regulations that any common citizen does. That means off-duty speedy FBI agents must be subject to the same traffic rules as anyone else. No one is above the law, not even the president, as Mr. Clinton learned.

I especially enjoyed learning about some of the past techniques the FBI used to shut down major criminal organizations. As Kessler makes note, many criminal enterprises work similar to businesses. One method -- creating shell companies, including cell phone companies and bars -- to meet and get to know these thugs -- is an incredible idea. The FBI's surveillance techniques are second to none, and while the author was able to discuss some obvious ones, the FBI's true secrets are left unmentioned, a good thing for Joe Citizen who just wants criminals taken off the street.

An excellent book.

If you want to know about what the FBI does, this is a must read. Ronald Kessler is an award-winning journalist and he does an excellent job of taking the reader inside the most powerful law enforcement agency on earth.

Kessler was granted extraordinary access to the FBI and he does a masterful job of revealing the way the FBI works. Forget what you see on television and in movies; this book provides a real look at this cryptic agency.

Some of the findings during Kessler's "investigation" even led to the dismissal of FBI Director William S. Sessions.

Though this book was published in 1993, I feel it is a must read for anybody who wants insight into the real FBI. It is also a great book for potential FBI candidates.

HIGHLY RECOMMENDED.

This is another around the world in 8 days tour of an American institution by Kessler. The author is presenting a book that is billed as basically an overview of the FBI as it is today with some history through in to give it some background and a few real life cases peppered through out the book for spice. The author has always done a good job in these large overview books and he has maintained that level here.

He has been working with contacts from this agency for years so there is some interesting inside info that will be new to the reader, but a lot of the really interesting stuff has been spelled out in an number of other books or TV programs. The book is a well written and constructed story with a good road map though the years and departments. The reader does not get lost in a jumble of department abbreviations. A good overview book that is probably what most readers are looking for.

I had high expectations for this book and frankly was very disappointed. After having read "At The Center of the Storm" by George Tenet I was anticipating another perspective from a CIA insider on September 11th, the War on Terror and the circumstance surrounding "curveball". This book does not deliver the goods. To be honest I kept loosing interest in the material. I found the writing rambling and wordy. I felt like I was reading a very loosely related collection of notes, diary entries and fragments of essays all in need of a major edit job. We are told on page 231 of the hardbound edition that one sixth of the book was deleted by the CIA vetting process to protect sources. When you consider the wide margins, double-spacing, blank page at the end of chapters, and major deletions of critical material I would recommend you pass this book up.

Almost incredible, how the ideological kidnapping by the Bush administration precipitated the retirement or resign of very senior officers at the CIA - without any regret.

I've read a few books by ex-CIA folks now and they all seem to have an overblown sense of arrogance and self-importance. Drumheller makes the case that the CIA was made the scape-goat in the lies that supported the Iraq invasion by providing faulty intelligence. The critical point being the Iraqi informant called "Curveball" that was being protected by German intelligence. Drumheller laments that Curball's self-serving claims where used without proper vetting out, that he (Curveball) had been long declared a "fabricator", and that no American intelligence professional had even been allowed to speak with him before Colin Powell used the unproven claims to construct his now famous "mobile biological labs" speech delivered to the UN as the 'foundation' of the WMD case. Drumheller makes this case within the first 90 pages of his book, but also convinces you that while he might be right, he could have been a little more proactive when it mattered. For example, after he reached his epiphany that the administration was molding the intelligence to fit the politics, he should have started talking to the press right then and there. Drumheller's entire mission in this book was to say "the CIA is a good organization, we did our job, but we where wronged". Maybe so, but you took an oath to protect and defend the constitution, you saw it being trashed, and you did nothing when you could have made a difference.

If one is a careful reader, this book provides a fascinating window on how CIA went about its business in the period prior to the tragic attacks of 9/11 and Operation Iraqi Freedom. This, one would suspect, was an unintended consequence of the book. The book is rather disjointed and episodic, but this is probably due to the fact that it is really the informal personal narrative of veteran CIA Officer Tyler Drumheller.

In order to look into the window on CIA activities, one has to sort through the narrative for interesting pieces of information. For example, early on in the narrative the reader learns that prior to 9/11 Drumheller, as chief of the European Division of CIA's Directorate of Operations and his leaders had agreed to "press harder on counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation issues in Europe" and that he "wanted to be more aggressive" in this effort. We are then told that this was really hard because the European security services had a different approach than we did. As an example, Drumheller noted getting a telephone tap in Germany was much more difficult than in the U.S. because the German services had to get taps cleared through a committee of parliament. Yet if the Germans didn't routinely tap telephones there would scarcely have been a legal procedure for doing so in place. Nonetheless one is left with the impression that this was a show stopper for CIA. Also apparently only after his retirement in 2004, did it occur to Drumheller that CIA could have attempted to recruit informants from the large expatriate Muslim population then living in Europe. Country to Drumheller's contention, the risk to CIA relations with their European counterparts would have been minimal, if the recruitment was handled properly. Again this risk was apparently a show stopper for CIA. Finally it is clear from this book that, as late as 2004, CIA still had only a minimalist understanding of the structure and nature of the al Qaeda terrorist movement and, according to Drumheller, was unable to determine if the target should be worked by the geographic divisions or as transnational issue by the Counter-Terrorism Center. This is pitiful.

