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What really happened to Hitler?Review Date: 2008-12-22
There is something missingReview Date: 2007-06-01
As Close as You'll Get to the Original Source MaterialReview Date: 2006-06-20
First is the sub-title, 'Last Great Secret.' It's really hard to say convincingly that this is the last secret. It seems that all the time more secrets are being found. And I can think of some other things that should be in the KGB files that haven't been reported yet. For instance, what were the Russian code breaking efforts.
The second problem is admitted on page 11 of this book. Much of the information contained in the book comes from the Soviet interrogation of captured Germans who had been close to Hitler in the bunker. It was in their interest to tell their captors what they wanted to hear. And under questioning by the KGB who knows what was done to them. 'The Hitler Book' covers much of this same subject and the diligent reader will want to read both as they present a different slant.
The Russian forces captured Berlin, and immediately began an investigation as to Hitler's last days. They compiled a great deal of forensic evidence, reports of which are included here. In fact, most of the book is in the form of reports of one kind and another. This book appears to be about as close to the original source material as can be found without the ability to read Russian.
Scholarly WW II historyReview Date: 2006-03-18
So finally, that's what really happened!Review Date: 2006-03-30
Now that the former Soviet Union is gone, the new Russia is slowly opening her doors - and her archives!, to reveal what was formerly the country's most guarded secrets. With Russian troops being the first the storm the Reichstag, it was to Stalin that all papers and diaries recovered from that building were delivered and, until recently, the world's historians had been denied access.
Now, those historians and writers have been allowed sight of the most telling documents about the final days of Nazism. In this book, we are treated to a compilation of evidence about Hitler's death unlike anything which has gone before. Evidence such as that from Hitler's own closest inner circle, reports made by the Russians and Germans who took part in that final battle, detailed accounts from those who were sent to arrest the Fuhrer, records of the interrogation of those who survived Hitler's Bunker, Martin Bormann's entire diary of the time and more besides.
Many people dismiss Adolph Hitler as a madman. Perhaps he was - but maybe that answer is just too simple. One thing is for certain, to read this book is to answer almost every single nagging question that was there before it was published.
An excellent job of research.
NM


"When you dance with the devil, the devil doesn't change......"Review Date: 2008-11-17
The simple fact that Dave walked away from this organization cerebrally intact, for the most part, is testament to his own governing morality.
If you are interested in reading a non-fiction, short book about the evils in our country, this is it. Dave is surrounded with Neo-nazi, mass gun wielding fools (I'm a gun owner and a firm believer in the second amendment) who have simplistic dreams of creating their own white country.
This read should open the eyes of all who would dare to fight those that would do wrong to others.
Excellent book and I highly recommend it!
Sequel to "Under & Alone"Review Date: 2008-10-06
Lynch mob losers lassoed by a large lovable leader...Review Date: 2008-08-07
Couldnt put the book down!Review Date: 2008-06-02
More Dangerous Than The MafiaReview Date: 2008-07-04

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The Secret Service: The Hidden History of an Engimatic AgencyReview Date: 2008-04-05
Vince Palamara, Secret Service expert, deceived usReview Date: 2006-01-07
So, imagine my horror when I turn on the television a few years back and I SEE the young researcher who promised myself and many others that he was not a journalist, stating facts, theories, and innuendo as the gospel truth. Emory Roberts, for one, cannot defend himself. I will concede that I have no good explanation for what transpires on the film Palamara shows-but does that have to lead to conspiratorial conclusions? Does it, Vince?
From what I gather, many members of the AFAUSSS, myself included, are quite upset with him, as well they should be.
Can we let sleeping dogs lie? Lee Harvy Oswald killed President John Kennedy, acting alone. Yes, my colleagues did not do their jobs as effectively as they could have or probably should have-but will that bring back the man? No. What useful purpose is served by defaming Kennedy's memory and all the still-living former agents with calling into question the very painful loss of said man, as well as their job performance.
Put that in your pipe and smoke it.
