1990 Books

I have known Barry well for thirty years now and have loved this book for the last fifteen. His book was highly inspirational to me in the writing of I Never Liked Those C-130's Anyway.
It is as germain today as it was in 1992 after the first Gulf War,which is when I first read it.
It is chocked full of humor and Barry McWilliams' special take on the every day. As the creator of the JP Doodles cartoon he has used his skills to full advantage by creating the wonderfull art within.
A worthy read.

If you REALLY want to find out how things were in the "First Gulf War", buy a copy of this book! It was sent to me by my best friend while I was over there digging in the big sand box, and while it does help provide some comic relief and allowed me to laugh at the situation I was in at the time, it sure tells it like it was at the time.

I met Barry at King Fahd International Airport when he interviewed me and several folks in my unit, the 511th Tactical Fighter Squadron. My story didn't make the final cut but you've got to read about our Flight Surgeon, Major Smith, and his war trophy!

This was an awesome book and I have read it numerous times. Being a Gulf War Veteran I read just about every book that came out right after the Gulf War to see what the various authors had to say about a war that affected millions of us and that 500,000 plus American attended/participated in. I no longer read books on the Gulf war because most of it is political dribble trying to explain what did not happen, Now it seems that it is more convient for some to write lies then the truth, no such thing as Gulf War Syndrome right. Enough of politics that is why I like this book, because it put everything in perspective using humor.

If you are not a veterans it will still be funny to most of you.

This will always be one of my favorite books on the Gulf War. I especially liked the chapter on the Red Rope Ranger. I laugh out loud every time I think about it!

This is the most objective analysis on events in the Middle East I found in years. Prof. Harari is a great internationally known theoretical physicist. He was the director of the Weizmann Institute from 1988 to 2001 and received several honors as a leading scientist. His analysis is cristal-clear. I already bought 4 books to give to friends.

This is a penetrating analysis of the components of terror. The book offers a survey of the landscape of middle-eastern conflicts. It is, however, not a pedantic rendition. The author presents a complicated issue in an easily understandable form.

In April 2004 internationally known physicist Haim Harari was asked by a meeting of the International Advisory Board of a large multi-national corporation to present his own personal view on events in the Middle East. He spoke candidly.

Without his knowledge a copy of his remarks was leaked and posted on the Internet. It caused a worldwide sensation and was translated into more than half a dozen languages. (The article is seven pages long and can be obtained by going to the FrontPageMag website, clicking on Archives, setting the date drop-downs to March 15, 2006 and clicking on Go. The article is at the bottom of the page.)

Due to the widespread interest in the article, Prof. Harari went on to write an expanded version, which resulted in "A View from The Eye of The Storm". This is not a scholarly treatise with bibliography and footnotes (although there is a very good index), but the perceptions of a fifth-generation Israeli-born observer. Yet Harari is no ordinary observer. He is a brilliant scientist, trained in objective and precise analysis. And he is a man not only of great acumen and scruples, but a man deeply concerned about human events and the future of humankind.

Prof. Harari believes we are already into a World War with Muslim Extremists, but that a few more years may pass before everybody acknowledges this is a fact. He outlines four main elements of the present World conflict: 1, suicide murder; 2, lies; 3, money and 4, the total breakdown of law. The role of each of these elements is examined in detail in the 211 page book.

Following is Harai's eminently sensible solution to the Israeli-Palestine conflict:

"There are certain immutable facts in the Middle East. Peace can arrive only if the Palestinians except the existence of Israel. Peace can materialize only if the Palestinians have their own state - next to Israel not instead of it. The densely Jewish areas will be part of Israel; the densely Palestinian areas will be part of the Palestinian state. Israel will have an Arab minority. Many Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza will have to be abandoned. Most of Jerusalem will remain in Israel, and it will continue to be the capital city. Some heavily populated Arab neighborhoods of the greater Jerusalem area will be in the Palestinian state and may form its capitol city. A carefully planned demilitarized strategy must be developed; it will take a substantial number of years and can be lifted only by mutual consent. Descendents of Palestinian refugees will be settled in Arab countries, many of them in the Palestinian state. All Arab countries bordering with Israel will have peace agreements with it, and no unresolved disputes will remain. The borders between Israel and its Arab neighbors will be protected by some kind of fence...because no open border can survive a 20:1 income ratio."

Later in the book Harari provides a concise prescription for treating the problem of international terror. He admits "it's easy to list these things...it's far more difficult to apply them worldwide." But "it's just a matter of time until all free countries unite and recognize they are facing a life-threatening, global problem."

Read this book, and you will learn the clear-headed professor's answers - answers that he urges are "simply the only possible solutions" to the international terror of our present World War.

Haim Harari is a great internationally known theoretical physicist. He was the director of the Weizmann Institute from 1988 to 2001 and received important honors as a leading scientist, including the prestigious Harnack Medal, awarded by the Senate of the Max Planck Society in an unanimous decision.

But this book is not about Physics, its about terror and reason in the Middle East. In my opinion, it is by far the best review of terrorism ever written.