The issue of Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and the role of a dubious informant called Curveball are also enlightening. Apparently the CIA office for non-proliferation (WINPAC) chose to accept Curveball at his word that the Iraqis had mobile biological warfare laboratories and weapons. Since Curveball was a German asset, Drumheller's division got involved and a nasty fight developed over Curveball's reliability. It is astonishing that in this fight it apparently did not occur to anyone to use CIA's all source charter to look for actual evidence to support or refute Curveball. Indeed apparently no one even bothered to check with bio-warfare experts such as those at Fort Dietrich to see if what Curveball claimed made any sense. Is this what our inflated intelligence budget is buying us?

This is a rather rambling personal account by a former senior executive service member of the CIA. It also includes a fascinating "Episodes from the Life of a CIA Family" by co-author Elaine Monaghan as well as her Afterward which includes extensive excerpts from the Silberman-Robb report (with online URLs) which investigated the issues raised in this book. It's obvious that the author's operational division/group disagreed with its intelligence counterparts in CIA's WINPAC & other intel agencies. The tragedy was that the ops folks were right (this time). Of course, we have no idea how this one event fits into the overall scheme of things statistically. Apparently, the relatively lower level ops folks didn't have the credibility or juice needed on this issue. It's impossible to ascertain whether the fault lay with President & advisors or with CIA top executives (who voluntarily took the blame) since the text seems to disagree with the Silberman-Robb report in this regard. I think it was admirable that Monaghan included such extensive reporting on it. Still, one wonders at this fiasco--not that such a thing could happen, we're all human and this is after all human intelligence = humint, but at the apparent lack of creativity. For example, though the Germans initially denied US agents access to Curveball (they got access eventually--but too late), they could have asked to see him behind one-way glass (done all the time by police during questioning and for lineups) or at least provided the questions to the Germans to ask. It was the questions asked (after access was given) that provided the inconsistencies proving that Curveball was a fabricator. Most appalling, however, was the lack of any integration of intelligence data, even for a particular issue or source. Further, the data provided to users lacked context (i.e. the source WAS considered questionable by some CIA personnel--whether you agreed with them or not). Thus, they had a black & white, all-or-nothing approach to information & data--and they only provided those, NOT knowledge (which requires context). Only knowledge is actionable--not data or information (something out of context is valueless).

This is an excellent resource for those who want to know more about Bible prophecy in general, and specifically, the "666" Mark of the Beast, as described in God's Book of Revelation, Chapter 13, Verses 16-18.

In these verses, the Bible says that at some future time a global satanic dictator will lead the world and force everyone to receive his "666" Mark in their right hands or foreheads, without which no one will be allowed to buy or sell anything globally!

Based upon the voluminous evidence Mr. Cook presents in his book, I'm convinced that such a time is fast approaching.

This information is really scary! However, we certainly need to be aware of what's happening in this regard because it is indeed happening! And if you don't believe that after reading this book, you never will! Honestly, the documentation presented in this work is very thorough, convincing, and frankly, incredibly overwhelming!

Accordingly, I recommend Big Brother NSA to anyone with a strong desire to learn the truth and better understand current events in light of Bible prophecy regarding the Lord Jesus Christ's soon return.

People that spout this nonsense scare me. The fact that others believe it scares me even more.

All I can say about this book is WOW! A whole lot of work went into putting this thing together. It is overwhelmingly informative!

How anyone can deny Mr. Cook's well documented assertions is beyond me.

You need to read this book immediately! Get it quickly and share it with everyone you love. They need to know about these things!

This book is incredibly prophetic in light of current events! Honestly, just take a look at current events such as President Bush's Homeland Security Department proposal and the Patriot Act and ask yourself if America is not indeed sliding down the "slippery-slope" of Big-Brotherism.

Accordingly, in the very near future, all private, corporate and government computer databases will be combined into one "VIRTUAL SYSTEM" that can readily access and analyze all informational data on everyone from all sources! Such a thing is really scary even if you think you "have-nothing-to-hide." Who truly wants any government to have that kind of control over its citizenry?

It is a fact that most of human history is replete with controlling authoritarian dictatorships. Therefore, who can deny that one day very soon America itself will NOT become a socialistic dictatorship? Combining all information on everyone into one huge government database system, such as the National Security Agency, really makes that probability viable.

George Orwell's so-called novel, 1984 (about "Big-Brother" totalitarian government control, surveillance and enslavement), should no longer be considered "science-fiction" because it is now an ominous and imminent reality. Yes, folks, it is indeed happening at this very moment! Therefore, if you have not recently read Orwell's book, 1984, I urge you to order it from Amazon.Com as well. For it is truly happening as we breath!

Mr. Cook's Big Brother NSA is very timely at this moment in America history. You won't like the reality of the information contained therein, but get it and read it anyway!! You need to understand these things!

Also, if you can still find a used copy of his former book, The Mark of the New World Order, get that and read it as well. Then you'll truly be enlightened about the world in which we all live.

Accordingly, I highly recommend Mr. Cook's work to anyone wanting to know the truth about current events and where they are obviously taking us!

Many Tools of Big Brother Are Up and Running
By JOHN MARKOFF and JOHN SCHWARTZ

In the Pentagon research effort to detect terrorism by electronically monitoring the civilian population, the most remarkable detail may be this: Most of the pieces of the system are already in place.