T.R., proud alumni/ past member of the folowing organizations:
MSU
Army 1957-1959
USSS 1961-1982
Disorganized the book somewhat was but covered it topic the well!Review Date: 2008-05-08
Not quite Review Date: 2007-06-25
Again, this is a must read for anyone considering joining the Service. Also, there is a Uniformed Branch of the Secret Service (they are not called Agents) who also do protective detail work and around US Treasury facilities. After reading this I have a greater appreciation for these agents--now having to see through their sunglasses, when on that protective detail about who's just enthusiatic, who's just protesting, who's just angry, and who's actually about to ....
[Many years ago, I read my dad's copy of Bouton's "Ball Four" in [....]. So it was a look behind the curtain of baseball's 'clean image'. It was a funny book, and real people. Today I know more about baseball than most people, particular its history, statistics & sabermetrics, and a card-carrying member of SABR (Society for American Baseball Research). I consider baseball people the most quotable species on earth. While baseball, like most disciplines, has a seamy side (it's partly what gives it some color, not always the scandalous but stunts), it is not an indictment of the sport. Nor should what is seen behind the Secret Service's mystic dissuade anyone from pursuing a position. It is simply not an agency for those who are introspective, emotionally restless, or racked with doubt. Just know what to expect. It was a good read from beginning to end.]
New & improved...sort of (4.5 stars, anyone?)Review Date: 2005-09-16
Well, Melanson evidently heard all the first-edition bad reviews regarding editing and typos and the like: gone is his co-author, Peter F. Stevens. Also, he added a nice new cover and TWO new chapters, as well as sourcing former agent Joseph Petro's excellent 2005 book entitled "Standing Next To History." (It still says "the authors" [plural] in the Bibliography and, from the larger font, you can tell that Petro's book was added!]
That said, I highly recommend this book (as I did with regard to the poorly edited/ proofread first edition)---still alittle bit of a "dry" text, but he listened to all the criticisms regarding STYLE. And, while I achieved a world's record---SIXTY SEVEN former agent interviews (the old record was by the HSCA: 44)---Melanson did interview a handful of former agents (such as Winston Lawson, also interviewed numerous times by myself)and his book serves as a good general overview---using mostly secondary sources--- of the (history of) the Secret service, 1865-2005 (while my work focuses more on the FDR-Reagan days, with special emphasis on the JFK/ LBJ years...and alot more PRIMARY research). For the record, my work is now credited on pages 72, 74, 77, 85, 388, 389, 408, 424 ["uncredited": pages 59, 60, 70, 71, 73, 75-76]
Potscript: Melanson writes on page 61: "Some of the agents, THOUGH NOT WINSTON G. LAWSON, lied to the Warren Commission about how thorough they were [my emphasis]." It is obvious that Melson didn't want to ruffle Lawson's feathers, as he interviewed him and probably feared he would take exception to that!
If you want an extremely thorough, take-off-the-gloves approach to the Secret Service, get my 276-page book "Survivor's Guilt: The Secret Service & The Failure To Protect The President." In the meantime, Melanson's 30 pages regarding 11/22/63 should suffice...and the rest of the book, now mostly improved and expanded, should still be a good start for anyone interested in the U.S. Secret Service.

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Riveting companion to the Spielberg movieReview Date: 2009-01-01
interesting but not too differentReview Date: 2008-12-22
An Incredible Thrill-RideReview Date: 2008-12-01
One of the aspects I found most intriguing was Avner's training as a Mossad agent prior to his covert mission. The few chapters that cover the skills he acquires to become a stellar agent (weaponry, observation, memorization) were like something out of James Bond training school. But it was the overall suspense of the mission that grabbed me and had me sitting on the edge of my seat while Avner's team honed in on their objectives and even found themselves to be targets. Of course there were the moral implications of such an operation (eye for an eye). While killing a handful of international terrorists won't stop terrorism, will it slow it down by any degree?
When the mission suddenly draws to a close and control slips out of Avner's hands, there is an uncertainty as to who the victims really are. It is hard to fathom the lengths a fledgling nation would go to uphold justice and to defend its need for autonomy in the face of hatred even if it means abandoning their own.
Overall, though, it was a great book, reading like an action-packed novel if you take it at face value and put a limited trust in Jonas's sources. Avner's eye for detail and recollections to Jonas are remarkable and the writing is straightforward and exciting.