Harari is a fifth generation Israeli. His grandmother was born in Jerusalem in 1872, and so was her grandmother. So where his children and grandchildren. He writes in Chapter 1:

"For seven generations we have lived here, in the eye of the storm. We have survived more wars and terror attacks than any other nation. But now we are informed by the former French ambassador to London that we are "a shitty little country" endangering the world; at the same time we learn that the rulers of Iran want to replace our "shitty little country" by yet another Shiite country.

So writes this gifted and deep observer of the reality of the Midle East today. Every page of this book has deep and extremely intelligent observations, whose truth is undeniable. Harari's reasoning is always compelling, like that of any great scientist. He starts each one of the 32 chapters of this extraordinary book with a short citation. These themselves are little gems. For example here is the gem that starts Chapter 30: "You cannot punish a suicide murderer by [the] death penalty; You cannot bomb into the Stone Age somebody who is already there."

Indeed, the war between radical Islam and the West is waged by people yearning to go back to the past. They reject modernity above all.

Or here is the gem starting Chapter 13: " The incredible economy of China creates an entirely new "South Korea" every three years. Why can't the rest of the poor rural areas of the world do the same?"

World War III already started though many people do not realize it yet. A relatively new totalitarian movement has grown and gained roots in the Middle East, financed by Saudi Arabia, Iran and other oil-rich states. Like the totalitarian regimes of the past, whether in Mao's China , Stalin's Soviet Union, Pol Pot's Cambodia, Hitler's Nazi Germany, fascist Italy, or Tojo's Japan, the adherents of this Islamic form of fascism are prepared to kill a large part of Humanity in order to bring forth the Islamic "paradise" that is supposed to triumph in the entire World. All fascists, it seems, are megalomaniacs, and the new Islamic fascists are no different.

This book is living proof that the pen is mightier than the sword, and a potent weapon against the Islamic totalitarians of today in World War III. Just like Nazi Germany, fascist Italy, Tojo's Japan, Pol Pot's Cambodia, or Stalin's Soviet Union were defeated, ultimately reason will win over this new form of religious fascism and barbarism. World War III already started, but the victors are going to be the same ones as the victors in World War II.

This book is highly recommended. It should be read and reread by every thinking person on Earth.

At last an unbiased intelligent analysis of the situation in the middle east and the events that brought to that situation. A must read for anyone interested in world affairs.

I found this book by chance while browsing amazon.com; complete chance. What luck, what amazing luck! This is truly the most useful book in existence for any poet young or old, amateur or professional. Not only is the list of publishers ENORMOUS but the book provides you with inside contact information as well as what type of poetry each publisher wants, all organized so it's easily located in the book. There's also an excellent brief section on etiquette when submitting and other formal things that give you an inside track on the editor. No poet can live without this book. Buy it now, it's WELL worth the price!!

I use this book to send submissions of my poetry to various magazines. The biggest help has been in introducing me to magazines that are not available at your average bookstore. The other thing is that I had no idea of the format of a submission before I first picked this book up. I have at least gotten read a couple of times, even if I did get rejection slips. Don't let this book scare you. There's so much information here that it's a little overwhelming. I have the 2001, but I would recommend buying the latest edition. You might even want to wait and buy the 2003. Also, hang in there. Being a poet in 2002 is a little difficult I know.

This book is an indispensable resource for both the beginning and the established poet. It is simply packed with ways to make your voice heard. 100% updated every year, you cannot go wrong with this bbook.

Poets faithfully depend on Poet's Market for their #1 reference. Market guidelines by the thousands are readily available. As an editor of a literary magazine, I can tell you candidly, that its greatest advantages for the poet of 2000 are Poet's Market inclusion of: the subject index, poetry websites, publications that accept e-mail submissions, and chapbook publishers. Poet's Market 2000 gives the poet a bona fide chance at publication.

There's too much competition for a poet and not enough time to waste knocking at the wrong door with the improper product. You've got to click on the advantage...be at the right place at the right time. I always suggest studying Poet's Market to my contributors. Submission procedures and needs change...stay in tune with a fresh copy of Poet's Market.

Avigdor Haselkorn provides a very serious examination of the weapons of mass destruction available to Iraq during the Gulf War and presents a sobering insight into the dangers that the possession of these weapons by the Iraqi regime presents to it's neighbours and the West today.

A very well-timed book in view of current events.

The book also examines the circumstances surrounding the reasons why the Gulf War was so abruptly terminated. Some arguing that the coalition might have collapsed if any further advances had been made into Iraq, others of the opinion that such allied actions would have forced the use of Iraq weapons of mass destruction. Other opinions leave the matter open to some debate.

Although a military defeat for Iraq, it was a conflict that did not remove the Iraqi dictator's regime from power. We now face the inevitable consequences and the world is in a turmoil as to how to approach the present situation.

The contents of this book are disturbing. The weapons of mass destruction available are examined in some detail together with the effects that the delivery of these weapons could have on the military or the civilian populace. One cannot but remain convinced that this matter is as dangerous and significant now as it was at the time of the Gulf War. Recommended read.