Because of the inroads the Internet and other digital network technologies have made into everyday life over the last decade, it is increasingly possible to amass Big Brother-like surveillance powers through Little Brother means. The basic components include everyday digital technologies like e-mail, online shopping and travel booking, A.T.M. systems, cellphone networks, electronic toll-collection systems and credit-card payment terminals.

In essence, the Pentagon's main job would be to spin strands of software technology that would weave these sources of data into a vast electronic dragnet.

Technologists say the types of computerized data sifting and pattern matching that might flag suspicious activities to government agencies and coordinate their surveillance are not much different from programs already in use by private companies. Such programs spot unusual credit card activity, for example, or let people at multiple locations collaborate on a project.

The civilian population, in other words, has willingly embraced the technical prerequisites for a national surveillance system that Pentagon planners are calling Total Information Awareness. The development has a certain historical resonance because it was the Pentagon's research agency that in the 1960's financed the technology that led directly to the modern Internet. Now the same agency - the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, or Darpa - is relying on commercial technology that has evolved from the network it pioneered.

The first generation of the Internet - called the Arpanet - consisted of electronic mail and file transfer software that connected people to people. The second generation connected people to databases and other information via the World Wide Web. Now a new generation of software connects computers directly to computers.

And that is the key to the Total Information Awareness project, which is overseen by John M. Poindexter, the former national security adviser under President Ronald Reagan. Dr. Poindexter was convicted in 1990 of a felony for his role in the Iran-contra affair, but that conviction was overturned by a federal appeals court because he had been granted immunity for his testimony before Congress about the case.

Although Dr. Poindexter's system has come under widespread criticism from Congress and civil liberties groups, a prototype is already in place and has been used in tests by military intelligence organizations.

Total Information Awareness could link for the first time such different electronic sources as video feeds from airport surveillance cameras, credit card transactions, airline reservations and telephone calling records. The data would be filtered through software that would constantly look for suspicious patterns of behavior.

The idea is for law enforcement or intelligence agencies to be alerted immediately to patterns in otherwise unremarkable sets of data that might indicate threats, allowing rapid reviews by human analysts. For example, a cluster of foreign visitors who all took flying lessons in separate parts of the country might not attract attention. Nor would it necessarily raise red flags if all those people reserved airline tickets for the same day. But a system that could detect both sets of actions might raise suspicions.

Some computer scientists wonder whether the system can work. "This wouldn't have been possible without the modern Internet, and even now it's a daunting task," said Dorothy Denning, a professor in the Department of Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif. Part of the challenge, she said, is knowing what to look for. "Do we really know enough about the precursors to terrorist activity?" she said. "I don't think we're there yet."

The early version of the Total Information Awareness system employs a commercial software collaboration program called Groove. It was developed in 2000 by Ray Ozzie, a well-known software designer who is the inventor of Lotus Notes. Groove makes it possible for analysts at many different government agencies to share intelligence data instantly, and it links specialized programs that are designed to look for patterns of suspicious behavior.

Total Information Awareness also takes advantage of a simple and fundamental software technology called Extended Markup Language, or XML, that is at the heart of the third generation of Internet software. It was created by software designers at companies like Microsoft, Sun Microsystems and I.B.M., as well as independent Silicon Valley programmers.

This book is by far the bet ever published on the subject. The author makes extensive use of primary and secondary sources including active Chinese Intelligence officers, internal Chinese documents, and publications. His approach is clearly analytical with no unsupported opinions. Even ten years after publication this work is the only one of its kind. This work remains a "bible" in the Intelligence Community.

"China's Intelligence and Internal Security Forces: Jane's Special Report" (1999) has all you need to know on this special topic. Unfortunately, it's out-of-print and very, very expensive...

I borrowed this book from the library and was glad I didn't buy it. There was some good information in it, but the writing style was so dry I couldn't bring myself to finish the 100-or-so pages. Most of what was contained was the kind of stuff I already knew or suspected, but good for people just getting into the subject or curious. If it wasn't such a dry read, I would have given it 5 stars.

Mr. Eftimiades' book is over ten years old and yet probably remains the single most helpful introduction to the subject. His book covers the organization of the various Chinese intelligence agencies, their function, and several illustrations of how they collude to gather information for the People's Republic. Eftimiades is well-connected to the U.S. intelligence community and so can be considered somewhat of an expert, along with Bill Gertz and Paul D. Moore.

What is tragic about the book is that it was written before the public came to hear about China's intelligence operations through the Los Alamos incidents with Wen Ho Lee. Eftimiades' insight into that amazing story would be interesting, I'm sure.

I recommend this book to anyone interested in China, in espionage or intelligence in general. It is worth the large sum of money you most likely will have to pay to read it.

Nick is an experienced sinologist who has worked at the Department of State, CIA, and DIA, and is also a naval reserve officer. His book is well-organized, well-researched, and essential reading for those who would understand how comprehensively the Chinese seek out scientific, technical, and military information in the United States, with a special emphasis on open sources of intelligence.