Error in review counterReview Date: 2008-11-28
Highly highly recommended, as well as watching the film-version "Munich".
Btw, how is it, that the review counter only counts 1 review, when there are many more. Should we become paranoic now? Amazon, please correct the review counter.
Beware - this book is a hoax by a known fabricator!Review Date: 2008-09-17
This a competently done hoax, but a hoax nonetheless. For the real story, read "STRIKING BACK."

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"Arrive firstest with the mostest."Review Date: 2007-11-13
This book is an excellent overview of warfare and what it takes to win.Warfare has changed much over the centuries. At one tine the biggest,toughest guy would win.Then it was one who could throw the biggest stone,the greatest distance with the most accuracy.Through the centuries massive armies and weaponry evolved till we saw the results of WWII. As weapons of agression evolved,so did systems of defence,from simple forts to the Great Wall of China,the Maginot Line,etc.
With the Atomic Bomb and Hiroshima ,all that changed.There have been things like poison gas,terrorists,guerrilla warfare,enslavement,and a host of other methods employed;but in the end it is the one with the best weapon and best ighters that wins.
History has shown that appeasement only prolongs the inevitable,and the sooner an enemy is dealt with the better.However ,the political approach and the military approach are always in conflict;and the longer that conflict extends,the more costly in both resources and loss of lives it becomes.
In this book we see where todays method of Shock and Awe is what the future approach will be.
The author also gives a pretty good idea of the types of weaponry that we will be seeing in the future. However;the weapon that has the biggest impact,is usually that which was least expected. When we saw Saddam tossing those Skud missils willy-nilly;we learned what Shock and Awe was all about when we saw that US missil get placed directly into the door of the structure.I would have liked to have been there when Saddam saw it on his TV;and heard his comment.He knew,then and there,it was the end.
The author very clearly defines the future of warfare with what he calls Rapid Dominance as the way of the future. The next step will be to deploy forces within a few days. I surmise we will become first aware of a conflict when we hear that it has already taken place.
This book is not just some academic musings. It is a clear outline of what we are going to see in the future.
Didn't Knock my Socks OffReview Date: 2007-02-25
The book was engaging in parts, but tedious in others depending on the author of the individual essay. While I would say most essays were decent, the first four were the best in my opinion.
Standouts included Eric Haney's chapter in the use of special forces, an essay on legitimacy of an occupying force, and one of the later essays "The Eye of God". The "Hearts and Minds in 2025" chapter was unnecessarily long and boring, as was the Appendix on the original "Shock and Awe" doctrine. The essay on "Weapons of the Next War" was uninformative, and not entirely well researched.
All in all, this was an OK read, but not a knock your socks off experience.
For ThinkersReview Date: 2006-08-28
Excellent and Valuable!Review Date: 2006-07-09
Emminantly trained and qualified in understanding what makes the emerging global enemies of free societies tick, that is, the terrorist state, Eric Haney with Brian Thomsen provide incredible insight in laymen's terms to what kind of enemy we're facing, why the war efforts of free nations against terrorists is currently incredibly swift but enduringly challenging after "victory".
Perhaps for the first time, this comprehensive work gives expert and layman alike the opportunity to understand why terrorists target us so severely (even when our countries are separated by thousands of miles of oceans), why the most powerful nations on earth are struggling to find and neutralize the threat, and best of all, how we can reach success in the future.


Global perspective and coverage of US security issuesReview Date: 2004-02-17
Good coverage of bioscience topicsReview Date: 2004-02-12
Touts the cover storiesReview Date: 2004-02-14
An excellent general reference resource!Review Date: 2004-02-10
The set is at its best when tackling science and technology related topics. Written and edited by scientists and teachers for the general public, the articles often take the space to explain fundamental science concepts and how they relate to emerging security related technologies. The science articles are first-rate and show consistent effort to make tough and complex topics understandable.
The books set a modest goal of portraying the impact of modern science and technology on security issues, but the editors and writers achieve more by including interesting short articles on historical topics that also emphasize the impact of the science and technology on the history of espionage and intelligence. The selection of articles shows a crafted regard not to tread the well-worn path of prior books on spycraft, and the omissions allow the authors to explore fresh angles to old stories. While the political and historical articles often seem condensed, and in places oversimplified, they add readability, usefulness, and context to the more technical articles.