Excellent book!!! Haselkorn brings a new dimension to our understanding of the Gulf War. In a nutshell Haselkorn argues that the reason the Coalition did not go "all the way" to Bagdad was due to the Chemical/Biological threat posed by Saddam. This is a fascinating thesis, though Haselkorn, in my opinion places to much weight on some flimsy evidence. Haselkorn argues that when the Iraqis fired a Scud missile at Israel with a concrete block attached instead of a warhead it was intended to warn Israel and the coalition that Saddam was prepared to fire missiles with biological warheads. Haselkorn further argues that the concrete block was intended to be seen as some kind of biological delivery vehicle. Is it not far more likely that in the heat of battle the Iraqis fired a missile with a dummy training round or that due to the pressure of the coalition bombing explosive warheads were not available? There are any number of reason why the Iraqis could have fired a missile with a concrete warhead, I think its a stretch to say that because the Iraqis fired a concrete warhead they were signaling their intenion to escalate to Chemical and Biological weapons. Nonetheless, this is an informative, well researched and well written book; moreover, it forces the reader to take a new look at the more conventional histories of the Gulf War. Good read, worth the money!!!!

"[The Continuing Storm] is the mother of all books on the gulf war written by one of today's most brilliant political-military analysts, Avigdor Haselkorn...The author's extraordinary documentation--the encyclopedic footnotes alone are a sort of volume two--and reasoning must be attended two."

"'As long as we accept the arguments of Bush and his colleagues as they struggle to explain their stated reasons for ending the war,' writes Mr. Haselkorn,'it will be impossible not to conclude that the president was either dangerously out of touch with the events at the close of the war or was simply acting irrationally. It is far better to believe that he and his cohorts are simply less than truthful.'"

Arnold Beichman in WASHINGTON TIMES, April 18, 1999

"This is an impressive and well written book about the part played by biological and chemical weapons in the Gulf War, their impact on in-war deterrence and their continuing relevance as the war drew to a close and thereafter. There are lessons to be learned from the Iraq experience that must be applied in the future not only in Iraq itself but further afield. quiescent alongside the Kosovo turmoil, we should stay aware of savagely unfinished business of vital interest." part played by biological and chemical weapons in the Gulf War, their impact on in-war deterrence and their continuing relevance as the war drew to a close and thereafter. There are lessons to be learned from the Iraq experience that must be applied in the future not only in Iraq itself but further afield. quiescent alongside the Kosovo turmoil, we should stay aware of savagely unfinished business of vital interest." Rear Admiral Richard Cobbold, Director Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI, RUSI Journal, London, August 1999

"[This book] is an essential companion to whatever other reading one does on the Gulf War. The Continuing Storm is a highly readable and extremely valuable book for understanding not only the American decision to end the war and the continuation in power of Saddam's regime, but also the impact of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of ruthless regimes and the psychology of 'terrorist deterrence.' Its insights are keen and its scholarship is thorough, as evidenced by more than 900 footnotes, many of them containing multiple citations and informative content. This is not a book just for scholars and experts, however; it is written also for the interested layman."ÿ

I was privileged to serve with Bill Meara in Special Forces in Central America. His book is dead on it's mark. Bill's frustrations with the military are shared by many. It seems that our government doesn't learn from history. Conventional commanders continue to lead unconventional wars with no comprehension of the difference between the two. Language capability continues to be a key factor in the success. The book is short and well written. A book for all to enjoy and learn.

The ongoing Coalition conflicts against insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated just how difficult a challenge conventional expeditionary forces face in adapting to asymmetric threats. Nowhere is this difficulty of adaptation greater than within the US Armed Forces, currently the most powerful and technologically-advanced military in the world.

What is significant is that failure to adapt at a theater, or even tactical, level engenders dysfunction at a strategic level, and creates deeply-paralyzing or divisive morale problems which eventually pervade the political structures of democratic societies. Indeed, the damage to (or impact on) the society is often evident even before the damage caused by the failure to adapt to asymmetric warfare shows up in the overall capabilities of the military forces itself. The result can often be a "hollow force": a monolithic defense structure, incapable of acting against the adversaries who besiege it daily, and yet waiting, becoming more bureaucratic by the day, for a "worthy [symmetric] adversary" who may come but once in a lifetime, if at all.

It is the persistent failure of much of the US conventional military leadership as well as the US political leadership to understand how to successfully prosecute warfare against a fluid, informal adversarial structure, operating within a broader psychopolitical environment, in Iraq (and Afghanistan) which is the Achilles Heel of the US as a strategic power into the 21st Century.

These are lessons which should have been learned after the Vietnam War ended in the 1970s. After all, the Vietnamese, the Soviets, and the leadership of the People's Republic of China (PRC) all emphasized that they had defeated the US in the media, and by sowing disenchantment (and narcotics) within US and Western society; in other words, by irregular, contextual, and psychopolitical stratagems. But peace after the Vietnam War -- as with the peace which followed World War I and World War II -- merely allowed the rump of the conventional US forces to re-assert the formal, highly-bureaucratized doctrine and methodologies which suit a rigidly hierarchical command and control system. Today's "Net-Centric Warfare", for example, is designed to use modern technologies, such as computerization and communications, imagery, and the like, to give true battlefield advantage to the field commanders, down to platoon level. Instead, it has been used repeatedly to afford centralized, remote micro-management of conflict, denying fluidity and cultural insinuation in the conflict zone by the forces there, where field officers should be able to exercise the command mandates of their commissions.

