Agencies

Students of intelligence have been blessed this year with the publication of two outstanding books on American intelligence: Mark Lowenthal's "Intelligence" and Arthur Hulnick's "Fixing the Spy Machine."

Hulnick, a retired intelligence officer and former "CIA Officer in Residence" at Boston University and one of the Agency's first public spokesmen, provides a stimulating overview of the major problems facing the US intelligence community. It is a particularly useful book for those who seek a professional's critical view on issues ranging from the need for better recruitment to improved coordination between civilian and military clandestine activities.

Although Hulnick clearly has considerable sympathy for the needs of the intelligence community, this is by no means an uncritical whitewash. On the contrary, it is a thoughtful probing of present and future problems facing US intelligence and policy makers.

I would rate this book as one of a handful any serious student of US intelligence should read and own --- to come back to often as a reference volume.

This book has two good features-the author really does understand the personnel issues, and hence one can read between the lines for added value; and the book is as good an "insider" tour of the waterfront as one could ask for. How the book treats the CIA-FBI relationship, for example, is probably representative of how most CIA insiders feel. The book does not reflect a deep understanding of open sources and tends to accept the common wisdom across the intelligence bureaucracy, that all is "generally okay" and just a bit of change on the margin is necessary. In this respect, it is a good benchmark against which the more daring reformist books may be measured.

A lot has changed in the business since this book was written. And unfortunately, what still applies is too vague to be of much use. You can't begin to cover the scope attempted here in enough detail to call this a "how to" guide.

This is an excellent book for anyone considering or just starting their own business. Though the content focus is on an advertising agency (as the title dictates) most of the information is easily transferable to most types of small business. The author presents the material in an easy-to-follow format and the book is full of things that will prevent the many "gotchas" of setting up a business. I read the book the first year of opening my first business. I wish I would have read it *before* I opened my doors but that didn't stop it from being one of the most useful books I have ever read.

I despise what Philip Agee did with this book, endangering the lives of real people and violating his oath as a commissioned officer in the clandestine service. I was also very surprised by the level of detail in the book, and concluded that he intended to betray the CIA well prior to leaving. I've served three overseas tours and three Washington assignments, and from all that time I can barely remember one cryptonym series and not a single true identity. I think Agee took notes and planned ahead to burn the CIA. This is a good diary, and I include it in this bibliography to represent the pedestrian side of the DO-the day to day monotony of going through the motions and doing agent recruitments and agent handling operations in third world countries where the bulk of what one does really does not contribute to U.S. national security or understanding.

Philip Agee does a wonderful job of unmasking the villains and personel of the CIA. It is written in a diary format, with each occasion listed to the exact date. Philip Agee was a former CIA agent positioned in Ecuador. His story depicts how the Company goes about their business and describes what their business is.

The Kempei Tai were the Japanese Military Police, and were responsible for internal security (like the FBI or British MI-5). Spying was not considered dishonorable: an aristocrat could work as a laborer to carry out a mission. The Japanese learned that the apparent honesty of Westerners cloaked devious purposes and selfish aims. The 19th century brought threats to Japan from the imperialism of America, Britain, France, and Russia. Japan was able to resist and remained independent, built up an army and navy, and gathered intelligence from Western nations. They studied military factories and ship builders, and early on learned about inefficient production in the West. The Japanese government kept tight control over industries handling military contracts. Students were sent abroad to learn and gather intelligence legally. They also created secret societies to gather intelligence from these volunteers. One well-tried method to gather intelligence was to operate bordellos (blackmail, bribery). The Black Dragon Society was founded to oppose Russians in Manchuria. Japan signed a Treaty of Alliance with Britain in 1902.

The Russo-Japanese War began with the massive advance intelligence operations of Japan. Japan severed diplomatic relations and then attacked the Russian ships at Port Arthur. Some of their spies were trumped by Russian counter-intelligence. Japan later entered into an alliance with Britain, France, and Russia for WW I; they captured German colonies in the Pacific. Japan tried to save the Romanovs and began conflicts with the Bolsheviks. American pressure on Britain put an end to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Now Japan turned to Germany, its only possible ally. Japan now began to move in on a divided China, like Western countries. Japan even sought to settle Jews in Manchuria.

The "Thought Police" were created in 1927 as part of a national spying system. People were to report any suspicions about their neighbors. The Kempei Tai created a secret society to eliminate all parliamentary political parties and became powerful and feared. Espionage increased from the Panama Canal north into California in the 1930s. Barber shops were used to collect gossip from US naval personnel! Japan broke off negotiations with America on December 7, 1941. Pain-language coded messages used double meanings. A Japanese general could pose as a farm laborer, a captain as a female cook ! Japanese spies flooded Singapore and Malaysia by 1941. Japan lost the cryptographic war, the Battle of Midway, and WW II.

After 1945 the financial and business interests that supported groups like the Black Dragon Society were purged, along with the Communist Party. Japan spent its limited budget on a "global intelligence gathering system" that provided information on trade, commerce, markets, technological developments, and economic research. The Keidanren arbitrates the fluctuating interests and requirements of various businesses, formulates policies for the government, and collects information. Some call this "industrial espionage", or a willingness to learn. Pollution is a necessary evil in an industrialized society; it can be controlled but not eliminated. Rapid industrial progress cost dearly in pollution, particularly from lead. Consumer tastes are studied so exports remain competitive. Quality may be more important than increased productivity. Japan lowered their imports of Iranian oil years before 1979. One Japanese company had good industrial relations in Britain. (This version covers more than the first edition.)