The non-science writing is utilitarian, but having the wide range of topics related to countries and organizations in one set is handy. Although certain articles may subtly convey a particular author's bias, the overall tone of the book is decidedly balanced and fair. In fact, although apparently written before the conclusion of the recent war in Iraq, and the rise of issues related to the search for WMD stockpiles, the book exhibits an eerie insight into the complexities of the intelligence issues and failures related the current WMD controversy.
This is an excellent general resource for high school students and the general public. The books are a sound starter resource for undergraduate students. Libraries, newsrooms, and emergency planners would find this encyclopedia a worthwhile investment.

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Murder of the crew of the USS Liberty by Israel- 6/8/1967Review Date: 2003-11-25
One of the most disturbing incidents in the six days [war between Israel and
the surrounding
Arab states] came on the morning of June 8[, 1967] when the
Pentagon flashed(urgent top-priority precedence) a message
that the U.S.S.
Liberty, an unarmed U.S. Navy communications(spy) ship, was under attack in
the Mediterranean, and
that American fighters had been scrambled to defend
the ship....
.... The following urgent reports showed that Israeli
jet fighters and
torpedo boats had launched the attack. The seriously damaged Liberty
remained afloat, with thirty-four
dead and more than a hundred wounded
members of the crew.
Israeli authorities subsequently apologized for the accident,
but few in
Washington could believe that the ship had not been identified as an
American naval vessel. Later, an interim
intelligence memorandum concluded
that the attack was a mistake and "not made in malice against the U.S."....
.... When
additional evidence was available, more doubt was raised. This prompted my
[D]eputy [Director of Central Intelligence],
Admiral Rufus Taylor, to write
me his view of the incident. "To me, the picture thus far presents the
distinct possibility
that the Israelis knew that the Liberty might be their
target and attacked anyway, either through confusion in Command
and Control
or through deliberate disregard of instructions on the part of
subordinates."
The day after the attack,
President Johnson, bristling with irritation, said
to me, "The New York Times" put that attack on the Liberty on an inside
page. It should have been on the front page!"
I had no role in the board of inquiry that followed, or the board's finding
that there could be no doubt that the Israeli's knew exactly what they were
doing in attacking the Liberty. I have
yet to understand why it was felt
necessary to attack this ship or who ordered the attack.
(299 words in a 452 page book)
Murder... they KNEW they were murdering defenseless American kids barely in their twenties so that they could complete WHAT two Israeli Prime Ministers(Menachim Begin and Moshe Dayan) have since admitted was a "land grab"....
...to get more land, ....more land than they had already grabbed by the fourth day of the Six-Day War-they left 34 American families without their sons, brothers, dads... and sent a good subset of the 171 injured home to THEIR families in the US maimed for life.
and the kids burned and maimed for life who are standing up for their 34 fallen comrades unable to rise from the dead to defend their own memories and blameless conduct... now the Israelis call them "liars" and "anti-Semites"...
...except a couple of the crew members of the USS Liberty were Jewish themselves... so they're not called "liars" and "anti-semites"... no, the Israeli attackers and Government of Israel call them "liars" and "self-hating jews"...
THE OFFICIAL POSITION OF THE CIA
IS THAT THIS WAS A "TRAGIC MISTAKE".... BUT HERE IS WHAT THE OFFICIALS AT THE NSA HAD TO SAY TO UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE'S,
DAVID C WALSH:Former NSA Officials Agree
David C. Walsh
The jamming of unique U.S. frequencies during the Liberty incident
seems to establish deliberate intent. And in exclusive interviews with this author, several former high-level National Security
Agency (NSA) officials agree.
On 14 February 2003, the "godfather" of the NSA's Auxiliary General Technical Research program, Oliver Kirby, noted that the Liberty was "my baby." Within weeks of the calamity, Kirby, deputy director for operations/production, read U.S. signals intelligence (SigInt)-generated transcripts and "staff reports" at NSA's Fort Meade, Maryland, headquarters. They were of Israeli pilots' conversations, recorded during the attack. The intercepts made it "absolutely certain" they knew it was a U.S. ship, he said. Kirby's is the first public disclosure by a top-level NSA senior of deliberate intent based on personal analyses of SigInt material.