Significantly, many of the failures attributed to outgoing US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld were caused by his determination to bring change and greater flexibility to the US defense structures. He may have had other failings, but his attempt to force change on the services is what created many of his enemies within the uniformed leadership, those who are reluctant to change, and to learn the lessons of history.

What better time, then, for a book about an aspect of the "lost history" of the Cold War to emerge, giving profound lessons from the battle front on the business of asymmetric warfare.

William R. Meara's new book, Contra Cross: Insurgency and Tyranny in Central America, 1979-1989, is a profound contribution to thinking about strategic doctrine, as the US -- and all major industrial powers -- face a watershed of introspection following the US electorate's decision to essentially retire from the global battlefield. Meara's great contribution is the fact that his book recounts the impact of doctrine and the strategic environment on the battlefield of that "small" war against the Nicaraguan Sandinista leadership which projected one of the last aspects of the Soviet grand strategy against the West before the end of the Cold War.

The book is also timely in that it reminds a new generation of strategic thinkers of the real origins of the Sandinista Government which has now returned to Nicaragua, following the re- election of former Sandinista Pres. Daniel Ortega -- now 60 years old -- with the November 5, 2006, Nicaraguan Presidential election. But more than that, Meara's book, told from the perspective of a "boots on the ground" true Cold Warrior, has the true grit of realism. It is not a book of theory, but a book which shows how theory translates on the ground in an asymmetric conflict.

William Meara was a US Army Special Forces officer who trained as a Foreign Area Officer (FAO), and then specialized in, and relished, psychological operations. His field of expertise was Central America. His book cover, and the name of his book, reflect the "Contra Cross", the Contra crucifix memento made from a neutralized M-16 5.56mm ammunition by wounded Contra veterans in the hospitals which housed them after their personal war was over. Meara carried with him the memento, and the draft of his book, for a couple of decades before deciding to finally publish his writings.

The US Armed Forces and Government -- operating mostly from Honduras, supporting the Nicaraguan Contras against the Sandinistas -- were at this time still nursing their wounds after Vietnam. Many of the US military policies being pursued in Central America were based on either lessons learned from Vietnam and other Cold War theaters, or on a stubborn persistence in the view that a monolithic military machine -- the Green Machine of the Army, as Meara reminds us -- could roll over any adversary with "superior firepower" and technology. Clearly, the mainstream US Army had little time for psychological warriors or for grubby little wars. But there were those who understood this kind of warfare, such as the "crusty old SF (Special Forces) team sergeant" who embraced what he called "Low Intensity, High Per Diem War".

Meara, who left the US Army for the US Foreign Service (he remains a US diplomat) where he essentially continued his liaison and support work with the Contras of the ERN (Army of the Nicaraguan Resistance) until the end, highlights the profound importance of understanding the language and culture of the environment in which any war is being conducted. He knew that he had made the breakthrough when, as he put it, he was able to "swear like a Contra", and be able to converse at a truly meaningful level with the forces and cultures in which he had to operate. His time in Nicaragua, before he became part of the US-supported war supporting the Contras, gave him a good understanding of the Sandinistas, who took their name from the 1920s nationalist Nicaraguan fighter, Augusto César Sandino.

But before he was engaged in supporting the Contras, Meara was also engaged in US Army support operations in El Salvador where he also learned not only how Latin American armed forces shaped their priorities and doctrine, but also how guerilla forces, such as the Faribundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), functioned. He also faced the more enduring adversary: US Army "milicrats".

Apart from the profound timeliness of the book, as Sandinista Daniel Ortega returns to power in Nicaragua -- this time ostensibly within the framework of an ongoing process of democratic elections (we have yet to see whether he abides by the process, or whether he continues to think of "one-man, one-vote, once" as the process of re-entrenching pseudo-marxist-leninist governance) -- Contra Cross has real lessons for war- fighters and planners considering Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, or Sudan.

William Meara also highlights the distinctions which often exist between the actual combatants in the guerilla wars and their political leaders, citing the case of the Contras, whose political leadership was based in Miami, Florida, where sophistry and political expediency prevailed to the detriment of the forces in the field. Meara highlights the disservice done to the Nicaraguan rebellion by the Contra political leadership in Miami, which was the principal interface with the US political system.

Meara's final chapter, Contrarian Conclusions, outlines some of his maxims for conducting irregular or asymmetric warfare, and particularly the aspect of this which is conducted by great powers at arm's length: surrogate warfare. But before that, Meara had to defend, even resurrect, the image of the Contras, noting: "My positive sentiments about the Nicaraguan resistance put me clearly in contrarian territory. It would be hard to exaggerate the extent to which the contras were vilified in the United States."

He added: "But I think the world should be proud of the contras. The young peasants of Nicaragua refused to be enslaved by communism. They waged a courageous struggle against great odds. They persevered when the situation looked very bleak. They sacrificed for the good of their people and the future of their country. They were noble and honorable freedom fighters. The mucos refused to be like Longfellow's `dumb, driven cattle'. They were heroes in the strife. ... I give the contras most of the credit for the elections held in Nicaragua in February 1990."