I am sure some of the stories told by this author are true. However, his "path to redemption" seems just a bit far fetched. If he could lie with a very straight face to the FBI to save his pension, who is to say, that he is now telling the "truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth" now that book royalties are involved. His flip flopping loyalties continue to amaze me, and that does not even get to the strange logic he employs to reach each shifting conclusion.

Certainly there have been incidents and events in the FBI's history that given the opportunity it would have done things differently and better. However, this does not negate the hundreds of thousands of successful prosecutions of federal cases handled both efficiently and professionally by tens of thousands of current and former FBI agents who have devoted their lives and careers to ensuring that America's citizens are protected and criminals prosecuted. Whether Swearingen's "FBI Secrets" is a valid measure for that review remains to be seen.

The real test of credibility about anything Swearingen has to offer the reader must be based on his own words and personal firsthand accounts. What follows is but one example of many where he reduces the nexus of his reliability to a mere two very important paragraphs. If the reader is to accept the premise of just this one event, then all of Swearingen's "FBI Secrets" must stand on its own; otherwise, like a house of cards, or in this instance a stream of fabrications, it all must fall of its own weight.

Chapter 12 "Perjury Before Congress," Swearingen relates the 1975 testimony of W. Raymond Wannall, then Assistant Director (A.D.) of the FBI's Intelligence Division before the Church Committee investigating governmental operations regarding intelligence activities.

Swearingen is not taken out of context or misquoted because he is clearly accusing Wannall of lying under oath before Congress:

"SOON after Raymond Wannall testified before Congress, he traveled to Los Angeles, where he held a BRIEFING for AGENTS in the Security Division of the Los Angeles FBI field office, WHICH I ATTENDED. Wannall EXPLAINED how he and other TOP FBI OFFICIALS had CONSPIRED to ALTER TESTIMONY before the Church Committee."

"Mr. Wannall SAID "When it came to [testifying about] black bag jobs, WE SELECTED agents who had NO FIRSTHAND KNOWLEDGE of the ILLEGAL BREAK-INS to conduct a search of the [FBI] files." HE SAID that those agents who had had no experience in bag jobs WOULD NOT KNOW WHERE TO LOOK for information on bag jobs. WANNALL SAID that the only documentation they could find was what existed in the indices for surreptitious entries, WHICH WAS NOT MUCH. WANNALL SAID that no effort was made to interview agents who, based on information in their PERSONEL FILES, might have had any knowledge of bag jobs. WANNALL SAID, "We did a GOOD JOB of CONCEALING THE EXTENT of black bag jobs."" (p. 101; Emphasis Added)

It is curious that Swearingen quotes Wannall (even providing parenthetical details) but then goes on to editorialize or paraphrase what he said at this briefing. Why not provide the entire text of the Wannall's speech, or better yet, since Swearingen was nearing the twilight of his career and had already demonstrated his loathing for the FBI in his book, that he wouldn't have secretly recorded such a devastatingly indicting presentation. After all, Swearingen was an FBI agent and allegedly familiar with secret monitoring and the like and certainly could have memorialized this meeting in some more definitive way, or at a minimum, fully quoted Wannall.

Swearingen doesn't state how many agents were at this briefing, however, the agent population of the Bureau in 1975 was about 8500 and the Los Angeles Division was then, and remains, one of the FBI's largest field offices. It is reasonable to estimate that the Intelligence Division must have comprised at least a significant percentage of agents assigned to the L.A. office. But for illustration purposes lets put that number on the low side, fifty, or maybe even less, twenty-five agents who attended the briefing by A.D. Wannall along with Swearingen.

The reader has to accept, as prima facie evidence, that A.D. Wannall deliberately lied under oath before the Church Committee under penalty of contempt at a minimum and certainly of a potential perjury charge, and then held a briefing of ordinary street agents in Los Angeles to tell them exactly HOW and WHY he lied.

This then, if the reader is to accept Swearingen's recitation of the incident, was not a briefing by Wannall at all, but was, in every sense of the word, a confession to a felony.

For this to be true, A.D. Wannall must have felt compelled to unload this terrible burden of lying to congress about the suspected illegal deeds of the FBI to a roomful of agents he did not personally know, any one of whom (including Swearingen himself) could have picked up the phone at the end of the briefing and called someone, anyone in the press, or from the Church Committee, and in the parlance of the street "dropped a dime" on the Assistant Director. Certainly there would have been another agent in the room who would not want to hear something so distasteful coming from the mouth of a senior FBI official. Or in the alternate, maybe carry a grudge against Wannall or any senior FBI official and want to even the score a bit. Why would have Wannall felt comfortable enough to confide in a group of agents he did not know, or worse, know whether they would keep his confidence to themselves? Wannall must have been an incredibly stupid, naïve, or trusting individual. But perhaps the agents present would never have spoken about Wannall's confession because they were afraid of the repercussions as Swearingen repeatedly claims for himself. But, J. Edgar was already gone and the Bureau had been changing monthly since his death in 1972. However, since A.D. Wannall's career, pension and retirement were in jeopardy, along with a potential indictment, staggering and ruinous legal fees, and quite possibly a prison sentence, confessing would have been a major leap of faith for the Assistant Director. No, Wannall was no fool, but we have only Swearingen to contest that at this point. Because, he tells the reader, he was there at the time and heard the confession himself.