"Kempei Tai: The Japanese Secret Service Then and Now" is a straightforward narrative, probably the only of its kind, on the history of JapanÕs modern intelligence activities. Although Richard Deacon is not a historian of Japan, his book is a good supplement for anyone interested in JapanÕs history, especially the period 1904-45.

The most intriguing aspect of the book deals with Japanese intelligence in China before 1941, which includes a more genuine account of the conspiring associations Sun Yat-Sen, Yuan Shi KÕai, and ChinaÕs last emperor, Henry Pu Yi had with Japanese agents. Also discussed at length is the history of intelligence on both Imperial and Soviet Russia, with a particularly interesting story about Japanese agent involvement in a plan to rescue the Romanovs from their Bolshevik captors. As for intelligence on the United States, Deacon of course devotes part of the book to covert activities, especially for naval intelligence, before 1945.

In its weaker moments, two major problems standout in "Kempei Tai." First, although Deacon rightly discusses the influence of right-wing extremism on the Japanese intelligence services, he never addresses the inherent weaknesses in the system or the brutality it inflicted in Asia in 1941-45. Second, Deacon sometimes strays from the subject of intelligence in the postwar period, trying to tie in too many political and economic issues. Since this volume of "Kempei Tai" is a revision of an earlier book, material in the later chapters is often irrelevant to the original title.

In summary, however, "Kempei Tai" is easily readable and recommended to anyone with an interest in modern Japanese history or affairs of State.

This is a frank account of the CIA's operations in Guatemala to overthrow the democratically elected centre-left government of Jacobo Arbenz. It was written in 1994 by an historian of the CIA's History Staff, classified as "secret", and disclosed to the general public in 1997 with some minor deletions. Although dealing only cursorily with the Guatemala history and politics of the period, it is rather detailed with respect to the CIA's role in them, and it is a very useful book if one wants to get a clear view of the political climate of the era and of the role of the US in Latin American politics. With the tragic example of the CIA's sucess in the overthrown of the Arbenz government as a vivid and recent event, is it all that strange that, four years later, cuban reformists and revolutionaries would move with a much tougher determination in the path of social and economic reforms, just before the US government could try to repeat the operation? which incidentally they did at the Bay of Pigs... The Afterword to the book, written by Piero Gleijeses, on the consequences of the CIA's coup to Guatemala up to the present day, is chilling and revolting

Nick Cullather's account of the CIA operation PBSuccess is quite interesting in that it relies primarily on CIA documents. These documents were unavailable to those previously writing about the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz in 1954. He provides insight into the processes rather than into the personalities involved. The only negative about this account, pointed out by Cullather himself, is that the CIA uses retired agents to screen material before publication. The screeners' deletions can be quite extensive in certain areas despite the CIA promise to be more open. As one reads this book it becomes annoying when many names, sentences and paragraphs are sanitized by the retired CIA agents. Nonetheless the book is informative, well written and a very enjoyable read. This book is a must for anyone interested in the covert world of the CIA. The book also would be of interest to anyone studying the nature of U.S. involvement in the national affairs of our Latin American neighbors.

Apparently, not everyone in Russia was dying to develop democracy. In fact, the leadership likes to assume in times of trouble that the KGB was never disbanded, Yeltsin used their strong-arm tactics just as effectively as any Soviet premier.

Knight does write an interesting book, but there are some major flaws. I was reading this book for enjoyment, and found that it is about as dry as the vellum the Constitution was printed on - I fell asleep quite easily while reading it. That's not to say I didn't think it was good, I just wouldn't read it if I was suffering from insomnia. The second flaw isn't Knight's fault: this is an account of the first 4 years of the Russian Federation and the Commonwealth of Independent States through the eyes of the former KGB - what about the time since '95? Perhaps a post-Yeltsin update is in order. The third flaw is that Knight's research was primarily Russian newspaper and other media sources - so if you're interested in international espionage for example, the Russian media didn't cover it all except for the Aldritch Ames case.

However it does have its good points, and is a great source for anyone wondering whatever happened to the KGB. I wouldn't drop everything and get it, but if you can find it it is a good enough read.

Amy Knight identifies a part of post-Soviet society that the citizens of that former empire need to reconsile with. The Secret Police Empire is the remnant of Bolshevik terror and corruption that eats away at what could possibly be a law based society. Knight illustrates how post Soviet leaders have tried to distance themselves from their KGB goons but hurry back when going get tough.

Very scary stuff. The bottom line is that for the sake of enhancing national security and national competitiveness, the U.S. Government, with approval from the highest levels, funded the wholesale introduction into U.S. citizenship of both Nazi scientists and Nazi participants in genocidal programs who were viewed in many cases as "essential" to our anti-Communist endeavors. The loss of perspective among selected senior intelligence and policy officials, and the long-term influence of this program on our obsession with Communism, give one pause.

This finely wrought and intelligent book does a fine job extending the debates on the nature of personal identity which were first fired into philosophical life by Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons. As such, Rovane's book stands as a useful and worthwhile extension of Parfitian revisionary metaphysics. Rovane is to be applauded.

This book is for those of you who are sick of redundant and mundane bureaucratic routine work, and wan to learn about the ways to change such system. This books points out inefficiencies of bureaucracy and promotes the idea of simple and quick approach to technology, which the way we do things. It also gives some good examples from a few corporations that are being affected by their implementation of rational organizational structure i.e. bureaucratic structure. It's an advocate of creative behavior at jobs regardless of the nature.

this book is very good because it help me a lot in my studies. and also give me knowledge that i really want.