Equally, in saying that he felt that "Americans should be proud of what the Reagan Administration did and tried to do in Central America", he added: "But I don't think that everyone has the right to feel good about their actions during the Central American conflict. I think those Americans who gave aid and comfort to the Sandinistas and the Salvadoran communists should feel guilty. They were on the wrong side in the Cold War." These were, he said, what Lenin called "useful idiots".

In his "lessons learned" in that concluding chapter, Meara notes: "Cultural factors really are the equivalent of a terrain feature that cannot be ignored [in surrogate wars]."

And: "Fluency in foreign languages is the indispensable key to understanding." "Regional expertise and experience are crucial. People working on insurgencies shouldn't be doing so on their first trip to the region."

He went on: "Americans need to be aware of the institutional biases and shortcomings which make it difficult for us to deal with foreign insurgencies. We need to realize that our big, high-tech military machine -- our big catapult -- might not be much use against an insurgency built around people like Miguel Castellanos [real name Napoleón Romero García, an El Salvadoran FMLN guerilla who later defected to the Government]. I saw many signs of our weakness in this area: the tank traps we were building in the `Choluteca gap' [in Honduras, to face literally a non-existent cross-border threat from Sandinista tanks]; our big bucks, high-tech approach to support for the Salvadoran armed forces; our army's conviction that `any good officer' can work on insurgency. I came to the conclusion that our powerful military is a blunt instrument. It is very capable of performing its primary mission (destroying enemy military forces), but is poorly-suited for cross-cultural battles for foreign hearts and minds."

"Finally, when we get involved in foreign insurgencies," Meara says, "we should always strive to conduct ourselves in a manner consistent with our national values ... we should remember our history. We should remember that we were helped by foreigners when we were fighting for our independence. We should remember that we too were once embattled farmers. ... we should not think of these people [the surrogate fighters] as dis- posable pawns."

Contra Cross is full of personal insights and anecdotes "from the field", and is an inspiring and timely read. It is, in fact, essential reading, not just for those psyops and special forces practitioners who already embrace asymmetric warfare, but for the policymakers and those who have found their careers in the bureaucracy of military leadership. That is where the lessons need to be learned.

We all should thank William Meara for carrying this document with him over the decades, and giving it to us at this particular time.

[Reviewed by Gregory R. Copley, Editor, Defense & Foreign Affairs Publications, at the International Strategic Studies Association, Washington, DC area.]

"In 1949, Alexander Foote wrote a small book, "A Handbook for Spies" which contains all one needs to know to conduct espionage. Now comes another small volume, "Contra Cross", by William Meara which contains much of what one needs to understand to counter or for that matter support an insurgency. Based on his experience in El Salvador and with the Contras in Honduras/Nicaragua during the 1980's, Meara provides a crisp, thoughtful exposition of the problems and requirements for the winning of such conflicts. Meara's thoughts and experiences are well worth pondering as our nation takes on its current adversaries."

Duane Clarridge - Thirty-three year veteran of the CIA's clandestine service, Chief of CIA Latin American Division 1981-84, conceiver and chief of CIA Counterterrorism Center 1986-88, author of " The Spy for All Seasons."

Contra Cross is unique among personal memoirs of former soldiers, government officials, diplomats, and intelligence officers. The author is humble. He had a front row seat at the numerous Central American proxy wars the United States engaged in during the 1980s. Despite this experience, the author never believed he was as important as the events around him, a trait that so many memoirs lack. He was a Cold War grunt and he knew it.

The numerous insurgencies and counter-insurgencies fought in Central America are slowly being forgotten. Located between the large and divisive Vietnam War and the even larger Global War on Terror, the proxy wars in Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador are now seen as the last gaps of the Cold War. Despite this hindsight, during the 1980s it was where the action was.

Since the author was involved at the ground level, he is able to give the people of the area a real human feel, which is lost in the Cold War rhetoric of policy makers from Washington.

The author makes several outstanding points about the need for cultural and language skills when dealing with local conflicts. While our current conflict is called the Global War on Terror it is the really combination of thousands of local conflicts tied together. Having the deep local cultural knowledge is the real key to winning our current war. While the book is far from being the seminal book on U.S. involvement in Central America, it never tries or claims to be. Its true strength is how it depicts dedicated Americans, whether military or Department of State, attempt to implement strategic policy made thousands of miles away in Washington into actual action on the ground amongst real people.

It is often quipped that the mark of a brilliant man is that he agrees with what you believe; I read Bill Meara's book Contra Cross yesterday and I would use the words brilliant and brilliantly delivered to describe it.

Let me back up in time a bit. In 1988 just back from UN duty in Lebanon and Egypt I sat down in my 15-man section at CGSC and we did the "where I have been and what I have been doing" confessional. My section leader looked at me and quipped, "you have not been in the Army." I simply asked him and the larger group, "Have any of you been shot at lately?" No one answered. Later the same guy in discussing low intensity conflict remarked, "I cannot see anyway the US Army will ever get involved in a counter-insurgency again after what happend in Vietnam." I asked him what exactly he thought was going on in Central America at the very moment. He suggested that what was happening was not really the US Army. Six years later I greeted that same individual as he arrived in Goma with a water truck task force. He had a stunned look on his face. I said, "Welcome to my world."