In an interview on 24 February 2003, retired Air Force Major General John Morrison, the agency's then-second-in-command (and Kirby's successor), said he had been informed at the time of Kirby's findings and endorsed them. Former NSA Director retired Army Lieutenant General William Odom said on 3 March 2003 said that, on the strength of such data, the attack's deliberateness "just wasn't a disputed issue" within the agency. On 5 March 2003, retired Navy Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, NSA director from 1977-1981, said he "flatly rejected" the Cristol/Israeli thesis. "It is just exceedingly difficult to believe that [the Liberty] was not correctly identified." He said this was based on his talks with NSA seniors at the time having direct knowledge. All four were unaware of any agency official at that time or later who dissented from the "deliberate" conclusion.
Revealing: politics is personal, tooReview Date: 2004-02-13
The Preface reports that February 2, 1973, was the day James Schlesinger was sworn in as head of CIA and Richard Helms lost the position which was his main claim to fame. Richard Nixon had something to do with it, and Chapter 1, `A Smoking Gun' reports enough about the Watergate break-in to give the CIA perspective from the top, and ends with "Five months later, and a few days after his reelection, President Nixon called me to Camp David. It was the last time we spoke while he was in office." (p. 13). The Preface even claims "President Nixon had ended my intelligence career with a handshake at Camp David." (p. vi). If Helms is right about that, there was no personal contact between the Director of the CIA and the President of the United States in December 1972 and January 1973, when the Vietnam ceasefire was being hammered into place and a record number of B-52 bombers were being shot down by North Vietnamese anti-aircraft guns and SAMs. That figures.
The German spies are most fascinating in the beginning of the book. Helms calls Martha Dodd an American, as she was the daughter of the American ambassador to Germany from 1933 to 1938, but she was also girlfriend of Boris Vinogradov, the press secretary at the Soviet embassy in Berlin. After being charged with spying in 1957, she fled to Czechoslovakia. "Martha was seventy when she died in Prague in 1990." (p. 20). Spies and Richard Nixon have an acute sense of which side someone is on, and Helms seems to be particularly sensitive to the issues that Nixon would be prone to notice. Other major personalities are easy to locate in the index: Allen Dulles, James Angleton, Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Henry Kissinger, Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko, and Frank Wisner.
Chapter 8, "The Gehlen Organization," deals with the group most responsible for allowing German intelligence after World War Two to maintain some continuity with the information that had been accumulating while Hitler was in power. As the only employer in West Germany that was not averse to employing the upper echelons of the previous regime, it had no trouble recruiting four thousand former Nazis, but Helms did not find them reliable. " . . . the American officers working with Gehlen in Washington neglected to insist upon being given the names of and biographical data on the RUSTY staff personnel. . . . Even in the confusion of the immediate post-war intelligence picture, this oversight violated one of the fundamental rules of secret intelligence, and helped to set the stage for the security disasters that in time all but destroyed the entire effort." (p. 86). A lot of people have been jumping to this conclusion without having the kind of in-depth knowledge of the situation which Helms observed.
On "fundamental rules of secret intelligence," (p. 86), Helms seems most upset that he received a felony conviction for denying something in testimony to Congress that he felt compelled to deny. Helms was bitter that in his confirmation hearings to be appointed ambassador to Iran, he was asked questions by people who knew that the answer was officially secret, so he was being forced to lie to maintain a cover story that was maintaining dubious deniability. This is the area of books on intelligence that I find most interesting. Nosenko was not allowed to participate in a free debate in America over the nature of KGB activities regarding Lee Harvey Oswald because the entire nature of the KGB was a matter of exclusive CIA jurisdiction within the American system, and holding Nosenko a prisoner for years was the perfect symbol of the amount of control that the CIA believed it was entitled to maintain over such information. Convicting Helms of a felony for lying to Congress was a matter of attempting to establish the principle that laws have a higher function than rules, and any individual within the American system is subject to the possibility of being hauled into court to be a patsy for whatever law the administration of justice intends to glorify in its present incarnation.
