1990 Books

Akenson and Wolfe have provided a format for scholars, students and others to share their love and insight into the broad and diverse range that is country music yesterday and today. The papers presented in the book are well researhed, informative and extremely readable...which makes the book all the more enjoyable! I give this book a 5 star rating and look forward to the next issue.

This former public affairs officer has combined three interesting studies of press coverage with related information about the role of the press and ethics for news people. Murray writes in simple language that is easy to understand. He cites examples of how the press covered sexual harassment, race relations and gender-integrated training. Although the book's price may seem high, the research studies are worth it. Readers should ask their libraries to stock this book.

Under Cover, or Out of Control? The New York Times November 29, 1987, Sunday, Late City Final Edition (Review of 2 books, including The perfect failure: Kennedy, Eisenhower, and the CIA at the Bay of Pigs, only this book review included here)

The torrent of revelations about the Iran-contra affair during the summer's televised hearings, and in the recently released report of the Congressional committees that conducted the hearings, has made Americans aware both of the importance of covert action in the foreign policy of their country and of its risks and costs. These two books do nothing to rehabilitate its reputation or to improve its image...

Both men show how much euphoria about covert action was created by two early successes of the C.I.A.: in Iran in 1953, when Kermit Roosevelt, with the help of what Mr. Treverton calls a ''strange assemblage'' - a pro-Shah mob controlled by one Iranian leader, ''complete with giant . . . weight-lifters recruited from Teheran athletic clubs'' - overthrew Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh's Government and consolidated the Shah's shaky power; and in Guatemala in 1954, when the regime of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman was toppled by a small group of rebel soldiers moving in from Honduras. The action in Guatemala led officials to believe that such successes could be repeated elsewhere; it ''consolidated the ascendancy of covert action over espionage, and of operations over intelligence in the CIA,'' in Mr. Treverton's words - and it led directly to the Bay of Pigs and to the later operations in Chile that toppled that country's Government. Most of the men who planned these later activities had been involved in the Guatemalan affair.

''Covert Action'' is valuable not only for its brief, sharp accounts of covert enterprises (the one in Chile was undertaken even though none of the official assessments had concluded that the election of Salvador Allende Gossens in 1970 threatened any vital United States interest), but above all for the lessons Mr. Treverton draws from history, and for his own assessments. The lessons are stark. As the targets of United States action became more formidable (Fidel Castro learned from Arbenz's fate), the chances of success decreased. Success requires bigger operations - and big operations can't remain secret (as the Reagan arms sales to Iran demonstrated).

If the covert activities go on for a long time, as they have in Angola and, since 1981, in Nicaragua, the purposes tend to expand, along with the commitment and public knowledge. When the operations entail the manipulation of foreign elements with their own agenda (the Cuban exiles mobilized for the Bay of Pigs landing, or the Nicaraguan contras, or the anti-Allende factions in the Chilean military), American ability to control them is often limited. In any case, the fine-tuning of covert actions is difficult. In Chile, the United States Government tried to maintain a barrier ''between supporting opposition forces and funding groups trying to promote a military coup,'' but local realities made this ''a distinction built of sand.'' As a result, whatever restrictions and distinctions the United States may have tried to observe, in Chile and elsewhere, it ended up, in the eyes of foreign observers, being seen as responsible for the fall of Allende, or for the acts and fate of the Shah, or as colluding with South Africa against the Marxist regime in Angola.

Mr. Treverton deals at length with the problems of control over covert action. He shows that the enthusiasm shown for it by several Administrations resulted not merely from the ''operational behavior'' of the C.I.A. - its bias for action over mere espionage - but also, frequently, from Presidential pressures (especially from Presidents Nixon and Reagan). But the need to keep operations secret - and the need to protect Presidents by maintaining the possibility of so-called plausible denial - meant that the activities would be discussed only by a small number of people, that insufficient debate and criticism would lead to grievous errors (such as the mistaken belief that the Cuban people would support the invading exiles rather than Mr. Castro) and that only a small proportion of covert-action projects would be reviewed by the National Security Council system.

As for Congress, which went through a long period of complacency and complicity, it tried to reverse course after the Watergate crisis. The Hughes-Ryan Act of 1974 put an end to plausible denial by requiring a Presidential finding that each operation is important to national security, and the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 required that Congress be notified of all covert operations. But both laws are full of enough vague terms and escape hatches to allow the executive branch to thwart their authors' intentions, as the Iran-contra affair has shown. Indeed, the members of Congress are in a dilemma, highlighted by Mr. Treverton: when they are informed, they are in no position to stop the action - unless they leak its existence and thereby foreclose ''the option of covertness.''