Contra Cross is about Bill Meara's world, one like and at once unlike my own. The book is from the foot soldier's perspective and it offers unique insights on the wars in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Bill was a Special Forces officer trained in psychological operations and as a regional specialist. He served in uniform with the Military Advisory Group in El Salvador and later as a Foreign Service Officer as liaison to the Contras from Honduras. Like any good read, Bill's book offers key themes and messages, weaving them through the pages, repeatedly exposing the reader to them in the hopes they will imprint. I will list some here:

Culture and Cultural Understanding is Critical

Language is Fundamental

COIN and Guerrilla Warfare Target the Minds of the Population, Not the Enemy

The Greatest Cultural Gap is Between DC and the Field

The Unconventional Warrior is Indeed From Venus and the Conventional Warrior Refuses to Visit From Mars


I tell every Soldier that I coach, teach, and mentor that I have two fundamental rules for cross cultural understanding:

They do not think like you do

They have an agenda in every interaction with you

Bill's narrative hammers home the first point and his story reinforces the second. His self-reflection on his role as an US government representative while serving as liaison to the Contras is one of the book's greatest strengths.

I would recommend this book to all from Strategic Corporal to the White House. I only wish that it had come out earlier.

Great job, Bill!

Sincerely,

Tom Odom
Author Journey Into Darkeness: Genocide in Rwanda

There are some things that only a first-hand account can truly convey. The kind of details that put you into the cockpit as a participant, and not just an outside observer. This book has those details, offering an unparalleled look at modern jet aviation air combat from the pilots that scored the kills.

The book chronicles all US air-to-air victories made between 1981 and 2001 - most of them scored during Operation Desert Storm (over Iraq) in 1991, or Operation Allied Force (over Bosnia) in 1999. Retold from the testimony of the pilots who flew the missions, this book offers a glimpse of the real world adrenalin rush, that you just don't get from the more dry, historical texts covering these same wars and events.

This book is a must-have for any jet aviation enthusiast, providing a much-needed companion to the broader historical texts written on these wars.

Accounts of the US Air Force and US Navy air engaments.
A good book on the subject, though it can be a bit "dry" to a reader with little knowledge about air warfare.

I was not sure how good of a read this book would be, and figured it would be something I'd shove under the coffee table after a bit and only look at it from time to time. I was wrong. I haven't been able to put it down. There's no better way to hear these stories than to get them directly from the pilots, and that's exactly the idea the author had.

Thanks for a great read, Quizmo.

In this invaluable 2007 volume, ex-USAF fighter pilot Craig Brown presents blow-by-blow accounts of all 56 successful air combats fought by U.S. air units between 1981 and 1999. In terms of accuracy and excitement, Brown's book can't be beat since, in almost all cases, the accounts were supplied by the aircrew involved in the engagement. Air combat enthusiasts will want to add this exciting, well-illustrated book from Schiffer Publishing to their collection post-haste.

The engagements covered in DEBRIEF are a real smorgasbord of aircraft types and geographic locations. Not unexpectedly the Air Force and Navy's top-line fighters - the F-14, F-15 and F-16 - were the main players not to mention the occasional odd-duck like the A-10! Likewise their opponents were a mixed bag of MiGs, Mirages, Sukhois, helos, transports, trainers, etc. With few exceptions the kills were made with AAMs, mainly AIM-7 Sparrows, which may surprise some readers considering the Sparrow's dismal record over North Vietnam.

Though I gave DEBRIEF five stars, to be honest I felt 4 1/2 stars a more appropriate rating. Don't get me wrong: DEBRIEF is a great read and stands as THE definitive account of post-Vietnam War engagements. The air combat junkie in me loves this book. The first-person accounts, though heavy with fighter pilot techno-babble, put you right in the cockpit for some very exciting missions. Then too the narratives are illustrated with hundreds of photographs, mostly in color, of aircrew, aircraft, in-flight formations, ships, squadron patches, etc. and ten artworks depicting specific engagements.

The amateur historian in me, though, wishes Brown had done more with his material. Having compiled all this raw data, he could have made the book much more useful by doing some basic analysis of all those engagements. Specifically, what do all those combats MEAN in terms of modern air combat?

Reading through DEBRIEF, several points easily come to mind: what a killer machine the F-15 is, what a dominant role U.S. AWACS platforms play in modern air combat, the outstanding performance of the AIM-7, etc. So why did the F-15 perform so well? How have AWACs aircraft reshaped air combat? How come the Sparrow performed as well as it did and so on?

Then too I wondered if there were unsuccessful engagements during that timeframe and, if so, why did they fail? When I was doing the research for my MIG KILLERS OF YANKEE STATION I felt it was equally as important to discuss the failures as well as the successes to get the complete story. I would have enjoyed reading Brown's take on fighter combat in the 1980-90 timeframe.