Helms doesn't exactly vilify Richard M. Nixon in this book, but just honestly stating "It has long been clear to me that President Nixon himself called the shots in the Watergate cover-up," (p. 13) is damn close. On our most recent impeachment, I think the movie "Candy" (1969, DVD 2001) with Enrico Maria Salerno as Jonathan J. John provides a better joke, when the police ask, "Did you see what happened to the girl in the blue dress?" Film buff J.J.J. responded, "I don't know. Who directed it?" That is the way most Presidents feel about the CIA.
Interesting To Read, But Helms Struggles To Keep Things NiceReview Date: 2003-06-14
Sometimes Bland, But Priceless Collection of GemsReview Date: 2003-05-24
Richard Helms is, after Allen Dulles, arguably the most significant US spymaster and intelligence manager in history. It is a fortunate circumstance that he overcame his reluctance to publish anything at all, and worked with the trusted William Hood, whose own books are remarkable, to put before the public a most useful memoire.
Below are a few of the gems that I find worth noting, and for which I recommend the book as a unique record:
1) Puts forward elegant argument for permissive & necessary secrecy in the best interests of the public
2) Defends the CIA culture as highly disciplined--he is persuasive in stating that only Presidents can order covert actions, and that CIA does only the President's direct bidding.
3) Makes it clear in passing, not intentionally, that his experience as both a journalist and businessman were essential to his ultimate success as a spymaster and manager of complex intelligence endeavors--this suggests that one reason there is "no bench" at CIA today is because all the senior managers have been raised as cattle destined to be veal: as young entry on duty people, brought up within the bureaucracy, not knowing how to scrounge sources or meet payroll...
4) Compellingly discusses the fact that intelligence without counterintelligence is almost irrelevant if not counterproductive, but then glosses over some of the most glaring counterintelligence failures in the history of the CIA--interestingly, he defends James Angleton and places the blame for mistreating Nosenko squarterly on the Soviet Division leadership in the Directorate of Operations.
5) Points out that it was Human Intelligence (HUMINT), not Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), that first found the Soviet missiles in Cuba.
6) He confirms the Directorate of Intelligence and the analysis it does, as the "essence" of intelligence, relegating clandestine and technical intelligence to support functions rather than driving functions. This is most important, in that neither clandestine nor technical collectors are truly responsive to the needs of all-source analysts, in part because systems are designed, and agents are recruited, without regard to what is actually needed.
7) He tells a great story on Laos, essentially noting that 200 CIA paramilitary officers, and money, and the indigenous population, where able to keep 5 North Vietnamese divisions bogged down, and kept Laos more or less free for a decade
8) In the same story on Laos, he explains U.S. Department of Defense incapacity in unconventional or behind the lines war by noting that their officers kept arriving "with knapsacks full of doctrine".
9) In recounting some of CIA's technical successes, he notes casually that persistence is a virtue--there were *thirteen* satellite failures before the 14th CORONA effort finally achieved its objectives.
10) He gives Lyndon Baines Johnson (LBJ) much higher marks at a user and leader of intelligence, such that we wondered why Christopher Andrew, the noted author on US Presidents and intelligence, did not include LBJ is his "four who got it" (Washington, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Bush Senior).
11) He confirms, carefully and directly, that the Israeli attacks on the USS Liberty were deliberate and with fore-knowledge that the USS Liberty was a US vessel flying the US flag on US official business.
12) He expresses concern, in recounting the mistakes in Chile, over the lack of understanding by President Nixon and Henry Kissinger (who writes the Foreword to this book) of the time lags involved in clandestine operations and covert actions.
13) In summary, he ends with pride, noting that all that CIA did not only reduced fear, it saved tens of billions of dollars in defense expenditures that would have been either defeated by the Soviets, or were unnecessary. There can be no question, in light of this account, but that CIA has more than "paid the rent", and for all its trials and tribulations, provides the US taxpayer with a better return on investment than they get from any other part of the US Government, and certainly vastly more bang for the buck that they get from the US Department of Defense.
Richard Helms is a one-of-a-kind, and this memoire should be read by every intellience professional, and anyone who wishes to understand how honorable men can thrive in the black world of clandestine and covert operations. RIP.