Thus, covert action raises formidable issues in an open society. Mr. Treverton lists the realists' arguments on behalf of secret operations - especially the need to meet, if not to match, Soviet covert activities and to help one's friends in a harsh and dangerous world. But his own position is closer to that of the idealists. He recognizes that covert operations may be necessary at times. But he doubts they'll remain secret, warns about their unintended effects and long-term costs and argues against having them run from the White House or in contradiction of official policy (as in the case of Irangate). He also shows that much that is done covertly by the C.I.A. could be done overtly by private organizations (he notes the foundations established by West German political parties that have aided democratic forces in such countries as Portugal), and, above all, he concludes that most covert-action successes have been small, ambiguous and transitory (Iran and Guatemala in the 1950's, for example).''Covert Action'' is enlightening, thoughtful and wise.

Mr. Treverton, who writes elegantly, paints an often dirty scene in pastel colors.

---
1987 Foreign Affairs
1987 / 1988, Winter

RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: The United States; Pg. 438
This is a succinct, authoritative history and critique of the government's use of covert action to shape or overthrow foreign regimes. Mr. Treverton's interest in the subject began in 1975 when he served on the staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (the Church Committee). His conclusion, based on deep knowledge of major actions (Iran, Guatemala, Cuba, Chile, Angola and others), is that covert action cannot be kept secret, usually has consequences far different from and less desirable than those intended, often ties the U.S. to clients who are not easily controlled, undermines the comparative advantage which the United States has as an open society, and is almost always a bad idea.
---
Los Angeles Times, October 18, 1987
THE SEARCH FOR A 'MAGIC BUTTON' IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY;

I first encountered CIA covert action operations in the early 1960s in Guayaquil, Ecuador, where I was serving my initial tour of duty as an American Foreign Service officer. A powerful anti-communist documentary film called "We Will Bury You" had been released commercially in several local theaters. On the second day of screenings, a teen-age boy who was bicycling reels from theater to theater was stopped by a gang of communist toughs. The can of film was stolen and the boy was shot in the head. A public uproar ensued. The U.S. Consulate quickly arranged for the boy to be flown to the U.S. Army hospital in the Panama Canal Zone, where mercifully he recovered.

Years later, when I headed an investigative task force for the Senate Intelligence Committee, I learned the true story of that incident. The "communist toughs" were CIA "assets" hired to create an incident to promote the film. But when the boy resisted and tried to get away with the film, they panicked and shot him.

Gregory F. Treverton's book, "Covert Action: The Limits of Intervention in the Postwar World," is full of stories of CIA schemes gone wrong. In one surprising revelation, he describes how CIA Director William Casey, angry at his experts on terrorism for coming up with little evidence linking the Soviet Union to terror groups, ordered them to read Claire Sterling's famous book "The Terror Network." They did and found that virtually all of the examples she cited turned out to be CIA disinformation -- false stories planted in the foreign press that she unwittingly used in good faith.

But the book also examines operations that, in the view of many, went right -- like overthrowing Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala and Mossadeq in Iran in the 1950s. Treverton has little patience with arguments that the coup that ousted Mossadeq and restored the Shah to power lies at the core of our present conflict with Iran. He points out that the Shah was identified with the United States in many ways besides that one -- most prominently, wasteful arms purchases from the United States -- and that the CIA covert action that secured his throne brought about a quarter century of stability, no small feat in the turbulent Middle East.

Those initial successes set the pattern for other covert actions, some of which were disasters like the Bay of Pigs. This story has been told elsewhere, but Treverton treats us to new insights. Particularly shocking is his explanation that the invasion was considered foolproof because the exile brigade originally planned to land at the town of Trinidad, where, if something went wrong, they could melt into the mountains.

But, at the last minute, Secretary of State Dean Rusk objected, prefering a "quieter site" for the landing. The Bay of Pigs was finally chosen, the planners apparently overlooking the fact that the mountains would then be 80 miles away across a swamp!

Treverton, a lecturer at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, draws important lessons both for the public and for officials responsible for covert operations. He shows how the momentum of covert-action projects often carries them far beyond their original scope, citing not only the Bay of Pigs but efforts against Salvador Allende in Chile, which ultimately ended in the coup in which he was killed, and the Reagan Administration's undiminished stake in the contras. Treverton explains why covert actions are inherently difficult to control and often produce unintended results -- such as U.S. support for the Jonas Savimbi forces in Angola, putting us on the same side as South Africa and thus damaging our reputation throughout black Africa.

Though often critical of the CIA, the author makes clear that one reason Presidents turn to covert action is that the Agency is extremely competent and gets the job done. He points out that Presidents are not tools of the CIA; rather the White House is often the source of pressure to come up with covert operations and even originates some of the more ill-considered ideas, such as the Iran-contra caper.

I recall during my days as a Senate investigator finding a piece of yellow note pad with jottings from a meeting with White House officials during the Kennedy Administration that discussed an "Executive Action" or, in plain English, an assass-- capability. The notes referred to it as the "magic button."

This unfortunately is all too often the mind set of senior government leaders when they consider the "covert option"; namely, that somehow magically it will sweep away threats or obstacles to the success of U.S. policy. As Treverton points out, we have failed as often as we have succeeded, and even then our successes frequently cause us to forget about the underlying causes of the problems we face. For example, after Arbenz was deposed in Guatemala, we ignored Central America until the Sandinistas reminded us of the revolutionary potential of injustice in that region.