Swearingen tells us that Wannall's confession contained the details needed to have him charged with obstruction of justice, and with the witnesses in the room at the time, certainly all of whom if called upon to testify under oath, would have told the truth about hearing that Wannall had not only lied to the Church Committee but how he had pulled it off. Wannall, according to Swearingen's account, even implicated other "top FBI officials" in the same breath, creating the groundwork for a conspiracy and telling those present why the committee was looking in the wrong place. Unwittingly, Wannall, if he said these things, was broadening the potential witness list against himself or making the agents present at the briefing potential defendants' after-the-fact for remaining silent, or at a minimum, subject to an internal FBI disciplinary investigation.

Swearingen reports this exceedingly significant and specific event as if it actually happened; but the reader has only his word that it even occurred. If Swearingen were able to produce the tiniest thread of corroboration it could add even an ounce of credibility to this tale. Further, there are no footnotes (other than Swearingen's own editorial comments), no proper sourcing of any factual claims or even a bibliography with which any intelligent reader could further test Swearingen's factual accuracy on other claims made in the book. This becomes then no more than a first-person running narrative, a diary of hatred and fabrication where everyone connected with the FBI is a complete fool or incompetent; it suggests only of retribution for a less than illustrious career.

Swearingen's hatred for the FBI is obvious from cover to cover, for example: When only in the Bureau a matter of weeks he states, "But no matter how ridiculous New Agents class seemed, I could not bring myself to get up and leave." (p. 9) "In just a few short months of being in the FBI I had observed a dark side of cheating and bigotry that made me uncomfortable. Still, I did not want to quit a well-paying job that commanded worldwide respect. " (p.17) "This and other intimidation tactics of Hoover's FBI, such as the weight requirement, were pushing me more and more toward leaving the FBI." (p.48) (After resigning from the FBI and being reinstated) "I thought of resigning again but decided to stay because I could not afford to be bouncing around from one job to another. My employment résumé would look terrible." (p.51) "I was afraid to say or do what Turner had the guts to do. I wanted job security. I was ashamed of what I had become." (p.55) "After witnessing twenty years of FBI wrongdoing, I had accepted it as a means to survive in the Bureau." (p.1) And, there are many more examples.

This event allegedly took place in 1975, "FBI Secrets" came out in 1995. The reader must then also believe that in those intervening twenty years (or even up to now, 2008, thirty-three years later) that Swearingen couldn't convince just one of those in attendance at A.D. Wannall's confession to step forward and offer even a hint of corroboration. Swearingen though, has been consistent in his lack of timely reporting of significant events (see Swearingen's 2008 book, To Kill a President; Finally---An Ex-FBI Agent Rips aside the Veil of Secrecy that Killed JFK, at amazon.com), written over four decades after the fact.

The reader need only apply a modicum of judgment and a very simple test to decide whether Swearingen's reporting is plausible at all. Where is the logic? Where is there a gram of common sense in Swearingen's claim to such a fanciful event as A.D. Wannall making these dreadfully self-incriminating statements to a roomful of agents? There isn't any. It makes no sense because it never happened and Swearingen cannot prove otherwise, and the reader need not be compelled to accept only his word for it. A briefing by Wannall may have indeed occurred, but devoid of Swearingen's fanciful rhetoric and concocted dialogue. If just this one instance of a specific event cannot be proven in any manner, then the entire book and its author lack credibility. If the reader is inclined to accept this seminal event as factual, then so be it; everyone is entitled to their own opinion. If not, then nothing Swearingen offers can be taken at face value and "FBI Secrets" collapses under the weight of the author's fabrications.

A person purportedly named C. Cumming gave FBI SECRETS a one star review thirteen years after publication based upon the Forward, which was written by Ward Churchill. Over the objections of the author, South End Press insisted the forward be written by Churchill because South End Press had published some of Churchill's books. The author had suggested the forward be written by noted authors such as William Turner or Curt Gentry, author of Helter Skelter.

Ward Churchill had absolutely nothing to do with writing or editing FBI Secrets. South End Press asked Churchill to read the book for his comments. Churchill is not one of the authors as claimed by C. Cumming.

This book is a must read for everyone who wants to know what the FBI is capable of doing to their civil rights. The author knows what he is writing about because he lived through most of what is reported.

If you believe everything you read, you should not read this book. Look into the background of Ward Churchill and decide if he is a person who is fair and balanced when it comes to his version of events.

After a lifetime of devoted service conducting illegal wiretaps, break-ins and burglaries, known as "black bag jobs" former FBI agent Wesley Swearingen decided to tell all about an FBI that few people really know.

To be fair, government employees, no matter what agency employs them, are awash in an ocean of fraud, waste, corruption and general mismanagement perpetuated by their so called "supervisors." These individuals are generally unemployable, mediocre and incompetent. Thank God for government service, the largest, most pernicious public employment and welfare system in existence next to the Pentagon and its arms suppliers, or they'd be on the streets.

"FBI Secrets" does more than expose specific secrets documenting COINTELPRo-type programs designed to deny and destroy the rights of American citizens to actively engage in political dissent, it exposes the moral dilemma faced by those who perpetuate them. Admittedly, this agent waited until after retirement to expose what he knows; but he reveals to the reader the torment of an agent who became disillusioned with the agency yet had a career to protect.