In any case, if you like reading about air combat, pick up a copy of DEBRIEF asap. You won't regret it!

This book is a MUST HAVE for anyone interested in modern military aviation - it covers every successful Air to Air engagement by the US military since the Vietnam war through the present day. Full of first hand accounts and personal photographs of the aircrew and aircraft involved, this is the most comprehensive book on this topic to date. The only thing that would have made this book better would be the addition of the unsuccessful engagements during the same time period, like Michael O'connor's 'Mig Killers of Yankee Station' does. I also recommend - MIG Killers of Yankee Station, Aces Against Japan, Aces Against Germany

Exelent book, buy it if you can find it

This book is an invaluable reference source for modelers of fast-jets! It shows every single unit that participated in DESERT STORM...IN DETAIL! With plenty of three view drawings and full color photos. It also gives you a 'pilot's eye-view' of the war through their own stories. A must for history and detail maniacs!

This book is the best book that I have read on Operation Desert Storm. It covers all the major weapons system in great detail, including the units, weapons carried and the roles they played in the war. A must for anyone interested in the subject

This book is an invaluable reference source for modelers of fast-jets! It shows every single unit that participated in DESERT STORM...IN DETAIL! With plenty of three view drawings and full color photos. It also gives you a 'pilot's eye-view' of the war through their own stories. A must for history and detail maniacs!

This book is the best book that I have read on Operation Desert Storm. It covers all the major weapons system in great detail, including the units, weapons carried and the roles they played in the war.

My book review is on John Deere Tracrors and Equipment. this book is on all of the John Deere Tractors and Equipment made from 1963-1990.
You should read this book if you want to learn and enjoy John deere tractors and equipment.
the audence that would enjoy this book is young s and s. thier is some big words like pto shafs,pistons and valves.
this book has lots of information about tractors and equipment,and when they were made.
John Deere tractors and equipment is the book you want to read if you want to learn more about tractors and equipment.this book is for you.

This book was different from most tractor books as it had interesting equipment as well

If you are into John Deere during these years, this is the book to have. Awesome. I want to run out and paint my car green.

The quick response and quality of the product make this a very satisfying purchase. The book is well written and provides both historical and technical information that is very helpful. The pictures and illustrations in the book are excellent. I would recommend this book as one of the best and most complete on this topic.

This is a great book on late model John Deere equipment from around the world. It is filled with color photos. It describes equipment chronologically and by type. Not only does it discuss agricultural equipment but it covers construction and lawn and garden equipment. There are charts on equipment statistics and it has a large section on the "New Generation of Power". If you are interested in later model Deeres, then I highly recommend this book.

It was late, raining and we were starved. We had just checked into our hotel in Verona and needed a good meal to put our spirits back on track. That's when we dug out our little red guide and found a 4 star restaurant within walking distance. Don't let the fact that it's all written in Italian put you off. I have no language skills and found it easy to use and quite indispensable. While it's difficult to have a truly bad meal in Italy, with this book it's amazingly simple to have a positively great one.

If you want to stay in lovely out of the way places and eat in good restaurants, here's your book. Instead of relying on the canned list of chain hotels a travel agent has, and taking pot luck at tourist dining places, get a Michelin, make your reservations in advance (figure 4-6 weeks to be safe for any restaurant with a star rating), and you'll do very well for yourself. In my experience, anyplace that's listed at all is quite decent, at least; if a restaurant or hotel is highly rated it is superb. Vacationers looking for hotels should look for places marked in red, which means especially pleasant and peaceful; you'll arrive and say to yourself: "Oh, how lovely."

Hotel and restaurant listings are very extensive and very reliable, and the guide has maps of lots of cities and small towns you won't find anywhere else , with all of the places listed marked on them. Indispensable if you want to travel around and plan your own trip.

The Michelin tourist and motoring atlases (also excellent) mark all of the towns which are mentioned in the Red Guides, so when you're planning your trip once you know where you want to go you can look for places nearby to stay and dine.

I travel all over the continent and have always taken my Michelin guides with me. There is no better way to treat yourself the way you deserve to be treated. I like to travel in Italia since I have a home off the Amalfi Coast on the Isle of Capri, even though I am French. I live in Provence, the most spectacular place on this very earth, but I do like to see other wonderful places and dine on foreign foods. Italia is good for doing both of those pleasures.I like to fly most of the time, but then you do not get to see the sites close up. Flying is really for getting some place fast. But if you want to take your time and really see Italia, then you must have this Michelin guides in your possession. Since I am French, I don't know every place to go, so this guide always comes in very handy for me.

Be AWARE that this guide is "written" in Italian -- but do NOT be intimidated by that fact. The essential information is (as in the case of all Michelin texts) conveyed by ideograms or other diagrams (maps, etc.), and the meanings are clearly explained in the multilingual bookmark which accompanies the guide. The information itself is the most accurate -- and most respected -- in the world. Consider that when deciding on how you're going to spend the thousands of US$ that your Italian vacation will cost.

Although I am French, I have traveled extensively in Italy. I can say without a doubt say that the Michelin Red Guide Italia is absolutely the best guidebook available. The information is so extensive that even native Italians will find a wealth of information!