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A special pick for college-level or military collections also strong in democratic politics.Review Date: 2006-12-12
Diane C. Donovan
California Bookwatch
The sordid history of the CIA's covert opsReview Date: 2007-01-10
Multiple conclusions can be drawn from each of the operations. A recurring theme in of these operations is that the CIA is not the "rogue" agency that does whatever it wishes without the knowledge of the president. In each of these secret wars the president often provided the initiative for the operation, was aware what was occurring, and had the full capability of stopping it at least some point in the operation. A prime example given is Kissinger and Nixon pursuing a more aggressive meddling in Chilean politics against Allende.
Another recurring theme in the operations is often the targeted administrations plotted against were often moderate, independent regimes, who neither wanted to be in the Soviet camp or in the U.S. camp. But, dare they nationalize industries, and suddenly, with our obsessive paranoia of communism, the president and CIA would plot their overthrow, support the shadiest paramilitary insurgents and turn a blind eye to their misdeeds, including drug dealing. Often this led left leaning politicians of the targeted countries straight into the arms of the Soviets.
In Cuba, the rebels created a "disposal" problem. What do you do with armed and trained rebels eager to dispose of Castro, and knowledge of assassination plots? Apparently some believed the answer was to keep the pot boiling. The plots against Castro continued well after Bay of Pigs. In Tibet, Hungary, and Indonesia, the CIA stirred things up and promised support, but for various reasons, such as the need for secrecy or fear of full confrontation, full support to finish the job never arrived. That left rebels dangling, and caused bitterness towards the U.S. Often these operations were fueled by bad, incomplete or ignored intelligence.
Safe for Democracy is an important addition to any CIA history bookshelf. It is a well documented, objective and balanced history of CIA clandestine operations. Our foreign policy hubris is not new, something recently invented by Bush Jr. Though covert operations weren't as brazen as invading and toppling a regime by brute force, the results were destructive for the targeted nations, and did not make the world safe for democracy. The CIA, though it may not be the sole impetus for these operations, was the cat's paw for bad policy, and often a careless one too.
BiasReview Date: 2008-01-20
If you read only this book about the CIA, you will believe it to be a corrupt and ineffective apparatus of clumsy power. While a popular view, it's not correct. But if you already believe that the CIA is a bastion of evil stupidity, prepare to have your belief system validated.
It gets two stars because it does actually include correct facts; it's missing three because they are only select facts, separated by manipulation.
A very comprehenive and valuable history of the CIA Review Date: 2007-05-21
He shows us its role in engaging in alternative warfare and in undermining regimes that were hostile to America, its allies, and their mutual interests. Prados is not pro-CIA. Nor is he nakedly anti-CIA. It is pretty good reporting. I can't imagine how much digging he had to do to provide the information that is here. I enjoyed one footnote that after he got some information from some declassified files in a Presidential library that planes and agents were sent to collect those documents and others after he published his findings.
Prados points up the embarrassing failures that have become public knowledge. And when there are successes, he points up the transitory nature of such clandestine efforts. He is plainly unconvinced that the long term problems created by those efforts are worth the various kinds of costs incurred in pulling them off. In his concluding chapter he points out that the CIA and intelligence gathering should not be viewed only by the ends they claim to support, but evaluated as to whether their means are compatible with our Democracy and its professed ideals. I will leave this for each reader to judge.
I will say that Prados does not go out of his way, this is already a long book, to set the chessboard up and discuss what the Soviets were doing. In doing so, he makes the United States to out to be the aggressor, instigator, and fumbler of so many global events. In my view, this is a distortion. It isn't that Prados is wrong (he may well be, but I am not competent to say so), it is that he is only showing us one part of the stage. The actors that he show us look quite silly at times, however, if we saw what they were reacting to, with, or against on the unlit art of the stage, our perception of the story might well be different.
Still, this is a very valuable and comprehensive telling of this history and until we get something even more complete or authoritative or more information is declassified, this is a must have text for those interested in the history of the CIA.

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This Book Lacks Real SolutionsReview Date: 2006-08-27
6 years older , but none the wiser...Review Date: 2002-10-21
Now with 9/11 and the "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism" (U.S.A.P.A.T.R.I.O.T) Act (how much time, do you suppose, does it take to come with these acronyms?), the authors are back with a critical look at a drive towards what has very little to do with counterterrorism and quite a bit to do with increasing and centralizing power.