Swearingen could have simply walked away. it would not have stopped these invasive violations of American's civil liberties but, at least, he would nt have been involved. With hindsight, and through the work of many investigative journalists and authors, information concerning how the FBI violates the civil rights of American citizens is abundantly avaialble.

The history of the founding of the FBI, beginning in 1908 with the corrupt Bureau of Investigation, the Palmer raids, orchestrated by Attorney General Mitchell Palmer and executed by an unknown federal bureaucrat named J. Edgar Hoover, stands in stark contrast to the James Stewart inspired cinematic travesty, "The FBI Story." Certainly, the author's slim, yet powerful volume, stands as a beacon of truth next to this cinematic garbargio.

The peculiarities of the Director, his life-long homosexual relationship with Clyde Tolson, his liasons with other rich and pwerful gay men, such as Lewis Rosenthiel of Schenley, the red baiting Roy Cohn and New York's Cardinal Spellman made, in large measure, what the Bureau what it is today, the nation's political police.

I bought (or got) this book 'cause I've always liked spy stories (I'm a John LeCarre man myself)and I had some expectations of a "show and tell" book by a former head of the Mossad. I also had some respect, as a citizen consumer of the news, of this official who had,somehow, something more European and dignified than the "average" Israeli macho security hero. Halevy was also Israel's ambassador to Jordan and very instrumental in brokering the peace agreement with Jordan.

I found the book rather tiresome with a great deal of muted self-glorification and almost no revelations or juicy bits. Halevy comes across as a very loyal and careful technocrat with clear views (which I don't subscribe to) about the "War on Terror" being the central stuggle of our times.

Efraim Halevy could as well had added the following subtitle to his book: "My War Against Shimon Peres". The leitmotif of the first part of the book is the constant popping up of Shimon Peres's name in every possible circumstance where Shimon obstructs, deceives and schemes against literally everybody to assuage his thirst for glory. There is little doubt that Shimon richly deserved the overt animosity coming from Efraim Halevy. One can only sympathize and empathize with Halevy since the object of his dislike continues to scheme to this day.

It is by no means easy to write a book on intelligence, especially so soon after leaving office. Everything you write may be used against your country. Therefore Halevy writes about people who are out of office or dead (the exception being Peres) , his contribution to the Israeli - Jordanian Peace Treaty and about general principles that are applicable at any time and therefore do not divulge anything of immediate value. His portraits of Israeli prime ministers are interesting in that he rehabilitates Shamir, is complimentary of Netanyahu, Rabin and Sharon, much less so of Barak and the premiership of his nemesis Peres does not even register. The ultimate snub.

Halevy's observations about the work in intelligence are logical : "On issues of life and death the intelligence officer must always err on the side of the threat and not on the side of the optimist".

To me the most significant part of the book are the last two chapters in which Halevy talks of WWIII, i.e. the war against Islamic terror. This is the part in which his weight as the ex head of the Mossad may have some impact on the `powers that be' of today. He correctly defines it as Islamic terror and not `war on terror' and warns that the West does not cooperate enough to confront the common threat. He is fully aware of the dangers of Al Qaeda and the way things may eventually turn: " Government and their senior executive officials will take action, the like of which has rarely ever been dreamed in the past." Halevy should be given credit for being one of the rare ex government officials who does not obfuscate in naming the enemy.

But two aspects of his recommendations are questionable. The first is to squeeze in anti- terror legislation as soon as possible while the country is recovering from a major terror attack. Would it not be more reasonable to be entirely frank with the population, stop avoiding the truth and minimizing the threat, and educate the population so that it can support anti- terror measures in full clarity of what is being done?

The second is his differentiation between Al Qaeda on the one hand and Hamas and Hezbolah on other. Hamas is, according to Halevy, different because "Hamas is not solely a terrorist group. It has political and social interest" "`In their own way, they aspire to be part of the system and not as Al Qaeda aspires, to destroy it ".

Yes, but part of what system does Hamas want to be a part of? Exactly the same one Al Qaeda is fighting for! Allegiance to Islam tops any local self interest. Efraim Halevy and the intelligence community in Israel should be well advised to read up on Islam in the works of Ibn Warraq, Bat Ye'or, Serge Trifkovic , Robert Spencer and Daniel Pipes.

i love this kind of books .as a person who is living in the middle east which lived a lot of wars and conflicts between the arabs and the israeles i alaways search on the books talk about such a topic . this man mr halevy because his possision as a post leader of mossad explains and clears every thing about the middle east crisis. in a good degree of objectivety in a way that gives the reader who does not no any thing about the middle east a good background he is simple , clear , no complcations as he is chating with you or as when our moms told us stories before sleeping when we were young . it is a book you can read in the week end , in the holiday , in the tunel before going to the work >

It is true that this book is not riddled with "cloak and dagger fireworks" but, it is not at al true that it is nothign more than a self-glorifying account of a man's own actions, as one reviewer has said.

Halevy describes how events over the last 10-20 years have unfolded in the middle east, and in the process relates how the individual characteristics of the various leaders invovled helped to shape them. His accounts of the larger than life life people he describes are plain, to the point, and overall extremely insightful. He recounts, with much insight, the victories and successes of the last 2 decades. He furthermore, does not shy from describing, in detail, both his own failures and those of others.

This book is an excellent read for those truly interested in the actuall manner and circumstance of the unfolding of history.