Treverton notes that the world's revolutionaries have also learned a thing or two about covert action. As in Nicaragua they have discovered how to use CIA pressure to rally their publics against U.S. intervention. Fledgling left-wing regimes turn more quickly to Moscow for protection. The contrast with the past is striking: Arbenz was overthrown with 300 men; at the Bay of Pigs we hoped to overthrow Castro with 750 exiles and a tiny air force; but now, the CIA is supporting an army of 10,000 contras and still nobody thinks they have a prayer of displacing the Sandinistas.

The striking change from the 1950s is that virtually all major covert actions now become public, often before they are concluded. Increasingly, the U.S. government doesn't care. American support for the Afghan resistance is not a secret, only unacknowledged. Still, bad decisions like trading arms for hostages are made without full appreciation of what will happen when, inevitably, the story leaks out.

The most important contribution of Treverton's brilliant analysis is to demythicize covert action. It is not a romantic "magic button" that does away with the need for sound military and diplomatic strategies. It does not allow us to ignore economic and social realities in the turbulent underdeveloped world. But neither are such CIA operations the cause of all our troubles or inherently evil, as many critics might suggest.

I firmly believe that covert action has a legitimate role in U.S. national security, but as Treverton makes clear, such operations are only as sound as the policy they seek to advance. The risks are always substantial and success is often fleeting.

Ultimately, I became chairman of the National Security Council subcommittee that was responsible for intelligence operations during the Carter Administration. I only wish I had been able to read Treverton's fascinating and compelling book before doing so. For all those who may in the future have a role in such clandestine intelligence operations, including the watchdogs in Congress, "Covert Action" is required reading.

The Princeton Review people really know what they are doing to help students prepare for the GRE. My scores were amazing, and I owe it all to this book! I especially was grateful for the sample questions and the guidelines for the logic portion. I only missed 3 questions in that section and scored a 780! Thanks, Princeton Review, for helping me succeed!

In Creating New Schools: How Small Schools Are Changing American Education, Evans Clinch has assembled informative contributions from sixteen educational scholars and experts who share their critical views of the standards and testing movement; as well as explore the major reform issues currently facing American educational institutions. Their collective wisdom is sound in its consideration of the difficulties with implementing educational reforms in the fact of structural and ideological limitations. Creating New Schools is both a survey of the role small schools are playing in influencing American educational practices and expectations, it also offers cogent, balanced advice for those seeking to understand or inspire educational reform within their own educational facilities and programs.

Well written, in three different styles, the journalist, the industry insider and most inportant the RAVER.
Its has made my hair stand up, its a astonishing book with a deep insight to d&b with the full on history, raves, changing scene........
When can i buy one, my mates all want one.
Top marks

Having just spent 4 months cruising the Leeward and the Windward islands, I must say that I can't imagine doing so without Chris Doyle's cruising guides. They provide an amazing amount of detail on virtually every aspect of the islands; from anchorages to repairs to provisioning to customs. His maps and navigation sections prove invaluable.

The information in these guides are incredibly up to date considering the amount of change which is occurring in the islands. While Chris may be overly kind with his pen at times, you can always tell when he really likes or dislikes something. He is also very receptive to receiving corrections via e-mail.

All in all this is a must-have book for anyone thinking of cruising the Leewards.

I read this book some years ago when a friend was recovering from a severe head trauma. Page after page just spoke to me, and to my friend when she read it. If you are living in this territory, of recovering from a devastating accident or deterioration in your health, you need to read this book. It is filled with deep insights and hard-won wisdom from someone who has been there before you, someone who from being a brilliant self-assured surgeon, had to rebuild his whole world including who he was.

Cole presents a different perspective on the Cuban revolution that challenges the orthodox approaches that have viewed the Revolution as in need of reform or essentially a failure. The reformist approach understands Cuban development as a socialist system that needs to adjust to market socialism in order to survive. Alternatively the Cuban revolution can be viewed as alien to human nature and Cubans should reject socialism and join the globalisation of their economy using market forces. Cole analyses these views from a perspective of human nature where people can be seen as individuals with their own tastes and talents requiring market freedoms in order to survive or people as social beings needing guidance and control to bring social consensus. Social beings can be taught how to behave and work together to bring stability but guided by a paternalistic state. Socialism is possible but under state guidance and reforms. The final scenario is the consideration of people as social individuals who are creative but adaptable. Cole links these three perspectives to Cuban development and makes a significant case for seeing the Revolution as one that has been linked to understanding people as social individuals. This is a book that deserves to be read by Cubanologists, Students and Development Theorists for it makes a significant challenge to orthodox thinking.

In its tenth edition, this mammoth tome is rightly considered to be the "bible" of Cuban Studies. It both covers a wide breadth of political subjects and has an equally wide variety of contributors. Anyone wishing one-stop shopping for understanding the last 40 years in Cuba and Cuba-American relations will find this to be a beneficial purchase.