In the past 12 months we've had proposals for a national ID card, a missle defense system, legalized torture, suspension of writ of habeas corpus, a "homeland security" infrastructure that is heavily reliant on security technologies of dubious value. Basically the only thing that has changed that would have prevented the 9/11 are locked Cabin doors and the newfound general awareness that "cooperating with the hijacker" might not be the best policy for passeners.
Also along the way, a steady trickle of stories of missed opportunities, ignored warning and frustrated investingations have come out regarding the FBI and others to use the powers they already do have.
The bulk of the book deals with FBI misdeed during the Cold War and proposes an unfashionable counterrorism strategy that emphasizes the responsibility of actors, not ideology. Basically, trying to treat terrrorism as a crime not as war.
The proposals are a little narrow. Terrorism of the sort represented by al Quaeda is international, not just national. The fight against it will share more with racketeering and global criminal networks. And a world court is needed. I'm not sure if dealing on a purely "case-by-case" basis will do the trick.
Nevertheless, the authors have offered a well reasoned case and in the current climate when we are asked to give up so much with only the assurance of "trust us" we would do to heed their call.
Great book, but scary to think about, post-9/11 study.Review Date: 2003-09-18
Rest in Peace Bill of Rights...slain by the Patriot ActReview Date: 2004-12-10
Yet, what is new about the post 9/11 climate is the depth of these anti-terrorism policies and the general public's apparent willingness to sacrifice their freedom inexplicably to receive 'security'.
Whether it is the terror alert 'color' of the day, or the list of people who can/cannot fly on planes, national security could instead be used as a tool to generate even more fear...or a weapon to attack political dissenters.
A government effectively stifling criticism of its policies as `being for the terrorists' is allowed to do whatever it wants to citizens whenever it wants. Reminiscent of Nazi Germany, people who still attempt to critique government policy (including the Patriot Act) quickly find themselves labeled as an enemy of the state.
It is significant that the first edition of this book was published after the Oklahoma City bombing. Everybody had agreed this event was a national tragedy, yet the government did not use it as a battering ram to dismantle citizen civil liberties and/or eliminate people whom they have disagreed with. By focusing on case specifics, the Clinton administration found the people who were responsible for that incident (two disgruntled veterans from America's heartland!).
Sharply contrasting, the measures taken in response to 9/11 demonstrate excess and paranoia. "Homeland security" permits the Bush White House to target ANYBODY it does not like.
How else to explain why Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D MA)'s name has repeatedly turned up on the nation's no fly-list, despite a public service career whose length easily exceeds that of many "Homeland Security" officials themselves?
And then there is the issue of increased FBI surveillance to 'combat' terrorist threats. Again, because the FBI had spied on dissenting groups until Hoover's death, there is a strong case that this same government agency will not ethically be able to conduct impartial investigations today.
It is indeed a sad day when we want the rest of the world to be democratic but cannot bring ourselves to have similar conditions inside this same country. The greatest causality of the war on terror is the American Bill of Rights.

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When In Doubt, ReorganizeReview Date: 2007-11-11
"Uncertain Shield" is one of three books about US Intelligence and counter terrorist activities written by Judge Richard A. Posner. Posner, a Judge on the Federal Court of Appeals for the 7th circuit, has the work pace of a machine: aside from being a judge, he's a lecturer in Chicago Law School, a leading scholar of Law and Economics, who regularly produces tombs on subjects from Aging and Anti Trust to Sex and Utilitarianism, a frequent contributor to periodicals, both popular and scholarly, and a blogger.
Whatever topic Posner tackles, he always brings his great analytic powers and wordcrafting gifts to it. In previous books of his I have read, Posner took on fascinating topics and made unputtdownable books of them; Here his topic is not obviously intriguing, but the result is compelling and insightful.
Posner asserts that US Intelligence should not be faulted for the failures of 9/11 and the Iraqi WMD affair. Intelligence is an inherently difficult field, and that a high rate of failure should be expected. Preventing Terrorist attack is particularly difficult because of the plurality of possible targets - with limited resources, strengthening the defense of one target means