This book consists of some interesting recollections from Efraim Halevy, who served as the director of Israel's Mossad.

We readers see how the First Gulf War, in 1991, Israel fared poorly. Yes, the United States helped defend Israel from Iraqi missile attacks. However, Halevy makes the point that most knowledgeable Israelis "did not believe that the United States was doing its best to apprehend the missile launchers" and for that reason, many Israelis are very suspicious of how much help the United States will ever give Israel should its survival be at stake.

Israel did indeed agree not to join in the attack on Iraq, which may have saved the coalition against Iraq but the author shows that this did Israel very little good. While Iraq, a serious enemy of Israel, was indeed weakened, Israel quickly came under severe pressure from its friends to appease its remaining enemies.

Israel has always needed peace, and this has made it susceptible to bogus offers of peace. Halevy explains how this affected negotiations that involved covert channels. As he says, rather than being a way to discuss issues regarding Israel's future, keeping Israel's interests in mind, the covert talks "evolved into a strategy designed to enable the devoted negotiators to engage in dreams of peace rather than to confront the true facts of life and to grapple with them."

There is a long and interesting section on how Israel and Jordan managed to sign a peace treaty. And we also see what Halevy thinks of several famous people of the region. One is the notorious Yassir Arafat, who Halevy mentions was a "compulsive liar" who "would never honor a commitment and rarely would have anything but contempt for his peers." I remember being flabbergasted by the fact that rather than arresting, trying, and executing this thug, leaders of Western nations often showed esteem for him. But Halevy says that Arafat did pay a political price in 2000 and 2001 for refusing to make a deal at Camp David and then for lying about the Karin A arms smuggling to the president of the United States. Once again, I'm shocked that it took all this to discredit such a horrible person.

We also see Halevy's puzzlement at Israel's acceptance, even under pressure, of the infamous "road map" proposed by the quartet of the United States, Russia, the European Union, and the United Nations. This document "was deemed a nonstarter and a real danger to Israel's interests for a variety of reasons." And these reasons included allowing the quartet to determine if the Arabs had fulfilled their obligations on issues such as ending terror. That would pretty much let the Arabs do what they pleased.

In this book Halevy often makes the point that one ought to honor one's word and build up one's credibility. I agree. And I think that means needing to resist pressure to make agreements that one can not or will not fulfill.

I enjoyed reading this book and I recommend it.

The book presented a fundamental knowledge of an Intranet, which may be applied in the business world. The only thing Top Secret about the book was just the words on the cover which is a sales pitch.

Best reference of Intelink acronymns - for those who care.

Otherwise if you know what PKI, SGML and digital certificates are, this book is a bust. No discussion of impementation details. No discussion of firewalling, intrusion detection, encryption techniques (except to mention a few commonly known ones) or even VPNs.

Do they really use SSL and DES to protect our national secrets? That's scarier than a "dark and stormy night"!

Promises: "Security and Information techniques you can use right now" - no techniques here - just general discussion of common-sense principles

Promises: "Preview the future of intranets and extranets" - yeah right - from the newbies:

"AOL offers Internet access, updates on weather, email, news, sports, and stocks, multimedia entertainment, and their own search engine. Successful intranets like Intelink must have at their disposal a similar vast array of mission relevant tools" Page 160

Should Promise: "Interesting inside look at Gov. bureaucracy in action!"

Note: This book had to pass review by security agencies and this may be the reason it is so vapid.

Another Note: CD is somewhat interesting or I would have given this book a "0"

Intelink is the classified, worldwide intranet for the U.S. Intelligence Community¾ linking together the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and 8 other intelligence organizations, including the FBI. Intelink is the subject of Frederick Thomas Martin's flashily titled Top Secret Intranet: How U.S. Intelligence Built Intelink¾ The World's Largest, Most Secure Network. Perhaps the most surprising revelation the book makes is that this very closed network was built entirely on open system standards like TCP/IP (the communication protocols of the Internet) and SGML (Standard Generalized Markup Language, of which HTML¾ the hypertext presentation language of the World Wide Web¾ is an application). Indeed, Martin gets around to boldly stating that "Intelink is patterned after the global Internet."

"It was a dark and stormy night," Martin's introduction begins, and that is the best written sentence in the somewhat ponderously crafted and repetitious Intro¾the literary techniques of English novelist Edward Bulwer-Lytton otherwise conspicuous by their absence. Reading Martin's mushy acknowledgements, one quickly forms the impression of a book both written and vetted by a committee; indeed, one begins to question whether Martin's name should appear on the book at all. Martin recently retired from the NSA as Deputy Director of its Information Services Group.

But it gets better once we reach the book proper. Chapter 1 tells the origin of Intelink, how in 1994 DCI James Woolsey created the Intelligence Systems Board (ISB) to improve the interoperability of information systems supporting intelligence operations. Along with ISB came a permanent staff, known as the Intelligence Systems Secretariat (ISS). Steven Schanzer, the first Director of the ISS, became the "father" of Intelink. A "proof of concept" prototype was put together in April 1994, and by the end of the year Intelink was operational. The rest of Chapter 1 gives a thumbnail history of the Internet and the World Wide Web, introduces SGML and its offspring HTML (an SGML application) and the more recent XML (eXtensible Markup Language, a subset of SGML which will be supported in future Netscape and Internet Explorer browsers), and concludes with a discussion of the need for Intelink to meet the changing needs of intelligence.