All aspects of a trip are covered including hotels, restaurants tourist attractions, road and city maps and suggested traveling routes, among other things.

Michelin didn't get its superior reputation for nothing! It is the most trusted name in travel guides. This guide is just another addition to its superb library.

Here Chomsky compares and contrasts the responses of western governments (specifically, those of Clinton's USA and Blair's Britain) to two instances of "ethnic cleansing", both of which received extensive media attention at the end of the millennium. In Kosovo, there was NATO intervention, a 78-day bombing campaign, and a much-publicised war crimes tribunal; in East Timor, at the very most, a few regretful shakes of the head and perhaps the suspicion that we are not, as yet, quite living up to our high ideals of truth, justice and liberty. Chomsky collates some of the facts underlying this apparent irony and shows that, as usual, the paradox has a rather simple solution. For example: (1) The indictment against Milosevic confines itself largely to crimes committed after the bombing began; it seems logical to assume that (a) "ethnic cleansing" in Kosovo was not a major motivation for the bombing, and (b) any crimes committed before the bombing are not a major concern of our new generation of moral crusaders. Nevertheless, on the grounds that they sanctioned and participated in "ethnic cleansing", Milosevic and his cronies have been routinely portrayed as the worst enemies of human life and moral decency since Adolf Hitler. (2) The 1999 massacre in East Timor (much advertised in advance as the inevitable consequence if a referendum concerning independence from Indonesia should go the wrong way) was the latest episode in an extremely well-documented record of slaughter dating from the Indonesian invasion of 1975. All the atrocities, including the accession to power of the Indonesian leader Suharto in 1965, with its attendant third of a million casualties, were carried out with western backing and with US armament and training. The solution to that paradox, then, is obvious: the west has, as is traditional, no problem with genocide just so long as it's done by the right people. Chomsky is adept at drawing out the salient points (e.g. the timing of the Serbian war crimes indictment noted above) from voluminous and often skewed information; and, as befits a scientist, his sources of evidence are painstakingly documented. The focus on two contrasted sets of events throws the Standards of the West into sharp and unpleasant perspective.

Chomsky uses the NATO bombing of Milosevic as a framework for analyzing the direction of Western foreign policy, specifically in East Timor. While NATO (remember, not UN) forces were destroying non-military targets and infrastructure in the name of a "just cause", US sponsored paramilitaries were rampaging through E Timor slaughtering thousands. It is the awareness of this hypocrisy (as well as the well documented FACT that NATO bombing would worsen the humanitarian crisis it was designed to alleviate) that forms the framework for his analysis. With recent events in the world (easy to predict for those of us who actually know our own foreign policy, our history, and the history of the regions and people in question) Chomsky is one of the few, non PC, intellectuals who are willing to actually hold their own nation to the standards that we hold other nations to. Not surprisingly, CNN, Fox, and the other worthless entertainment disseminators masquerading as flag-waving "news" outlets refuse to cover the obvious issues raised by Chomsky (or Zinn, Fisk, Pilger, Nader, Roy, Herman, Said; the list is much to long to list). Oh well, its just the bodies and misery of the "evildoers" (read: Bush Daddy's old friends who no longer know their place) that are piling up in the name of corporate US hegemony. Also, beware of negative reviews like the one above (nothing wrong with negative reviews, but it woiuld be nice if they would at least attempt to deal with and refute Chomsky's thesis) that quote passages completely out of context.

This is scholar and public servant Noam Chomsky at his analytic best. The focus is "new internationalism where the brutal repression of whole ethnic groups will no longer be tolerated," as thunderingly stated by British Prime Minister Tony Blair. Never content with rhetoric, Chomsky examines the record of new internationalism for actual results, paticularly in test cases like East Timor, Kosovo, and NATO member Turkey with its repressed Kurdish population. The tone is sober, the style searching, the results depressing for a new millenium, demonstrating that more of the same old bloody double-standard wine is being served, this time in new rhetorical bottles. There's no need to editorialize on the professor's findings. They speak eloquently for themselves. Instead a salute is due him: his tireless ongoing pursuit of truth, pleasant or not, his refusal to bow down before the gods of government and media, his steady deep regard for the powerless and voiceless - all in modest, accessible fashion - recommend him as the conscience of the nation and the hope of a better America.

This is Chomsky at his continued best. His insight into and knowledge on American's involvement in Kosovo and East Timor is once again unparalled by other intellectuals. Chomsky is one of the most important assets to truth and knowledge ever to exist.

(...). I had always towed the party line about the evil Serbs and their misdeeds, but have changed my tune after reading this enlightening, if disturbing book. Some may accuse Chomsky of being an apologist for Serb atrocities, but it is clear after reading this text that all sides, most notably NATO, were engaged in quite troublesome behavior that cost many thousands of lives. I heard Bill O' Reilly dismiss Chomsky as a "revisionist," and it is sadly interesting that most critics of this and similar works simply stick a "communist", "liberal", or "revisionist" label on the author without ever addressing the points made within the work. If you are looking for a wealth of facts on deceitful and imperialist American policy in Serbia/Yugoslavia and Indonesia/East Timor, I doubt if a better source could be found.