AFA

Colonel John A. Warden III was one of the most distinguished officers of his generation. A veteran fighter pilot, he was--is--as well a true defense intellectual--not the sort of individual often touted by the so-called "defense reform movement," but a true warrior-scholar in the classic image of, say, a J. F. C. Fuller--or a George Patton. Not one to shy away from controversy, Warden was convinced in the 1980's that the United States Air Force--had strayed away from its first principles. It had become a stove-piped, tribal organization, riven by discord and confusion between its "strategic" and "tactical" communities. Warden, in this brilliant work (written as a thesis at the National Defense University), posited an exciting new vision of the centrality of air power in national defense. This book served as an important departure point for the service's subsequent "Global Reach--Global Power" strategic planning framework issued in 1990. By that time, Warden was running Checkmate, a key office in Air Force planning. Through his own initiative and vision, he and a small team of "weapons officers" planned Instant Thunder, the first major response to Saddam Hussein's aggression in the Gulf. Warden briefed Instant Thunder to the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff (the Chief was away), and then on his suggestion to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Gen. Colin Powell. Powell sent him to CENTCOM to brief Norman Schwarzkopf. His reaction was enthusiastic, and Warden was directed to brief Instant Thunder in the Gulf, to the CENTAF air component commander, General Charles Horner. Horner, brilliant in his own right, accepted much of what Warden said. But the personal chemistry between the two men was bad, and Warden returned to the States, leaving behind a small staff of acolytes and experts, most notably Lt. Col. David A. Deptula. It was the partnership of Deptula, Gen. Buster Glosson, Gen. Horner, and (back in Checkmate) John Warden that made the Desert Storm air campaign a success. After the war, Warden became commander of the Air Command and Staff College, making notable (and badly needed) changes to its curriculum. This book is a "must read" by anyone who would consider themselves a military and/or air power professional. There are Americans alive today because of John Warden's work. Warden never made general, largely because of petty jealousies by senior people above him. He was--is--a consumate professional and true patriot: never complaining, never self-advocating, always keeping true to his core beliefs. But his truest legacy is this book and the thinking it has inspired--thinking that has lead to five notable American victories over the last decade. Buy it, read it, keep it, use it!

John Warden was the strategist of the air campaign in the 1991 Gulf War. In 1998, he updated his influential book. A must read for anyone interested in the military, its past, present and future.

Col. Warden adds new material to this important work on strategy, especially new material on what happened after the Gulf War. This book is many things. It is a history of airpower. It is a fresh look at the application of airpower. It is a guide for anyone in the military or business world who wants to compete or attack a system. Very readable. With Col Warden's reputation as the architect of the Air Campaign against Iraq, he has demonstrated that he can apply his ideas in real world situations. Outstanding read.

No mathematical errors possible. Incrediable timesaver, even better than a computer!
Frank -