Martin notes that SMGL was adopted for document tagging by the Department of Defense in 1987 in its CALS ("Continuous Acquisition and Life-Cycle Support") Program, then as an information processing standard by the CIA in 1993, and finally by Intelink in 1994.

Chapter 2 is essentially a bureaucratic history of the development of Intelink, and describes the eventual formation of the Intelink Management Office (IMO), whose Director alternates between the CIA and DIA, and whose Deputy Director is always NSA. There are dry recitations of duties and goals, some of which read like they were written by an IT-trained Russian speaker struggling with the English language. For example:

"· Enhancing support infrastructures to ensure that future Intelink services enjoy the stability of a robust and well-administered information environment; [Translation: Get our shit together.]

"· Establishing a viable training program to ensure that all producers and users can effectively use existing and new services; [Translation: Teach people to use the system.]

"· Developing a technology integration program to ensure that Intelink enjoys the benefits of early introduction of new information technology;" [Translation: Grab the new stuff pronto.]

The chapter notes that the Global Command and Control System (GCCS)¾ the Department of Defense's new system for delivering command and control capabilities to the warfighter¾ relies in part on Intelink. (See "Intelink-S," below.)

As currently constituted, Intelink is segmented into security levels. At the core is "Intelink-SCI." SCI, according to Martin, stands for "Special" Compartmented Information, although most other people seem to think it stands for "Sensitive" Compartmented Information (see, for example, Jeffrey T. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, 3rd edition). Information available on Intelink-SCI is classified up to "Top Secret/SCI." About 50,000 people have access to this level, including Monica Lewinsky, while she was at the Pentagon. (You will recall that Monica had a Top Secret/SCI clearance for reasons never explained, but presumably because of her need for detailed handling of Presidential Decision Directives. Image what could have happened, for example, if a foreign intelligence service had gotten a sample of Presidential DNA and created a Clinton clone.)

The next level is "Intelink-SecretNet" or "Intelink-S," which carries information classified up to the Secret level. Intelink-S primarily serves the military, and has around 265,000 users¾ most of whom access Intelink-S through the Defense Information Systems Agency's SIPRNET (short for Secret Internet Protocol Router Network).

The most interesting (and most highly classified) level is "Intelink-PolicyNet" or "Intelink-P," which is operated by the CIA and is only available to very high-level policy makers¾ such as the National Security Council, the DCI, or the President. That way the latter can get all the information they need, say, before deciding to decimate pharmaceutical factories in the Sudan or nomad tents in Afghanistan with Tomahawk cruise missiles.

The final level is "Intelink-UnclassifiedNet" or "Intelink-U," which includes all open-source (unclassified) intelligence, and which is available to members of OSIS (the Open Source Information Service) or others approved by them. OSIS is managed by the CIA, and relies on public data bases and other unclassified information¾ the "open-source intelligence" promoted by Robert Steele. This level is accessed through Virtual Private Networks (but hopefully not ones that use Microsoft's Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol).

Martin notes the close relationship of the intelligence community¾ especially the NSA¾ to the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) at Carnegie Mellon University in Pittsburgh.

Chapter 3 argues the need for standards (and there is little to argue with here), and discusses three from the Department of Defense: TAFIM (Technical Architecture Framework for Information Management), COE (Common Operating Environment), and JTA (Joint Technical Architecture). In charge of all this is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I (otherwise known as Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence). (Elsewhere I have attempted to create an easy-to-read intuitive guide to what command and control¾ C2¾ is all about, in the context of SIOP, the Single Integrated Operational Plan for Nuclear War.)

The 8 volumes of TAFIM basically focus on open systems and the need to follow international and national standards. JTA¾ which like TAFIM was inspired partly by co-ordination failures in the 1991 Gulf War¾ is the practical implementation of TAFIM, mandating the use of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) software and hardware products, as well as standards such as SGML for documents.

COE can be briefly explained as follows. The 1970s mainframe-based war-fighting system, the World-Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS, "whim-mix"), was upgraded in the 1980s, and eventually replaced in the 1990s. The new system was called the Global Command and Control System (GCCS), and was built by direction according to international and national information processing standards, using commercial and government "off-the-shelf" products wherever possible. (GCCS runs on Sun Microsystems computers running the Solaris Unix operating system.) COE consists of the software pieces of this common computing and communications environment, as well as the specifications for putting the pieces together to support specific military missions.

These three Defense Department standards automatically impact 8 of the 13 intelligence organizations within Intelink-NSA, DIA, NIMA, NRO, and the military intelligence units of Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Marines. To such Defense standards are added other initiatives relevant to Intelink and specific to the intelligence community, such as the Unified Cryptologic Architecture 2010 (by analogy to Joint Vision 2010), initiated by NSA Director Kenneth Minihan in September 1997, which mandates common cryptology standards and procedures across the intelligence community.

Chapter 3 concludes with a discussion of the Defense Message System (DMS), Defense's new e-mail system using COTS software. It looks pretty much like the e-mail system you use, except encryption is provided by FORTEZZA instead of PGP. (In the DMS, "e-mail" refers strictly to personal, as opposed to organizational traffic. Here I ignore this dis